Sajjan: The Warrior Minister - Legion Magazine Interview

Interview published in the Legion Magazine, by Adam Day 


Harjit Sajjan on the difference between the Taliban and Islamic State, why Russia is not behaving like a democratic nation, what we may have done wrong in Afghanistan, and a candid answer concerning hisleast-favourite thing about being a politician

Canada’s war against the Islamic State has switched into a higher gear. Hundreds of our special operations forces are flooding into Iraq, backed by helicopters, deepened intelligence capabilities and deployments of more than 100 soldiers to neighbouring Lebanon and Jordan. And in Iraq, at least, the likelihood is that the troops will be in combat, since they are going in on the same advise-and-assist mission that saw Canada’s troops placed in harm’s way last year.

But Harjit Sajjan, Canada’s minister of national defence, doesn’t want to call it a war. Not yet, anyway. And don’t call it a combat mission either, even though there will be combat.

Despite the semantic evasions, Sajjan takes up his new post with a reputation for solving tough problems. He is not just a former lieutenant-colonel, an Afghanistan combat veteran and a former gang-unit detective. He is also reportedly an all-star thinker whose analysis of enemy networks in Kandahar Province earned him repeated tours and accolades. And it brought him to his current position.

Now, Sajjan’s training as an intelligence officer is being tested on a bigger stage. The world is complex, he says, and we can’t hope to stop threats unless we understand where they come from. Sajjan is always thinking about the big picture. As such, he sometimes sounds like he may suffer from the paralysis of a man who understands too much—aware of the situation’s complexity, of underlying causes and third-order consequences and the relentless nature of a negative feedback loop. The question then becomes one of where to act, when, and why.

To get a better sense of the new minister and his objectives, Legion Magazine conducted a brief, lighting-round-style phone interview with him as he sped toward the airport in Ottawa, slightly behind schedule. While he is certainly more forthcoming than many recent ministers, Sajjan has already picked up the politician’s game of dodging a question as if it’s a sport.

The Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, presents medals to the members of CANSOF Task Force during a visit to Iraq on December 21, 2015.
PHOTO: SGT YANNICK BÉDARD, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA. IS01-2015-0007-040

Legion Magazine: Please give your opinion, and remember you have one minute to answer this question: did we win the war in Afghanistan?

Sajjan: It was not about winning or losing. It was about making sure we brought the Afghan National Security Forces and the government structure to a point where they were taking greater responsibility. You have to leave at some point; otherwise there is no long-term solution for it. And I think that was accomplished.

LM: Can you compare the Taliban to the Islamic State? Which one was or is the greater threat to Canadian national security?

Sajjan: ISIL is definitely a greater threat to Canadian security. The Taliban stayed within the borders. You didn’t have a lot of conversation regarding what they wanted to do outside their borders. The brutality is literally the same, but one thing is that ISIL uses social media to get brutality out. The Taliban were just as brutal, although only some of us who were in certain areas knew and witnessed some of that.

LM: Here’s something harder to understand: we responded to the Taliban with military force, and indeed, occupation of their country. But we respond to ISIL with more of a hands-off approach, with less combat. So can you describe why we respond to the greater threat with less force?

Sajjan: Well, it’s not about us bringing capabilities and force, it’s about the totality of what you’re trying to do. If you look at how long the United States was at war in Iraq fighting the insurgency, and in the end, some Sunni tribes came onto their side and things were okay and they left. And what happened all of a sudden was that ISIL, a small radical organization that came out of Syria, became so big. This fight has to be done by the local regime. Yes, we can go in and fight and potentially get to a stalemate and even win. But it’s not about just defeating ISIL, it’s about allowing the Iraqi forces to defeat ISIL so we can have more of a long-term solution. And that’s far more important, because at the end of the day, we only have so much force, even with the U.S. and the European Union working together.

“As you fight, if you do not deal with the
recruitment, you will just keep fighting.”

LM: It seems that Sunni extremism—an ideology that gave rise to both al-Qaida and ISIL—is the real problem here. How do we deal with Sunni extremism?

Sajjan: I think any extremism needs to be dealt with. And in this particular region, ISIL—a small but very radical group—is at the forefront. Any group gets its recruitment based on its population. Even though we’re fighting, what we’re really doing is buying time to separate the population from the radical group and once you do that you end up fighting a smaller organization. And that’s the critical piece that has to be done in Iraq.

LM: So your proposal to defeat Sunni extremism is to separate the extremists from the population?

Sajjan: Well, in any counter-insurgency strategy, you have to do that. As you fight, if you do not deal with the recruitment, you will just keep fighting. So the base that they have to recruit from is absolutely critical to getting the long-term success that we’re looking to achieve.
“Dialogue is the absolute key to
understanding Russia’s intentions.”

LM: What do you believe is the greater threat: ISIL or Russia?

Sajjan: You can’t separate them. You have to look at the threats in a different manner. With Russia, you have far greater regional and strategic issues. And with all the aggression they are showing around the world, the hope is that they’ll get back to a place of dialogue and be partners in the dialogue, which is better for their county. However, in ISIL you have a group you can’t negotiate with and so you have to deal with them in this [forceful] manner. So we need to be able to isolate that group and ensure they don’t take advantage of the political issues that have been created to push or pull the greater population. Once we isolate this radical organization in order to be able to destroy it, that’s going to be critical. But you can’t really look at which one is the greater threat. It’s like looking at apples and oranges, really.

LM: In your read, what is animating Vladimir Putin’s aggression? What is animating Russian aggression?

Sajjan: That’s pretty difficult to say for me, looking at it from the outside, like any other Canadian, having only recently gotten into this. It’s important to know what the person’s mindset is and what experience they have. When you’re leading a country like Russia, it cannot be done in an irresponsible manner, where you just invade other countries, regardless of what issues you have. Democratic nations deal with difficult issues. You come to the table and discuss them.

Defence Minister, Harjit S. Sajjan speaks with Antoni Macierewicz, his counterpart from Poland during the annual Defence Ministerial Meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on February 10, 2016.
PHOTO: SGT YANNICK BÉDARD, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA. IS01-2016-0001-010

LM: We are living in a unique historical period. We’ve seen international borders being rewritten, which doesn’t happen all that often. Crimea and Iraq. So, related to Russia’s aggression, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe does seem to be a bit of a trigger. Now we want to get Ukraine into NATO. How does this expansion serve our interests?

Sajjan: I’ll be going to my first NATO meeting in a week and half or so, and these are a lot of the important discussions that we will have. It’s important to have the right balance, but I think dialogue is the absolute key to understanding Russia’s intentions. But NATO has a really important role and has had for a really long time. We have to stay unified. We’re going to stay steadfast with our partners, with Ukraine and some of the other Eastern European countries, but the opportunity for dialogue will always be there.

LM: Your career as a soldier is over. What was its defining moment?

Sajjan: In Afghanistan in 2006, when an infantry section allowed me to do the work I did, it really opened my eyes. Just because you have rank doesn’t mean you have all the answers. Some of the best answers and solutions come from unlikely sources. And I don’t know how many times that golden nugget of a clue we were looking for came from troops on the ground. I can look back and say, wow, our troops really are second to none. The thought processes they can bring to the table, the heart that they have, and the fight that they bring. They can easily turn around from doing humanitarian work in a village to fighting within the hour. Being able to switch on a dime like that is pretty hard to achieve. Just being able to work with people like that was the highlight.

LM: What is something you don’t like about being a politician?

Sajjan: I would say that the discussions that sometimes happen in the House take away from the real work that’s being done for Canadians. In Ottawa now it’s like being in a bubble and fighting to stay out of that bubble so you keep connected with Canadians and the real issues and what’s going on. In the Canadian Armed Forces, we do have a perspective on politicians, but at the same time we know that a lot of people who’ve gotten into politics, especially the colleagues I know, really do want to make a difference. When we serve, we all know that if you think you can make a difference and you have the capability and the experience that you should seek and accept responsibility. I felt that my experience was needed and I didn’t like how certain things were being done, so I stopped complaining about it because I felt I had the capability to do something and so I did.

Report: CAF slow to act on sexual abuse of Afghan children

By: Bruce Campion-Smith Ottawa Bureau, The Star

OTTAWA—Canada’s military has changed how it trains soldiers for overseas deployments, with more focus on ethical issues, cultural differences and addressing human rights violations — all resulting from the fallout of its mishandling of child abuse reports in Afghanistan.

CAF Members in Afghanistan, AP File Photo

The defence department on Tuesday released the results of a long-awaited investigation examining the response of the Canadian military to reports of sexual abuse of boys by Afghan soldiers and interpreters.

The board of inquiry report — almost eight years in the making — concludes that at no time did commanders order troops to turn a blind eye to suspected abuse.

But it does note that the military could have acted on the abuse of minors in 2006 but didn’t because of breakdowns in communications between soldiers in the field and commanders.

Instead, the military took action only after a soldier told the Toronto Star in 2008 that he had witnessed abuse. Other stories said soldiers had been told by commanders to ignore incidents of sexual abuse.

Gen. Jonathan Vance, the chief of defence staff, said he’s confident that soldiers would take action today if confronted with allegations or evidence of abuse.

“A soldier would be able to take a pro-active role, whether that is reporting or whether it’s an actual intervention,” Vance told the Star Tuesday.

Indeed, he’s given specific orders to Canadian soldiers now deployed in northern Iraq to report any violation of Canadian or international law. That includes the use of child soldiers, torture, inhuman treatment and sexual assault of children and other vulnerable populations, according to an excerpt of the directive obtained by the Star.

The 107-page report released Tuesday confirms that Canadian soldiers witnessed or suspected that sex acts were taking place between Afghan National Security Forces and children.

“These reports include incidents of oral sex and genital fondling under clothing,” according to the report.

There was one report of Canadian Forces (CF) medical personnel treating both male and female children for rectal damage that resulted from the assault, the inquiry found.

“Sufficient information existed as early as 2006 to warrant action on the possible sexual abuse of minors by (Afghan National Security Forces),” the report said.

But some soldiers were uncertain whether to intervene, confused whether such activities were condoned by the Afghans and “therefore not considered reportable.” The military’s policy and training was “unclear.”

And communications breakdowns — reports viewed as hearsay or made informally — left senior commanders in the dark about the abuse concerns, according to the report. “No specific and permanent CF action was ever taken,” the report says.

It was only after revelations in the media in 2008 that the Canadian Forces, as it was known then, began changing how such situations were handled and launched the inquiry investigation.

The inquiry, which heard testimony from 105 witnesses, says it found no evidence that anyone in the military’s chain of command had ever ordered troops to turn a blind eye to the sexual assault of children.

But it did find evidence that commanders up and down the chain were informed of “possible” sexual activity but that action was limited and that formal reports were never passed up the chain.

For example, on Oct. 3, 2006, a weekly advisory from Afghanistan to the legal adviser for the command leading the Afghan mission said that “possible sexual assaults were taking place in theatre and that a CF policy review was required.”

The report says it’s “clear” that the information on sexual abuse was in the headquarters of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, the unit overseeing the mission. But that message was never passed along to defence legal team or mission commanders for review or action, the report said.

The inquiry found six specific instances in which commanders in Afghanistan were told of possible sexual abuse. In one case, a unit deputy commander sought legal advice about what soldiers should do if they suspect abuse.

In another case, a battle group commander, hearing reports of abuse, issued orders to his subordinates that they were to intervene and to report all incidents.

The report also notes that during this time Canadian soldiers were engaged in a fierce, deadly fight with the Taliban in the Kandahar region and the intensity of the engagement took up the attention of military staff, at the expense of this issue.

“Survival and combat were the primary missions and all other issues were secondary,” the report says.

While the report was completed in 2010, it has taken six years to work its way through the military bureaucracy. Indeed, in the years since its completion, several inquiry members have retired and Canada has ended its military operations in Afghanistan.

The military says the “scope and complexity” of the recommendations were a “significant” factor in the time it took to release the report. And the high tempo of recent operations has strained resources in headquarters.

Michel Drapeau, a retired colonel who is now a lawyer in Ottawa, called the length of inquiry “disappointing.”

The fact that some soldiers deployed in the early days of Canada’s Afghan mission felt conflicted about their response to the abuse allegations raises questions about the leadership.

“The fact that they would not feel comfortable or feel hesitant or somehow uncertain how the chain of command would stand sends a disturbing message,” Drapeau said in an interview.

Officials on Tuesday stressed that the military has not waited for the report’s release to act on its recommendations and direction.

For example, in 2008, Gen. Rick Hillier, then-chief of defence staff, made it clear that troops were “not going to stand by” if they witnessed abuse.

Col. Mark Misener, a commander with the Canadian Army Training and Doctrine centre, said training in ethics, law of armed conflict and rules of engagement has all been improved to give soldiers greater clarity on how they should act.

Those lessons were then reinforced in real-life scenarios. Soldiers training to go to Afghanistan were exposed to scenarios starting in 2009 that had them dealing with reports of sexual abuse, human trafficking and other rights violations they might encounter, he said.

Troops are also taught the cultural practices of the country they are headed to, Misener said. That helps ensure that soldiers are “better trained and prepared to face the challenges of complex environments.”

Abuse report ‘a long time coming, too long,’ says top brass Jonathan Vance

CAF CDS General Jonathan Vance - Photo: Dave Chan

"Many of the recommendations were acted on right away," said Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Jonathan Vance, shown here in December, about Tuesday's report.

Gen. Jonathan Vance, the chief of defence staff, spoke to the Star about a newly released report that concludes the military failed to deal effectively with reports of child sexual abuse in Afghanistan by Afghan soldiers and interpreters. This interview was edited and condensed for space.

What is your take-away?

When I became (chief of defence staff) and was briefed that this board was still pending, I placed a very high premium on it getting done quickly, including putting a lot of personal time into reading it, understanding it, and getting it done. It’s been a long time coming, too long in my view. Many of the recommendations were acted on right away. . . . I want to make certain that it endures into all missions and so it becomes a part of what we do.

This report spoke to the nature of conflict today. Not only do you need to be trained in the enemy and warfare but there is a sub-layer of complexity.

It’s a conflicted environment. We were an active combatant in that environment and . . . because of the nature of our operations, we weren’t present and privy to the private acts of Afghans.

To characterize the environment as people kind of witness these acts right in front of us would be dead wrong. That certainly didn’t happen when I was task force commander. We can’t possibly expect all of our soldiers to be trained as international human rights lawyers. That’s not what we’re there for. What we do though is bring with us a very solid set of — and the ability to act on — Canadian values and the law of armed conflict.

You’re confident that between the written orders and beefed-up training that a soldier today would feel empowered to intervene?

A soldier would be able to take a pro-active role, whether that is reporting or whether it’s an actual intervention with the use of deadly force or non-deadly force. Mission-by-mission we make decisions around what is legal and authorized in that particular mission. It’s conceivable that we could be in a place where the use of deadly force may violate not only Canadian law but the law of the land that we are in, but non-deadly force would be perfectly acceptable. We got to make certain that we gear the training of the solider and the rules of engagement and the appropriate orders from me to do what is the right thing. . . . I am confident that our soldiers have an active avenue available to them on all missions.

I’m sure in some cases a soldier feels conflicted, is he imposing a Canadian value?

I don’t feel as conflicted. I spent a lot of time in Afghanistan. Abusing children is not part of their culture. In fact, it’s quite the opposite. That culture tends to celebrate their children. They dote on their children and the abuse of a child is inherently and fundamentally not a part of their culture. I don’t know of any Afghan commander that I worked with that would condone such a thing. I mean they are all family people. They wanted their country to be better. I think this is down into the level of criminal act.

Senior CAF officer being investigated for 2009 helicopter crash in Afghanistan

CBC Exclusive Report: By Brett Ruskin

1 British and 2 Canadian soldiers died in flaming wreckage

At least one senior Royal Canadian Air Force officer is under investigation by the military police unit that probes major crimes for alleged negligence relating to a deadly helicopter crash six years ago in Afghanistan.

CBC News has confirmed that the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service is looking into allegations of negligence related to an incident on July 6, 2009, when a CH-146 Griffon crashed with six people on board.

All survived the impact, but three soldiers — including two Canadians, Master Cpl. Patrice Audet, 38, and Cpl. Martin Joannette, 25, and British Capt. Ben Babington-Browne, 27 — died after being unable to escape the flaming wreckage.

"This investigation is ongoing and no further information can be provided at this time," a military police spokesperson said in an email.
Heavily redacted report

Initially the crash was blamed on "pilot technique" and sandy ground conditions.

Those conclusions were based on a heavily redacted board of inquiry report released two years after the crash.

CBC News has since obtained a less-redacted version, along with the flight safety investigation report.

According to both reports, there are at least two underlying issues — the flight crew had too little training and the helicopter carried too much weight.

The crash involved a CH-146 Griffon helicopter. (Canadian Forces)

On July 6, 2009, the Griffon took off from a sandy area. The down force of the spinning blades created a "dust ball," which reduced the pilot's visibility.

Dust ball training is mandatory for all flight crews, who usually did exercises before and during their deployment to Afghanistan.

However, "the vast majority of the [Canada Helicopter Force, Afghanistan] aircrew only received the theory portion of the dust ball training," the board of inquiry report said.

Some pilots only got to watch the manoeuvre, not attempt it.

In this specific case, prior to his deployment "the [pilot] only observed a demonstration of the landing technique rather than practised dust ball landings himself," the flight safety report said. "Additionally, the [pilot] did not observe or complete any dust ball takeoff techniques."

Put simply, the pilot blamed for crashing the helicopter was allegedly sent to Afghanistan lacking the training to take off and land in sand.
Griffon weight limits modified

The original weight limit for the Griffon helicopter in Afghanistan was between 10,300 and 10,700 pounds.

But senior officials thought the weight cap would limit operations.

The weight cap "would significantly impair the ability of the unit to fulfil the entire spectrum of operations in support of the Joint Task Force," the board of inquiry report heard from military commanders.

So they changed the flight manual.

"The modified operating limitations in Section 1 of the flight manual restricted the Griffon to between 11,750 and 11,900 lb.," the board of inquiry report said.
Weight limit 'unknowingly' tested

Helicopter payload calculations are complex.

If a helicopter is close to the ground, it needs less power. The air its rotor forces downward bounces off the ground and creates a type of cushion.

To rise above that cushion and maintain altitude, more power is needed. A helicopter loaded to its maximum weight might be able to take off, but would have difficulty climbing above a certain height.

These two height zones are called "in ground effect" or "out of ground effect."

That height as well as the weight and power calculations change with air temperature and altitude above sea level.

Investigators compared the Griffon's payload to all possible weight limits.

The board of inquiry report found it exceeded those limits "by between 1,020 lb. to 1,320 lb." The flight safety report found it may have been as much as 1,720 lb. overweight.

"The Griffon flight [crew] was unknowingly flight testing the performance information found in the flight manual," the board of inquiry report found.

"The crew attempted to conduct a takeoff not knowing that the aircraft had an insufficient margin to remain within engine limitations," the flight safety found.
New allegations prompt investigation

These report observations went largely unnoticed for years.

But recently, a former Royal Canadian Air Force flight instructor began raising concerns about the incident.

"As a former helicopter pilot, I was stunned by what I read," said retired captain Anthony Snieder.

Snieder said he began looking into the crash after noticing safety violations in Moose Jaw in 2012. He was stationed at 15 Wing Moose Jaw teaching air force pilots.

He looked back at previous incidents and found issues with the Griffon crash.

Retired Capt. Anthony Snieder (Facebook) in a CT-114 Tutor

"We have limitations for how to operate the aircraft, and they were intentionally violating aircraft limitations," he said.

As a result of voicing his concerns, Snieder said, he was reassigned to an office position and publicly discredited. He filed a harassment claim with the military, but it was dismissed. At that time Snieder asked to be released from the military.

Snieder has since applied to Federal Court for a judicial review of the dismissal of his harassment claim.

Amid his court battle, Snieder contacted the military police.

"If you do any act that could likely cause the destruction of an aircraft, it's against the law and you go to jail for it," Snieder said.

The Canadian Forces National Investigation Service is a unit with the military police that independently investigates serious and sensitive matters. Their jurisdiction covers Department of National Defence (DND) property, DND employees and Canadian Forces personnel serving around the world.

An official tells CBC News that "in all cases, investigations are conducted to determine the facts, analyze the evidence, and if warranted, lay appropriate charges."

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Brett Ruskin is a reporter and video-journalist covering everything from local breaking news to national issues. He's based in Halifax.

KAF Memorial to be Built at Former Nortel Site by 2017

Written by: David Pugliese, The National Post

A memorial to fallen Canadian troops that was once at Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan will be rebuilt in the west end of Ottawa by the summer of next year.

The memorial, known as the Kandahar Airfield Cenotaph, will be located on the former Nortel Campus, the new site for the National Defence headquarters.

An exact location on the grounds has not been decided but the cenotaph is expected to be in place by the summer of 2017, said Canadian Forces spokeswoman Lt.-Cmdr. Diane Grover.

“The KAF Cenotaph was repatriated from Afghanistan at the closure of our combat mission and is currently in storage,” she said. “As a powerful memorial to those who died in the service of Canada, it will be placed on display for viewing by the friends and families of the fallen, the defence team and the public.”

The Kandahar Memorial when it was located at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan. Photo: Colin Perkel

Grover said an analysis concluded the cenotaph would not be able to endure long-term exposure to the elements so it will be housed within a new structure. That building will be a 12-metre by 25-metre pavilion, according to DND documents produced last year and obtained by Postmedia. The cenotaph weights about 225,000 kilograms, the documents noted. An artist’s concept prepared for the DND shows a glass enclosure around the cenotaph.

Grover said that because it is expected the cenotaph will be within a secure area of the new headquarters complex, details need to be worked out about providing access to the public and families of the fallen.

Over the next several years, the DND will transfer about 8,500 military and civilian employees to the former Nortel Campus on Carling Ave. Some employees and military personnel are already working from the site.

The cenotaph at Kandahar airfield became a symbol for many Canadians of the losses during the Afghan war.

Canadian Forces personnel and Afghan employees built it in 2006 and added to the monument over time. On the cenotaph are 190 plaques that honour Canadian Forces members who died as well as Foreign Affairs official Glyn Berry, Calgary Herald journalist Michelle Lang, and Marc Cyr, a civilian from a company under contract to the DND. Other plaques honour U.S. military personnel and a civilian member who died while serving under Canadian command.

The granite plaques are etched with the photographs of those who died.

The military has the original drawings for the cenotaph as well as photos and video to help in reconstructing the monument in Canada. The cenotaph is in storage at an Ottawa warehouse.

In 2011 a military working group recommended the cenotaph be located on DND property at Dow’s Lake in Ottawa.

A CAF Member places a Poppy on the Kandahar Memorial during Remembrance Day in Afghanistan in 2008.
Photo: Post Media File Photo

At the time three Ottawa venues were considered the most serious options as a home for the cenotaph: Beechwood Cemetery, the new DND campus at the former Nortel site and the Dow’s Lake property, according to a July 2011 briefing note prepared for then army commander Lt.-Gen. Peter Devlin.

“When weighing the criteria, the Memorials WG (working group) considered Sanctity to be the most important, followed by Visibility and Accessibility,” Devlin was told in the documents obtained by Postmedia.

The Dow’s Lake option came out on top, followed closely by Beechwood Cemetery, according to the briefing.

The Memorials working group acknowledged that although their recommendation was for Dow’s Lake, a different method to rate the criteria for a location “may be preferable, for reasons not apparent to the Memorials WG.”

The briefing note pointed out that, in the early stages of the evaluation process, one general said Beechwood Cemetery was his favourite option, while another preferred the Nortel site.

In an email to Postmedia in 2011, the DND noted that the cenotaph would be unveiled in 2014. But military sources said that delays in rebuilding the monument in Canada were expected.