A Deeper look at the necessity of a mixed RCAF Fighter Fleet

By: Alexis Amini, NATO Association 

Despite the military and economic benefits of having a mixed fighter fleet composed of the 5th generation stealthy F-35 and the 4th generation non-stealthy Super Hornet, some critics argue that Canada cannot afford such an aerial force structure. Therefore, some experts suggest that the RCAF should opt for a sole purchase of either the Super Hornet or the F-35. Nonetheless, with the return of great power competition, by having a single fighter fleet, Canada will have difficulties in upholding its two mandates defined in its current defense policy: the defense of North America in cooperation with the US and contributing to international security through expeditionary operations within coalitions like NATO.

Regarding expeditionary operations, peer and near-peer competitors are looking to counter Western air forces’ supremacy by developing land and air-based weapon systems that can be used in an Anti Access/Area denial (A2/AD) fashion aimed at making an airspace off-limits to an enemy air force including stealth fighters. Indeed, it is necessary to bear in mind that stealth has been developed to avoid detection from high frequency radars optimized for targeting, against which non-stealthy aircrafts are vulnerable. However, stealth planes with tail fins like the F-35 are visible to low-frequency radars used for early warning and surveillance. Being aware of this F-35 vulnerability, revisionist countries like Russia and China are developing low frequency surveillance radars able to cue high frequency targeting radar toward the F-35’s location in the sky. Such a radar system can detect and target both non-stealth and stealth aircrafts at greater distances. It is being integrated into ground A2/AD weapons like surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) batteries as well as aerial A2/AD assets like fighters such as the Russian non-stealthy Flanker and the stealthy T-50 PAK-FA. Such a development is quite revolutionary since low frequency radars are voluminous compared to their high frequency counterparts. Usually, airborne low frequency radars are installed as radar dishes on top of large airframes acting as Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platforms such as the E-3 Sentry or the E-2 Hawkeye. That said, the Russian aerospace industry managed to miniaturize these low frequency radars and fit them on fighters in addition to their onboard high frequency targeting radar. Current Western fighters like the 4thgeneration Super Hornet and the 5th generation F-35s are only equipped with high frequency targeting radars which only permits them to detect and engage non-stealthy platforms while enemy stealth jets may operate unopposed.

To counter this rising A2/AD threat in the context of expeditionary operations, a mixed fighter fleet composed of a single type of stealth jet and a series of non-stealth aircrafts is essential. The non-stealth component would include Electronic Warfare (EW) aircrafts, airborne missile platforms (or arsenal planes) and dedicated AEW planes equipped with low frequency radars capable of detecting both stealthy and non-stealthy enemy jets. The stealth component would be composed of the F-35 that will mainly act as a survivable Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) platform as well as an airborne Command and Control (C2) node. Indeed, since near peer and peer competitors will possess a vast amount of military capabilities employed in an A2/AD fashion, stealth fighters cannot destroy those in a swift manner given their limited payload due to their stealth design. The F-35 would be armed with missiles for mostly self-defense. Therefore, to degrade these A2/AD military capabilities in the swiftest way possible, a non-stealthy platform that can act as an arsenal plane is required. As a first step to degrade the air defenses, an EW aircraft operating at a safe distance from the A2/AD envelope will jam low-frequency surveillance radars equipping SAM batteries and airborne enemy fighters. Once the low frequency radars are jammed thus preventing the cueing of high frequency targeting radars designed to guide missiles launched from opposing SAMs or jets, the F-35 can safely enter the A2/AD envelope and identify land and airborne non-stealthy targets (ISTAR role) whose coordinates will be transmitted to far-flying arsenal planes armed with long-range missiles (C2 role). Parallel to that, an AEW platform equipped with a low-frequency radar would be operating at a safe distance from the A2/AD envelope and would be tasked with searching and detecting airborne stealth fighters and then cue in F-35s and non-stealthy arsenal planes’ high frequency targeting radar toward the enemy stealth jet’s location so that they may eliminate them.

Despite the advantages of such a mixed fighter fleet in facing the A2/AD threat posed by revisionist powers, critics argue that Canada cannot afford such a force structure. Indeed, a mixed fighter fleet entails high costs given the need for distinct supply chains and training regimens, something Ottawa can ill afford with a limited defense budget. Therefore, the case is being made for a RCAF exclusively composed of either the 4thgeneration non-stealthy Super Hornets or the 5th generation F-35. However, in developing a single type force structure, Canada will not have the full spectrum of capabilities mentioned above that are necessary to degrade an A2/AD envelope. The RCAF would have to rely on other partners for certain capabilities it will not have in its arsenal. Thus, Canada will only be a second-tier partner in any future coalition in the context of expeditionary operations. Such an outcome would dash Canada’s aspiration to be an invaluable coalition partner by having military capabilities in high demand.

In addition, a single type fighter fleet would complicate Canada’s task in defending North American airspace in the context of NORAD. Since Russian aerospace forces possess 4th generation Flankers and 5th generation T-50s are equipped with a low and high frequency radar able to detect and engage both non-stealthy and stealthy jets at great distances, a single type RCAF fighter fleet composed exclusively of either the F-35 or a Super Hornet will be unable to effectively counter Russian incursions thus warranting American intervention as per the NORAD treaty.

Nonetheless, Canada can afford a mixed fighter fleet composed of a single type of stealth jets and a series of non-stealth planes if it’s a combination of one manned platform and several types of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) given the relative low cost of drones compared to their manned counterparts.

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Alexis Amini – editor for the Canadian Armed Forces program – is a graduate student in public and international affairs at Université de Montréal (UdeM), Québec. He has a BSc in political science from the same university. Having lived in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates where he witnessed major geopolitical events, Alexis developed a passion for international security. His research focus revolves around geopolitics, defense policies and political risk analysis. Upon completion of his master’s program, Alexis intends to join the strategic intelligence industry.

A Mixed Fighter Fleet for Canada? Super Hornets, F-​35s, and the challenge of comparisons

By: Dr. Peter Layton, CDA Institute 

Every country has an F-​35 story it seems. Both Australian and Canadian force structure planning has been blighted by the aircraft’s problems and long delays. In 2007 Australia opted for a bridging capability – against Air Force advice – and acquired the F-​18F Super Hornet. Canada now appears to be similarly considering a bridging capability, perhaps also against Air Force advice, and possibly acquiring Super Hornets.

USAF F/A-1 Super Hornets.

Sounds much the same, at first glance. But Australian and Canadian requirements have some fundamental differences, and just as importantly time has moved on. 2016 is not 2007.

For Australia, the F-​18F acquisition has been a good experience; the aircraft arrived on time and under budget. Neither are surprising in that the aircraft was an off-​the-​shelf buy rather than an F-​35 developmental program. The in-​service F-​18A Hornet aircrew found converting to the Super Hornet easy and quick, with the US Navy (USN) training system providing a good head start.

The maintenance and support, however, was a much more complex matter. The current variant Super Hornet technology is considerably more advanced than the 1980s vintage Hornet. In many respects the Super Hornet’s technology is closer to the F-​35 than the F-​18A; it is really more of an F-​35 Lite than a ‘super’ Hornet.

In being more advanced, the Super Hornet’s operating costs are much greater than those of the older Hornet. Apples to oranges comparisons are hard given different fleet sizes and other factors, but are probably more than twice as much per aircraft (see p. 120 of a recent Australian Strategic Policy Institute report). In this, a major project lesson learned by the Australian acquisition organisation is that, while off-​the-​shelf jets can be quickly acquired, “the establishment of a sustainment solution is a challenge and requires early management oversight.” Half the Super Hornet fleet had been delivered within three years but reaching the final operational capability state, when everything is bedded down, took 5½ years from government approval.

It must also be remembered that the F-​18 that Australia and Canada bought was developed from the US Air Force’s (USAF) Lightweight Fighter technology evaluation program. The F-​18 began life as an air-​to-​air fighter first and a bomber second. The F-​35 is the reverse with air-​to-​ground the primary requirement and air-​to-​air secondary. By dent of excellent sensors, datalinks, stealth, and millions of lines of code, the F-​35 overcomes the airframe deficiencies that arise from this upbringing, albeit at the cost of great complexity and perhaps a certain operational brittleness.

In contrast, the F-​35 and the Super Hornet are both alike in being originally designed as strike fighters. Unsurprisingly, both offer broadly similar capabilities and neither are highly manoeuvrable dogfighters. In wars-​of-​choice such as fightingISIS in Iraq the differences between the aircraft in terms of operational effect might be marginal.

Given this, maybe a Canadian Super Hornet bridging capability makes some sense. It would take the pressure off having to make an F-​35 decision – at a time when the aircraft design remains unstable, maintenance systems are immature, operating costs uncertain, and the US’s chief tester is still publishing scary flight test reports. On the other hand, the F-​35 program office is progressively addressing technical issues, unit costs are coming down, more aircraft have been ordered by various countries, and the USAF looks set to declare an initial operational capability this year.

Yet this might not be the kind of capability most want or are expecting. As more becomes known about the software, it seems that the F-​35 might not be fully operationally ready until Block 4 is implemented. This Block may also see some key hardware changes, such as bringing the Electro-​Optical Targeting System (EOTS) up to a suitable standard. Block 4 should be ready early next decade. Buying F-​35s before then might mean expensive upgrades before they even enter delivery flight-​test. Unfortunately for the F-​35, buying later is always cheaper and always brings a better standard aircraft.

In Canada, another consideration is whether there will be a capability gap between the new fighters’ introduction to service and the last old Hornet retiring, by 2025 or even earlier. It should be recognised that the transition period will see a dip in capability and some years when deploying a squadron overseas would severely tax the RCAF, especially on the personnel front. Individuals can’t be at home bringing a new fighter on board while fighting offshore. Moreover 2025 is not far away in major project terms. It took Australia almost six years to fully bed down a technically well-​understood, off-​the-​shelf fighter. The F-​35 is in nothing like the same state; even if contracting this year, meeting the 2025 deadline would be a near-​run thing if Canada wanted a seamless transition from one aircraft type to the other.

But hold everything. The F-​35 program, while too big to stop, may not be too big to fail, at least in the air-​to-​air arena. (Its air-​to-​ground capabilities appear robust by comparison.)

Enter stage left the shadow of the future. Air superiority is becoming contested again in both East Asia and Europe. As the RAND Corporation warns, “continuous improvements to Chinese air capabilities make it increasingly difficult for the United States to achieve air superiority within a politically and operationally effective time frame.” The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, considering China’s full range of defence capabilities – including its rapidly advancing fighter fleet – observes: ” at the current rate of U.S. capability development, the balance of military power in the region is shifting against the United States.”

In this vein, the USAF in Europe commander recently noted: “The advantage that we had from the air, I can honestly say, is shrinking.… This is not just a Pacific problem. It’s as significant in Europe as it is anywhere else on the planet … I don’t think it’s controversial to say they’ve closed the gap in capability.”

Most worryingly, USAF’s head office has determined that the “projected force structure in 2030 is not capable of fighting and winning against …potential adversary capabilities.” The growing fleets of F-​35s in service with America and its allies seems inadequate to ensure air superiority beyond 2030. Future control of the air is in doubt.

What to do is uncertain. Whatever Canada buys now appears unlikely to be operationally viable in the air-​to-​air role beyond 2030 or so. The USAF is suggesting an expedited program to get some suitable ‘system of systems’ into service before then – maybe even 2025 – so air superiority can be maintained long term. What these systems might be remains unknown.

One option is for Canada to ignore this reality, press on and buy F-​35s to replace the Hornets by 2025. This is not necessarily a bad approach. The F-35’s air-​to-​air capabilities might be doubtful long-​term against advanced fighters but should be adequate for contributing to NORAD where the threats will hopefully be meagre. The F-35’s air-​to-​ground capabilities should be suitable for participating in NATO and future coalitions of the willing. In this case, the American alliance will be primarily relied upon to ensure control of the air.

Some will say – probably correctly – that this sounds like spending vast sums of money to buy a second rate air combat force and that ‘hope is not a strategy.’ Yet Canada’s (and Australia’s and most European NATO nations) Cold War fighter contribution was arguably in this vein. But you have to ask if you’re buying a doubtful capability anyway, is there any reason not to go for the lower cost Super Hornet option then.

Another alternative is to buy say 30 Super Hornets now, retain 30 CF-​18 Hornets, and wait until mid-​next decade to decide what to do. By then America’s intentions concerning new air superiority systems will be clearer and perhaps – a big ‘perhaps’ – Canada could buy into a long-​term robust solution. This offers at least a chance Canada may remain an ally important for more than just geographical proximity. If however this air superiority path does not eventuate, is unaffordable, or not releasable to close allies, by the mid-​2020s better and cheaper F-​35 versions will be available to round out Canada’s fighter force in terms of numbers. Importantly, also by then, the F-​35s operating costs will finally be known, allowing a more accurate assessment of whether a mixed fleet really is more expensive than a single type one. It may not be.

The later approach stresses hedging and is suitable for uncertain times but takes a dark view of the future where strategic circumstances are deteriorating. The other option is more of a big bet built on the hope the geopolitical situation in next few decades is better than seems to be likely now. The choice between these two options is not easy but indicates the F-​35/​Super Hornet issue is more complex than it seems at first. Which is more sensible? More pragmatic? Some deep thinking is required.
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Dr. Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University in Queensland, Australia. (Image courtesy of Staff Sgt. Aaron Allmon, U.S. Air Force.)