Written by Canadian American Strategic Review — Editorial
The Royal Canadian Air Force ( RCAF ) has held primary responsibility for aerial search and rescue (SAR) over Canada and its territorial waters since 1947. [1] Initially, the dedicated SAR aircraft fleet consisted of patrol aircraft for search (large, four- engined Avro Lancaster Mk.10 SRs ) and flying boats for rescue (the Canadian-made Canso and, later, Grumman Albatrossamphibians). [2]
Helicopters joined these fixed-wing SAR aircraft as rotary-wing technology matured. By the 1970s, Canada's fixed-wing search and rescue fleet had devolved into an ad hoc collection of old tactical transport aircraft – CC-130 Herculesand CC-115 Buffalo STOL transports (which lacked a role). [3]
Fast-forward to 2004 and DND's Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) Project presented no real advance over the 1970s approach. Those ad hoc tactical transport aircraft were to be replaced by purpose-bought tactical transports, without questioning which type of aircraft actually suited the FWSAR role. This approach appealed to Air Force planners focused on bolstering the transport fleet. But, other than providing newer airframes, this procurement approach offered no real enhancement of the actual fixed-wing search and rescue capability.
After a 2010 external review by the National Research Council of the FWSAR Project, DND belatedly acknowledged that fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft might benefit from a more capable sensor than simply relying upon the human eye. [4] As a result, an infrared electro- optical turret was added to a revised FWSAR Statement of Operational Requirements (SOR).
The FWSAR Project has dragged on for a decade because, despite all of the proclamations, neither the Air Force nor the Government of Canada has ever made the FWSAR Project a genuine top priority. [5] This indifference may be, in part, because both bureaucracies know that completing the FWSAR Project will gain them very little in the end. Most of the current complaints about existing FWSAR aircraft relate to lengthy reaction times. But new FWSAR aircraft – still based on transport airframes – will make almost no difference to reaction times.
Idée fixe: Getting away from Fixed Ideas about the Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Project
In accordance with the Canadian SAR Manual, an RCAF SAR Major Operating Base (MOB) must have one FWSAR aircraft ready to respond to any emergency call at 30 minutes notice. New FWSAR aircraft would continue to fly out of these MOBs, which are situated far to the south. As a result, response times will be no quicker than before the arrival of new FWSAR aircraft – and transit times to Northern Canada almost as long and just as exhausting for the FWSAR aircraft flight crews. Potential solutions to this FWSAR conundrum emerge from re- examinating the way that the RCAF implemented the aerial SAR when first assigned the role.
As noted, in 1947, the RCAF separated 'Search' from the more complex 'Rescue' functions. Compared to today, SAR bases were more widely distributed. There were very few 'Regular' SAR squadrons. Most of the early RCAF FWSAR aircraft weren't assigned to squadrons at all. They belonged to small, regional 'Rescue Flights' and were flown by RCAF Reservists.
A survivor of that model is Yellowknife-based 440 Transport Squadron. Originally designated a Transport and Rescue Squadron, [6] 440 (T) began as 111 Search and Rescue Flight. Based further north than other RCAF squadrons, 440 members are a mix of Reservists and Regulars. 440's four CC-138Twin Otter aircraft are a tiny number to be designated a squadron, but quite typical for earlier RCAF Air Reserve 'Rescue Flights' – which often held only 3-to-5 aircraft.
'Fixed-Wing Surveillance and Response'? – Re-examining the RCAF's FWSAR Roles
In a modern context, having RCAF Reservists form the crew of 'Search' aircraft has multiple advantages. Currently, the RCAF has been forced to employ foreign pilots due to domestic recruiting constraints (civilians lacking prior military experience) and training budget limits.
With a different approach to FWSAR, this 'experienced pilot' recruiting problem can be side- stepped. Consider a dedicated 'Search' role within FWSAR. By adopting an airframe already in widespread Canadian commerical service, RCAF Reserve crews could be readily recruited. And the ideal airframe for search, surveillance, and monitoring is the Canadian-made Dash 8.
Earlier model Dash 8s (with their greater cruising economy) are operated by airlines throughout Canada – including in the Arctic ( with Air Inuit, Canadian North and Summit Air). [7] In contrast to finding pilots with military aircraft experience, recruiting suitable pilots to become Reservists to crew the 'Search' Dash 8would be comparatively easy. Recruits would have ties to home locations across Canada, with no incentive to stick to the established RCAF SAR MOBs in the south.
The advantages of recruiting Reservist flightdeck crews would also be true for 'spotters'. At present, volunteers from the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA) often man the 'bubble' windows on the RCAF's FWSAR aircraft. That volunteer resource should not be abused, but it does show that civilians are quite capable of doing the 'spotter' job. And some of the CASARA volunteers might be highly motivated to serve in the RCAF Air Reserve. [8]
Also see: 'Search': The First Element in the FWSAR Project's Interim Solution
FWSAR Primary and Secondary Roles – Tactical Transport is as Tactical Transport does
The primary role for any FWSAR aircraft is SAR. But that has never been all that FWSAR aircraft do. The 'Search' Dash 8 described above is a surveillance platform specialized in the SAR role. However, sensors would allow it to perform a host of surveillance and monitoring roles when not required for SAR duty. What it wouldn't do is carry parachuting SAR Techs.
The 2010 NRC review reaffirmed the Air Force's choice of rear ramps for any FWSAR aircraft dropping SAR Techs. And 'rear ramp' means 'tactical transport aircraft'. The current FWSAR conundrum results, in part, from trying to squeeze some operating economies out of tactical transports. But it doesn't work. Tactical transport is a demanding role and few economies are to be found. The Air Force's attempted solution was to make their tactical transports smaller.
The outcome of the FWSAR project as planned would be unfamiliar new airframes with only marginally better operating economies than the Hercules. But separate 'Search' from 'Rescue' and a superior option appears. Relieved of the need to fly long search patterns, that 'Rescue' aircraft is already more economical. That allows other capabilities – like tactical transport and fleet commonality – to be made higher priorities for the FWSAR Project. Viewed in that light, the ideal 'Rescue' component of this two-role FWSAR approach would be another Hercules.
Also see: 'Rescue': The Second Element in the FWSAR Project's Interim Solution
[1] See online pdf, 'Canada Command SAR CONOPs' (or Concept of Operations) for details.
[2] Secondary responsibility for aerial SAR tended to fall on RCAF 'KU' or Composite Units. Many of the KUs flying utility transport aircraft would evolve into regional 'Rescue Flights'.
[3] The Buffalo had been designed as a short take-off and landing tactical transport. But the Canadian Air Force found little use for these rough-field specialists (outside Arctic supply).
[4] FWSAR now relies exclusively on human spotters augmented with night vision goggles and flares. The revised FWSAR SOR also included, under instruction from government, the consideration of 'Alternative Service Delivery' and to allow for more than one aircraft type.
[5] FWSAR as top priority was 2005 Conservative election promise. However, once elected, the Harper Tories shelved the FWSAR Project in favour of buying C-17 strategic transports.
[6] 440 TRS was redesignated a pure Transport squadron when moved from Edmonton up to Yellowknife in 1995. Despite their yellow paint, 440's Rescue markings were removed in 1999.
[7] Summit's Dash-8/Q100s first flew with Arctic Sunwest (which Summit took over in 2012).
[8] Remaining in one's home community is a recruiting advantage for the RCAF Air Reserve.
Monday, September 12, 2016
Should Canada join the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mali?
By: Louis A. Delvoie, Kingston-Whig Standard
In my last column, I applauded the Trudeau government's decision to once again contribute significantly to United Nations peace operations after a hiatus of 10 years. I also argued very strongly against the idea of sending a Canadian contingent to the UN force in the Congo on the grounds that the history, dimensions and complexities of the conflict in that country made it a "mission impossible." Today, on a somewhat more positive note, I would like to suggest that there might be some merit in the Canadian government looking to yet another UN force in Africa, the force in Mali. That force is performing a more useful and manageable task than its counterpart in the Congo.
The fundamentals of the two countries explain in part why this is so. In area Mali is one half the size of the Congo. Its population is one quarter the size of that of the Congo. Its people are not as abjectly poor, since the country's Gross Domestic Product per person stands at $1640.00 whereas that of the Congo is only $810.00. Most important perhaps is the fact that Mali is not so fractured along ethnic and tribal lines as is the Congo. Put simply, it is a more coherent nation state than the Congo and its security issues are much more amenable to solutions.
Historical Background
Mali began to emerge as a recognizable entity in the 13th century. It was an essentially Muslim country, which over time became a fairly sizeable empire. Its principal city Timbuktu was home to numerous schools and mosques which attracted scholars from many Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East. And those scholars took an interest not only in religion and theology, but also in mathematics and astronomy. Nearly a million manuscripts from the period survived well into the 20th century. Timbuktu was also a major trading centre for the caravans criss-crossing the Sahara, and developed a complex trading economy based on gold, textiles and salt.
The Malian empire lasted little more than a hundred years before it was subsumed by the Songhai empire and later conquered by forces emanating from Morocco. In the late 19th century Mali was invaded and occupied by French forces under the command of General Gallieni. Mali thus emerged into the modern world as a colony of France, which controlled it until 1960 when it became an independent state once again.
Mali's political history since independence has been, to say the least, tumultuous. Its first president Modibo Keita was democratically elected but quickly turned the country into a one party state. In 1968 Keita was ousted in a military coup led by General Moussa Traoré who ruled the country as a military dictator for nearly 23 years. In early 1991 Traoré was confronted by mass protests led by university students and trade unionists. When thousands of his soldiers refused to fire on the non-violent protestors and eventually joined the pro-democracy movement, Traoré was overthrown. What followed was a classic reaction to years of military dictatorship. A new democratic constitution was drafted, was approved in a national referendum and resulted in the holding of multi-party elections in 1992. For the next twenty years Mali came to be viewed as one of the most politically and socially stable countries in Africa.
Current Realities
Early in 2012 Mali was hit with a triple whammy which had the effect of totally destabilizing the country.
The first event was the outbreak of a rebellion among the Touaregs of northern Mali. The Touaregs are an essentially nomadic ethnic group which represents approximately ten per cent of the population of Mali. They routinely criss-cross the Saharan frontiers of several countries and many of the fighters who joined the rebellion had obtained weapons and military experience in the service of the Libyan dictator Moamar Qaddafi. The rebellion was led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The MNLA was successful in defeating the Malian armed forces and eventually proclaimed the creation of a newly independent state of Azawad in northern Mali.
The second development was the entry into the fray of Islamist extremist forces, including Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Those forces initially helped the Touaregs to defeat the Malian army, but then turned on the Touaregs and seized northern Mali for themselves. The Islamists gained control of large swaths of territory and several cities, including Timbuktu. In the areas they overran the Islamists imposed a very harsh version of Sharia law to the dismay of the local population which adhered to a very moderate and tolerant form of Islam. In Timbuktu they set about ransacking and demolishing schools, libraries, museums and mausoleums which they deemed un-Islamic. In very short order they largely destroyed what UNESCO had designated a World Heritage Site.
The Touareg rebellion and the Islamist incursions produced a third dismal event. Claiming that the elected president had been ineffective in dealing with these crises, elements within the Malian army overthrew him and seized power in a military coup in March of 2012. The coup was widely condemned abroad and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed economic sanctions on Mali. The new government was, however, no more successful than its predecessor in stopping the advances of the Islamist militants who began to make inroads into the south of the country taking full advantage of the political confusion prevailing in the capital, Bamako.
Unable to cope with the Islamist threat, the Malian government eventually appealed to France for military assistance. The French government obliged for two main reasons. First they feared that an Islamist victory might lead to the destabilization of much of north west Africa, including a number of former French colonies where France continued to have important interests. Secondly they were afraid that Mali might become a safe haven for Islamist extremists of all stripes, who could use it as a base of operations for terrorist attacks against targets in Western Europe.
The intervention of some 2000 French troops in January 2013 turned the tide in Mali. Not only were the Islamists stopped in their tracks, but most of the urban centres which they had captured in the north were re-taken, including Timbuktu. The Islamists nevertheless continued to hold some territory in northern Mali and to mount attacks on both civilian and military targets. In July of 2013 the United Nations Security Council deployed a force of some 12,000 troops and police officers to help stabilize the country and oversee a return to civilian rule. The force has been at least partially successful in fulfilling its mandate in that a ceasefire agreement was concluded with the Touareg rebels and general elections were held. The country is once again governed by a democratically elected president. The Islamists, however, continue to maintain a threatening presence in the north of the country despite the efforts of French and UN forces.
Canadian Role
The UN force in Mali could benefit greatly from the addition of a well trained and well equipped Canadian contingent. One of the handicaps from which the force now suffers is a lack of mobility. Canadian helicopters and light armoured vehicles would help to overcome this. And there are good reasons why the Canadian government should consider deploying forces to the Mali mission.
Apart from some investments in the mining sector, Canada's interests in Mali are negligible. There are no compelling political, economic or social reasons for Canada to take an interest in Mali. There are, however, significant security and diplomatic reasons for doing so. Canada, like most Western countries, is preoccupied with the threat posed by Islamist extremism. It is for this reason that it is participating in the US led coalition to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. A contribution to the UN force in Mali would simply be another contribution to that struggle, and fully consistent with existing Canadian security policy.
A Canadian contingent deployed to Mali would also pay handsome diplomatic dividends. It would provide concrete evidence of Canada's commitment to re-engage with the United Nations and would help to enhance Canada's image within that organization, an image that suffered real damage during the Harper years. It would be warmly welcomed by the French government and thus help to solidify Canada's relations with an important ally. Finally, it would be applauded by the United State administration which is becoming ever more troubled by the spread of Islamist extremism in northern Africa, as evidenced by its current military activities in Libya.
If and when the Canadian government considers deploying a contingent to Mali, it should make it clear to the Canadian public that this is not a classical peacekeeping operation of a bygone era. Long gone are days when UN forces were deployed as neutral arbiters between the forces of two parties which were committed to a ceasefire and which had formally accepted a UN presence. The UN force in Mali is charged with ridding the country of Islamist extremists and protecting the state and the civilian population from them. It is not a peacekeeping but a peace enforcement operation. As such it will involve combat and could well involve casualties. Nevertheless it is something well worth doing.
In my last column, I applauded the Trudeau government's decision to once again contribute significantly to United Nations peace operations after a hiatus of 10 years. I also argued very strongly against the idea of sending a Canadian contingent to the UN force in the Congo on the grounds that the history, dimensions and complexities of the conflict in that country made it a "mission impossible." Today, on a somewhat more positive note, I would like to suggest that there might be some merit in the Canadian government looking to yet another UN force in Africa, the force in Mali. That force is performing a more useful and manageable task than its counterpart in the Congo.
The fundamentals of the two countries explain in part why this is so. In area Mali is one half the size of the Congo. Its population is one quarter the size of that of the Congo. Its people are not as abjectly poor, since the country's Gross Domestic Product per person stands at $1640.00 whereas that of the Congo is only $810.00. Most important perhaps is the fact that Mali is not so fractured along ethnic and tribal lines as is the Congo. Put simply, it is a more coherent nation state than the Congo and its security issues are much more amenable to solutions.
Historical Background
Mali began to emerge as a recognizable entity in the 13th century. It was an essentially Muslim country, which over time became a fairly sizeable empire. Its principal city Timbuktu was home to numerous schools and mosques which attracted scholars from many Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East. And those scholars took an interest not only in religion and theology, but also in mathematics and astronomy. Nearly a million manuscripts from the period survived well into the 20th century. Timbuktu was also a major trading centre for the caravans criss-crossing the Sahara, and developed a complex trading economy based on gold, textiles and salt.
The Malian empire lasted little more than a hundred years before it was subsumed by the Songhai empire and later conquered by forces emanating from Morocco. In the late 19th century Mali was invaded and occupied by French forces under the command of General Gallieni. Mali thus emerged into the modern world as a colony of France, which controlled it until 1960 when it became an independent state once again.
Mali's political history since independence has been, to say the least, tumultuous. Its first president Modibo Keita was democratically elected but quickly turned the country into a one party state. In 1968 Keita was ousted in a military coup led by General Moussa Traoré who ruled the country as a military dictator for nearly 23 years. In early 1991 Traoré was confronted by mass protests led by university students and trade unionists. When thousands of his soldiers refused to fire on the non-violent protestors and eventually joined the pro-democracy movement, Traoré was overthrown. What followed was a classic reaction to years of military dictatorship. A new democratic constitution was drafted, was approved in a national referendum and resulted in the holding of multi-party elections in 1992. For the next twenty years Mali came to be viewed as one of the most politically and socially stable countries in Africa.
Current Realities
Early in 2012 Mali was hit with a triple whammy which had the effect of totally destabilizing the country.
The first event was the outbreak of a rebellion among the Touaregs of northern Mali. The Touaregs are an essentially nomadic ethnic group which represents approximately ten per cent of the population of Mali. They routinely criss-cross the Saharan frontiers of several countries and many of the fighters who joined the rebellion had obtained weapons and military experience in the service of the Libyan dictator Moamar Qaddafi. The rebellion was led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The MNLA was successful in defeating the Malian armed forces and eventually proclaimed the creation of a newly independent state of Azawad in northern Mali.
The second development was the entry into the fray of Islamist extremist forces, including Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Those forces initially helped the Touaregs to defeat the Malian army, but then turned on the Touaregs and seized northern Mali for themselves. The Islamists gained control of large swaths of territory and several cities, including Timbuktu. In the areas they overran the Islamists imposed a very harsh version of Sharia law to the dismay of the local population which adhered to a very moderate and tolerant form of Islam. In Timbuktu they set about ransacking and demolishing schools, libraries, museums and mausoleums which they deemed un-Islamic. In very short order they largely destroyed what UNESCO had designated a World Heritage Site.
The Touareg rebellion and the Islamist incursions produced a third dismal event. Claiming that the elected president had been ineffective in dealing with these crises, elements within the Malian army overthrew him and seized power in a military coup in March of 2012. The coup was widely condemned abroad and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed economic sanctions on Mali. The new government was, however, no more successful than its predecessor in stopping the advances of the Islamist militants who began to make inroads into the south of the country taking full advantage of the political confusion prevailing in the capital, Bamako.
Unable to cope with the Islamist threat, the Malian government eventually appealed to France for military assistance. The French government obliged for two main reasons. First they feared that an Islamist victory might lead to the destabilization of much of north west Africa, including a number of former French colonies where France continued to have important interests. Secondly they were afraid that Mali might become a safe haven for Islamist extremists of all stripes, who could use it as a base of operations for terrorist attacks against targets in Western Europe.
The intervention of some 2000 French troops in January 2013 turned the tide in Mali. Not only were the Islamists stopped in their tracks, but most of the urban centres which they had captured in the north were re-taken, including Timbuktu. The Islamists nevertheless continued to hold some territory in northern Mali and to mount attacks on both civilian and military targets. In July of 2013 the United Nations Security Council deployed a force of some 12,000 troops and police officers to help stabilize the country and oversee a return to civilian rule. The force has been at least partially successful in fulfilling its mandate in that a ceasefire agreement was concluded with the Touareg rebels and general elections were held. The country is once again governed by a democratically elected president. The Islamists, however, continue to maintain a threatening presence in the north of the country despite the efforts of French and UN forces.
Canadian Role
The UN force in Mali could benefit greatly from the addition of a well trained and well equipped Canadian contingent. One of the handicaps from which the force now suffers is a lack of mobility. Canadian helicopters and light armoured vehicles would help to overcome this. And there are good reasons why the Canadian government should consider deploying forces to the Mali mission.
Apart from some investments in the mining sector, Canada's interests in Mali are negligible. There are no compelling political, economic or social reasons for Canada to take an interest in Mali. There are, however, significant security and diplomatic reasons for doing so. Canada, like most Western countries, is preoccupied with the threat posed by Islamist extremism. It is for this reason that it is participating in the US led coalition to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. A contribution to the UN force in Mali would simply be another contribution to that struggle, and fully consistent with existing Canadian security policy.
A Canadian contingent deployed to Mali would also pay handsome diplomatic dividends. It would provide concrete evidence of Canada's commitment to re-engage with the United Nations and would help to enhance Canada's image within that organization, an image that suffered real damage during the Harper years. It would be warmly welcomed by the French government and thus help to solidify Canada's relations with an important ally. Finally, it would be applauded by the United State administration which is becoming ever more troubled by the spread of Islamist extremism in northern Africa, as evidenced by its current military activities in Libya.
If and when the Canadian government considers deploying a contingent to Mali, it should make it clear to the Canadian public that this is not a classical peacekeeping operation of a bygone era. Long gone are days when UN forces were deployed as neutral arbiters between the forces of two parties which were committed to a ceasefire and which had formally accepted a UN presence. The UN force in Mali is charged with ridding the country of Islamist extremists and protecting the state and the civilian population from them. It is not a peacekeeping but a peace enforcement operation. As such it will involve combat and could well involve casualties. Nevertheless it is something well worth doing.
---
Louis A. Delvoie, a Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen's University and, in 1980, Canada's Ambassador to Algeria ( to the north of Mali ). Louis Delvoie's article is a concise summary of the evolution of political, military, and social conditions that exist in Mali today.
Louis A. Delvoie, a Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen's University and, in 1980, Canada's Ambassador to Algeria ( to the north of Mali ). Louis Delvoie's article is a concise summary of the evolution of political, military, and social conditions that exist in Mali today.
Liberals won’t amend cluster bomb treaty loophole
By: Mike Blanchfield, The Canadian Press
OTTAWA — The Trudeau Liberals are facing criticism at home and abroad for not closing a controversial legal loophole that allows the Canadian Forces to operate alongside allies, such as the United States, which use cluster bombs.
The previous Conservative government faced widespread international condemnation because the law it used to ratify the United Nations treaty banning cluster bombs contained a controversial clause that allowed joint military operations with countries outside the treaty.
The Conservatives said Canada couldn't compromise its ability to conduct military missions with its key ally, the U.S. — which has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) — but pledged never to use the weapons.
That sparked widespread criticism that Canada was undermining the legal basis of the treaty, including complaints from the normally neutral International Committee of the Red Cross.
In opposition, the Liberals along with the NDP pushed unsuccessfully for amendments to the bill that would categorically rule out any connection to the use of cluster bombs — tennis-ball sized submunitions that can lie dormant for decades and have maimed or killed civilians, often young children, in dozens of post-war countries.
After almost a year in power, the Liberal government has yet to change the law and faces the same criticism as the Conservatives.
While the Conservatives never worried about snubbing the UN treaty system, the stance could have implications for the Liberals, who are pursuing closer ties with the world body, including a temporary seat on the Security Council.
"Canada's implementing legislation meets our obligations under the CCM and we currently have no plans to amend it," Chantal Gagnon, a spokeswoman for Foreign Affairs Minister Stephane Dion told The Canadian Press.
"Canada believes that our legislation, like the CCM, strikes an appropriate balance between humanitarian considerations and security interests in addressing the impact of cluster munitions."
Gagnon reiterated what the government told the annual international meeting of state parties to the treaty in Geneva last week.
Canada has a "special responsibility" to encourage countries that have not ratified the treaty to join it. "As such, we are demarching all states outside the convention with whom we operate militarily to remind them of our responsibilities as a CCM state party and to strongly call upon them to join the convention," she added.
But Canada was singled out at the Genva meeting by the international Cluster Munition Coalition for not doing enough.
"We also call on countries to strengthen weak implementation legislation. For example, Canada's new government should amend its 2014 statute in order to prohibit assistance with the use of cluster munitions in joint military operations," said Bonnie Docherty, of the New York-based Human Rights Watch, on behalf of the coalition.
Earl Turcotte, Canada's former chief negotiator for the treaty, said he is "surprised and disappointed" by the government's inaction.
Turcotte quit the federal government in protest five years ago over the then Conservative government's decision to include the controversial clause.
"I had expected far more from Mr. Trudeau's government," Turcotte said. "I will continue to advocate for amendments to avoid further loss of civilian life from these indiscriminate weapons."
The World Federalist Movement urged Dion last month to use the Geneva meeting to "initiate a process to review and repair" the cluster bomb law.
The same letter reminded Dion how MP Marc Garneau — now the Liberal transport minister — argued in opposition for amendments, once proclaiming: "You're either against cluster bombs or you're not."
In August 2015, the campaigning Liberal party told Mines Action Canada in a letter that the "ratification legislation for the treaty passed by the Conservative government did not adequately promote the stigmatization of the use of cluster bombs. Liberals believe that the legislation should have been more in line with both the spirit and the letter of the Convention on Cluster Munitions."
Paul Hannon, the executive director of Mines Action Canada, said it is "curious" the Liberals have not amended the "flawed legislation" given that Garneau and two Liberal senators "gave a very spirited, comprehensive and logical case for amending the legislation" during parliamentary hearings while in opposition.
Hannon said he realizes the first year of a new government can be busy, so his organization is being patient.
"But the government missed a significant opportunity" at the Geneva meeting, he said, to signal "a new approach."
OTTAWA — The Trudeau Liberals are facing criticism at home and abroad for not closing a controversial legal loophole that allows the Canadian Forces to operate alongside allies, such as the United States, which use cluster bombs.
The previous Conservative government faced widespread international condemnation because the law it used to ratify the United Nations treaty banning cluster bombs contained a controversial clause that allowed joint military operations with countries outside the treaty.
The Conservatives said Canada couldn't compromise its ability to conduct military missions with its key ally, the U.S. — which has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) — but pledged never to use the weapons.
That sparked widespread criticism that Canada was undermining the legal basis of the treaty, including complaints from the normally neutral International Committee of the Red Cross.
In opposition, the Liberals along with the NDP pushed unsuccessfully for amendments to the bill that would categorically rule out any connection to the use of cluster bombs — tennis-ball sized submunitions that can lie dormant for decades and have maimed or killed civilians, often young children, in dozens of post-war countries.
After almost a year in power, the Liberal government has yet to change the law and faces the same criticism as the Conservatives.
While the Conservatives never worried about snubbing the UN treaty system, the stance could have implications for the Liberals, who are pursuing closer ties with the world body, including a temporary seat on the Security Council.
"Canada's implementing legislation meets our obligations under the CCM and we currently have no plans to amend it," Chantal Gagnon, a spokeswoman for Foreign Affairs Minister Stephane Dion told The Canadian Press.
"Canada believes that our legislation, like the CCM, strikes an appropriate balance between humanitarian considerations and security interests in addressing the impact of cluster munitions."
Gagnon reiterated what the government told the annual international meeting of state parties to the treaty in Geneva last week.
Canada has a "special responsibility" to encourage countries that have not ratified the treaty to join it. "As such, we are demarching all states outside the convention with whom we operate militarily to remind them of our responsibilities as a CCM state party and to strongly call upon them to join the convention," she added.
But Canada was singled out at the Genva meeting by the international Cluster Munition Coalition for not doing enough.
"We also call on countries to strengthen weak implementation legislation. For example, Canada's new government should amend its 2014 statute in order to prohibit assistance with the use of cluster munitions in joint military operations," said Bonnie Docherty, of the New York-based Human Rights Watch, on behalf of the coalition.
Earl Turcotte, Canada's former chief negotiator for the treaty, said he is "surprised and disappointed" by the government's inaction.
Turcotte quit the federal government in protest five years ago over the then Conservative government's decision to include the controversial clause.
"I had expected far more from Mr. Trudeau's government," Turcotte said. "I will continue to advocate for amendments to avoid further loss of civilian life from these indiscriminate weapons."
The World Federalist Movement urged Dion last month to use the Geneva meeting to "initiate a process to review and repair" the cluster bomb law.
The same letter reminded Dion how MP Marc Garneau — now the Liberal transport minister — argued in opposition for amendments, once proclaiming: "You're either against cluster bombs or you're not."
In August 2015, the campaigning Liberal party told Mines Action Canada in a letter that the "ratification legislation for the treaty passed by the Conservative government did not adequately promote the stigmatization of the use of cluster bombs. Liberals believe that the legislation should have been more in line with both the spirit and the letter of the Convention on Cluster Munitions."
Paul Hannon, the executive director of Mines Action Canada, said it is "curious" the Liberals have not amended the "flawed legislation" given that Garneau and two Liberal senators "gave a very spirited, comprehensive and logical case for amending the legislation" during parliamentary hearings while in opposition.
Hannon said he realizes the first year of a new government can be busy, so his organization is being patient.
"But the government missed a significant opportunity" at the Geneva meeting, he said, to signal "a new approach."
RCN Hosts CUTLASS FURY-16
DND Press Release
The Royal Canadian Navy is leading a fleet of 11 ships and approximately 25 aircraft from Canada, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States in anti-submarine warfare drills over the next two weeks. The training activity known as CUTLASS FURY16 takes place in and around the Maritime Operating Areas off the coasts of Halifax, Nova Scotia, and St. John’s, Newfoundland, from September 12 to 26, 2016.
This opportunity provides participants with a chance to enhance mutual understanding as participating forces train together across the spectrum of military operations with a focus on anti-submarine warfare in a joint environment. Participation in CUTLASS FURY contributes to the operational readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces. Operational readiness allows the CAF to meet the likely tasks that the Government of Canada will assign.
“CUTLASS FURY 16 provides the members of Maritime Forces Atlantic with a unique opportunity to work closely with several of our NATO partners in the Atlantic to enhance operational readiness, foster greater mutual understanding, and develop relationships that will strengthen our ability to work together during times of crisis. CUTLASS FURY is a unique training opportunity for all participants that will test our shore-based and at-sea personnel as they direct and respond to a range of complex training scenarios.” - Rear-Admiral John Newton, Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic and Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic
“CUTLASS FURY 16 is a chance for the Royal Canadian Navy to collaborate with our allies in a major joint exercise that layers air, maritime, land and communications elements. Exercise CUTLASS FURY will enhance joint NATO forces interoperability and ability to respond to real-world scenarios.” - Commodore Craig Baines, Commander Canadian Fleet Atlantic
CUTLASS FURY 16 is a Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)-led exercise that is intended to enhance cooperation with partner countries and allied forces on the East Coast of Canada. The exercise is designed to provide training in full-spectrum operations in a joint and combined environment.
Canadian participants will include HMCS Athabaskan, HMCS Fredericton, HMCS Montreal, HMCS Windsor, HMCS Goose Bay and HMCS Summerside.
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) aircraft include: CF-18 Hornet fighters, CH-124 Sea King helicopters, CP-140 Auroras and a CC-130T Hercules air-to-air refueller. Contracted air services include six Dornier Alpha jets and a Westwind 1124 aircraft.
CUTLASS FURY 16 brings together 3000 participants from five partner nations and includes 11 surface ships, 3 submarines, and approximately 25 aircraft.
All RCAF Sea Kings to be retired by December 2018
By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch
The retirement of the RCAF’s 28 Sea King helicopters is ongoing and on schedule to conclude by December 2018, according to the Department of National Defence. To date, six aircraft have been removed from flying status, department spokeswoman Ashley Lemire told Defence Watch.
“Operational employment of the Cyclone will begin in 2018, ahead of final Sea King retirement, utilizing the Block 1 (Capability Release 1.1 and 1.2) aircraft version,” she added.
And what will or could become of the 28 Sea Kings? Lemire said the aircraft could be sold, transferred, donated, destroyed or retained for historical purposes. But at this point the RCAF doesn’t have an exact plan – it’s being worked on but I would expect at least some will be retained for museums and static displays on bases.
The retirement of the RCAF’s 28 Sea King helicopters is ongoing and on schedule to conclude by December 2018, according to the Department of National Defence. To date, six aircraft have been removed from flying status, department spokeswoman Ashley Lemire told Defence Watch.
“Operational employment of the Cyclone will begin in 2018, ahead of final Sea King retirement, utilizing the Block 1 (Capability Release 1.1 and 1.2) aircraft version,” she added.
And what will or could become of the 28 Sea Kings? Lemire said the aircraft could be sold, transferred, donated, destroyed or retained for historical purposes. But at this point the RCAF doesn’t have an exact plan – it’s being worked on but I would expect at least some will be retained for museums and static displays on bases.
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