By: GEOFFREY YORK, The Globe and Mail
Canadian troops could face a terrifying arsenal of rebel-held weapons, from rockets and artillery to shoulder-fired missiles and anti-tank mines, if they are deployed as expected in a peacekeeping operation in the West African nation of Mali.
A report released on Wednesday shows that the terrorist and separatist groups have obtained a wide range of heavy weaponry from government stockpiles in both Mali and Libya, as well as other unknown sources.
The report, published by British-based Conflict Armament Research, also traces the weapons used by the Islamist radicals who killed six Canadians and 24 other civilians in Burkina Faso earlier this year. Their weapons were relatively new Chinese-made assault rifles, which – based on their similar serial numbers – appeared to share the same supplier as Islamic State fighters in Syria, the report says.
Conflict Armament Research is largely financed by the governments of Britain and Germany and the European Union. Its 49-page report is one of the most extensive recent studies of the sources of illicit weapons in West Africa.
The huge range of heavy weapons in Mali could help explain why the Canadian government has been cautious and hesitant in announcing its peacekeeping plans in Africa.
The government announced in August that it will deploy up to 600 soldiers and 150 police officers in “peace and stabilization operations” in Africa, but nearly three months later, it still hasn’t revealed the location of the deployment.
Most analysts believe that Mali is the most likely location for the Canadian deployment, although the Canadian troops could eventually be divided among several African locations. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan visited Mali and neighbouring Senegal last week, and his department earlier sent a reconnaissance team to Mali to scout out a possible peacekeeping mission.
Mali has endured civil war and terrorist attacks for much of the past five years. Radical Islamist militias won control of northern Mali in 2012, until they were pushed back by French and Malian forces. Terrorist attacks have continued since then, making Mali the deadliest country in the world for United Nations peacekeepers. More than 100 peacekeepers have been killed there since 2013, including more than 30 this year alone.
Asked about the dangers of a Mali mission, Mr. Sajjan told reporters this week that “radical groups” are a threat to UN peacekeeping missions in many parts of the world.
“Peacekeeping of today is much different from before,” he told reporters in Ottawa on Monday. “It’s far more complex. … And that’s why we want to make sure that we take our time, to make sure that we get all the necessary information on how we can actually reduce the threat.”
Before any Canadian troops are deployed, they will get “the right pre-deployment training, the right equipment … and the right rules of engagement to be able to not only defend themselves, but also the civilian population that they’re there to protect,” Mr. Sajjan said.
The dangers of a Mali mission were sharply highlighted last week when a UN peacekeeper was killed and seven others were injured in an attack on a military convoy in central Mali on the first day of Mr. Sajjan’s visit to the country.
The new report by Conflict Armament Research confirms that huge numbers of weapons have been smuggled into Mali from the vast arsenals of Moammar Gadhafi, the Libyan dictator who was killed in 2011 after a military intervention by Western countries, including Canada. Those arsenals were “one of the largest and most diverse conventional weapon stockpiles of any African country,” the report says.
Weapons from the Gadhafi stockpiles fuelled the 2012 insurgencies in northern Mali and later spread to several other countries in West Africa, even reaching Syria, where they were used by Islamic State forces, the report says.
Among the Libyan weapons obtained by rebels in Mali and neighbouring countries were Russian-made MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems), a shoulder-fired missile that can destroy helicopters and other aircraft. These would be of particular concern to Ottawa, since Canadian tactical helicopters could be deployed in Mali if there is a Canadian peacekeeping mission there.
Showing posts with label Peace Making. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Peace Making. Show all posts
Monday, November 21, 2016
Sending Canadian Peacekeepers to Mali should be an obvious choice
By: Campbell Clark, Globe and Mail
A month ago, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau knew that a return to UN peacekeeping would automatically be seen as a useful global contribution by Canada’s major ally in Washington. Donald Trump’s election changed that.
That’s why sending Canadian peacekeepers to Mali should now be an obvious political choice for the government, which has pledged to announce a deployment of up to 600 peacekeepers within weeks.
It’s not that the African country matters to Mr. Trump. It seems likely the president-elect couldn’t find Mali on a map and that his national-security staff might not bother pointing to it in his early briefings. But Mr. Trump’s priority is combatting the spread of Islamist terror, and that’s key to the mission in Mali.
That makes sending peacekeepers to Mali just the sort of international security initiative that fits a Canadian Liberal prime minister.
“It has both the realpolitik as well as the more idealistic liberal international justifications,” said Walter Dorn, an expert in peacekeeping and professor at the Royal Military College and the Canadian Forces College.
Mr. Trudeau’s Liberals want to embrace do-gooding internationalism that makes peacekeeping popular with Canadians. It was also something U.S. President Barack Obama urged allies to do.
Mr. Trump, however, doesn’t appear to have any interest in UN peacekeeping. But that still might suit Mr. Trudeau in one way: When the U.S. president is unpopular in Canada, Liberal prime ministers like to be perceived as pursuing an “independent” foreign policy.
Even so, it’s still valuable to be seen as a useful ally in Washington. Canada depends on U.S. co-operation. When the U.S. and other allies complain Canada’s military spending is half its expected NATO obligation, Ottawa likes to point to an active role in missions. Canada has troops advising Kurdish peshmerga forces in Iraq and joined efforts to bolster NATO presence in Eastern Europe, but Ottawa will also hope its peacekeeping mission will be seen in Washington as helpful.
Mali means sharp-ended UN peacekeeping. It operates alongside a French-led counterterrorism mission fighting insurgents in northern Mali and across the Sahel-Sahara region. The peacekeepers are trying to stabilize the country, including the vast north that still suffers disaffection from the government in Bamako – the same vacuum that helped fuel insurgents who were on the verge of taking the capital in 2013, until French troops intervened.
Mr. Trudeau’s government hasn’t yet said where in Africa it will deploy peacekeepers. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan visited Mali earlier this month, but the Liberals have also considered UN missions in Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There are arguments for going to a less-dangerous place. Former senator and retired lieutenant-general Roméo Dallaire has suggested Canada should send troops to CAR, where peacekeepers are tasked with tamping down sectarian violence. Ottawa is likely to choose one main mission but could send a handful of troops to others.
But there are also calls for Canada to send its peacekeepers to Mali precisely because it is dangerous. The UN’s under-secretary-general for peacekeeping field support, Atul Khare, said this weekend the Mali mission needs critical elements like helicopters.
“I think the most important contributions currently would be devoted to Mali,” he said in Halifax after meeting Mr. Sajjan and his British counterpart, Michael Fallon.
Mr. Dorn thinks Canadian troops would be more useful in Mali. They have Afghanistan experience, can offer equipment such as Chinook helicopters and expertise such as engineering, communications and possibly intelligence – the Mali mission has more intelligence personnel than any UN mission before it.
But it is more dangerous. So far, 109 peacekeepers have died, including a Togolese soldier two weeks ago. Statistically, Mr. Dorn said, peacekeepers in Mali have a 0.3-per-cent chance of fatality, compared with 1 per cent for Canadian troops in Afghanistan. That’s the biggest risk Mr. Trudeau’s Liberals must weigh. But the Mali mission has a purpose, protecting civilians in a fragile country threatened by insurgents, and it’s one that can be clearly explained to left and right, around the world, in Washington and at home.
A month ago, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau knew that a return to UN peacekeeping would automatically be seen as a useful global contribution by Canada’s major ally in Washington. Donald Trump’s election changed that.
That’s why sending Canadian peacekeepers to Mali should now be an obvious political choice for the government, which has pledged to announce a deployment of up to 600 peacekeepers within weeks.
It’s not that the African country matters to Mr. Trump. It seems likely the president-elect couldn’t find Mali on a map and that his national-security staff might not bother pointing to it in his early briefings. But Mr. Trump’s priority is combatting the spread of Islamist terror, and that’s key to the mission in Mali.
That makes sending peacekeepers to Mali just the sort of international security initiative that fits a Canadian Liberal prime minister.
“It has both the realpolitik as well as the more idealistic liberal international justifications,” said Walter Dorn, an expert in peacekeeping and professor at the Royal Military College and the Canadian Forces College.
Mr. Trudeau’s Liberals want to embrace do-gooding internationalism that makes peacekeeping popular with Canadians. It was also something U.S. President Barack Obama urged allies to do.
Mr. Trump, however, doesn’t appear to have any interest in UN peacekeeping. But that still might suit Mr. Trudeau in one way: When the U.S. president is unpopular in Canada, Liberal prime ministers like to be perceived as pursuing an “independent” foreign policy.
Even so, it’s still valuable to be seen as a useful ally in Washington. Canada depends on U.S. co-operation. When the U.S. and other allies complain Canada’s military spending is half its expected NATO obligation, Ottawa likes to point to an active role in missions. Canada has troops advising Kurdish peshmerga forces in Iraq and joined efforts to bolster NATO presence in Eastern Europe, but Ottawa will also hope its peacekeeping mission will be seen in Washington as helpful.
Mali means sharp-ended UN peacekeeping. It operates alongside a French-led counterterrorism mission fighting insurgents in northern Mali and across the Sahel-Sahara region. The peacekeepers are trying to stabilize the country, including the vast north that still suffers disaffection from the government in Bamako – the same vacuum that helped fuel insurgents who were on the verge of taking the capital in 2013, until French troops intervened.
Mr. Trudeau’s government hasn’t yet said where in Africa it will deploy peacekeepers. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan visited Mali earlier this month, but the Liberals have also considered UN missions in Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There are arguments for going to a less-dangerous place. Former senator and retired lieutenant-general Roméo Dallaire has suggested Canada should send troops to CAR, where peacekeepers are tasked with tamping down sectarian violence. Ottawa is likely to choose one main mission but could send a handful of troops to others.
But there are also calls for Canada to send its peacekeepers to Mali precisely because it is dangerous. The UN’s under-secretary-general for peacekeeping field support, Atul Khare, said this weekend the Mali mission needs critical elements like helicopters.
“I think the most important contributions currently would be devoted to Mali,” he said in Halifax after meeting Mr. Sajjan and his British counterpart, Michael Fallon.
Mr. Dorn thinks Canadian troops would be more useful in Mali. They have Afghanistan experience, can offer equipment such as Chinook helicopters and expertise such as engineering, communications and possibly intelligence – the Mali mission has more intelligence personnel than any UN mission before it.
But it is more dangerous. So far, 109 peacekeepers have died, including a Togolese soldier two weeks ago. Statistically, Mr. Dorn said, peacekeepers in Mali have a 0.3-per-cent chance of fatality, compared with 1 per cent for Canadian troops in Afghanistan. That’s the biggest risk Mr. Trudeau’s Liberals must weigh. But the Mali mission has a purpose, protecting civilians in a fragile country threatened by insurgents, and it’s one that can be clearly explained to left and right, around the world, in Washington and at home.
Thursday, November 3, 2016
Should Canada do battle to keep peace in Africa?
By: KENNEDY JAWOKO, Toronto Star
On June 6, 2014, a few hours after sunset, armed men opened fire on an outdoor church ceremony in Mutarule, a small village in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The assailants attacked the village with rifles and grenade launchers, shooting civilians at close range and then burning them alive.
The number of Canadian Forces troops and rules of engagement matter a great deal to the protection of civilians.
On June 6, 2014, a few hours after sunset, armed men opened fire on an outdoor church ceremony in Mutarule, a small village in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The assailants attacked the village with rifles and grenade launchers, shooting civilians at close range and then burning them alive.
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| An offensive use of force by Canada during its UN peacekeeping mission in Africa should reduce violence against civilians, writes Kennedy Jawoko. (ED JONES / ED JONES/AFP/GETTY IMAGES) |
A survivor described the experience to Human Rights Watch: “We heard bullets coming from all sides. We all got down on the ground. They came in by the door and were in camouflage military uniforms. There were many of them. The first one said: ‘Exterminate them.’ Then they started shooting.”
All told, the attackers killed 38 villagers in a few hours, including at least nine children. Many more were injured, stabbed with bayonets or burned past recognition.
That’s the picture Canadian peacekeepers are likely to come face-to-face with when Canada returns to peacekeeping in an era where the rules of engagement are non-existent.
The tragedy in Mutarule could have been avoided. A United Nations peacekeeping base, located just an eight-minute drive away, received frantic phone calls from villagers asking for help as the massacre began. Although the peacekeeping mission in the DRC has the authority to use force to protect civilians, UN soldiers stayed in their barracks.
This week the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sacked the commander of a peacekeeping force in South Sudan following a damning report that accused the blue helmets of failing to protect civilians during an outbreak of violence in July that killed dozens of people. Investigators concluded peacekeepers abandoned their posts and failed to respond to pleas for help from aid workers under attack.
These reports illustrate how peacekeepers’ choices — in particular the choice to use force — matter a great deal to the protection of civilians. For the past 15 years, UN peacekeepers have had robust mandates that require them to protect civilians and authorize them to use force beyond self-defence to achieve that goal. Despite these changes, long-standing debates on the offensive use of force in peacekeeping continue.
A Nanos Research survey conducted for CTV News last month found that nearly 70 per cent of Canadians support deploying Canadian Forces on UN peacekeeping missions in active fighting areas. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has committed to deploying 600 Canadian troops on UN peacekeeping missions. If Canadian peacekeepers were to use force beyond self-defence, then I believe four key factors should be taken into consideration.
First, the deployment of a large number of peacekeepers will likely amplify the deterrent effect of the use of force. When they intervened, blue helmets in Congo simultaneously launched offensives and deployed in greater numbers to war-affected regions. This combination probably did more to change the calculus of rebels than the offensive use of force alone, which failed to quell rebel violence against civilians in other cases.
Second, Canadian Forces should also weigh the capacity of rebel groups, compared to peacekeepers and their allies, when contemplating the use of force. UN peacekeepers and the Congolese army failed to change the behaviour of sophisticated rebel groups. These large and well-trained forces, with external financial or military support, continued to target civilians during and after the offensive use of force.
Third, Canadian peacekeepers might not be able to protect civilians through the use of force when the national government allies with a rebel group that commits atrocities. In these situations, Canada might have to turn to other tools to persuade the government to reconsider the alliance or to otherwise protect civilians. These tools might include diplomatic pressure, use of media, or threatening to suspend certain forms of co-operation with the government.
Lastly, rebel groups that operate out of a vast and remote forest, employ hit-and-run tactics, and disappear into the local population might not often respond to the offensive use of force. These guerrilla tactics mean offensive use of force might not bring about a decrease in rebel violence against civilians.
Research shows that deploying large numbers of peacekeepers does reduce violence against civilians. I believe the offensive use of force amplifies that effect. When Canada takes the initiative, it should do so with a sufficient number of troops — both civilian and military — not just 600 pairs of boots on the ground.
----
Kennedy Jawoko is a professor at Seneca College. He has conducted research on media and conflict in South Sudan.
All told, the attackers killed 38 villagers in a few hours, including at least nine children. Many more were injured, stabbed with bayonets or burned past recognition.
That’s the picture Canadian peacekeepers are likely to come face-to-face with when Canada returns to peacekeeping in an era where the rules of engagement are non-existent.
The tragedy in Mutarule could have been avoided. A United Nations peacekeeping base, located just an eight-minute drive away, received frantic phone calls from villagers asking for help as the massacre began. Although the peacekeeping mission in the DRC has the authority to use force to protect civilians, UN soldiers stayed in their barracks.
This week the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sacked the commander of a peacekeeping force in South Sudan following a damning report that accused the blue helmets of failing to protect civilians during an outbreak of violence in July that killed dozens of people. Investigators concluded peacekeepers abandoned their posts and failed to respond to pleas for help from aid workers under attack.
These reports illustrate how peacekeepers’ choices — in particular the choice to use force — matter a great deal to the protection of civilians. For the past 15 years, UN peacekeepers have had robust mandates that require them to protect civilians and authorize them to use force beyond self-defence to achieve that goal. Despite these changes, long-standing debates on the offensive use of force in peacekeeping continue.
A Nanos Research survey conducted for CTV News last month found that nearly 70 per cent of Canadians support deploying Canadian Forces on UN peacekeeping missions in active fighting areas. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has committed to deploying 600 Canadian troops on UN peacekeeping missions. If Canadian peacekeepers were to use force beyond self-defence, then I believe four key factors should be taken into consideration.
First, the deployment of a large number of peacekeepers will likely amplify the deterrent effect of the use of force. When they intervened, blue helmets in Congo simultaneously launched offensives and deployed in greater numbers to war-affected regions. This combination probably did more to change the calculus of rebels than the offensive use of force alone, which failed to quell rebel violence against civilians in other cases.
Second, Canadian Forces should also weigh the capacity of rebel groups, compared to peacekeepers and their allies, when contemplating the use of force. UN peacekeepers and the Congolese army failed to change the behaviour of sophisticated rebel groups. These large and well-trained forces, with external financial or military support, continued to target civilians during and after the offensive use of force.
Third, Canadian peacekeepers might not be able to protect civilians through the use of force when the national government allies with a rebel group that commits atrocities. In these situations, Canada might have to turn to other tools to persuade the government to reconsider the alliance or to otherwise protect civilians. These tools might include diplomatic pressure, use of media, or threatening to suspend certain forms of co-operation with the government.
Lastly, rebel groups that operate out of a vast and remote forest, employ hit-and-run tactics, and disappear into the local population might not often respond to the offensive use of force. These guerrilla tactics mean offensive use of force might not bring about a decrease in rebel violence against civilians.
Research shows that deploying large numbers of peacekeepers does reduce violence against civilians. I believe the offensive use of force amplifies that effect. When Canada takes the initiative, it should do so with a sufficient number of troops — both civilian and military — not just 600 pairs of boots on the ground.
----
Kennedy Jawoko is a professor at Seneca College. He has conducted research on media and conflict in South Sudan.
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