RCN Facing Mold Problems

By: Murray Brewster, CBC News 

A newly released report blames a build-up of potentially hazardous mold aboard Canada's frontline warships squarely on a lack of upkeep by the navy.

The engineering analysis — obtained by CBC News under access to information after an almost two-year battle — said shipboard heating and air conditioning structures (HVAC) and their associated controls were allowed to deteriorate over the years to the point where they became almost useless.

The systems have "significantly degraded," said a March 2015 engineering report prepared for the navy by an outside contractor. "Little maintenance has been performed and the state of equipment is old and unsupportable."

Thermostats and pneumatic devices, meant to control airflow and humidity, were "failing, outdated and unsupportable," said the engineering analysis by the firm Bronswerk.

The report is the first clear effort to assign blame for a hazard the navy has tried to control. It could even have legal ramifications.

A former sailor, retired lieutenant Alan Doucette, is suing the federal government over the "staggering mold growth" aboard navy destroyers in the early 2000s. He alleges exposure to the mold ruined his health and that the navy "failed to take appropriate action in order to ensure the health and wellness" of serving men and women.

Retired chief petty officer Patrick MacLaughlin said the failure to keep the ships' HVAC systems up-to-date should not be laid at the feet of individual sailors or those responsible for day-to-day maintenance.

The equipment, he said, should have been swapped out at least 15 years ago — particularly the thermostat controls, which regulate humidity and condensation buildup.

"We tried to get things done," said MacLaughlin, who has been a vocal critic of the navy's approach to the problem. The leadership "needed to go to NDHQ (National Defence Headquarters) and ask for the funding. They didn't."

Blame the navy

Commodore Simon Page, the navy's director general of maritime equipment, denied the navy is solely responsible for the problem.

"My personal assessment is that is this not a problem of our own making," said Page, adding warship interiors tend to be humid spaces.

He pushed back against the claim that "little maintenance" was performed, saying the navy does its "due diligence" and carries out the necessary work.

"It is possible sometimes that maintenance is deferred, but if it is deferred we have a measure to catch up," said Page.

The Bronswerk report was prepared after the contractor surveyed several Halifax-class frigates — which were, at the time, being modernized under a $4.3 billion, multi-year program.

CBC News was the first to reveal the navy's struggle with mold in pictures and video broadcast in the summer of 2016 — a situation a former fleet commander tried to downplay at the time by saying there was "absolutely no concern."

Rear-Admiral Craig Baines, who in 2016 was the commodore in charge of the East Coast fleet, acknowledged mold was a problem but insisted the navy was conducting regular air quality monitoring and there had been no reports of illness.

CBC News requested copies of engineering and health assessment reports under access to information legislation in August 2016.

Just last week, National Defence released technical assessments and minutes of fleet operations and maintenance meetings dating back several years, but did not produce any monitoring reports.

The department also has yet to produce evidence that health monitoring took place after the issue of mold growth in various compartments was flagged as a concern aboard HMCS St. John's in the fall of 2011.

Officials in the access to information branch insisted Wednesday those reports are forthcoming.

Page said he could not speak to the withholding of documents, but said he stands by Baines' assessment of two years ago and insisted "the small amount of mold" they see in the warships is not a significant source of concern.
The 'AC flu'

Sailors have complained informally for years about a myriad of health issues while serving on deployed ships, describing recurring colds and breathing trouble as "AC flu" or the "CPF hack" — CPF being an abbreviation for Canadian Patrol Frigate.

The records show there was considerable internal debate among top naval engineers, particularly over 2014-15, about how to deal with the mold problem.

Some ships bought dehumidifiers. MacLaughlin said they were often purchased at Canadian Tire. That approach, however, was criticized internally as an attempt to "treat the symptom rather than the cause."

Navy officials were also seriously divided about whether to issue a fleet-wide technical bulletin giving warship crews instructions on mold cleaning.

"The info is very simple/easy and there is concern that releasing a [technical bulletin] on mold cleaning procedures may cause undo (sic) panic for such [a] minor instruction," said a Dec. 8, 2015.

That directive was finally issued last year.

The navy has started a series of engineering fixes on each of the frigates to address the ventilation issues. Part of the plan is a program to swap out the thermostats.

Page said two of the frigates have had the work done already and four more are slated for it in the near future.

The navy also has conducted hazardous air quality assessments.

A report on HMCS Winnipeg obtained by CBC News said mold was found in four compartments, including the ship's galley.

"It was a surface sample," said Page. "Surface mold can be addressed in a very aggressive and immediate manner, which was done."

NORAD Struggles for Relevance after 60 Years

By: Andrea Charron The Conversation 
Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) will celebrate its 60th anniversary this week.

On May 12, 1958, the United States and Canada, recognizing that it made more sense to defend the airspace of North America together rather than separately, signed the first NORAD agreement.

This mutual defence logic, which drove the joint defence of North America following more than a decade of bilateral air defence, made infinite sense during the Cold War, when both states were threatened by the Soviet Union and its bear bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

As the world has changed, however, so have the threats facing North America, including threats emanating from within the continent that resulted in the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, requiring NORAD to adapt.

Canada and the United States have been “partners in defence” in NORAD since the beginning. Indeed, the agreement requires that the NORAD commander be chosen from one country and the deputy commander from the other.

The NORAD commander, currently Lori J. Robinson, has always been American; the deputy commander, currently Pierre St-Amand, has always been Canadian by convention, but Canada must agree to the U.S. choice of commander before the nomination is sent to the U.S. Senate for approval.

Lori J. Robinson, the first woman to lead a top-tier U.S. military command, is seen in this May 2016 photo in Colorado. (AP Photo/Brennan Linsley)

This speaks to the truly remarkable nature of the binational agreement. NORAD is charged with the combined defence of both the U.S. and Canada, and the commander of NORAD is responsible to the highest levels of both governments via the Secretary of Defense and the President on the American side, and to the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister in Canada.
Canadian in charge on 9/11

A Canadian, however, may find himself or herself responsible for the air defence of both states during a crisis, as was the case when then Maj.-Gen. Eric “Rick” Findley of the Royal Canadian Air Force was on watch as director of operations on 9/11, overseeing both Canadian and U.S. personnel at NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center.

The Canadian contribution also includes its NORAD regional headquarters based in Winnipeg, the maintenance of the North Warning System in the Arctic that provides vital aerospace surveillance information, data on maritime activity approaching North America and fighter jets to intercept potential threats.

Canada’s smaller military force, including approximately 150 personnel at NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, contributes a lot to NORAD. But that contribution isn’t well known, nor is the importance of NORAD to both countries fully appreciated.

NORAD today is largely out of sight and out of mind, best known as the organization that “tracks Santa.”

The organization, however, has evolved, adapted and modernized, providing aid to drug interdiction missions in the 1980s and adding a maritime warning mission in 2006 to its aerospace warning and control missions.

Both the U.S. and Canada reflexively point to NORAD as proof of excellent relations between the two countries. And yet, few outside NORAD grasp the significant changes that have taken place and will need to be made in the very near future if NORAD is to continue to “deter, detect and defeat” threats to North America.
Questions and the need to adapt

First, threats can originate from multiple domains: Air, sea, cyberspace, aerospace, land and space to threaten North America. Does a command with responsibility in only three of the domains —air, aerospace and maritime — still make sense?

Second, is NORAD currently organized optimally to react to threats? Does it make sense for the commander of NORAD to be involved in operational-level decisions (for example, allocation of NORAD aircraft to specific regions) or should the Commander and her team focus their attention on broader strategic implications and how NORAD coordinates with allies and other combatant commands?

Third, does NORAD have the right information at the right time to make decisions? Given that a vital source of such information comes from an aged North Warning System about to reach its end of life, what could replace it, with what capabilities and at what cost?

And finally, what might be the future of NORAD in another 60 years’ time? Will Mexico be invited to join? Will Greenland play a greater role? Might NORAD become a multi-domain, multi-partner, multi-mission North American defense command, dropping reference to “aerospace” altogether?

No organization is more focused on all of these questions than NORAD itself, but what about the Canadian and U.S. governments and Canadian and American citizens and stakeholders?

On NORAD’s 60th birthday, a good start to looking ahead would be to pause and consider the contributions, challenges and failures of the command and reflect on its six decades of adaptation.

Anniversary celebrations will be held in Colorado Springs on May 12 and in Winnipeg on May 24.

And if you look to the sky in those cities, you may see a reminder of NORAD and its constant watch over North America with a fighter jet flyby. Such an important binational agreement, coupled with potentially significant changes in the future, merits all of our attention.

More RCAF Helicopters a Possibility for Mali Mission

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch 

The number of helicopters the RCAF will eventually send to Mali continues to be uncertain.

Canada has announced it will send two Chinook and four armed Griffon escort helicopters to Mali. 

In mid-March Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan announced that Canada would send to the United Nations mission in Mali two Chinook helicopters and four armed Griffon helicopters to escort them. A few minutes later at the same news conference Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Jon Vance said the number of helicopters being assigned to the Mali mission have still not been determined as a reconnaissance had to be carried out.

A short time after that, Sajjan’s office sent out a message to journalists, contradicting Vance by stating that ‘up to’ two Chinooks and four Griffons would be sent.

Now in a response from the Canadian Forces to a series of questions about the Mali mission submitted by Defence Watch, it appears changes are again in the works…maybe…. “Details regarding tactics, risk mitigation, and force protection measures are yet to be finalized and many considerations need to be made,” the Canadian Forces noted in an email. “For instance, regarding operational sustainment, considerations include the possibility of deploying spare helicopters. As planning continues, we will be able to confirm such details in the near future.”

The response didn’t indicate whether that refers to spare Chinooks, Griffons, or both.

In addition, there are no details yet on costs….not even a ballpark figure on what Canadian taxpayers will have to spend for this one-year mission.