By: Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press
OTTAWA — The United Nations is pushing back against restrictions Canada wants to put on the use of a military transport plane it promised to deploy in Africa.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau first announced in November 2017 that Canada would send a C-130 Hercules to Uganda as part of a larger package of pledges to the UN.
The idea at the time was for the plane to ferry troops, equipment and supplies from the UN's logistics hub in Entebbe to different peacekeeping missions around the region.
Multiple sources say the offer of the plane came as a surprise to the UN, and the plan has run into numerous snags as Canadian, Ugandan and UN officials wrangle over the details.
One UN official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of diplomatic sensitivities, says Canada recently provided a list of conditions about where and when the plane can be used.
Those included a stipulation the plane only fly in daylight and only between Entebbe and five locations that, according to the UN official, either don't have any peacekeeping units or are easily accessible by road.
As a result, the UN told Canada the arrangement did not meet its needs.
Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan spokesman Todd Lane would not comment specifically on the concerns raised by the UN, but both sides say they continue to talk about the aircraft.
"We continue to be in discussions with the UN on how we can deliver on this pledge in a way that best fits the UN's current requirements," Lane said in an email.
News of the back-and-forth comes just ahead of a major peacekeeping summit in New York Friday, the first since Canada hosted a similar gathering in Vancouver, where Trudeau pledged the Hercules plane.
It also coincides with the UN pressing Canada to extend its mission in Mali by two-and-a-half months to prevent a gap in lifesaving medical evacuations.
Canada has eight helicopters and 250 peacekeepers in Mali providing medical evacuations to injured UN troops and workers. Operations are due to end on July 31, though Romanian replacements won't arrive until mid-October.
Both episodes speak to the UN's apparent frustration with Canada, said University of Montreal peacekeeping expert Jocelyn Coulon, who served as an adviser to then-foreign affairs minister Stephane Dion.
"What I can't understand from the Canadian government is why it is so complicated to negotiate with the UN," Coulon added in an interview from France.
"Canada seems to be dragging its feet every time the UN is asking something, and it doesn't seem to be complicated with NATO when you have to provide troops and material for Latvia or even to renew our commitment in Ukraine."
The Trudeau government announced last week that it was extending Canada's military missions in Ukraine and Iraq by several years, but has yet to respond to the UN's request on Mali.
The problem is that there's no champion for peacekeeping at the top levels of government, said Walter Dorn, a peacekeeping expert at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.
That extends to Trudeau and Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland, who Dorn said are preoccupied with Russia and the U.S., while defence chief Gen. Jonathan Vance has been very particular about where to send troops.
"So it just leads to all these delays."
Showing posts with label Canada and the UN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Canada and the UN. Show all posts
Thursday, March 28, 2019
Canadian Peacekeepers Evacuate Wounded French Soldiers in Mali
By: Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press
Canadian peacekeepers were called upon to evacuate several wounded French soldiers in Mali earlier this month after their patrol was ambushed while hunting for militants along the border with Niger.
The previously unreported incident marks the first time the Canadians have been asked to help non-United Nations forces in Mali, where the French have been conducting counter-insurgency operations since 2014.
READ MORE: Canadian peacekeepers in Mali challenged by geography, shifting violence
Canada has eight helicopters and 250 military personnel in Mali, where they have been providing emergency medical evacuations and transporting troops and equipment across a large swath of the remote African country.
The Canadians have conducted seven other medical evacuations since August, all of which involved injured UN troops and workers.
In an interview with The Canadian Press, the commander of Canada’s task force in Mali said the UN and France have agreed to help each other in extreme circumstances and that his peacekeepers did their jobs by helping save lives.
“I wouldn’t want people to presume or assume that we’re supporting counterterrorism efforts,” said Col. Travis Morehen. “But it’s really at this point about saving allied lives.”
News of the French evacuation comes as the federal government is contemplating a formal UN request to extend its peacekeeping mission in Mali, which is currently set to end at the end of July.
France has about 3,000 heavily armed soldiers in Mali and the surrounding region hunting militants linked to al-Qaida, the Islamic State and other extremist groups through what is known as Operation Barkhane.
While Operation Barkhane has been credited with keeping the numerous Islamic extremist groups in Mali off balance, it has also been accused in some corners of contributing to instability in the region.
READ MORE: Canada’s on a new kind of mission in Mali — mixing peacekeeping with counterterrorism
According to media reports, a French patrol was operating near Mali’s border with Niger on March 10 when they were ambushed by a vehicle packed with explosives and a group of militants on motorcycles.
Fifteen French soldiers were reportedly injured, two seriously before the militants fled.
The Canadians first learned about the attack when a French officer at the Operation Barkhane camp in Gao called while it was still happening and indicated an emergency medical evacuation might be required, said Morehen.
The French counter-terror mission operates largely independently from the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, but Morehen says there is a good working relationship between the two.
That includes the French providing air-traffic control services to the UN around Gao, the northern Malian city that is home to several military bases, including one belonging to Barkhane and another where the Canadians are located.
The French also boast a more capable hospital than the UN, Morehen said, which is why the Canadians often end up bringing any wounded peacekeepers that they pick up in the field to the Barkhane camp.
“So our pilots go over there and make sure that we have our flying procedures correct and we have a technical arrangement with them as well for medical support,” Morehen said.
“There’s lots of sharing between us, which is all blessed by our governments.”
READ MORE: UN reports sharp deterioration in Mali since Canadian peacekeepers arrived
Three Canadian helicopters were quickly deployed with approval from the UN mission commander in Bamako, Morehen said, and arrived at the scene about two hours later, at which point the fighting was over.
Because of the distance, the two smaller Griffon escorts were redirected to a nearby town to refuel while the larger Chinook, which is configured like a flying hospital, continued back to Gao alone with the injured French soldiers.
“It does increase the risk,” he said, “but we balanced it against the need to get those wounded back to medical facilities as soon as possible.”
While he agreed that it was “the right thing to do,” Walter Dorn, an expert on peacekeeping at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, said the evacuation nonetheless risked linking the UN and French missions in some minds.
“The risk is that we are associated with Barkhane and we then become subject to more attacks and the line between peacekeepers and counter-insurgency fighters is blurred,” Dorn said.
Morehen pushed back against such suggestions, insisting the evacuation was an extremely rare circumstance and that anyone who wants to target the UN – which has suffered dozens of casualties in Mali – will do so no matter what.
“The people that want to do people harm here, they’ve already got it formulated in their mind,” he said. “I don’t see how fathomable it is that we would be targeted because we gave a medevac to French forces.”
Canadian peacekeepers were called upon to evacuate several wounded French soldiers in Mali earlier this month after their patrol was ambushed while hunting for militants along the border with Niger.
The previously unreported incident marks the first time the Canadians have been asked to help non-United Nations forces in Mali, where the French have been conducting counter-insurgency operations since 2014.
READ MORE: Canadian peacekeepers in Mali challenged by geography, shifting violence
Canada has eight helicopters and 250 military personnel in Mali, where they have been providing emergency medical evacuations and transporting troops and equipment across a large swath of the remote African country.
The Canadians have conducted seven other medical evacuations since August, all of which involved injured UN troops and workers.
In an interview with The Canadian Press, the commander of Canada’s task force in Mali said the UN and France have agreed to help each other in extreme circumstances and that his peacekeepers did their jobs by helping save lives.
 |
| Prime Minister Trudeau visiting CAF members in Mali earlier this year. |
News of the French evacuation comes as the federal government is contemplating a formal UN request to extend its peacekeeping mission in Mali, which is currently set to end at the end of July.
France has about 3,000 heavily armed soldiers in Mali and the surrounding region hunting militants linked to al-Qaida, the Islamic State and other extremist groups through what is known as Operation Barkhane.
While Operation Barkhane has been credited with keeping the numerous Islamic extremist groups in Mali off balance, it has also been accused in some corners of contributing to instability in the region.
READ MORE: Canada’s on a new kind of mission in Mali — mixing peacekeeping with counterterrorism
According to media reports, a French patrol was operating near Mali’s border with Niger on March 10 when they were ambushed by a vehicle packed with explosives and a group of militants on motorcycles.
Fifteen French soldiers were reportedly injured, two seriously before the militants fled.
The Canadians first learned about the attack when a French officer at the Operation Barkhane camp in Gao called while it was still happening and indicated an emergency medical evacuation might be required, said Morehen.
The French counter-terror mission operates largely independently from the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, but Morehen says there is a good working relationship between the two.
 |
| Many critics have raised questions about Canada's mission in Mali - even asking if it is considered as Counter-Terrorism? |
That includes the French providing air-traffic control services to the UN around Gao, the northern Malian city that is home to several military bases, including one belonging to Barkhane and another where the Canadians are located.
The French also boast a more capable hospital than the UN, Morehen said, which is why the Canadians often end up bringing any wounded peacekeepers that they pick up in the field to the Barkhane camp.
“So our pilots go over there and make sure that we have our flying procedures correct and we have a technical arrangement with them as well for medical support,” Morehen said.
“There’s lots of sharing between us, which is all blessed by our governments.”
READ MORE: UN reports sharp deterioration in Mali since Canadian peacekeepers arrived
Three Canadian helicopters were quickly deployed with approval from the UN mission commander in Bamako, Morehen said, and arrived at the scene about two hours later, at which point the fighting was over.
Because of the distance, the two smaller Griffon escorts were redirected to a nearby town to refuel while the larger Chinook, which is configured like a flying hospital, continued back to Gao alone with the injured French soldiers.
“It does increase the risk,” he said, “but we balanced it against the need to get those wounded back to medical facilities as soon as possible.”
While he agreed that it was “the right thing to do,” Walter Dorn, an expert on peacekeeping at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, said the evacuation nonetheless risked linking the UN and French missions in some minds.
“The risk is that we are associated with Barkhane and we then become subject to more attacks and the line between peacekeepers and counter-insurgency fighters is blurred,” Dorn said.
Morehen pushed back against such suggestions, insisting the evacuation was an extremely rare circumstance and that anyone who wants to target the UN – which has suffered dozens of casualties in Mali – will do so no matter what.
“The people that want to do people harm here, they’ve already got it formulated in their mind,” he said. “I don’t see how fathomable it is that we would be targeted because we gave a medevac to French forces.”
Friday, October 19, 2018
Mali Mission has 'no prospect of immediate success: Former Op. Medusa Commander
Rachel Gilmore, CTV Power Play producer
The man who led Canada’s troops in Afghanistan said the Canadian peacekeeping mission in Mali has “no prospect of immediate success.”
The man who led Canada’s troops in Afghanistan said the Canadian peacekeeping mission in Mali has “no prospect of immediate success.”
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| Gao, Mali. July 18, 2018 – Photo has been digitally altered for operational security. Members of the CH-147 Chinook medical team practice exiting the helicopter under the watchful eye of the force protection team in support of Operation PRESENCE - Mali around Gao, Mali. (Photo: MCpl Jennifer Kusche) |
“The political overtones and what’s going on in this country and this mission are ugly,” retired major-general David Fraser told CTV’s Power Play host Don Martin on Monday.
“This is not going to be short mission.”
Canadian boots hit Malian soil in June for what has widely been regarded as a dangerous year-long peacekeeping mission. While Canada’s role is primarily to fly medical evacuation missions and provide support from the skies, the security situation in the region is said to have sharply deteriorated in recent months.
That’s something that hasn’t escaped Fraser’s notice.
“It’s as bad -- if not worse -- than what we experienced in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria,” Fraser said of the conditions in Mali.
“It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that this mission isn’t going in the right direction from a trajectory point of view.”
His comments echo the revelations of a United Nations report released Wednesday. The assessment, conducted by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, described a plummeting humanitarian situation in Mali. Food aid and other humanitarian relief is in overwhelming demand and the country, according to the report, is faring worse in many ways than when Canadian peacekeepers first arrived in June.
Fraser explained that the key issue marking this decline is a lack of leadership. Despite successful elections in July and August, he said the insurgents are “winning the fight on the ground.”
“Peacekeeping can’t be effective. It can’t be effective without a strong civilian government leadership that’s running the government, that’s actually providing oversight for the military and the police forces and that’s not happening fast enough,” Fraser said.
“The race is being won not by the government and not by the military -- it’s being won by the people we don’t want to win.”
That on-the ground reality means humanitarian efforts aren’t getting to where they need to be.
“Aid, from a strategic and from a tactical point of view, is not getting to the ground fast enough,” Fraser said.
And at the end of the day, Fraser warned this hurts some people more than others.
“The local people are the ones who are going to be adversely affected,” he said.
To change this, the UN needs a change in their approach, according to Fraser.
“The UN’s not getting the locals to get the leadership or the women engaged fast enough, and they’re going to lose this race.”
If nothing changes, Fraser warned, we can expect the situation to continue to deteriorate -- and the UN reports to harshen.
“The people that are adversely affected are women and children and the innocent people, which is just going to make the next report card even worse than this one,” he said.
“This is not going to be short mission.”
Canadian boots hit Malian soil in June for what has widely been regarded as a dangerous year-long peacekeeping mission. While Canada’s role is primarily to fly medical evacuation missions and provide support from the skies, the security situation in the region is said to have sharply deteriorated in recent months.
That’s something that hasn’t escaped Fraser’s notice.
“It’s as bad -- if not worse -- than what we experienced in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria,” Fraser said of the conditions in Mali.
“It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that this mission isn’t going in the right direction from a trajectory point of view.”
His comments echo the revelations of a United Nations report released Wednesday. The assessment, conducted by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, described a plummeting humanitarian situation in Mali. Food aid and other humanitarian relief is in overwhelming demand and the country, according to the report, is faring worse in many ways than when Canadian peacekeepers first arrived in June.
Fraser explained that the key issue marking this decline is a lack of leadership. Despite successful elections in July and August, he said the insurgents are “winning the fight on the ground.”
“Peacekeeping can’t be effective. It can’t be effective without a strong civilian government leadership that’s running the government, that’s actually providing oversight for the military and the police forces and that’s not happening fast enough,” Fraser said.
“The race is being won not by the government and not by the military -- it’s being won by the people we don’t want to win.”
That on-the ground reality means humanitarian efforts aren’t getting to where they need to be.
“Aid, from a strategic and from a tactical point of view, is not getting to the ground fast enough,” Fraser said.
And at the end of the day, Fraser warned this hurts some people more than others.
“The local people are the ones who are going to be adversely affected,” he said.
To change this, the UN needs a change in their approach, according to Fraser.
“The UN’s not getting the locals to get the leadership or the women engaged fast enough, and they’re going to lose this race.”
If nothing changes, Fraser warned, we can expect the situation to continue to deteriorate -- and the UN reports to harshen.
“The people that are adversely affected are women and children and the innocent people, which is just going to make the next report card even worse than this one,” he said.
Friday, October 12, 2018
UN Reports Situation in Mali Deteriorating
By: Lee Berthiaume, Global News
In a sobering new report, the head of the United Nations says the security situation in Mali has sharply deteriorated over the past three months even as demand for more food aid and other humanitarian assistance has skyrocketed.
READ MORE: Canadian troops ready as ‘complex’ Mali peacekeeping mission gets underway: commander
The assessment by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres coincides with the presence of Canadian peacekeepers in Mali, and suggests the country is in many ways worse off now than when they first arrived in June.
Not that there haven’t been some hopeful signs, including successful presidential elections in July and August and a marked decline in the number of peacekeepers killed or wounded despite continuing attacks by armed groups.
That is reflected in the fact that while the Canadian military’s primary task in Mali is to evacuate injured UN peacekeepers by helicopter, they have so far only conducted two such missions, both on Sept. 11.
Guterres nonetheless painted a picture of a country at war with itself as various ethnic and extremist groups targeted each other as well as the Malian military, international forces and even civilians.
The result was the largest number of civilians killed – 287 – in one three-month period since UN peacekeepers first arrived in the country in 2013, while thousands more have been forced to flee their homes to escape the violence.
Much of the fighting was between members of two different ethnic communities in the centre of the country, while groups linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State were also responsible for a great deal of violence.
READ MORE: Canada’s on a new kind of mission in Mali — mixing peacekeeping with counterterrorism
“Intercommunal conflict, exacerbated by violent extremist groups, is fraying an already fragile social fabric and is deeply concerning,” Guterres wrote. “Too high a human toll has accrued as a result of the ongoing spiral of violence.”
The number of human-rights violations in Mali, which was already troublingly high, was similarly worse because of hundreds of new extrajudicial killings, disappearances, tortures and rapes across different parts of the country.
While most of those atrocities were perpetrated by the Islamic groups and competing ethnic communities, the Malian military itself was implicated in 18 violations – including one mass killing that is being criminally investigated.
“The human rights situation is alarming,” Guterres wrote. “It is absolutely imperative that the government prevent human rights violations and abuses, including those committed by the Malian armed forces.”
Further adding to Malians’ woes were severe floods in some areas and drought in others that, when combined with the fighting, had doubled the number of internally displaced people and left one in four needing humanitarian aid.
“The level of needs of is higher than at any point since the beginning of the crisis in 2012,” Guterres wrote.
READ MORE: Jeff Semple: First impressions of Canadian peacekeepers in Mali
The country was plunged into turmoil after a rebellion in the north at the same time as the Malian military was staging a coup in the capital, Bamako.
Canadian peacekeepers recently helped the World Food Programme deliver more than two tonnes of food, water and medicine by helicopter to a village in central Mali.
Yet despite the growing need for more emergency aid, Guterres reported that only one-third of the roughly $400 million needed to help Malians had been provided to the UN by the beginning of September.
WATCH: Exclusive: Treacherous conditions for Canada’s troops in Mali
“While needs continue to increase, humanitarian funding has decreased, preventing a timely at-scale and appropriate response,” he wrote.
Canada has provided funding for various development projects and agencies in Mali, but Bruno Charbonneau, an expert on Mali at Laurentian University, said the $60 million in emergency aid given since 2012 is relatively small.
Most of that money was also pledged immediately after the rebellion in the north and the coup.
READ MORE: At least 6 soldiers killed in attack on military taskforce headquarters in central Mali
As for the bigger picture, Charbonneau said what is needed is more international focus on the centre of Mali and greater emphasis on development to tackle the root causes of the conflict.
“As long as the focus is on countering terrorism in the Sahel, everything else is secondary,” he said. “And I think it’s a bad reading of the situation based on assumptions about the dynamics of the conflict and its causes.”
In a sobering new report, the head of the United Nations says the security situation in Mali has sharply deteriorated over the past three months even as demand for more food aid and other humanitarian assistance has skyrocketed.
 |
| The UN Mali patch is shown on a Canadian forces member's uniform before boarding a plane at CFB Trenton in Trenton, Ont., on July 5, 2018. |
The assessment by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres coincides with the presence of Canadian peacekeepers in Mali, and suggests the country is in many ways worse off now than when they first arrived in June.
Not that there haven’t been some hopeful signs, including successful presidential elections in July and August and a marked decline in the number of peacekeepers killed or wounded despite continuing attacks by armed groups.
That is reflected in the fact that while the Canadian military’s primary task in Mali is to evacuate injured UN peacekeepers by helicopter, they have so far only conducted two such missions, both on Sept. 11.
Guterres nonetheless painted a picture of a country at war with itself as various ethnic and extremist groups targeted each other as well as the Malian military, international forces and even civilians.
The result was the largest number of civilians killed – 287 – in one three-month period since UN peacekeepers first arrived in the country in 2013, while thousands more have been forced to flee their homes to escape the violence.
Much of the fighting was between members of two different ethnic communities in the centre of the country, while groups linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State were also responsible for a great deal of violence.
READ MORE: Canada’s on a new kind of mission in Mali — mixing peacekeeping with counterterrorism
“Intercommunal conflict, exacerbated by violent extremist groups, is fraying an already fragile social fabric and is deeply concerning,” Guterres wrote. “Too high a human toll has accrued as a result of the ongoing spiral of violence.”
The number of human-rights violations in Mali, which was already troublingly high, was similarly worse because of hundreds of new extrajudicial killings, disappearances, tortures and rapes across different parts of the country.
While most of those atrocities were perpetrated by the Islamic groups and competing ethnic communities, the Malian military itself was implicated in 18 violations – including one mass killing that is being criminally investigated.
“The human rights situation is alarming,” Guterres wrote. “It is absolutely imperative that the government prevent human rights violations and abuses, including those committed by the Malian armed forces.”
Further adding to Malians’ woes were severe floods in some areas and drought in others that, when combined with the fighting, had doubled the number of internally displaced people and left one in four needing humanitarian aid.
“The level of needs of is higher than at any point since the beginning of the crisis in 2012,” Guterres wrote.
READ MORE: Jeff Semple: First impressions of Canadian peacekeepers in Mali
The country was plunged into turmoil after a rebellion in the north at the same time as the Malian military was staging a coup in the capital, Bamako.
Canadian peacekeepers recently helped the World Food Programme deliver more than two tonnes of food, water and medicine by helicopter to a village in central Mali.
Yet despite the growing need for more emergency aid, Guterres reported that only one-third of the roughly $400 million needed to help Malians had been provided to the UN by the beginning of September.
WATCH: Exclusive: Treacherous conditions for Canada’s troops in Mali
“While needs continue to increase, humanitarian funding has decreased, preventing a timely at-scale and appropriate response,” he wrote.
Canada has provided funding for various development projects and agencies in Mali, but Bruno Charbonneau, an expert on Mali at Laurentian University, said the $60 million in emergency aid given since 2012 is relatively small.
Most of that money was also pledged immediately after the rebellion in the north and the coup.
READ MORE: At least 6 soldiers killed in attack on military taskforce headquarters in central Mali
As for the bigger picture, Charbonneau said what is needed is more international focus on the centre of Mali and greater emphasis on development to tackle the root causes of the conflict.
“As long as the focus is on countering terrorism in the Sahel, everything else is secondary,” he said. “And I think it’s a bad reading of the situation based on assumptions about the dynamics of the conflict and its causes.”
Wednesday, July 18, 2018
Photos: Air Task Force Mali Arrive in Gao, Mali
Thanks to the Canadian Forces Combat Camera, the first images are surfacing from OP Presence, Canada's contribution to the UN mission in Mali.
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| Canada's contingent to the UN Mission in Mali includes a large Female presence. |
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| Canadian Forces members meet their German counterparts at Camp Castor, Gao, Mali. |
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| An RCAF CH-147 Chinook arrives at Camp Castor in Gao, Mali on July 15, 2018. Photo: MCpl Jennifer Kusche. Note the door gun MG in the Chinook for suppression during medevac or transport missions. |
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| A CH-146 Griffon with door gunner arrives at Camp Castor in Gao, Mali on July 15, 2018. Photo: MCpl Jennifer Kusche |
Monday, July 16, 2018
Eggleton: CAF Pulling Its Own Weight
By: Art Eggleton, Toronto Star - Opinions
As NATO leaders prepare for their upcoming summit in Brussels, U.S. President Donald Trump is complaining about Canada and other allies not spending enough on their military operations. This brings into play the goal from past summits of each country spending 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence.
There are two problems with this 2 per cent of GDP figure. First, meeting it would increase defence spending by approximately two thirds in Canada, and secondly, it is the wrong measurement for capabilities and contributions to NATO.
A two thirds defence expenditure hike would necessitate either substantial tax increases and/or significant reductions in other government programs and services, including social support measures. I consider that unrealistic and unacceptable.
GDP can go up or down, or it can be stagnant. If we have robust economic growth over the next decade, getting to 2 per cent will become even more expensive and challenging. If we unfortunately experience a recession, then our percentage of GDP for military expenditure can increase without spending a dollar more.
What sense does that make in terms of measuring capabilities and contributions? Also, only four of 29 NATO countries currently meet the 2 per cent goal. And the goal is not compulsory; or, as the Harper government said after the last summit in Wales, it is “aspirational.”
In my five years serving as Minister of National Defence in the Chrétien cabinet, I never came to appreciate that 2 per cent of GDP was the appropriate way to measure our contributions as a member of the alliance.
That was verified by NATO officials Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams, who wrote: “the 2 per cent takes no account of the ebbs and flows of economic fortunes; is vulnerable to changing circumstances and domestic pressure, both in terms of the security requirements and the economic base; encourages creative accounting to satisfy targets; and provides zero guidance concerning precisely what capabilities are needed to counter the threats and challenges that NATO faces.”
If not 2 per cent of GDP then what?
We could, for example, measure per capita expenditures, in which case Canada ranks ninth out of 29 member states. Or a percentage of the federal government expenditures, in which case Canada ranks sixth. In either case, we rank above the NATO average if you exclude the United States, which is really in a league of its own, spending more than double on defence than all the other NATO countries combined.
Better still, shouldn’t we be measuring outputs and outcomes rather than input percentages? As Lunn and Williams suggest, the important measurement should be based on capabilities and contributions.
When it comes to capabilities, our Canadian Forces personnel are some of the best in the world. They are motivated, highly skilled and dedicated to their roles. Our allies around the world, including the U.S. military, recognize this.
We are no laggard when it comes to joint military exercises and contributing to multilateral missions. We don’t need all the equipment in the world — we work with our allies — but what’s important is the interoperability with them that strengthens the capabilities of our troops.
On the issue of equipment, NATO does want member countries to update their assets and the government has started to implement that request with budget increases this year and thereafter. This commitment is real investment in the equipment of our forces, one that is not tied to GDP but reflects actual military expenditures, and again contributes to capabilities.
When it comes to recent contributions, we have sent troops and equipment, along with our NATO allies, to operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and are currently leading a mission in Latvia. And now with the United Nations, they are headed to Mali.
It is these and other capabilities and contributions to the defining conflicts of our time that armed forces should be measured by — not something as flawed as a financial yardstick that is tied to GDP.
As NATO leaders prepare for their upcoming summit in Brussels, U.S. President Donald Trump is complaining about Canada and other allies not spending enough on their military operations. This brings into play the goal from past summits of each country spending 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence.
There are two problems with this 2 per cent of GDP figure. First, meeting it would increase defence spending by approximately two thirds in Canada, and secondly, it is the wrong measurement for capabilities and contributions to NATO.
/https://www.thestar.com/content/dam/thestar/opinion/contributors/2018/07/11/canadian-forces-are-pulling-their-weight/lth112486133.jpg) |
| The UN Mali patch is shown on a Canadian forces member's uniform before boarding a plane at CFB Trenton on Thursday. The soldiers are heading to Mali for Operation Presence, the military operation to support the United Nations peace mission. (LARS HAGBERG / THE CANADIAN PRESS) |
GDP can go up or down, or it can be stagnant. If we have robust economic growth over the next decade, getting to 2 per cent will become even more expensive and challenging. If we unfortunately experience a recession, then our percentage of GDP for military expenditure can increase without spending a dollar more.
What sense does that make in terms of measuring capabilities and contributions? Also, only four of 29 NATO countries currently meet the 2 per cent goal. And the goal is not compulsory; or, as the Harper government said after the last summit in Wales, it is “aspirational.”
In my five years serving as Minister of National Defence in the Chrétien cabinet, I never came to appreciate that 2 per cent of GDP was the appropriate way to measure our contributions as a member of the alliance.
That was verified by NATO officials Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams, who wrote: “the 2 per cent takes no account of the ebbs and flows of economic fortunes; is vulnerable to changing circumstances and domestic pressure, both in terms of the security requirements and the economic base; encourages creative accounting to satisfy targets; and provides zero guidance concerning precisely what capabilities are needed to counter the threats and challenges that NATO faces.”
If not 2 per cent of GDP then what?
We could, for example, measure per capita expenditures, in which case Canada ranks ninth out of 29 member states. Or a percentage of the federal government expenditures, in which case Canada ranks sixth. In either case, we rank above the NATO average if you exclude the United States, which is really in a league of its own, spending more than double on defence than all the other NATO countries combined.
Better still, shouldn’t we be measuring outputs and outcomes rather than input percentages? As Lunn and Williams suggest, the important measurement should be based on capabilities and contributions.
When it comes to capabilities, our Canadian Forces personnel are some of the best in the world. They are motivated, highly skilled and dedicated to their roles. Our allies around the world, including the U.S. military, recognize this.
We are no laggard when it comes to joint military exercises and contributing to multilateral missions. We don’t need all the equipment in the world — we work with our allies — but what’s important is the interoperability with them that strengthens the capabilities of our troops.
On the issue of equipment, NATO does want member countries to update their assets and the government has started to implement that request with budget increases this year and thereafter. This commitment is real investment in the equipment of our forces, one that is not tied to GDP but reflects actual military expenditures, and again contributes to capabilities.
When it comes to recent contributions, we have sent troops and equipment, along with our NATO allies, to operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and are currently leading a mission in Latvia. And now with the United Nations, they are headed to Mali.
It is these and other capabilities and contributions to the defining conflicts of our time that armed forces should be measured by — not something as flawed as a financial yardstick that is tied to GDP.
---
Senator Art Eggleton is a member of the Canadian Senate from Toronto. He currently serves as chair of the Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.
Friday, July 6, 2018
Opinion: Canada is Sending the Wrong Helicopters to Mali
By: Robert Smol, iPolitics
"Will our next round of UN peacekeepers have to engage, yet again, in that perennial Canadian military tradition of sending our military into harm’s way with far less than what our allies might provide to their forces?"A
For the last four years the German peacekeeping contingents, as well as the preceding Dutch, have struggled though the military and political quagmire of Mali with heavily armed, combat-proven attack helicopters operated by specially trained crews.
Quite appropriate for what is already considered the most dangerous peacekeeping operation attempted by the UN in its 73-year history.
But Canada does not own any attack helicopters. Instead our aging Griffon utility helicopters will be taking on armed escort responsibilities alongside our larger Chinook transport helicopters. Griffons were never designed to be an attack helicopter except in a pinch.
So the question needs to be asked: if Canada is expected to carry on and match the efforts of the Germans and Dutch will we have comparable capability in our improvised “armed” helicopters or will our next round of UN peacekeepers have to engage, yet again, in that perennial Canadian military tradition of sending our military into harm’s way with far less than what our allies might provide to their forces?
National Defence Headquarters, perhaps predictably, would not respond to my requests for information on any possible armament, sensor, and protective devices being installed on our 22-year old utility helicopters. However during the Afghan and Iraqi deployments , when Canadian troops were under the protective shield of US and allied attack helicopters and fighter aircraft, our Griffons were occasionally photographed carrying a door gunner positioned in the aircraft’s opening with a C-134 machine gun.
This haphazard, Vietnam-era “gun in the door” protection is quite consistent with the Griffon’s purpose. The Griffon is classified as a Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter. Its primary role, according to the RCAF website is “transportation of troops and material” making it more of a flying pick-up truck as opposed to highly agile flying tank that is a modern attack helicopter.
We should be concerned because, in Mali we will be away from the protective, largely U.S military shield that our military, not to mention the Canadian public, have come to expect in recent years.
So what did the preceding Dutch and German contingents in Mali have by way of armed helicopter escort? What level of armed, combat capability would our improvised, souped up utility helicopters have to match?
From 2014 to 2017 the Royal Netherlands Air Force deployed A-64D Apache attack helicopters to protect its assets. The Dutch Apache is armed with a 30mm automatic Boeing M230 chain gun that has a rate of fire of 625 rounds a minute. It also has a Lockheed Martin/Boeing AGM-114D hellfire air-to-surface missile with a range of 8-12 km. Also, depending on the nature of the threat, the Dutch Apache can also be mounted with Hydra 70 general purpose rockets and the AIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.
Equally lethal, the standard armament for the German Tiger attack helicopter, currently exiting Mali, include a 30 mm cannon with a rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. The Tiger can also be equipped 8 HOT Trigat anti-tank missiles, and 4 Stinger or Mistral short range air-to-air missiles. Also standard for the Tiger are two pods carrying 22 SNEB 68mm rockets.
Also impressive are the defensive countermeasure systems that are fitted to these flying tanks maximizing their survivability and effectiveness. These include, on both the German Tiger and the Dutch Apache a radar warning receiver, laser warning, and a chaff/flare dispenser. Crew survivability is also enhanced through the armoured protection given them a chance to make it back safely even after taking on enemy fire.
Could it be that Canada’s modified utility-transport helicopters, being deployed to Mali, are fitted with comparable armament and protection? Since we all know what the answer likely is the question then has to be asked: what level of additional support and compensation for our military weakness and vulnerabilities could we demand from the primary peacekeeping contingents in Mali which today are Burkina Faso, Chad, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Togo?
With Germany and the Netherlands out of the conflict, and the United States disengaged, it is from these country’s militaries that we will have to rely on once Mali’s Islamic militants realize that America’s most humble and obedient military servant (Canada) is facing them with utility transports posing as attack helicopters.
Welcome back to peacekeeping Canada!
—
The views, opinions and positions expressed by all iPolitics columnists and contributors are the author’s alone. They do not inherently or expressly reflect the views, opinions and/or positions of iPolitics.
In Mali, Canada’s flying pick-ups are no replacement for European helicopters
 |
| Canadian Forces door gunner keeps watch as his Griffon helicopter goes on a mission, February 20, 2017 in northern Iraq. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Ryan Remiorz |
For the last four years the German peacekeeping contingents, as well as the preceding Dutch, have struggled though the military and political quagmire of Mali with heavily armed, combat-proven attack helicopters operated by specially trained crews.
Quite appropriate for what is already considered the most dangerous peacekeeping operation attempted by the UN in its 73-year history.
But Canada does not own any attack helicopters. Instead our aging Griffon utility helicopters will be taking on armed escort responsibilities alongside our larger Chinook transport helicopters. Griffons were never designed to be an attack helicopter except in a pinch.
So the question needs to be asked: if Canada is expected to carry on and match the efforts of the Germans and Dutch will we have comparable capability in our improvised “armed” helicopters or will our next round of UN peacekeepers have to engage, yet again, in that perennial Canadian military tradition of sending our military into harm’s way with far less than what our allies might provide to their forces?
National Defence Headquarters, perhaps predictably, would not respond to my requests for information on any possible armament, sensor, and protective devices being installed on our 22-year old utility helicopters. However during the Afghan and Iraqi deployments , when Canadian troops were under the protective shield of US and allied attack helicopters and fighter aircraft, our Griffons were occasionally photographed carrying a door gunner positioned in the aircraft’s opening with a C-134 machine gun.
This haphazard, Vietnam-era “gun in the door” protection is quite consistent with the Griffon’s purpose. The Griffon is classified as a Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter. Its primary role, according to the RCAF website is “transportation of troops and material” making it more of a flying pick-up truck as opposed to highly agile flying tank that is a modern attack helicopter.
We should be concerned because, in Mali we will be away from the protective, largely U.S military shield that our military, not to mention the Canadian public, have come to expect in recent years.
So what did the preceding Dutch and German contingents in Mali have by way of armed helicopter escort? What level of armed, combat capability would our improvised, souped up utility helicopters have to match?
From 2014 to 2017 the Royal Netherlands Air Force deployed A-64D Apache attack helicopters to protect its assets. The Dutch Apache is armed with a 30mm automatic Boeing M230 chain gun that has a rate of fire of 625 rounds a minute. It also has a Lockheed Martin/Boeing AGM-114D hellfire air-to-surface missile with a range of 8-12 km. Also, depending on the nature of the threat, the Dutch Apache can also be mounted with Hydra 70 general purpose rockets and the AIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.
Equally lethal, the standard armament for the German Tiger attack helicopter, currently exiting Mali, include a 30 mm cannon with a rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. The Tiger can also be equipped 8 HOT Trigat anti-tank missiles, and 4 Stinger or Mistral short range air-to-air missiles. Also standard for the Tiger are two pods carrying 22 SNEB 68mm rockets.
Also impressive are the defensive countermeasure systems that are fitted to these flying tanks maximizing their survivability and effectiveness. These include, on both the German Tiger and the Dutch Apache a radar warning receiver, laser warning, and a chaff/flare dispenser. Crew survivability is also enhanced through the armoured protection given them a chance to make it back safely even after taking on enemy fire.
Could it be that Canada’s modified utility-transport helicopters, being deployed to Mali, are fitted with comparable armament and protection? Since we all know what the answer likely is the question then has to be asked: what level of additional support and compensation for our military weakness and vulnerabilities could we demand from the primary peacekeeping contingents in Mali which today are Burkina Faso, Chad, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Togo?
With Germany and the Netherlands out of the conflict, and the United States disengaged, it is from these country’s militaries that we will have to rely on once Mali’s Islamic militants realize that America’s most humble and obedient military servant (Canada) is facing them with utility transports posing as attack helicopters.
Welcome back to peacekeeping Canada!
—
The views, opinions and positions expressed by all iPolitics columnists and contributors are the author’s alone. They do not inherently or expressly reflect the views, opinions and/or positions of iPolitics.
Monday, June 25, 2018
Rueter: Brief History of the Mali Conflict and the Challenges Canadian Soldiers are Likely to Face
By: Annie Rueter, CBC News
Canadian troops are set to join the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, a country that's been torn apart by violence since 2012.
They will be teaming up with around 13,000 authorized international troops as part of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) that's trying to stabilize the landlocked West African country amid an ethnic and jihadist insurgency.
Despite UN peacekeeping and French-led counterterrorism efforts that began in 2013 and a peace deal signed in 2015, Mali remains a "war zone," according to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres.
According to the UN, 170 peacekeepers have been killed there since 2013, making it one of the organization's deadliest peacekeeping missions to date.
The mission has 57 partner countries and is based in the northeastern city of Gao.
Key groups in the conflict
Bruno Charbonneau, an associate professor at Laurentian University and an expert in peacekeeping and military intervention in francophone Africa, says the groups involved in the conflict can be divided into two categories: those that signed the 2015 peace agreement and those that didn't.
The signatories include the Malian government; Platform, a pro-government coalition; and Co-ordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), a pro-separatist alliance that includes the Tuaregs, a traditionally nomadic ethnic group that has long felt marginalized and excluded in the country.
Both Platform and CMA are armed groups without representation in the legislature.
The non-signatory groups, Charbonneau says, are "fluid in membership" and include militias, bandits, jihadists and gangs. Members of each group are not mutually exclusive, further complicating counterterrorism efforts.
G5 Sahel is also an important player in the conflict. Developed in 2014, its members — Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania — support the French counterterrorism mission.
A history of violence
A former French colony, Mali became independent in 1960. It moved from a single-party state to a multiparty democracy in 1991 in the wake of anti-government riots. But a lack of autonomy and services for the sparsely populated northern region remained a problem.
In 2012, the anger in northern Mali boiled over as Tuareg rebels waged an insurgency against the Malian government in Bamako, located in the south. The Malian military took over the state and deposed President Amadou Toumani Touré for failing to quell the Tuareg rebellion.
The rebels and other insurgents took advantage of the chaos and seized control of the north, but French troops and airstrikes pushed the rebels back in January 2013, allowing the Malian government to regain control.
The UN authorized the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission three months after the French-led counterterrorism efforts began.
In 2015, Mali declared a state of emergency as attacks spread to the south, particularly in the Sikasso region.
"We focus a lot on terrorism in the north of Mali in the Sahel, while the actual problems within Mali right now are in the centre where you have a lot more people living there," Charbonneau said. "This is where it is really, really worrisome and yet the focus is still on the north and terrorism."
Persistent problems
Today, the coalitions remain factious, and the violence has only intensified. Northern jihadist groups have unified while Platform and CMA continue to splinter.
The al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, for example, was formed in 2017 and has since captured territory in the north.
Charbonneau said two big problems that help fuel the conflict are the lack of state services, including a functioning and impartial justice system and the army's "history of human rights abuses."
There's also the fact the government has yet to successfully implement the 2015 peace deal.
"There is definitely a lack of leadership within the government of Mali," Charbonneau said.
Risks for peacekeepers
In March, Canadian Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland announced Canada would deploy an aviation task force to Mali for a period of 12 months.
The task force will include up to 250 troops, two Chinook helicopters to provide needed transport and logistics capacity and four Griffon helicopters to provide armed escort and protection.
Charbonneau suspects the task force will have little interaction with people on the ground. However, he does anticipate the separation of roles between the peacekeeping mission and French-led counterterrorist operation could be a challenge.
The climate could also be an issue, he said.
"It definitely takes a toll on equipment to fly around in that region," he said, referring to the heat and dust storms.
And, of course, there is always the threat of violence.
The latest monthly report by the UN Security Council on MINUSMA says the security situation in Mali remains of "grave concern," and there's been an increase in the complexity of the attacks against Malian and international forces, as well as an "unprecedented number" of civilian casualties.
Canadian troops are set to join the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, a country that's been torn apart by violence since 2012.
They will be teaming up with around 13,000 authorized international troops as part of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) that's trying to stabilize the landlocked West African country amid an ethnic and jihadist insurgency.
Despite UN peacekeeping and French-led counterterrorism efforts that began in 2013 and a peace deal signed in 2015, Mali remains a "war zone," according to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres.
According to the UN, 170 peacekeepers have been killed there since 2013, making it one of the organization's deadliest peacekeeping missions to date.
The mission has 57 partner countries and is based in the northeastern city of Gao.
Key groups in the conflict
Bruno Charbonneau, an associate professor at Laurentian University and an expert in peacekeeping and military intervention in francophone Africa, says the groups involved in the conflict can be divided into two categories: those that signed the 2015 peace agreement and those that didn't.
The signatories include the Malian government; Platform, a pro-government coalition; and Co-ordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), a pro-separatist alliance that includes the Tuaregs, a traditionally nomadic ethnic group that has long felt marginalized and excluded in the country.
Both Platform and CMA are armed groups without representation in the legislature.
The non-signatory groups, Charbonneau says, are "fluid in membership" and include militias, bandits, jihadists and gangs. Members of each group are not mutually exclusive, further complicating counterterrorism efforts.
G5 Sahel is also an important player in the conflict. Developed in 2014, its members — Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania — support the French counterterrorism mission.
A history of violence
A former French colony, Mali became independent in 1960. It moved from a single-party state to a multiparty democracy in 1991 in the wake of anti-government riots. But a lack of autonomy and services for the sparsely populated northern region remained a problem.
In 2012, the anger in northern Mali boiled over as Tuareg rebels waged an insurgency against the Malian government in Bamako, located in the south. The Malian military took over the state and deposed President Amadou Toumani Touré for failing to quell the Tuareg rebellion.
The rebels and other insurgents took advantage of the chaos and seized control of the north, but French troops and airstrikes pushed the rebels back in January 2013, allowing the Malian government to regain control.
 |
| A French soldier inspects a home near Tin Hama in southeast Mali in October 2017. (Benoit Tessier/Reuters) |
In 2015, Mali declared a state of emergency as attacks spread to the south, particularly in the Sikasso region.
"We focus a lot on terrorism in the north of Mali in the Sahel, while the actual problems within Mali right now are in the centre where you have a lot more people living there," Charbonneau said. "This is where it is really, really worrisome and yet the focus is still on the north and terrorism."
Persistent problems
Today, the coalitions remain factious, and the violence has only intensified. Northern jihadist groups have unified while Platform and CMA continue to splinter.
The al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, for example, was formed in 2017 and has since captured territory in the north.
Charbonneau said two big problems that help fuel the conflict are the lack of state services, including a functioning and impartial justice system and the army's "history of human rights abuses."
 |
| The Malian army has a poor reputation when it comes to human rights, an analyst says. (Benoit Tessier/Reuters) |
"There is definitely a lack of leadership within the government of Mali," Charbonneau said.
Risks for peacekeepers
In March, Canadian Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland announced Canada would deploy an aviation task force to Mali for a period of 12 months.
The task force will include up to 250 troops, two Chinook helicopters to provide needed transport and logistics capacity and four Griffon helicopters to provide armed escort and protection.
Charbonneau suspects the task force will have little interaction with people on the ground. However, he does anticipate the separation of roles between the peacekeeping mission and French-led counterterrorist operation could be a challenge.
The climate could also be an issue, he said.
"It definitely takes a toll on equipment to fly around in that region," he said, referring to the heat and dust storms.
And, of course, there is always the threat of violence.
The latest monthly report by the UN Security Council on MINUSMA says the security situation in Mali remains of "grave concern," and there's been an increase in the complexity of the attacks against Malian and international forces, as well as an "unprecedented number" of civilian casualties.
First Canadian Peacekeepers arrive in Mali as year-long mission begins
By: Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press
Canadian troops started to take up their positions in the world’s most dangerous peacekeeping mission on Sunday, as a dozen Forces members flew into an isolated United Nations’ base to begin work on Canada’s year-long commitment to help bring peace and stability to this strife-riven African nation.
The sun beat down on the tarmac as defence chief Gen. Jonathan Vance led the small contingent out of the Hercules transport plane that had carried them into the country and were met by a German convoy covered in the red dust that seems to be everywhere.
Gen. Vance and the 12-member advance team, whose task will be to lay the groundwork for the eventual arrival of the eight helicopters and 250 military members who comprise Canada’s mission in Mali, were scheduled to arrive the day before.
But a horrific dust storm, pictures of which showed a scene straight out of a movie, had forced Gen. Vance and the others to remain in Mali’s capital, Bamako, the previous night. It’s testament to one of the unpredictabilities of this mission – the weather.
Asked his first impression upon landing, a master warrant officer from Quebec who previously served in Afghanistan and Bosnia and who will act here as the camp sergeant major, replied: “It’s very hot. It’s very, very hot.”
But Nick, who like most others could only identified by his first name due to security reasons, was also clearly excited about the prospect of getting on with the mission after months of training – and nearly 10 years after he last deployed into Afghanistan.
“When the ramp of the Herc goes down on the tarmac, that’s a very, very good feeling,” he said. “It’s hot, you can feel it here in the desert. But that feeling is great.”
The arrival of the advance team marked the culmination of years of promises by the Trudeau Liberals, which initially pledged in the 2015 election to take a leadership role in UN peacekeeping missions if elected to power.
But with memories of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda still fresh in many minds, the peacekeeping commitment has been politically divisive while some have questioned whether there is even a peace to keep in Mali.
In an interview with the Canadian Press, Gen. Vance said both the UN and Canada have learned a great deal since the previous peacekeeping debacles of the 1990s, both in terms of reviews and lived experience in Afghanistan.
“There was a time in the ’90s when we went on operations and we adopted their rules of engagement. We do not do that with this mission. We’ve learned,” Gen. Vance said.
“We understand a lot more than we did in the ’90s about the nature of theatre support to ensure command and control, communications, intelligence, logistics and engineering are put in place to the extent necessary to support a mission.”
Yet he was also candid in his assessment that, yes, the situation in Mali could get worse. But that is why the UN is in the country and why Canada is supporting the UN – to keep that from happening, which many say would unleash a Pandora’s box in the region.
The reality is that the Canadian mission was not expected to start until next year, when the government and military were expecting Canada to replace a contingent of Jordanian helicopters in Gao.
But when Jordan was unable, for reasons that are still unclear, to send their aircraft to replace the existing German helicopter contingent, which has been providing medical evacuations and transport, the UN turned to Canada in March.
Two large Chinook transport helicopters and four smaller Griffon escorts, along with one spare of each in case of breakdowns, are due to arrive next month and replace the Germans, who have been flying here for more than a year.
The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali – or Minusma, as the UN mission is known – has been criticized both for not doing enough to bring peace and stability to the country, and because of its dangers.
More than 100 peacekeepers have died since Minusma was established in 2013, but the reality is that cost has been borne by developing countries such as Chad, rather than more advanced Western forces like Germany and Canada.
Indeed, the Canadians will spend the next 12 months in what is known as Camp Castor, a German-run base that is actually separate from the so-called “super camp” that houses most of peacekeepers in what is known as Sector East.
The camp is a collection of buildings, most of them low-slung and reinforced to protect against mortar attacks, bounded by concrete barriers and dusty roads along which the occasional armoured vehicle passes bearing the famous “UN” on its side.
The Canadians will fly primarily medical evacuation missions – at least one Chinook and two Griffons must be on standby at the expansive nearby helipad at all times – but Gen. Vance said they could also be called upon to do other tasks.
Those could include providing medical assistance to a joint counterterrorism force established by Mali and four of its neighbours to fight Islamist jihadists and others, Gen. Vance said, as well as the actual defending of Malian civilians.
But it could also mean protecting convoys and giving fire support to fellow peacekeepers who find themselves in trouble, though Gen. Vance said those would only be launched if absolutely no other option was available.
That could put Canadian helicopters and troops in harm’s way, but one senior UN official told the Canadian Press that the Germans “never fired a shot in anger,” and that there is no significant threat to helicopters from the ground.
The bigger threat is the weather and desert, which have been blamed for the crash of one German and one Dutch helicopter over the years, and which was in clear evidence – at least the heat – on Sunday when the troops arrived.
There is also the ever-present danger of poisonous scorpions, snakes and spiders around the camp, particularly at night, as well as malaria-carrying mosquitos.
One of the main questions is whether Canada – and the UN – can make a difference in Mali, where poverty is everywhere and various factions are locked in bloody struggles for land, smuggling routes and ideology.
For Gen. Vance, the focus is on making sure the Canadian contribution accomplishes its mission by providing the UN – and by extension the Malian state – with the support that it needs until the situation begins to improve.
“I’m confident that we’re contemplating and doing the right things as an international community,” he said.
“I’m confident that our helicopter contribution to Mali will be first class and offer the mission exactly what it needs. And I suspect that all of that combined will help Mali resist any downward trends associated with those actors that would try and attack the state.”
Despite the challenges facing the Canadians, the UN and Mali as a whole, Capt. Megan of Kingston, Ont., is unwavering in her assessment of the situation: “I think the Canadians are part of an important thing here.”
Canadian troops started to take up their positions in the world’s most dangerous peacekeeping mission on Sunday, as a dozen Forces members flew into an isolated United Nations’ base to begin work on Canada’s year-long commitment to help bring peace and stability to this strife-riven African nation.
The sun beat down on the tarmac as defence chief Gen. Jonathan Vance led the small contingent out of the Hercules transport plane that had carried them into the country and were met by a German convoy covered in the red dust that seems to be everywhere.
Gen. Vance and the 12-member advance team, whose task will be to lay the groundwork for the eventual arrival of the eight helicopters and 250 military members who comprise Canada’s mission in Mali, were scheduled to arrive the day before.
But a horrific dust storm, pictures of which showed a scene straight out of a movie, had forced Gen. Vance and the others to remain in Mali’s capital, Bamako, the previous night. It’s testament to one of the unpredictabilities of this mission – the weather.
Asked his first impression upon landing, a master warrant officer from Quebec who previously served in Afghanistan and Bosnia and who will act here as the camp sergeant major, replied: “It’s very hot. It’s very, very hot.”
But Nick, who like most others could only identified by his first name due to security reasons, was also clearly excited about the prospect of getting on with the mission after months of training – and nearly 10 years after he last deployed into Afghanistan.
“When the ramp of the Herc goes down on the tarmac, that’s a very, very good feeling,” he said. “It’s hot, you can feel it here in the desert. But that feeling is great.”
The arrival of the advance team marked the culmination of years of promises by the Trudeau Liberals, which initially pledged in the 2015 election to take a leadership role in UN peacekeeping missions if elected to power.
But with memories of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda still fresh in many minds, the peacekeeping commitment has been politically divisive while some have questioned whether there is even a peace to keep in Mali.
In an interview with the Canadian Press, Gen. Vance said both the UN and Canada have learned a great deal since the previous peacekeeping debacles of the 1990s, both in terms of reviews and lived experience in Afghanistan.
“There was a time in the ’90s when we went on operations and we adopted their rules of engagement. We do not do that with this mission. We’ve learned,” Gen. Vance said.
“We understand a lot more than we did in the ’90s about the nature of theatre support to ensure command and control, communications, intelligence, logistics and engineering are put in place to the extent necessary to support a mission.”
Yet he was also candid in his assessment that, yes, the situation in Mali could get worse. But that is why the UN is in the country and why Canada is supporting the UN – to keep that from happening, which many say would unleash a Pandora’s box in the region.
The reality is that the Canadian mission was not expected to start until next year, when the government and military were expecting Canada to replace a contingent of Jordanian helicopters in Gao.
But when Jordan was unable, for reasons that are still unclear, to send their aircraft to replace the existing German helicopter contingent, which has been providing medical evacuations and transport, the UN turned to Canada in March.
Two large Chinook transport helicopters and four smaller Griffon escorts, along with one spare of each in case of breakdowns, are due to arrive next month and replace the Germans, who have been flying here for more than a year.
The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali – or Minusma, as the UN mission is known – has been criticized both for not doing enough to bring peace and stability to the country, and because of its dangers.
More than 100 peacekeepers have died since Minusma was established in 2013, but the reality is that cost has been borne by developing countries such as Chad, rather than more advanced Western forces like Germany and Canada.
Indeed, the Canadians will spend the next 12 months in what is known as Camp Castor, a German-run base that is actually separate from the so-called “super camp” that houses most of peacekeepers in what is known as Sector East.
The camp is a collection of buildings, most of them low-slung and reinforced to protect against mortar attacks, bounded by concrete barriers and dusty roads along which the occasional armoured vehicle passes bearing the famous “UN” on its side.
The Canadians will fly primarily medical evacuation missions – at least one Chinook and two Griffons must be on standby at the expansive nearby helipad at all times – but Gen. Vance said they could also be called upon to do other tasks.
Those could include providing medical assistance to a joint counterterrorism force established by Mali and four of its neighbours to fight Islamist jihadists and others, Gen. Vance said, as well as the actual defending of Malian civilians.
But it could also mean protecting convoys and giving fire support to fellow peacekeepers who find themselves in trouble, though Gen. Vance said those would only be launched if absolutely no other option was available.
That could put Canadian helicopters and troops in harm’s way, but one senior UN official told the Canadian Press that the Germans “never fired a shot in anger,” and that there is no significant threat to helicopters from the ground.
The bigger threat is the weather and desert, which have been blamed for the crash of one German and one Dutch helicopter over the years, and which was in clear evidence – at least the heat – on Sunday when the troops arrived.
There is also the ever-present danger of poisonous scorpions, snakes and spiders around the camp, particularly at night, as well as malaria-carrying mosquitos.
One of the main questions is whether Canada – and the UN – can make a difference in Mali, where poverty is everywhere and various factions are locked in bloody struggles for land, smuggling routes and ideology.
For Gen. Vance, the focus is on making sure the Canadian contribution accomplishes its mission by providing the UN – and by extension the Malian state – with the support that it needs until the situation begins to improve.
“I’m confident that we’re contemplating and doing the right things as an international community,” he said.
“I’m confident that our helicopter contribution to Mali will be first class and offer the mission exactly what it needs. And I suspect that all of that combined will help Mali resist any downward trends associated with those actors that would try and attack the state.”
Despite the challenges facing the Canadians, the UN and Mali as a whole, Capt. Megan of Kingston, Ont., is unwavering in her assessment of the situation: “I think the Canadians are part of an important thing here.”
Friday, June 22, 2018
Selling the Mali Mission: CDS Vance Heading to Africa with Journalists
By: David Pugliese, The Ottawa Citizen
Selling the public on the Mali mission will get underway pretty soon. The African mission is the Liberal government’s high-profile initiative to show Canada supports the United Nations. The government is concentrating on generating as much positive publicity as it can for Canada’s contribution, which also coincides with a Liberal election promise to do with the UN.
As part of that public relations effort, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Jon Vance is said to be soon heading to Mali, according to reports. Journalists from the CBC and the Canadian Press will be coming along. No dates are being provided at this time and the Department of National Defence doesn’t want to talk about Vance’s involvement in the public relations trip at this point.
Selling the public on the Mali mission will get underway pretty soon. The African mission is the Liberal government’s high-profile initiative to show Canada supports the United Nations. The government is concentrating on generating as much positive publicity as it can for Canada’s contribution, which also coincides with a Liberal election promise to do with the UN.
As part of that public relations effort, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Jon Vance is said to be soon heading to Mali, according to reports. Journalists from the CBC and the Canadian Press will be coming along. No dates are being provided at this time and the Department of National Defence doesn’t want to talk about Vance’s involvement in the public relations trip at this point.
 |
| Then LGen Jonathan Vance, then a Brigadier General, delivers a speech while serving as Kandahar 2013. |
“We cannot speak to movements of CAF senior leadership, however CBC and the Canadian Press will be visiting Mali in the near future,” Department of National Defence spokesman Dan Le Bouthillier told Defence Watch Thursday.
Canada announced in March that it would send support personnel, two RCAF Chinook helicopters, as well as four armed Griffon helicopters to act as escorts for those larger aircraft, to Mali, a west African country that since 2013 has been dealing with insurgents and armed Islamic extremists. The mission is expected to start in late July/early August.
The mission, however, has been dogged by more than a few concerns.
Conservative MPs have voiced criticism about the lack of planning and what they claim is a lack of mission focus.
To be sure, there was confusion initially. In mid-March, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan announced that Canada would send two Chinook helicopters and four armed Griffon helicopters. A few minutes later at the same news conference Vance said the number of helicopters being assigned to the Mali mission had still not been determined. A short time after that, Sajjan’s office sent out a message to journalists, contradicting Vance by stating that ‘up to’ two Chinooks and four Griffons would be sent. Then another message went out to journalists later that there would be extra helicopters sent as backup.
The helicopter issue was eventually sorted out. But attention turned to the potential danger and whether the Mali mission could be considered as combat. MPs on the House of Commons defence committee raised those concerns and questioned generals about details of the Mali operation and whether Canadian military personnel would be safe.
Conservative defence critic James Bezan wanted information about the risks and whether troops would have enough protection from insurgent attacks. Questions were also asked about whether insurgents had surface-to-air missiles that could be of a threat to RCAF helicopters. “Our guys could potentially be going into hot conflict,” Bezan said at the committee.
Another MP asked if Mali was a war zone. Lt. Gen. Stephen Bowes, who was appearing before a Commons committee, answered that, “war zone is not a term. It’s a complex conflict zone.”
Such questions from MPs sparked Col. Jay Janzen, the Canadian Forces Director of Strategic Communications, to tweet to defence journalists that “Canada can do better than the nonsensical ‘combat/not-combat’ debate.”
That, in turn, prompted a showdown between Bezan and Conservative MPs and Janzen (who is slated to be promoted to Brig.-Gen. and put in charge of Canadian Forces public affairs).
Bezan lectured Janzen that he, as a MP, could ask whatever question he pleased and that questions about the safety of troops were certainly valid. He accused Janzen of trying to stifle debate. Bezan also noted that the head of the United Nations mission to Mali has characterized the operation as “war.”
“We have the right to know how Justin Trudeau is using our Canadian Forces to get (a) UN Security Seat,” Bezan tweeted.
Janzen said that while the military is subordinate to civilian authority, he had the right to make such comments.
Vance has done such mission public relations tours before. In 2016, he brought journalists along for his tour of the Canadian special forces mission in Iraq. The special forces were there to help the Kurds battle Islamic extremists who had seized large parts of Iraq.
The event was closely coordinated with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s office, as is this Mali trip. Vance also used that trip to play down any concerns about cracks in the Iraq-Kurd alliance. He told CTV at the time he didn’t agree there was a rift in the relationship between the two groups. A year later Kurdish and Iraqi forces were fighting each other.
What comes from the Mali visit remains to be seen but the Trudeau government wants public relations emphasis on support to the United Nations and the use of women on such missions.
Here is a snippet of the messaging that is to be provided to the news media: “The Canadian Armed Forces are working as part of an integrated, whole-of-government approach to deliver on Canada’s commitment to increase its support for UN peace support operations. Canada is a strong supporter of UN peacekeeping, and the CAF is prepared to make valuable contributions to this UN stabilization mission. To be safe at home, we need to contribute to international security abroad.”
Canada announced in March that it would send support personnel, two RCAF Chinook helicopters, as well as four armed Griffon helicopters to act as escorts for those larger aircraft, to Mali, a west African country that since 2013 has been dealing with insurgents and armed Islamic extremists. The mission is expected to start in late July/early August.
The mission, however, has been dogged by more than a few concerns.
Conservative MPs have voiced criticism about the lack of planning and what they claim is a lack of mission focus.
To be sure, there was confusion initially. In mid-March, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan announced that Canada would send two Chinook helicopters and four armed Griffon helicopters. A few minutes later at the same news conference Vance said the number of helicopters being assigned to the Mali mission had still not been determined. A short time after that, Sajjan’s office sent out a message to journalists, contradicting Vance by stating that ‘up to’ two Chinooks and four Griffons would be sent. Then another message went out to journalists later that there would be extra helicopters sent as backup.
The helicopter issue was eventually sorted out. But attention turned to the potential danger and whether the Mali mission could be considered as combat. MPs on the House of Commons defence committee raised those concerns and questioned generals about details of the Mali operation and whether Canadian military personnel would be safe.
Conservative defence critic James Bezan wanted information about the risks and whether troops would have enough protection from insurgent attacks. Questions were also asked about whether insurgents had surface-to-air missiles that could be of a threat to RCAF helicopters. “Our guys could potentially be going into hot conflict,” Bezan said at the committee.
Another MP asked if Mali was a war zone. Lt. Gen. Stephen Bowes, who was appearing before a Commons committee, answered that, “war zone is not a term. It’s a complex conflict zone.”
Such questions from MPs sparked Col. Jay Janzen, the Canadian Forces Director of Strategic Communications, to tweet to defence journalists that “Canada can do better than the nonsensical ‘combat/not-combat’ debate.”
That, in turn, prompted a showdown between Bezan and Conservative MPs and Janzen (who is slated to be promoted to Brig.-Gen. and put in charge of Canadian Forces public affairs).
Bezan lectured Janzen that he, as a MP, could ask whatever question he pleased and that questions about the safety of troops were certainly valid. He accused Janzen of trying to stifle debate. Bezan also noted that the head of the United Nations mission to Mali has characterized the operation as “war.”
“We have the right to know how Justin Trudeau is using our Canadian Forces to get (a) UN Security Seat,” Bezan tweeted.
Janzen said that while the military is subordinate to civilian authority, he had the right to make such comments.
Vance has done such mission public relations tours before. In 2016, he brought journalists along for his tour of the Canadian special forces mission in Iraq. The special forces were there to help the Kurds battle Islamic extremists who had seized large parts of Iraq.
The event was closely coordinated with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s office, as is this Mali trip. Vance also used that trip to play down any concerns about cracks in the Iraq-Kurd alliance. He told CTV at the time he didn’t agree there was a rift in the relationship between the two groups. A year later Kurdish and Iraqi forces were fighting each other.
What comes from the Mali visit remains to be seen but the Trudeau government wants public relations emphasis on support to the United Nations and the use of women on such missions.
Here is a snippet of the messaging that is to be provided to the news media: “The Canadian Armed Forces are working as part of an integrated, whole-of-government approach to deliver on Canada’s commitment to increase its support for UN peace support operations. Canada is a strong supporter of UN peacekeeping, and the CAF is prepared to make valuable contributions to this UN stabilization mission. To be safe at home, we need to contribute to international security abroad.”
CAF Mali Mission May be Tainted by Atrocities
By: Geoffrey York, The Globe and Mail
African Correspondent, Johannesburg
As Canada prepares to send hundreds of troops to Mali on a peacekeeping mission, a fresh discovery of mass graves and alleged military atrocities has highlighted the human-rights challenges that the Canadians could face.
The defence minister of the West African country admitted this week that Malian soldiers were implicated in “gross violations” after the bodies of 25 civilians were found in mass graves in central Mali.
Canada plans to deploy up to 250 troops and six helicopters to northern Mali in August for a one-year mission as part of the United Nations peacekeeping force, known as MINUSMA, which co-operates with the Malian military on the ground. The Malian forces have been battling Islamists and other rebel groups.
Why is Mali in crisis?
Some experts say Canadian troops should look for opportunities to train and advise Mali’s soldiers on human rights – a subject where previous training by the European Union seems to have been ineffective.
Kisal, an organization that helps pastoral communities in Mali, said the 25 dead civilians in the mass graves were mostly herders from the Fulani ethnic group who had been detained by the Malian military last week.
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| Members of the Malian Armed Forces secure a road in 2017. |
Mali’s authorities are “firmly resolved to fight impunity and get soldiers to strictly observe international rights and humanitarian conventions,” Mr. Coulibaly said.
The evidence of mass graves was just the latest in a long series of documented cases of extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests by Mali’s military.
Corinne Dufka, a West Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch who travels frequently to Mali, said she has documented more than 60 alleged summary executions by Mali’s security forces since 2017, with the remains of the victims found in at least seven mass graves. This does not include the latest case of the 25 bodies reported this week.
“Since early 2017, scores of witnesses have described severe mistreatment, arbitrary arrest, disappearances and summary executions,” she said. “I am aware of no single soldier held to account for any of these. … As long as soldiers continue to enjoy impunity, the abuses will continue.”
Human Rights Watch had earlier warned in April that it had received many reports of torture and mass arrest by the Malian army. The army seemed to be “running amok” in central Mali, it said.
In a report in late March, covering a three-month period, the UN said Mali’s defence and security forces were involved in a quarter of the 133 cases of human-rights abuses that UN peacekeepers had documented.
It said, for example, that Malian armed forces had arbitrarily arrested 10 civilians in a counterterrorism operation on Feb. 21 and had summarily executed seven of them, while the others are still missing.
In another report in June, the UN cited allegations of 56 summary executions by Mali’s armed forces.
Because of the continuing problem of human-rights abuses, the Canadian troops in Mali should prioritize the protection of civilians and should try to advise and mentor Malian soldiers to ensure better respect for human rights, Ms. Dufka said.
“We have found that the presence of MINUSMA and French forces in conflict zones in Mali serve as a strong deterrent to abuses by armed groups,” she told The Globe and Mail.
The UN peacekeeping mission co-operates with Mali’s military in a number of areas, including intelligence-sharing and some ground patrols, although the Canadian troops would primarily be supporting the UN in helicopter operations.
The UN mission has “conducted regular patrols” with Mali’s defence and security personnel and provided medical evacuations for the military, according to the UN report in late March.
The Canadian government has disclosed few details of how Canada’s peacekeepers will operate in Mali. Opposition MPs in Ottawa have complained about a lack of information on the planned mission.
It seems likely, however, that the Canadian troops will be based at an airfield in the town of Gao in northern Mali, and they will primarily be there to support the Canadian helicopters.
Bruno Charbonneau, a peacekeeping expert and associate professor of political science at Laurentian University, said he is doubtful that the Canadian peacekeepers will have much contact with Malian forces.
He noted, however, that the Canadian forces could potentially be asked to support the activities of the French military or a new West African military force known as G5 Sahel, both of which are fighting Islamist jihadists in Mali. The G5 group includes Malian troops.
The UN peacekeeping force is not officially authorized to conduct counterterrorism operations, he said. “But in practice it is difficult if not impossible to differentiate between peacekeeping and counterterrorist operations,” he said.
Walter Dorn, a peacekeeping expert at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, said the Canadian military should support the UN peacekeeping force in providing human-rights training and mentoring for Malian soldiers.
Monday, June 11, 2018
UN Secretary General says Canadian Peacekeepers entering Mali 'war zone' but downplays risks
By: Katie Simpson, CBC News
When Canadian Forces arrive at the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali this summer, soldiers will be entering one of the most dangerous conflict zones in the world.
But the new UN secretary general is trying to downplay the safety and security threats Canadians will face once they land on the ground.
During an exclusive interview with CBC News at the G7 summit in Charlevoix, Que., Antonio Guterres acknowledged that Mali is a "war zone," adding that casualties are "possible" but not "inevitable."
"Inevitable is not a word that is adequate. The word is possible," Guterres said.
"Even in very peaceful environments, we have soldiers that die with car crashes, with diseases, so, the number of people dying for … causes not related to fighting is normally higher than those that come directly from, I would say, war incidents."
Since the United Nations operation launched in 2013, more than 160 peacekeepers have been killed in Mali.
The Canadian government announced in March it would be sending as many as 250 troops to be part of that mission, while also supplying six helicopters.
Those soldiers are expected to arrive in the west African nation this August; however, the details still need to be finalized.
When Canadian Forces arrive at the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali this summer, soldiers will be entering one of the most dangerous conflict zones in the world.
But the new UN secretary general is trying to downplay the safety and security threats Canadians will face once they land on the ground.
During an exclusive interview with CBC News at the G7 summit in Charlevoix, Que., Antonio Guterres acknowledged that Mali is a "war zone," adding that casualties are "possible" but not "inevitable."
"Inevitable is not a word that is adequate. The word is possible," Guterres said.
"Even in very peaceful environments, we have soldiers that die with car crashes, with diseases, so, the number of people dying for … causes not related to fighting is normally higher than those that come directly from, I would say, war incidents."
 |
| UN peacekeepers from Bangladesh arrive at the Niger Battalion Base in Ansongo, eastern Mali, in February 2015. (Marco Dormino/United Nations/Associated Press) |
The Canadian government announced in March it would be sending as many as 250 troops to be part of that mission, while also supplying six helicopters.
Those soldiers are expected to arrive in the west African nation this August; however, the details still need to be finalized.
'It is a war zone indeed there'
Guterres met with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on Saturday during the G7 summit.
"It is a war zone indeed there, but, it's not for the peacekeepers to fight the war," the secretary general said.
"It is a dangerous environment and … peacekeepers may be attacked, and it's important that we take all precautions to prevent that."
"Canadian peacekeepers are extremely welcome," Guterres said, adding that it is important for developed countries to provide more than just financial aid.
The UN envisions Canadian troops taking on a largely traditional peacekeeping role, despite the dramatic evolution in threats in these types of conflict zones.
Guterres said Canadian peacekeepers will focus on the "protection of civilians, to make sure that civilians do not pay the price of the difficulties that exist in Mali."
"If we want to serve those that are more vulnerable, those that suffer more, then there are risks in it always."
Guterres met with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on Saturday during the G7 summit.
"It is a war zone indeed there, but, it's not for the peacekeepers to fight the war," the secretary general said.
"It is a dangerous environment and … peacekeepers may be attacked, and it's important that we take all precautions to prevent that."
"Canadian peacekeepers are extremely welcome," Guterres said, adding that it is important for developed countries to provide more than just financial aid.
 |
| Guterres, left, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau are seen at the G7 summit in La Malbaie, Que., on Saturday. (Sean Kilpatrick/Canadian Press) |
Guterres said Canadian peacekeepers will focus on the "protection of civilians, to make sure that civilians do not pay the price of the difficulties that exist in Mali."
"If we want to serve those that are more vulnerable, those that suffer more, then there are risks in it always."
In Mali, how do we avoid helping the bad guys again?
By: Doug Saunder, The Globe and Mail
In a few weeks, six military helicopters and 250 soldiers will begin their journey from Canada to the Sahara Desert, where they will join more than 11,000 international forces in a five-year-old operation known as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
In a few weeks, six military helicopters and 250 soldiers will begin their journey from Canada to the Sahara Desert, where they will join more than 11,000 international forces in a five-year-old operation known as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
/arc-anglerfish-tgam-prod-tgam.s3.amazonaws.com/public/G7ATLPQNABALXNZM45CAHBJDCU.JPG) |
| MINUSMA Guinean contingents set up positions on higher ground around Kidal, Mali, in December 2016. UN PHOTO/HARANDANE DICKO/UN PHOTO |
And once again, there is controversy: Are we pouring money and lives into another mission that risks becoming a decade-long quagmire, with unclear goals? Has the Trudeau government pushed our soldiers into this commitment because there’s pressure from our allies and a voter appetite to see maple leaves on the peacekeepers’ blue helmets?
While there’s some truth in both accusations, the Mali mission is not, by itself, an unworthy or imprudent use of our military resources. Mali, a hopeful and comparatively stable country until Islamist forces invaded its north in 2012, needs help rescuing itself from an outside invader hated by most of the population. The UN mission is not a Western imposition or a regime-change operation: Mali’s legitimate government has requested military assistance with what should be a limited operation against a jihadi insurgency – thus the operation’s name.
That said, there is reason to be gravely concerned about the prospects of this sort of military mission. While this is still officially a peacekeeping operation, in practice it bears no resemblance to the classic conflict-prevention campaigns of decades ago. Its mission is “to help stabilize key population centres and support the re-establishment of state authority throughout Mali, and to develop and implement programs for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.” It is, in everything but name, a counter-insurgency operation.
And counterinsurgency operations – designed to neutralize an extremist guerrilla enemy by strengthening a country’s civic institutions and supporting the population – have a terrible track record.
The Mali goals are strikingly similar to those of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. The stabilization and institution-building operations in Afghanistan were expensively implemented by hundreds of thousands of people, lavishly and carefully designed by scholars and social scientists – and they failed badly.
Last week, the U.S. government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction released its report concluding that 17 years of “efforts to stabilize insecure and contested areas in Afghanistan mostly failed,” and that elsewhere the Afghan mission “overestimated its ability to build and reform government institutions as part of the stabilization strategy,” and “spent far too much money, far too quickly, in a country woefully unprepared to absorb it.”
As a consequence, “opportunities for corruption and elite capture [theft] abounded, making many of those projects more harmful than helpful,” and “power brokers and predatory government officials with access to coalition projects became kings with patronage to sell, fueling conflicts,” and the many Afghans left outside these power networks “found natural allies in the Taliban, who used that support to divide and conquer communities the coalition was keen to win over.”
This pattern keeps repeating itself: Even the most well-intentioned and well-designed “stabilization and assistance” operations end up benefiting the enemy.
Aisha Ahmad, a political scientist at the University of Toronto who specializes in the financing and economic activities of jihadi extremist groups (patterns she investigates in her new book Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power) has found that most efforts to stabilize and normalize countries are designed in ways that benefit the jihadis more than those they’re meant to support.
The reason why jihadist groups keep returning to power in African and Central Asian countries, she writes in a new essay, “has remarkably little to do with jihadist ideology or identity politics. Rather, there is a clear economic logic behind these patterns of jihadist resurgence.”
Big international interventions (whether UN or NATO), she writes, “flood conflict zones with foreign resources, which create a series of perverse incentives. These incentives change the cost calculations and the behaviour of local armed groups, especially the international community’s local allies. Too often, foreign dollars socialize and incentivize these local allies to behave poorly — and indeed, even sabotage mission success.”
From the perspective of a poor country’s economy, an international military mission is something like a discovery of oil – a flood of untethered money that risks a “resource curse” effect, making the worst people more powerful. This has a tendency to turn insurgent groups into winners and governments into losers. It is still possible to play an important role in making Mali a better place – but, as Dr. Ahmad concludes, we’d better pay a lot more attention to what our money is doing.
While there’s some truth in both accusations, the Mali mission is not, by itself, an unworthy or imprudent use of our military resources. Mali, a hopeful and comparatively stable country until Islamist forces invaded its north in 2012, needs help rescuing itself from an outside invader hated by most of the population. The UN mission is not a Western imposition or a regime-change operation: Mali’s legitimate government has requested military assistance with what should be a limited operation against a jihadi insurgency – thus the operation’s name.
That said, there is reason to be gravely concerned about the prospects of this sort of military mission. While this is still officially a peacekeeping operation, in practice it bears no resemblance to the classic conflict-prevention campaigns of decades ago. Its mission is “to help stabilize key population centres and support the re-establishment of state authority throughout Mali, and to develop and implement programs for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.” It is, in everything but name, a counter-insurgency operation.
And counterinsurgency operations – designed to neutralize an extremist guerrilla enemy by strengthening a country’s civic institutions and supporting the population – have a terrible track record.
The Mali goals are strikingly similar to those of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. The stabilization and institution-building operations in Afghanistan were expensively implemented by hundreds of thousands of people, lavishly and carefully designed by scholars and social scientists – and they failed badly.
Last week, the U.S. government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction released its report concluding that 17 years of “efforts to stabilize insecure and contested areas in Afghanistan mostly failed,” and that elsewhere the Afghan mission “overestimated its ability to build and reform government institutions as part of the stabilization strategy,” and “spent far too much money, far too quickly, in a country woefully unprepared to absorb it.”
As a consequence, “opportunities for corruption and elite capture [theft] abounded, making many of those projects more harmful than helpful,” and “power brokers and predatory government officials with access to coalition projects became kings with patronage to sell, fueling conflicts,” and the many Afghans left outside these power networks “found natural allies in the Taliban, who used that support to divide and conquer communities the coalition was keen to win over.”
This pattern keeps repeating itself: Even the most well-intentioned and well-designed “stabilization and assistance” operations end up benefiting the enemy.
Aisha Ahmad, a political scientist at the University of Toronto who specializes in the financing and economic activities of jihadi extremist groups (patterns she investigates in her new book Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power) has found that most efforts to stabilize and normalize countries are designed in ways that benefit the jihadis more than those they’re meant to support.
The reason why jihadist groups keep returning to power in African and Central Asian countries, she writes in a new essay, “has remarkably little to do with jihadist ideology or identity politics. Rather, there is a clear economic logic behind these patterns of jihadist resurgence.”
Big international interventions (whether UN or NATO), she writes, “flood conflict zones with foreign resources, which create a series of perverse incentives. These incentives change the cost calculations and the behaviour of local armed groups, especially the international community’s local allies. Too often, foreign dollars socialize and incentivize these local allies to behave poorly — and indeed, even sabotage mission success.”
From the perspective of a poor country’s economy, an international military mission is something like a discovery of oil – a flood of untethered money that risks a “resource curse” effect, making the worst people more powerful. This has a tendency to turn insurgent groups into winners and governments into losers. It is still possible to play an important role in making Mali a better place – but, as Dr. Ahmad concludes, we’d better pay a lot more attention to what our money is doing.
Wednesday, May 30, 2018
CAF Will Not Rush to Meet Mali Mission Deadlines
By Charlie Pinkerton, iPolitics
The Canadian Armed Forces won’t be rushing to meet any deployment deadlines in Mali or on any other future peacekeeping missions under this government, the minister of defence said Tuesday.
“I will not speed up the process just for the sake of meeting a certain timeline for any time of competitive nature. We will always make sure that when we make a decision that we will achieve the mission and that our troops will have the right training and equipment,” Harjit Sajjan told members of the House Standing Committee on National Defence.
The Canadian Forces are preparing to send two Chinook transport helicopters and four Griffon escort helicopters as part of a United Nations’ peacekeeping mission in Mali. Canada is replacing German and Belgian allies in an area near Gao, where its helicopters will serve in a support role.
The Canadian Press reported last week that the helicopters and 250 military personnel are scheduled to leave in July and begin work at the start of August.
Sajjan insisted the number of troops deployed is not as important as their capabilities in modern peacekeeping missions such as Mali.
“This is not about the numbers anymore. This is about understanding what contributions that we can make that can have a substantial impact.”
He added that the number of Canadian troops deployed should be expected to fluctuate.
“We now have the flexibility, based on the plan that we have, to go up to 600 and we will make adjustments.”
Conservative defence critic James Bezan slammed the government for the amount of time it has taken to deploy troops.
“The armed forces know how to deploy, that’s what they do. Why is it taking so long to move a small helicopter task force to Mali?” Bezan questioned.
Sajjan blamed planning and safety concerns for delays in deployment.
When pressed by Conservative members on the dangers that Canadian Armed Forces members deployed in Mali will face, Sajjan admitted that the mission poses threats.
“We need to look at what the realities are on the ground and that’s what we need to discuss. Yes, those conflicts are complex, and are dangerous,” he said.
Both German and Dutch forces have lost helicopters in accidents in Mali over the last couple of years in the area where Canadian helicopters will deploy. Four peacekeepers died in those accidents, which were caused by difficulties posed by the environment.
Canadian troops are pledged to a one-year commitment to the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Mali.
The Canadian Armed Forces won’t be rushing to meet any deployment deadlines in Mali or on any other future peacekeeping missions under this government, the minister of defence said Tuesday.
“I will not speed up the process just for the sake of meeting a certain timeline for any time of competitive nature. We will always make sure that when we make a decision that we will achieve the mission and that our troops will have the right training and equipment,” Harjit Sajjan told members of the House Standing Committee on National Defence.
The Canadian Forces are preparing to send two Chinook transport helicopters and four Griffon escort helicopters as part of a United Nations’ peacekeeping mission in Mali. Canada is replacing German and Belgian allies in an area near Gao, where its helicopters will serve in a support role.
The Canadian Press reported last week that the helicopters and 250 military personnel are scheduled to leave in July and begin work at the start of August.
Sajjan insisted the number of troops deployed is not as important as their capabilities in modern peacekeeping missions such as Mali.
“This is not about the numbers anymore. This is about understanding what contributions that we can make that can have a substantial impact.”
He added that the number of Canadian troops deployed should be expected to fluctuate.
“We now have the flexibility, based on the plan that we have, to go up to 600 and we will make adjustments.”
Conservative defence critic James Bezan slammed the government for the amount of time it has taken to deploy troops.
“The armed forces know how to deploy, that’s what they do. Why is it taking so long to move a small helicopter task force to Mali?” Bezan questioned.
Sajjan blamed planning and safety concerns for delays in deployment.
When pressed by Conservative members on the dangers that Canadian Armed Forces members deployed in Mali will face, Sajjan admitted that the mission poses threats.
“We need to look at what the realities are on the ground and that’s what we need to discuss. Yes, those conflicts are complex, and are dangerous,” he said.
Both German and Dutch forces have lost helicopters in accidents in Mali over the last couple of years in the area where Canadian helicopters will deploy. Four peacekeepers died in those accidents, which were caused by difficulties posed by the environment.
Canadian troops are pledged to a one-year commitment to the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Mali.
Tuesday, May 29, 2018
Canada's Blue Baret's in Mali
HUDSON ON THE HILL
FrontLine Defence (Vol 15, No 3)
If all goes according to plan, two Boeing CH-147F Chinook transport helicopters and four Bell CH-146 Griffon utility tactical helicopters, supported by 200-250 personnel, will be deployed to Mali in August to augment what is arguably the most challenging mission for United Nations’ “blue berets” in recent years.
Our first major involvement in Africa since the troubled missions in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, it was described by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as a re-engagement in the UN after a decade of withdrawal by the former administration. “That’s what Canadians expect,” he told the House of Commons when the plan was unveiled in mid-March after months of speculation.
Toronto Conservative MP Lisa Raitt, calling the decision “absolutely deplorable,” noted that Jean-Pierre Lacroix, a career French diplomat, had questioned the objectives in a country where 162 foreign troops have been killed since 2013. A review kick-started by Lacroix last January was, he said, “a race against time” to keep the situation in Mali from deteriorating even further.
Trudeau, reading from notes, told Raitt that Canada would be contributing “in ways that bring the most value” to the mission – mainly by transporting other countries’ personnel under the protection of Griffon crews. Having reiterated that “the safety of our men and women in uniform is paramount”, Trudeau noted that while troops have the appropriate training and equipment, “of course we cannot altogether eliminate the risk.”
It will be the most dangerous mission on the UN’s recent agenda, and there are fundamental questions about the organization’s ability to rebuild what is clearly a broken country with a government that has little effective control.
Considered a model of democracy and African stability only a decade ago, Mali was one of Canada’s “countries of focus” for development aid. Averaging more than $100 million annually and topping out at $125 million in 2016 alone, Canada ranked third on Mali’s international donor list behind France and the United States.
FrontLine Defence (Vol 15, No 3)
If all goes according to plan, two Boeing CH-147F Chinook transport helicopters and four Bell CH-146 Griffon utility tactical helicopters, supported by 200-250 personnel, will be deployed to Mali in August to augment what is arguably the most challenging mission for United Nations’ “blue berets” in recent years.
Our first major involvement in Africa since the troubled missions in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, it was described by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as a re-engagement in the UN after a decade of withdrawal by the former administration. “That’s what Canadians expect,” he told the House of Commons when the plan was unveiled in mid-March after months of speculation.
Toronto Conservative MP Lisa Raitt, calling the decision “absolutely deplorable,” noted that Jean-Pierre Lacroix, a career French diplomat, had questioned the objectives in a country where 162 foreign troops have been killed since 2013. A review kick-started by Lacroix last January was, he said, “a race against time” to keep the situation in Mali from deteriorating even further.
Trudeau, reading from notes, told Raitt that Canada would be contributing “in ways that bring the most value” to the mission – mainly by transporting other countries’ personnel under the protection of Griffon crews. Having reiterated that “the safety of our men and women in uniform is paramount”, Trudeau noted that while troops have the appropriate training and equipment, “of course we cannot altogether eliminate the risk.”
It will be the most dangerous mission on the UN’s recent agenda, and there are fundamental questions about the organization’s ability to rebuild what is clearly a broken country with a government that has little effective control.
Considered a model of democracy and African stability only a decade ago, Mali was one of Canada’s “countries of focus” for development aid. Averaging more than $100 million annually and topping out at $125 million in 2016 alone, Canada ranked third on Mali’s international donor list behind France and the United States.
 |
| Two German UH -Tiger Attack Helicopters taxi in after finishing a patrol over Mali in 2017. |
Canada has also sent instructor troops to Mali since 2010 as part of a US-led effort to help train the land-locked country’s army in counter-terrorism, border security and other priorities. One of the program’s graduates, Captain Amadou Sanogo, spearheaded a military coup which prompted Canada to suspend aid for nearly two years.
Sundry so-called rebel forces have since struggled for dominance, mainly in the northern Gao region, part of a sprawling desert zone declared “independent” in 2012 by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. The NMLA subsequently lost control to Islamist militias.
The “rebels” are a loose and shifting coalition of groups with different aims and motivations. This fractured and fractious environment has been a major stumbling block for the UN and its partners.
Marie-Joëlle Zahar, research director at the University of Montreal’s peace operations network and a UN-sanctioned mediation expert, highlighted the problem during an appearance in late April before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.
“Deployment environments […] have changed since Canada was last part of a UN mission,” Zahar noted, speaking as an individual witness rather than for the university network. “Violent conflict is on the rise, and there are at least four characteristics of violent conflicts. […] The first is that they're much more regionalized than internationalized, as they used to be.” Most current wars were not civil wars per se, but “internationalized civil wars” in which foreign states and non-state actors instigate and prolong conflict for their own interests.
“In Mali, the fragmentation of northern anti-government forces and their composition and re-composition into ever-shifting alliances and counter-alliances remains one of the main obstacles to achieving sustainable peace,” Zahar said.
On the specific issue of Canada’s upcoming Mali deployment, she said it would fill “the most serious gaps” in the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. “MINUSMA has repeatedly highlighted that this is what it needs and what it cannot get from a majority of troop-contributing countries. […] The high number of fatalities is partly due to logistical difficulties of attending to injuries in situ and providing reliable evacuation of the wounded.” The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations confirms that at least 143 of the MINUSMA fatalities came from troop-contributing countries whose militaries are deployed as part of the ground forces.
Inadvertently linking to Lisa Raitt’s impossible-to-answer question about risk, Zahar said that “not only would the Canadian Forces be helping reduce the number of casualties, but based on current trends of who is most in danger, they would not be a primary target.”
That, obviously, remains to be seen because there is a key capability gap, demonstrated graphically during Op Athena in Afghanistan. Canada’s Chinooks, considered the most advanced model of the twin-rotor platform, have a maximum speed of 170 knots (315 kilometres per hour). The single-rotor Griffons, meanwhile, max out at 140 knots (160kph). Faster just isn’t aerodynamically possible and the significant differential means that Chinooks have to be throttled back to let their Griffon escorts keep up, presenting an easier target for opponents on the ground. The geography of the most likely theatre of operations features plateaus up to 500 metres above sea level and, in the northeast, hills up to 1,000 m.
Sources with the Royal Canadian Air Force have acknowledged the challenge but, without going into detail, say they have refined tactics to take that into consideration. They also privately echo Zahar’s warning that re-engaging in peacekeeping, while not free of danger, is “a necessity to prevent trouble spots […] from becoming open sores and the source of regional and international instability.”
As one veteran Chinook pilot pointed out, “it’s what we train for, what we do, and we have the best aircraft of its kind for the job.” It helps that the Chinooks have been fitted out with the latest countermeasures.
Dutch and German forces (Canada will be replacing the latter but there will be a gap of about a month) have used their armed helicopters to support UN ground troops against ambushes, but General Jonathan Vance, the Chief of the Defence Staff, demurred when the prospect of using Griffons in that role was broached during a televised interview. “At this juncture, the planning we’re doing is armed escort,” he said, adding that his planners would be talking with their German counterparts. “It is possible […] they could be used for support to ground forces. It is possible. We’ve got to look at it. We need to get a lot more detail.”
Why Train?
Carolyn McAskie, who oversaw the 2004-2006 UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi, which involved some 5,600 troops, 120 police and 1,000 civilians, stressed the need not to “get hung up on traditional peacekeeping” because “there has been no such thing since the Cold War.”
Testifying as an individual as well, McAskie advised those on the Committee to “ignore the nervous Nellies” who fret about risk. “Of course it's dangerous; why else would we be going? It’s a war zone; of course armies have to take precautions. Of course I’m sensitive to the political and human side of casualties, absolutely, but if we want a casualty-free war, why do we have 68,000 really good, well-trained, experienced troops? Why bother? Are we then to leave the heavy lifting to others?”
She also pointed out that Canadian civilians had been in the forefront all along – with no government support. “When I joined the UN in 1999 as humanitarian relief coordinator, it was at a time when there was a pullback internationally from peacekeeping. More humanitarians died on the front lines in 1998 than peacekeepers.”
On Mali specifically, Canada’s involvement would be in our national interest. “We’ve had a development program for years of […] up to $100 million a year,” McAskie explained. “There are a dozen Canadian mining companies in Mali with an investment of $1.5 billion. In the 1990s, if you were a Canadian and walked into Bamako, you were welcomed with open arms.” She says the signs of trouble have been brewing, but ignored, in recent years.
Military involvement, however, must be matched with development investment to foster economic stability and undercut criminal and terrorist elements. “If we want to contribute to the success of the mission, we need a place at the political table. We don’t have that now. Our contribution, military or financial, has to be enough to give us a voice. Otherwise, we’re just playing around the edges.”
McAskie challenged those who don’t seem to understand that Canada has a responsibility, working with the international rules-based system that Canada helped to build over the last 70 years. Otherwise, she cautioned, “we cannot blame others it if fails.”
Peacekeeping Capacity
Walter Dorn, a professor of defence studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, told the committee that missions in Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia and then Rwanda saw Canada’s military and police deployments peak at 3,300 in mid-1993. A UN hiatus for the rest of that decade saw Canada drop its numbers to the 300-500 range before a general cutback which meant that Canada currently provides no units and only 47 personnel as individuals, 23 police in Haiti, and 24 military personnel in Haiti, the Congo, Cyprus, South Sudan, and the Middle East.
“Unlike the UN’s, Canada’s capacity for peace operations has declined,” said Dorn. “With few personnel deployed over the past two decades, the Canadian Armed Forces have less experience than in previous generations and do much less training.”
Closure of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in 2013 meant there was no place where military, police and civilian personnel could be trained together and, although the new Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston does “excellent work”, it is strictly for the military and aimed mainly at tactical training with “only a small fraction” focused on the UN.
“As the only person who teaches a course on peace operations at the command and staff level, I can tell you that the number of activities in the Canadian Armed Forces has dropped to less than a quarter of what it was in 2005, with fewer exercises and almost no role-playing as UN peacekeepers, though some efforts are now being made to reinvigorate the peace operations curriculum.”
Dorn closed his testimony by pointing out that while Canada presses for more women to be involved in UN peace operations, it is failing to lead by example with only three women currently deployed. “I’ve had women in my office saying that they’ve been trying for years to get on UN operations but that the opportunities just haven’t been there.”
Sources have told FrontLine that one of the reasons for the more than four-month delay between mission announcement and deployment, other than the need to have the aircraft ready to move out of CAF Base Petawawa for transport overseas, is that there is a renewed effort within the military to significantly increase the number of women who will be eligible to wear the UN blue beret.
===
Hudson on the Hill
The role of Hudson is being filled by contributing editor Ken Pole.
Sundry so-called rebel forces have since struggled for dominance, mainly in the northern Gao region, part of a sprawling desert zone declared “independent” in 2012 by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. The NMLA subsequently lost control to Islamist militias.
The “rebels” are a loose and shifting coalition of groups with different aims and motivations. This fractured and fractious environment has been a major stumbling block for the UN and its partners.
Marie-Joëlle Zahar, research director at the University of Montreal’s peace operations network and a UN-sanctioned mediation expert, highlighted the problem during an appearance in late April before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.
“Deployment environments […] have changed since Canada was last part of a UN mission,” Zahar noted, speaking as an individual witness rather than for the university network. “Violent conflict is on the rise, and there are at least four characteristics of violent conflicts. […] The first is that they're much more regionalized than internationalized, as they used to be.” Most current wars were not civil wars per se, but “internationalized civil wars” in which foreign states and non-state actors instigate and prolong conflict for their own interests.
“In Mali, the fragmentation of northern anti-government forces and their composition and re-composition into ever-shifting alliances and counter-alliances remains one of the main obstacles to achieving sustainable peace,” Zahar said.
On the specific issue of Canada’s upcoming Mali deployment, she said it would fill “the most serious gaps” in the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. “MINUSMA has repeatedly highlighted that this is what it needs and what it cannot get from a majority of troop-contributing countries. […] The high number of fatalities is partly due to logistical difficulties of attending to injuries in situ and providing reliable evacuation of the wounded.” The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations confirms that at least 143 of the MINUSMA fatalities came from troop-contributing countries whose militaries are deployed as part of the ground forces.
Inadvertently linking to Lisa Raitt’s impossible-to-answer question about risk, Zahar said that “not only would the Canadian Forces be helping reduce the number of casualties, but based on current trends of who is most in danger, they would not be a primary target.”
That, obviously, remains to be seen because there is a key capability gap, demonstrated graphically during Op Athena in Afghanistan. Canada’s Chinooks, considered the most advanced model of the twin-rotor platform, have a maximum speed of 170 knots (315 kilometres per hour). The single-rotor Griffons, meanwhile, max out at 140 knots (160kph). Faster just isn’t aerodynamically possible and the significant differential means that Chinooks have to be throttled back to let their Griffon escorts keep up, presenting an easier target for opponents on the ground. The geography of the most likely theatre of operations features plateaus up to 500 metres above sea level and, in the northeast, hills up to 1,000 m.
Sources with the Royal Canadian Air Force have acknowledged the challenge but, without going into detail, say they have refined tactics to take that into consideration. They also privately echo Zahar’s warning that re-engaging in peacekeeping, while not free of danger, is “a necessity to prevent trouble spots […] from becoming open sores and the source of regional and international instability.”
As one veteran Chinook pilot pointed out, “it’s what we train for, what we do, and we have the best aircraft of its kind for the job.” It helps that the Chinooks have been fitted out with the latest countermeasures.
Dutch and German forces (Canada will be replacing the latter but there will be a gap of about a month) have used their armed helicopters to support UN ground troops against ambushes, but General Jonathan Vance, the Chief of the Defence Staff, demurred when the prospect of using Griffons in that role was broached during a televised interview. “At this juncture, the planning we’re doing is armed escort,” he said, adding that his planners would be talking with their German counterparts. “It is possible […] they could be used for support to ground forces. It is possible. We’ve got to look at it. We need to get a lot more detail.”
Why Train?
Carolyn McAskie, who oversaw the 2004-2006 UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi, which involved some 5,600 troops, 120 police and 1,000 civilians, stressed the need not to “get hung up on traditional peacekeeping” because “there has been no such thing since the Cold War.”
Testifying as an individual as well, McAskie advised those on the Committee to “ignore the nervous Nellies” who fret about risk. “Of course it's dangerous; why else would we be going? It’s a war zone; of course armies have to take precautions. Of course I’m sensitive to the political and human side of casualties, absolutely, but if we want a casualty-free war, why do we have 68,000 really good, well-trained, experienced troops? Why bother? Are we then to leave the heavy lifting to others?”
She also pointed out that Canadian civilians had been in the forefront all along – with no government support. “When I joined the UN in 1999 as humanitarian relief coordinator, it was at a time when there was a pullback internationally from peacekeeping. More humanitarians died on the front lines in 1998 than peacekeepers.”
On Mali specifically, Canada’s involvement would be in our national interest. “We’ve had a development program for years of […] up to $100 million a year,” McAskie explained. “There are a dozen Canadian mining companies in Mali with an investment of $1.5 billion. In the 1990s, if you were a Canadian and walked into Bamako, you were welcomed with open arms.” She says the signs of trouble have been brewing, but ignored, in recent years.
Military involvement, however, must be matched with development investment to foster economic stability and undercut criminal and terrorist elements. “If we want to contribute to the success of the mission, we need a place at the political table. We don’t have that now. Our contribution, military or financial, has to be enough to give us a voice. Otherwise, we’re just playing around the edges.”
McAskie challenged those who don’t seem to understand that Canada has a responsibility, working with the international rules-based system that Canada helped to build over the last 70 years. Otherwise, she cautioned, “we cannot blame others it if fails.”
Peacekeeping Capacity
Walter Dorn, a professor of defence studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, told the committee that missions in Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia and then Rwanda saw Canada’s military and police deployments peak at 3,300 in mid-1993. A UN hiatus for the rest of that decade saw Canada drop its numbers to the 300-500 range before a general cutback which meant that Canada currently provides no units and only 47 personnel as individuals, 23 police in Haiti, and 24 military personnel in Haiti, the Congo, Cyprus, South Sudan, and the Middle East.
“Unlike the UN’s, Canada’s capacity for peace operations has declined,” said Dorn. “With few personnel deployed over the past two decades, the Canadian Armed Forces have less experience than in previous generations and do much less training.”
Closure of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in 2013 meant there was no place where military, police and civilian personnel could be trained together and, although the new Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston does “excellent work”, it is strictly for the military and aimed mainly at tactical training with “only a small fraction” focused on the UN.
“As the only person who teaches a course on peace operations at the command and staff level, I can tell you that the number of activities in the Canadian Armed Forces has dropped to less than a quarter of what it was in 2005, with fewer exercises and almost no role-playing as UN peacekeepers, though some efforts are now being made to reinvigorate the peace operations curriculum.”
Dorn closed his testimony by pointing out that while Canada presses for more women to be involved in UN peace operations, it is failing to lead by example with only three women currently deployed. “I’ve had women in my office saying that they’ve been trying for years to get on UN operations but that the opportunities just haven’t been there.”
Sources have told FrontLine that one of the reasons for the more than four-month delay between mission announcement and deployment, other than the need to have the aircraft ready to move out of CAF Base Petawawa for transport overseas, is that there is a renewed effort within the military to significantly increase the number of women who will be eligible to wear the UN blue beret.
===
Hudson on the Hill
The role of Hudson is being filled by contributing editor Ken Pole.
Thursday, May 24, 2018
With Mali Mission, Canadian Troops are entering a Madhouse
By: ROSIE DIMANNO, The Toronto Star
Canadian troops deployed in UN peacekeeping missions, as of Feb. 28, 2018: 0.
Canadian police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions as of Feb. 28, 2018: 19.
Canadian staff officers deployed in UN peacekeeping missions as of Feb. 28, 2018: 12.
In all, 22 actual soldiers — excluding some staff positions — are participating in four of the 16 international peacekeeping operations around the world sanctioned by the UN Security Council, according to National Defence figures. Lowest number ever.
Out of 90,000 — 77,456 troops — deployed under the UN flag by 123 nations.
Which is surely an indictment for a country that likes to think it invented the whole blue helmet thing and still rhapsodizes/romanticizes over the concept.
Operationally, we are frauds.
Just as a by-comparison, for instance: Bangladesh has 6,342 troops in UN peacekeeping missions. Ethiopia has 8,121. Nepal has 4,672. (As per most recent UN statistics).
Of course Canada played a key role — sacrificing blood and treasure — in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. Canadian CF-18s conducted airstrikes in the military intervention that brought down the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, with a Canadian general in top command of that NATO undertaking. It was a spectacular success — until NATO wiped its hands of Libya, leaving a frail democratic movement to be overwhelmed by all the warring militias and terrorist groups on the ground. In a sideways development, tons of weapons from what is now a failed state were dispersed across Africa, fuelling conflicts in Syria, Somalia and Mali.
Some of those arms, now in the hands of Malian insurrectionists, could very well eventually be trained on the Canadian helicopter contingent — two Chinook choppers to provide medical evacuations and logistical support (unclarified in the details) and four smaller, lightly armoured Griffons to act as armed escorts for larger transports — that Ottawa this week announced will be sent to Mali by the end of the summer. For one year.
Fulfilling Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s long, lazy, laggard commitment to step up Canada’s peacekeeping pledges to the UN.
While Mali is the worst of hellholes for UN peacekeeping missions — 162 peacekeeping fatalities since the mission began in 2013 — only four resulted from helicopter incidents and all of those were the result of mechanical failures, as Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Jonathan Vance told Global News in an interview a few days ago. Though I still don’t much like the idea of lightly armoured aircraft for the purpose in a war zone.
If nothing else — and a deployment of some 250 Canadians for the Mali endeavour, which is pitifully meagre — the commitment makes good on a Trudeau electoral vow after three years of dithering and dawdling and, even before that, as Opposition leader, disrespecting Canadian pilots (advocating humanitarian aid to Iraq rather than joining the military coalition against Daesh, “trying to whip out our CF-18s to show how big they are.”)
Ugh.
And nowhere near the later promise to deliver 600 troops and 150 police officers to UN operations.
Still and all, Mali wins the lottery. Canadian troops will, in about six months, replace the Belgians, who are currently in the process of replacing the Germans.
Also, this being Trudeau, the deployment comes wrapped in gender parity tinsel, because that is Trudeau’s obsession.
So off to war-ravaged Mali we shall go, where a peace agreement signed in 2015 hasn’t been worth the paper it was written on.
Listen, I’m all for peacekeeping, when there’s any peace to keep. I’m much more for peacemaking and boots on the ground when absolutely necessary. I know Canadian Forces personnel are well-trained and eager to deploy somewhere — and that they don’t require being swathed in no-risk gauze. That’s what Ottawa would deeply prefer, of course — noncombat no risk and no blowback should a Canadian be killed.
(A bit rich, however, for the Conservatives to be leading that war-leery charge now, a change-lobsters-and-dance position from the Afghanistan years.)
Not to Syria, then. Because, oh no, Ottawa doesn’t want any part of that endless atrocity. Not for a combat capacity contribution to Northern Iraq, where a U.S.-led coalition of the more-willing has seized back most of the territory which had fallen under the control of Islamic State (also known as ISIS and Daesh). And not to Burma, where a genocide against the Muslim-minority Rohingya continues to unfold before our uncaring eyes.
There are compelling reasons to intervene — to contribute to a military intervention — in combustible flashpoints across our war-exhausted planet:
Urgency. Except civilians dying by the tens of thousands in Syria is apparently not catastrophic enough for Canada, and in any event Russia’s veto at the Security Council would block a sturdy response under the UN aegis. President Barack Obama’s “line in the sand” — gas attacks — was just a rhetorical figment.
Reasonable expectation of making a difference. As Canadian troops clearly did in Afghanistan, until they were withdrawn and the Taliban tide erased just about every security and governance footprint.
Keeping the fighting sides apart by putting some armed muscle into ceasefire agreements. Not happening in Mali.
Places where Canada could make a difference, could be on the side of the angels. Because the Canadian public apparently insists on this — on clear-cut virtue.
Maybe that will be Mali as Canada returns to Africa, a continent where this country’s peacekeeping bona fides went to just about die: the 1993 shooting of an unarmed Somali drawn into an ambush to prevent looting and, two weeks later, beating to death a Somali teenager who snuck into their compound. Followed by denials and coverup conspiracies and, finally — there really was no choice, it was rotten to the core — disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.
There is always the potential for unforeseen consequences, in a strange land, and Mali is among the strangest of lands of all, torn apart by civil war between north and south, overrun with child soldiers and Islamic terrorism, reeling from severe food shortages.
Great big HOWEVER: Mali is a madhouse. And the United Nations MINUSMA (Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) has mismanaged the operation from the get-go, originally sending 10,000 soldiers in response to a terrorist takeover by independence fighters from the north, turned back from reaching the captial only by the earlier intervention of rapid response French troops in their former colony.
The UN troops were unprepared to engage in counterterrorism, which fundamentally the mission has become. In fact, they were explicitly ordered not to engage, until the rules of engagement were changed.
Writing in the New York Times two years ago, outgoing UN assistant secretary general Anthony Banbury called the Mali mission a blunder, with 80 per cent of the deployment’s resources going to logistics and self-protection. “The UN in Mali is day by day marching into its first quagmire.”
We’ll lock-step with them.
Rosie DiManno is a columnist based in Toronto covering sports and current affairs. Follow her on Twitter: @rdimanno
Canadian troops deployed in UN peacekeeping missions, as of Feb. 28, 2018: 0.
Canadian police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions as of Feb. 28, 2018: 19.
/https://www.thestar.com/content/dam/thestar/opinion/star-columnists/2018/03/22/with-mali-mission-canadian-troops-are-entering-a-madhouse/mali_2.jpg) |
| Helicopters piloted by German soldiers take off from Gao airport in Mali last year. When the Canadians are deployed later this year, they will be replacing the Belgians, who are currently in the process of replacing the Germans. (SOULEMAIN AG ANARA / AFP/GETTY IMAGES FILE PHOTO) |
In all, 22 actual soldiers — excluding some staff positions — are participating in four of the 16 international peacekeeping operations around the world sanctioned by the UN Security Council, according to National Defence figures. Lowest number ever.
Out of 90,000 — 77,456 troops — deployed under the UN flag by 123 nations.
Which is surely an indictment for a country that likes to think it invented the whole blue helmet thing and still rhapsodizes/romanticizes over the concept.
Operationally, we are frauds.
Just as a by-comparison, for instance: Bangladesh has 6,342 troops in UN peacekeeping missions. Ethiopia has 8,121. Nepal has 4,672. (As per most recent UN statistics).
Of course Canada played a key role — sacrificing blood and treasure — in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. Canadian CF-18s conducted airstrikes in the military intervention that brought down the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, with a Canadian general in top command of that NATO undertaking. It was a spectacular success — until NATO wiped its hands of Libya, leaving a frail democratic movement to be overwhelmed by all the warring militias and terrorist groups on the ground. In a sideways development, tons of weapons from what is now a failed state were dispersed across Africa, fuelling conflicts in Syria, Somalia and Mali.
Some of those arms, now in the hands of Malian insurrectionists, could very well eventually be trained on the Canadian helicopter contingent — two Chinook choppers to provide medical evacuations and logistical support (unclarified in the details) and four smaller, lightly armoured Griffons to act as armed escorts for larger transports — that Ottawa this week announced will be sent to Mali by the end of the summer. For one year.
Fulfilling Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s long, lazy, laggard commitment to step up Canada’s peacekeeping pledges to the UN.
While Mali is the worst of hellholes for UN peacekeeping missions — 162 peacekeeping fatalities since the mission began in 2013 — only four resulted from helicopter incidents and all of those were the result of mechanical failures, as Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Jonathan Vance told Global News in an interview a few days ago. Though I still don’t much like the idea of lightly armoured aircraft for the purpose in a war zone.
If nothing else — and a deployment of some 250 Canadians for the Mali endeavour, which is pitifully meagre — the commitment makes good on a Trudeau electoral vow after three years of dithering and dawdling and, even before that, as Opposition leader, disrespecting Canadian pilots (advocating humanitarian aid to Iraq rather than joining the military coalition against Daesh, “trying to whip out our CF-18s to show how big they are.”)
Ugh.
And nowhere near the later promise to deliver 600 troops and 150 police officers to UN operations.
Still and all, Mali wins the lottery. Canadian troops will, in about six months, replace the Belgians, who are currently in the process of replacing the Germans.
Also, this being Trudeau, the deployment comes wrapped in gender parity tinsel, because that is Trudeau’s obsession.
So off to war-ravaged Mali we shall go, where a peace agreement signed in 2015 hasn’t been worth the paper it was written on.
Listen, I’m all for peacekeeping, when there’s any peace to keep. I’m much more for peacemaking and boots on the ground when absolutely necessary. I know Canadian Forces personnel are well-trained and eager to deploy somewhere — and that they don’t require being swathed in no-risk gauze. That’s what Ottawa would deeply prefer, of course — noncombat no risk and no blowback should a Canadian be killed.
(A bit rich, however, for the Conservatives to be leading that war-leery charge now, a change-lobsters-and-dance position from the Afghanistan years.)
Not to Syria, then. Because, oh no, Ottawa doesn’t want any part of that endless atrocity. Not for a combat capacity contribution to Northern Iraq, where a U.S.-led coalition of the more-willing has seized back most of the territory which had fallen under the control of Islamic State (also known as ISIS and Daesh). And not to Burma, where a genocide against the Muslim-minority Rohingya continues to unfold before our uncaring eyes.
There are compelling reasons to intervene — to contribute to a military intervention — in combustible flashpoints across our war-exhausted planet:
Urgency. Except civilians dying by the tens of thousands in Syria is apparently not catastrophic enough for Canada, and in any event Russia’s veto at the Security Council would block a sturdy response under the UN aegis. President Barack Obama’s “line in the sand” — gas attacks — was just a rhetorical figment.
Reasonable expectation of making a difference. As Canadian troops clearly did in Afghanistan, until they were withdrawn and the Taliban tide erased just about every security and governance footprint.
Keeping the fighting sides apart by putting some armed muscle into ceasefire agreements. Not happening in Mali.
Places where Canada could make a difference, could be on the side of the angels. Because the Canadian public apparently insists on this — on clear-cut virtue.
Maybe that will be Mali as Canada returns to Africa, a continent where this country’s peacekeeping bona fides went to just about die: the 1993 shooting of an unarmed Somali drawn into an ambush to prevent looting and, two weeks later, beating to death a Somali teenager who snuck into their compound. Followed by denials and coverup conspiracies and, finally — there really was no choice, it was rotten to the core — disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.
There is always the potential for unforeseen consequences, in a strange land, and Mali is among the strangest of lands of all, torn apart by civil war between north and south, overrun with child soldiers and Islamic terrorism, reeling from severe food shortages.
Great big HOWEVER: Mali is a madhouse. And the United Nations MINUSMA (Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) has mismanaged the operation from the get-go, originally sending 10,000 soldiers in response to a terrorist takeover by independence fighters from the north, turned back from reaching the captial only by the earlier intervention of rapid response French troops in their former colony.
The UN troops were unprepared to engage in counterterrorism, which fundamentally the mission has become. In fact, they were explicitly ordered not to engage, until the rules of engagement were changed.
Writing in the New York Times two years ago, outgoing UN assistant secretary general Anthony Banbury called the Mali mission a blunder, with 80 per cent of the deployment’s resources going to logistics and self-protection. “The UN in Mali is day by day marching into its first quagmire.”
We’ll lock-step with them.
Rosie DiManno is a columnist based in Toronto covering sports and current affairs. Follow her on Twitter: @rdimanno
GoC Still Considering Spare Helicopters for Mali Mission
By: Lee Berthiuame, The Canadian Press
OTTAWA — The Trudeau government is keeping the door open to sending more helicopters to Mali to ensure the Canadian Forces can provide round-the-clock medical evacuations in what is expected to be a harsh operating environment.
Canada is preparing to send two Chinook transport helicopters and four armed Griffon escorts to the African nation this summer as part of a commitment to support the UN mission there.
Those helicopters and about 250 military personnel are scheduled to leave in July and begin work on Aug. 1, Col. Chris McKenna, the commander of the helicopter detachment, told The Canadian Press on Wednesday.
While the detachment will likely be called upon at times to move troops and equipment across the arid landscape as required by UN officials, their primary mission will be evacuating injured peacekeepers and others.
That will entail having one Chinook and two Griffons on "perpetual standby, 24/7," McKenna said, "so our crews are essentially sleeping almost beside the aircraft ready to launch.
"We are focused on getting to an incident site as quick as we can to be able to provide lifesaving interventions for both soldiers and anyone else that the UN would choose to medevac."
Such medical services are especially important given the nature of the UN mission in Mali, which has seen dozens of peacekeepers killed or injured in ambushes and roadside bomb attacks by local militants.
While that high tempo alone could be expected to put a heavy burden on the detachment, the extreme heat and dust at the UN mission in Gao, where the Canadians will be based, isn't expected to make life any easier.
Both the Germans and the Dutch have lost helicopters in the area over the last couple of years in crashes blamed on technical problems caused by the environment. The accidents killed four peacekeepers.
McKenna, whose detachment recently wrapped up several days of training at Canadian Forces Base Wainwright in Alberta, described the environment as "the biggest enemy."
"We're talking about operating state-of-the-art helicopters in the sub-Saharan Sahel region where the temperatures can reach 50-plus degrees and you see an enormous amount of dust," he said.
"And as you know from our experience in Afghanistan, that can be quite tricky from a helicopter point of view."
There are ways to manage those challenges, McKenna said, including making sure crews are familiar with the environment and setting up a stringent and efficient maintenance regime.
But the question of whether to send spare helicopters to Mali, either now or at some other point during the 12-month mission, is also on the horizon.
"I've been given leeway (to ask) for spares if we so think that that is required," he said. "And it is still being determined by government whether or not we'll be able to bring spares."
The Canadian helicopters and military personnel will replace counterparts from Belgium and Germany, the latter of which has been operating both transport and attack helicopters in Mali for several years.
Canada's arrival in Mali comes only months after the UN Security Council authorized the peacekeeping mission there to provide medical evacuations and transport services to a multinational counterterror mission in the country.
When asked whether that means his force could be called upon to support the so-called Group of Five Sahel force, McKenna would only say that his role will be to support the peacekeeping mission's mandate.
"We are having essentially no caveats going in," he added, "so we work for that force commander and we execute what he asks us to do as long as it's within our capabilities and our risk."
— Follow @leeberthiaume on Twitter.
OTTAWA — The Trudeau government is keeping the door open to sending more helicopters to Mali to ensure the Canadian Forces can provide round-the-clock medical evacuations in what is expected to be a harsh operating environment.
Canada is preparing to send two Chinook transport helicopters and four armed Griffon escorts to the African nation this summer as part of a commitment to support the UN mission there.
Those helicopters and about 250 military personnel are scheduled to leave in July and begin work on Aug. 1, Col. Chris McKenna, the commander of the helicopter detachment, told The Canadian Press on Wednesday.
While the detachment will likely be called upon at times to move troops and equipment across the arid landscape as required by UN officials, their primary mission will be evacuating injured peacekeepers and others.
That will entail having one Chinook and two Griffons on "perpetual standby, 24/7," McKenna said, "so our crews are essentially sleeping almost beside the aircraft ready to launch.
"We are focused on getting to an incident site as quick as we can to be able to provide lifesaving interventions for both soldiers and anyone else that the UN would choose to medevac."
Such medical services are especially important given the nature of the UN mission in Mali, which has seen dozens of peacekeepers killed or injured in ambushes and roadside bomb attacks by local militants.
While that high tempo alone could be expected to put a heavy burden on the detachment, the extreme heat and dust at the UN mission in Gao, where the Canadians will be based, isn't expected to make life any easier.
Both the Germans and the Dutch have lost helicopters in the area over the last couple of years in crashes blamed on technical problems caused by the environment. The accidents killed four peacekeepers.
McKenna, whose detachment recently wrapped up several days of training at Canadian Forces Base Wainwright in Alberta, described the environment as "the biggest enemy."
"We're talking about operating state-of-the-art helicopters in the sub-Saharan Sahel region where the temperatures can reach 50-plus degrees and you see an enormous amount of dust," he said.
"And as you know from our experience in Afghanistan, that can be quite tricky from a helicopter point of view."
There are ways to manage those challenges, McKenna said, including making sure crews are familiar with the environment and setting up a stringent and efficient maintenance regime.
But the question of whether to send spare helicopters to Mali, either now or at some other point during the 12-month mission, is also on the horizon.
"I've been given leeway (to ask) for spares if we so think that that is required," he said. "And it is still being determined by government whether or not we'll be able to bring spares."
The Canadian helicopters and military personnel will replace counterparts from Belgium and Germany, the latter of which has been operating both transport and attack helicopters in Mali for several years.
Canada's arrival in Mali comes only months after the UN Security Council authorized the peacekeeping mission there to provide medical evacuations and transport services to a multinational counterterror mission in the country.
When asked whether that means his force could be called upon to support the so-called Group of Five Sahel force, McKenna would only say that his role will be to support the peacekeeping mission's mandate.
"We are having essentially no caveats going in," he added, "so we work for that force commander and we execute what he asks us to do as long as it's within our capabilities and our risk."
— Follow @leeberthiaume on Twitter.
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