UN Reports Situation in Mali Deteriorating

By: Lee Berthiaume, Global News 

In a sobering new report, the head of the United Nations says the security situation in Mali has sharply deteriorated over the past three months even as demand for more food aid and other humanitarian assistance has skyrocketed.

The UN Mali patch is shown on a Canadian forces member's uniform before boarding a plane at CFB Trenton in Trenton, Ont., on July 5, 2018.

READ MORE: Canadian troops ready as ‘complex’ Mali peacekeeping mission gets underway: commander

The assessment by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres coincides with the presence of Canadian peacekeepers in Mali, and suggests the country is in many ways worse off now than when they first arrived in June.

Not that there haven’t been some hopeful signs, including successful presidential elections in July and August and a marked decline in the number of peacekeepers killed or wounded despite continuing attacks by armed groups.

That is reflected in the fact that while the Canadian military’s primary task in Mali is to evacuate injured UN peacekeepers by helicopter, they have so far only conducted two such missions, both on Sept. 11.

Guterres nonetheless painted a picture of a country at war with itself as various ethnic and extremist groups targeted each other as well as the Malian military, international forces and even civilians.

The result was the largest number of civilians killed – 287 – in one three-month period since UN peacekeepers first arrived in the country in 2013, while thousands more have been forced to flee their homes to escape the violence.

Much of the fighting was between members of two different ethnic communities in the centre of the country, while groups linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State were also responsible for a great deal of violence.

READ MORE: Canada’s on a new kind of mission in Mali — mixing peacekeeping with counterterrorism

“Intercommunal conflict, exacerbated by violent extremist groups, is fraying an already fragile social fabric and is deeply concerning,” Guterres wrote. “Too high a human toll has accrued as a result of the ongoing spiral of violence.”

The number of human-rights violations in Mali, which was already troublingly high, was similarly worse because of hundreds of new extrajudicial killings, disappearances, tortures and rapes across different parts of the country.

While most of those atrocities were perpetrated by the Islamic groups and competing ethnic communities, the Malian military itself was implicated in 18 violations – including one mass killing that is being criminally investigated.

“The human rights situation is alarming,” Guterres wrote. “It is absolutely imperative that the government prevent human rights violations and abuses, including those committed by the Malian armed forces.”

Further adding to Malians’ woes were severe floods in some areas and drought in others that, when combined with the fighting, had doubled the number of internally displaced people and left one in four needing humanitarian aid.

“The level of needs of is higher than at any point since the beginning of the crisis in 2012,” Guterres wrote.

READ MORE: Jeff Semple: First impressions of Canadian peacekeepers in Mali

The country was plunged into turmoil after a rebellion in the north at the same time as the Malian military was staging a coup in the capital, Bamako.

Canadian peacekeepers recently helped the World Food Programme deliver more than two tonnes of food, water and medicine by helicopter to a village in central Mali.

Yet despite the growing need for more emergency aid, Guterres reported that only one-third of the roughly $400 million needed to help Malians had been provided to the UN by the beginning of September.

WATCH: Exclusive: Treacherous conditions for Canada’s troops in Mali



“While needs continue to increase, humanitarian funding has decreased, preventing a timely at-scale and appropriate response,” he wrote.

Canada has provided funding for various development projects and agencies in Mali, but Bruno Charbonneau, an expert on Mali at Laurentian University, said the $60 million in emergency aid given since 2012 is relatively small.

Most of that money was also pledged immediately after the rebellion in the north and the coup.

READ MORE: At least 6 soldiers killed in attack on military taskforce headquarters in central Mali

As for the bigger picture, Charbonneau said what is needed is more international focus on the centre of Mali and greater emphasis on development to tackle the root causes of the conflict.

“As long as the focus is on countering terrorism in the Sahel, everything else is secondary,” he said. “And I think it’s a bad reading of the situation based on assumptions about the dynamics of the conflict and its causes.”

Opinion: Canada is Sending the Wrong Helicopters to Mali

By: Robert Smol, iPolitics 

In Mali, Canada’s flying pick-ups are no replacement for European helicopters

Canadian Forces door gunner keeps watch as his Griffon helicopter goes on a mission, February 20, 2017 in northern Iraq. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Ryan Remiorz

"Will our next round of UN peacekeepers have to engage, yet again, in that perennial Canadian military tradition of sending our military into harm’s way with far less than what our allies might provide to their forces?"A

For the last four years the German peacekeeping contingents, as well as the preceding Dutch, have struggled though the military and political quagmire of Mali with heavily armed, combat-proven attack helicopters operated by specially trained crews.

Quite appropriate for what is already considered the most dangerous peacekeeping operation attempted by the UN in its 73-year history.

But Canada does not own any attack helicopters. Instead our aging Griffon utility helicopters will be taking on armed escort responsibilities alongside our larger Chinook transport helicopters. Griffons were never designed to be an attack helicopter except in a pinch.

So the question needs to be asked: if Canada is expected to carry on and match the efforts of the Germans and Dutch will we have comparable capability in our improvised “armed” helicopters or will our next round of UN peacekeepers have to engage, yet again, in that perennial Canadian military tradition of sending our military into harm’s way with far less than what our allies might provide to their forces?

National Defence Headquarters, perhaps predictably, would not respond to my requests for information on any possible armament, sensor, and protective devices being installed on our 22-year old utility helicopters. However during the Afghan and Iraqi deployments , when Canadian troops were under the protective shield of US and allied attack helicopters and fighter aircraft, our Griffons were occasionally photographed carrying a door gunner positioned in the aircraft’s opening with a C-134 machine gun.

This haphazard, Vietnam-era “gun in the door” protection is quite consistent with the Griffon’s purpose. The Griffon is classified as a Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter. Its primary role, according to the RCAF website is “transportation of troops and material” making it more of a flying pick-up truck as opposed to highly agile flying tank that is a modern attack helicopter.

We should be concerned because, in Mali we will be away from the protective, largely U.S military shield that our military, not to mention the Canadian public, have come to expect in recent years.

So what did the preceding Dutch and German contingents in Mali have by way of armed helicopter escort? What level of armed, combat capability would our improvised, souped up utility helicopters have to match?

From 2014 to 2017 the Royal Netherlands Air Force deployed A-64D Apache attack helicopters to protect its assets. The Dutch Apache is armed with a 30mm automatic Boeing M230 chain gun that has a rate of fire of 625 rounds a minute. It also has a Lockheed Martin/Boeing AGM-114D hellfire air-to-surface missile with a range of 8-12 km. Also, depending on the nature of the threat, the Dutch Apache can also be mounted with Hydra 70 general purpose rockets and the AIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.

Equally lethal, the standard armament for the German Tiger attack helicopter, currently exiting Mali, include a 30 mm cannon with a rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. The Tiger can also be equipped 8 HOT Trigat anti-tank missiles, and 4 Stinger or Mistral short range air-to-air missiles. Also standard for the Tiger are two pods carrying 22 SNEB 68mm rockets.

Also impressive are the defensive countermeasure systems that are fitted to these flying tanks maximizing their survivability and effectiveness. These include, on both the German Tiger and the Dutch Apache a radar warning receiver, laser warning, and a chaff/flare dispenser. Crew survivability is also enhanced through the armoured protection given them a chance to make it back safely even after taking on enemy fire.

Could it be that Canada’s modified utility-transport helicopters, being deployed to Mali, are fitted with comparable armament and protection? Since we all know what the answer likely is the question then has to be asked: what level of additional support and compensation for our military weakness and vulnerabilities could we demand from the primary peacekeeping contingents in Mali which today are Burkina Faso, Chad, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Togo?

With Germany and the Netherlands out of the conflict, and the United States disengaged, it is from these country’s militaries that we will have to rely on once Mali’s Islamic militants realize that America’s most humble and obedient military servant (Canada) is facing them with utility transports posing as attack helicopters.



Welcome back to peacekeeping Canada!

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The views, opinions and positions expressed by all iPolitics columnists and contributors are the author’s alone. They do not inherently or expressly reflect the views, opinions and/or positions of iPolitics.

Rueter: Brief History of the Mali Conflict and the Challenges Canadian Soldiers are Likely to Face

By: Annie Rueter, CBC News

Canadian troops are set to join the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, a country that's been torn apart by violence since 2012.

They will be teaming up with around 13,000 authorized international troops as part of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) that's trying to stabilize the landlocked West African country amid an ethnic and jihadist insurgency.

Despite UN peacekeeping and French-led counterterrorism efforts that began in 2013 and a peace deal signed in 2015, Mali remains a "war zone," according to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres.

According to the UN, 170 peacekeepers have been killed there since 2013, making it one of the organization's deadliest peacekeeping missions to date.

The mission has 57 partner countries and is based in the northeastern city of Gao.
Key groups in the conflict

Bruno Charbonneau, an associate professor at Laurentian University and an expert in peacekeeping and military intervention in francophone Africa, says the groups involved in the conflict can be divided into two categories: those that signed the 2015 peace agreement and those that didn't.

The signatories include the Malian government; Platform, a pro-government coalition; and Co-ordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), a pro-separatist alliance that includes the Tuaregs, a traditionally nomadic ethnic group that has long felt marginalized and excluded in the country.

Both Platform and CMA are armed groups without representation in the legislature.

The non-signatory groups, Charbonneau says, are "fluid in membership" and include militias, bandits, jihadists and gangs. Members of each group are not mutually exclusive, further complicating counterterrorism efforts.

G5 Sahel is also an important player in the conflict. Developed in 2014, its members — Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania — support the French counterterrorism mission.
A history of violence

A former French colony, Mali became independent in 1960. It moved from a single-party state to a multiparty democracy in 1991 in the wake of anti-government riots. But a lack of autonomy and services for the sparsely populated northern region remained a problem.

In 2012, the anger in northern Mali boiled over as Tuareg rebels waged an insurgency against the Malian government in Bamako, located in the south. The Malian military took over the state and deposed President Amadou Toumani Touré for failing to quell the Tuareg rebellion.

The rebels and other insurgents took advantage of the chaos and seized control of the north, but French troops and airstrikes pushed the rebels back in January 2013, allowing the Malian government to regain control.

A French soldier inspects a home near Tin Hama in southeast Mali in October 2017. (Benoit Tessier/Reuters) 

The UN authorized the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission three months after the French-led counterterrorism efforts began.

In 2015, Mali declared a state of emergency as attacks spread to the south, particularly in the Sikasso region.

"We focus a lot on terrorism in the north of Mali in the Sahel, while the actual problems within Mali right now are in the centre where you have a lot more people living there," Charbonneau said. "This is where it is really, really worrisome and yet the focus is still on the north and terrorism."
Persistent problems

Today, the coalitions remain factious, and the violence has only intensified. Northern jihadist groups have unified while Platform and CMA continue to splinter.

The al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, for example, was formed in 2017 and has since captured territory in the north.

Charbonneau said two big problems that help fuel the conflict are the lack of state services, including a functioning and impartial justice system and the army's "history of human rights abuses."

The Malian army has a poor reputation when it comes to human rights, an analyst says. (Benoit Tessier/Reuters)

There's also the fact the government has yet to successfully implement the 2015 peace deal.

"There is definitely a lack of leadership within the government of Mali," Charbonneau said.
Risks for peacekeepers

In March, Canadian Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland announced Canada would deploy an aviation task force to Mali for a period of 12 months.

The task force will include up to 250 troops, two Chinook helicopters to provide needed transport and logistics capacity and four Griffon helicopters to provide armed escort and protection.

Charbonneau suspects the task force will have little interaction with people on the ground. However, he does anticipate the separation of roles between the peacekeeping mission and French-led counterterrorist operation could be a challenge.

The climate could also be an issue, he said.

"It definitely takes a toll on equipment to fly around in that region," he said, referring to the heat and dust storms.

And, of course, there is always the threat of violence.

The latest monthly report by the UN Security Council on MINUSMA says the security situation in Mali remains of "grave concern," and there's been an increase in the complexity of the attacks against Malian and international forces, as well as an "unprecedented number" of civilian casualties.

First Canadian Peacekeepers arrive in Mali as year-long mission begins

By: Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press

Canadian troops started to take up their positions in the world’s most dangerous peacekeeping mission on Sunday, as a dozen Forces members flew into an isolated United Nations’ base to begin work on Canada’s year-long commitment to help bring peace and stability to this strife-riven African nation.

The sun beat down on the tarmac as defence chief Gen. Jonathan Vance led the small contingent out of the Hercules transport plane that had carried them into the country and were met by a German convoy covered in the red dust that seems to be everywhere.

Gen. Vance and the 12-member advance team, whose task will be to lay the groundwork for the eventual arrival of the eight helicopters and 250 military members who comprise Canada’s mission in Mali, were scheduled to arrive the day before.

But a horrific dust storm, pictures of which showed a scene straight out of a movie, had forced Gen. Vance and the others to remain in Mali’s capital, Bamako, the previous night. It’s testament to one of the unpredictabilities of this mission – the weather.

Asked his first impression upon landing, a master warrant officer from Quebec who previously served in Afghanistan and Bosnia and who will act here as the camp sergeant major, replied: “It’s very hot. It’s very, very hot.”

But Nick, who like most others could only identified by his first name due to security reasons, was also clearly excited about the prospect of getting on with the mission after months of training – and nearly 10 years after he last deployed into Afghanistan.

“When the ramp of the Herc goes down on the tarmac, that’s a very, very good feeling,” he said. “It’s hot, you can feel it here in the desert. But that feeling is great.”

The arrival of the advance team marked the culmination of years of promises by the Trudeau Liberals, which initially pledged in the 2015 election to take a leadership role in UN peacekeeping missions if elected to power.

But with memories of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda still fresh in many minds, the peacekeeping commitment has been politically divisive while some have questioned whether there is even a peace to keep in Mali.

In an interview with the Canadian Press, Gen. Vance said both the UN and Canada have learned a great deal since the previous peacekeeping debacles of the 1990s, both in terms of reviews and lived experience in Afghanistan.

“There was a time in the ’90s when we went on operations and we adopted their rules of engagement. We do not do that with this mission. We’ve learned,” Gen. Vance said.

“We understand a lot more than we did in the ’90s about the nature of theatre support to ensure command and control, communications, intelligence, logistics and engineering are put in place to the extent necessary to support a mission.”

Yet he was also candid in his assessment that, yes, the situation in Mali could get worse. But that is why the UN is in the country and why Canada is supporting the UN – to keep that from happening, which many say would unleash a Pandora’s box in the region.

The reality is that the Canadian mission was not expected to start until next year, when the government and military were expecting Canada to replace a contingent of Jordanian helicopters in Gao.

But when Jordan was unable, for reasons that are still unclear, to send their aircraft to replace the existing German helicopter contingent, which has been providing medical evacuations and transport, the UN turned to Canada in March.

Two large Chinook transport helicopters and four smaller Griffon escorts, along with one spare of each in case of breakdowns, are due to arrive next month and replace the Germans, who have been flying here for more than a year.

The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali – or Minusma, as the UN mission is known – has been criticized both for not doing enough to bring peace and stability to the country, and because of its dangers.

More than 100 peacekeepers have died since Minusma was established in 2013, but the reality is that cost has been borne by developing countries such as Chad, rather than more advanced Western forces like Germany and Canada.

Indeed, the Canadians will spend the next 12 months in what is known as Camp Castor, a German-run base that is actually separate from the so-called “super camp” that houses most of peacekeepers in what is known as Sector East.

The camp is a collection of buildings, most of them low-slung and reinforced to protect against mortar attacks, bounded by concrete barriers and dusty roads along which the occasional armoured vehicle passes bearing the famous “UN” on its side.

The Canadians will fly primarily medical evacuation missions – at least one Chinook and two Griffons must be on standby at the expansive nearby helipad at all times – but Gen. Vance said they could also be called upon to do other tasks.

Those could include providing medical assistance to a joint counterterrorism force established by Mali and four of its neighbours to fight Islamist jihadists and others, Gen. Vance said, as well as the actual defending of Malian civilians.

But it could also mean protecting convoys and giving fire support to fellow peacekeepers who find themselves in trouble, though Gen. Vance said those would only be launched if absolutely no other option was available.

That could put Canadian helicopters and troops in harm’s way, but one senior UN official told the Canadian Press that the Germans “never fired a shot in anger,” and that there is no significant threat to helicopters from the ground.

The bigger threat is the weather and desert, which have been blamed for the crash of one German and one Dutch helicopter over the years, and which was in clear evidence – at least the heat – on Sunday when the troops arrived.

There is also the ever-present danger of poisonous scorpions, snakes and spiders around the camp, particularly at night, as well as malaria-carrying mosquitos.

One of the main questions is whether Canada – and the UN – can make a difference in Mali, where poverty is everywhere and various factions are locked in bloody struggles for land, smuggling routes and ideology.

For Gen. Vance, the focus is on making sure the Canadian contribution accomplishes its mission by providing the UN – and by extension the Malian state – with the support that it needs until the situation begins to improve.

“I’m confident that we’re contemplating and doing the right things as an international community,” he said.

“I’m confident that our helicopter contribution to Mali will be first class and offer the mission exactly what it needs. And I suspect that all of that combined will help Mali resist any downward trends associated with those actors that would try and attack the state.”

Despite the challenges facing the Canadians, the UN and Mali as a whole, Capt. Megan of Kingston, Ont., is unwavering in her assessment of the situation: “I think the Canadians are part of an important thing here.”

Arsenault: Canadian Troops in Mali prepare for daunting Task

By: Adrienne Arsenault, CBC News 

This is where it begins.

A small advance team for Canada's first substantial peacekeeping mission in nearly two decades has arrived in Mali.

The sweat was starting to pour off the dozen or so soldiers even as their plane thumped down in the capital, Bamako — and that might not just be because of the choking heat.
This is one of the most complicated tasks we have had to do.- Lt.-Col. Tom Murphy

A lot is expected.

Lt.-Col. Tom Murphy, commanding officer of the joint task force support component, has hurdles as high as his title is long. "This is one of the most complicated tasks we have had to do," he says.

This small team is what the Canadian Forces calls a theatre activation team, arriving ahead of the others to do reconnaissance and logistics planning.

Poverty and drought are just a few of the factors threatening civilians in Mali. (Stephanie Jenzer/CBC)

Work will only get busier and more complicated as the summer goes on.

By Monday, a few dozen more troops will land at the dusty northern base in Gao, and by August, Canada's contribution begins in earnest: up to 250 troops, two Chinook helicopters, four armed Griffon helicopters and a major role in a daunting and expanded UN mandate.
Peacekeepers 'targeted'

Established in 2013, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) started as a plan to keep some sort of political stability and security in the West African country that was plunged into strife after a coup gave rise to warring factions of insurgents. But time has not eased the violence of extremist groups here.

Aboard a Hercules aircraft with Canadian troops bound for Mali. (Adrienne Arsenault/CBC)

This terrifies those who look at a map and see the potential of a failed Mali.

They see the inevitability of more desperation pushing more people across the Mediterranean, deepening the migrant crisis in Europe.

They envision a foothold for terrorism that could threaten the Sahel region and beyond.

So the objectives have swollen: protect the civilians, promote human rights, rebuild the security sector, support political dialogue. The Canadian contingent joins 57 other countries — around 13,000 troops in all have been authorized to participate in the mission.

There are no small asks in this country. And you won't find credible voices sugarcoating what's ahead.

The UN's deputy force commander, Senegalese Maj.-Gen. Amadou Kane, is blunt about the dangers peacekeepers face. Yes, it is one of the UN's most deadly missions. Yes, 170 peacekeepers have already been killed. And yes was the answer to a CBC News question about whether he believes the peacekeepers are being targeted for attack.

"Absolutely," he said from the base in Bamako on a day when a delegation from the Canadian theatre activation team was swooping in to introduce themselves.

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Jonathan Vance paid a visit to Mali and the Gao facilities where a Canadian advance team is arriving to set up for Canada’s mission that starts in August. He has since left. (Stephanie Jenzer/CBC)

"The armed groups have shown their willingness to hamper the peace process by all means…. And we know that whatever opportunities they can get, they will act."

Even before the Canadians strap on the blue helmets, Kane has a list of needs and wants just to keep them and the other forces safe -- never mind all it will take to keep the population safe, which is effectively the point of this multinational effort.

"We don't have the intelligence in real time — this is the problem," he says.

Armed groups have carried out 44 attacks over two months this spring alone that killed and wounded civilians, Malian soldiers and UN personnel.
1-year commitment

Canada's commitment will be to make medical evacuations and provide aerial support.

No, that doesn't mean treacherous foot patrols. But it also doesn't mean a danger-free assignment. Canadians are entirely likely to be flying right into danger.

The UN’s deputy force commander, Senegalese Maj.-Gen. Amadou Kane, believes the peacekeepers in Mali are being targeted for attack by insurgents. (Stephanie Jenzer/CBC)

Lines blur and dance in the heat of Mali. So do missions. A documentary for the German network DW looked at the experience of Germans who are part of the Mali mission. A sergeant who had served in Afghanistan compared the two missions in terms of threat.

"There we had the Taliban — the one enemy that attacked us," the sergeant said. "Here we have several groups, and you lose track of who is who, and that's what makes it dangerous."

This will be at least one of the warnings the Canadians surely heed when they take over from the German helicopter contingent.

The plan is that Canada's contribution will have a hard end-date of one year. But few would be surprised if the UN didn't at least try for an extension or an expansion, because even after years of both a counterterror campaign and the UN mission, the violence has not abated. Some jihadist groups are joining forces, sharing their skills and intelligence and funds, which just adds a layer of vulnerability to both the people needing the peace and those trying to maintain it.

Timing is a wrinkle. Canada's deployment coincides with the Malian presidential election, set for July 29. That it will be free and fair is far from guaranteed.

Guterres reviews the honour guard composed of MINUSMA peacekeepers, in Mopti, Mali, on May 30.(MINUSMA/Flickr)

Canada's ambassador to Mali, Louis Verret, is cautious in the way diplomats have to be.

"We hope that they will be transparent," he told CBC News in an interview at the embassy in Bamako.

"We hope that it will be democratic. We know we are not going to be perfect.… Let's say we are careful about those elections."

He and the Canadian troops have another serious concern: the discovery of mass graves holding the bodies of 25 civilians, purportedly executed by members of the Malian army -- the same military force MINUSMA is backing. The Malian government has said it will investigate.

"How can we have the civilian population being killed by their own army? This is not what we we believe in. This is not acceptable in terms of human rights," Verret says.

The work ahead is a little hard to fathom.

Mali needs fair elections. It needs stability. It needs the extremists to go away. It needs its poverty alleviated. It needs its drought abated.

In all this Canada has a part to play. And in all this there are risks around every dusty corner.

Boeing Sending Technical Staff with RCAF to Mali

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch 

Boeing says it will be sending a technical representative to Mali to support the RCAF when it deploys its Chinook helicopters. So far one specialist is scheduled to go but others could follow.

The Boeing staff will be at the RCAF base in Mali to consult on issues that arise during the Chinook operations in what is expected to be a deployment that is hard on the helicopters because of the environment.

Members of the Canadian Medical Emergency Response Force Protection Team fall back to the CH -147 Chinook helicopter, during Exercise Maple Resolve in Wainwright, Alberta on the 16th of May 2018. Photo: Corporal Andrew Kelly, Canadian Forces Combat Camera IS08-2018-0010-009

On March 19 the Canadian government announced its commitment to deploy a task force made up of medium utility and heavy lift transport helicopters for up to 12 months to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

The task force will provide two CH-147F Chinook helicopters from 450 Tactical Helicopter Squadron, based in Petawawa, Ont. and four CH-146 Griffon helicopters from 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron, based in Edmonton, Alta. Aircraft spares could also be made available to the Aviation Detachment.

The aircraft and personnel are expected in Africa by August.

In Mali, the CH-146 Griffon helicopters will serve as an armed escort for the Chinooks as they carry out UN missions. The Canadian Armed Forces will provide MINUSMA with a number of medically-trained personnel who will help in medical evacuations for partners and allied forces on the ground and provide logistical support for the mission.

In Mali, how do we avoid helping the bad guys again?

By: Doug Saunder, The Globe and Mail

In a few weeks, six military helicopters and 250 soldiers will begin their journey from Canada to the Sahara Desert, where they will join more than 11,000 international forces in a five-year-old operation known as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

MINUSMA Guinean contingents set up positions on higher ground around Kidal, Mali, in December 2016.
UN PHOTO/HARANDANE DICKO/UN PHOTO

And once again, there is controversy: Are we pouring money and lives into another mission that risks becoming a decade-long quagmire, with unclear goals? Has the Trudeau government pushed our soldiers into this commitment because there’s pressure from our allies and a voter appetite to see maple leaves on the peacekeepers’ blue helmets?

While there’s some truth in both accusations, the Mali mission is not, by itself, an unworthy or imprudent use of our military resources. Mali, a hopeful and comparatively stable country until Islamist forces invaded its north in 2012, needs help rescuing itself from an outside invader hated by most of the population. The UN mission is not a Western imposition or a regime-change operation: Mali’s legitimate government has requested military assistance with what should be a limited operation against a jihadi insurgency – thus the operation’s name.

That said, there is reason to be gravely concerned about the prospects of this sort of military mission. While this is still officially a peacekeeping operation, in practice it bears no resemblance to the classic conflict-prevention campaigns of decades ago. Its mission is “to help stabilize key population centres and support the re-establishment of state authority throughout Mali, and to develop and implement programs for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.” It is, in everything but name, a counter-insurgency operation.

And counterinsurgency operations – designed to neutralize an extremist guerrilla enemy by strengthening a country’s civic institutions and supporting the population – have a terrible track record.

The Mali goals are strikingly similar to those of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. The stabilization and institution-building operations in Afghanistan were expensively implemented by hundreds of thousands of people, lavishly and carefully designed by scholars and social scientists – and they failed badly.

Last week, the U.S. government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction released its report concluding that 17 years of “efforts to stabilize insecure and contested areas in Afghanistan mostly failed,” and that elsewhere the Afghan mission “overestimated its ability to build and reform government institutions as part of the stabilization strategy,” and “spent far too much money, far too quickly, in a country woefully unprepared to absorb it.”

As a consequence, “opportunities for corruption and elite capture [theft] abounded, making many of those projects more harmful than helpful,” and “power brokers and predatory government officials with access to coalition projects became kings with patronage to sell, fueling conflicts,” and the many Afghans left outside these power networks “found natural allies in the Taliban, who used that support to divide and conquer communities the coalition was keen to win over.”

This pattern keeps repeating itself: Even the most well-intentioned and well-designed “stabilization and assistance” operations end up benefiting the enemy.

Aisha Ahmad, a political scientist at the University of Toronto who specializes in the financing and economic activities of jihadi extremist groups (patterns she investigates in her new book Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power) has found that most efforts to stabilize and normalize countries are designed in ways that benefit the jihadis more than those they’re meant to support.


The reason why jihadist groups keep returning to power in African and Central Asian countries, she writes in a new essay, “has remarkably little to do with jihadist ideology or identity politics. Rather, there is a clear economic logic behind these patterns of jihadist resurgence.”

Big international interventions (whether UN or NATO), she writes, “flood conflict zones with foreign resources, which create a series of perverse incentives. These incentives change the cost calculations and the behaviour of local armed groups, especially the international community’s local allies. Too often, foreign dollars socialize and incentivize these local allies to behave poorly — and indeed, even sabotage mission success.”

From the perspective of a poor country’s economy, an international military mission is something like a discovery of oil – a flood of untethered money that risks a “resource curse” effect, making the worst people more powerful. This has a tendency to turn insurgent groups into winners and governments into losers. It is still possible to play an important role in making Mali a better place – but, as Dr. Ahmad concludes, we’d better pay a lot more attention to what our money is doing.

Is sending helicopters to Mali good enough?

By Chris Kilford

Given the recent concern over Canada’s upcoming contribution to the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), one might easily assume that up until now few Canadians had ever set foot in Mali. However, this is far from the case – Canada is Mali’s second-most important bilateral development partner, after France.

Sgt Chad Zopf, a door gunner, onboard a Griffon helicopter while on exercise in Afghanistan.

At the Embassy of Canada in Mali, which opened in the city of Bamako in 1970, the Université Laval and various Canadian non-governmental organizations have been working for years to improve the daily lives of Malians.

In the past 12 months alone, and with the support of the Canadian government, efforts were underway to: improve agricultural output and food security; to assist community health physicians graduate from the University of Bamako; and to provide new software to Mali’s government for improving domestic revenue collection.

Meanwhile, several Canadian mining companies have significant investments in Mali. B2Gold Corporation, for example, operates the Fekola Mine with a 950-strong, mostly Malian workforce. According to Canada’s Ambassador, Louis Verret, the gold sector “accounts for about 66% of Mali's exports and is therefore critical for government revenue.”

However, since 2012, Mali has been gripped by civil war in part fuelled by the Canadian-backed ouster of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Following his death, many Malian Tuareg fighters who had fought for his regime, returned home to fight for their own space in northern Mali. And, while a peace agreement between the government and its main opponents (including the Tuareg) was signed in 2015, little has changed on the security front. Instead, the French, the G5 Sahel regional force, and MINUSMA are doing what they can to contain various rebel factions.

As for MINUSMA, it is only as good as the troops it gets from contributing countries – and many western armies, which could make a big difference – are noticeably absent from the front lines. For a mission deployed in an asymmetrical conflict environment, this is a big problem, and has resulted in significant casualties for UN troops that have largely been drawn from developing countries.

Still, not all is lost. In June 2017, the UN instructed MINUSMA to fully concentrate its efforts on supporting the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation and step-up efforts to redeploy Malian security forces to the centre and north of the country. To help, an EU Training Mission with 580 personnel is re-building the military, while 128 personnel with the EU Capacity Building Mission are focused on training the police, gendarmerie and national guard.

As for Canada, it will soon send six helicopters and approximately 250 personnel for 12 months in support of MINUSMA. For those wanting Canada to take on a more active international role, it’s good news. But when it comes to truly helping the UN, apparently our deeds are falling short of our words. Sending helicopters is important, but it’s not quite what many had expected from a government that has been consistently eager to portray itself internationally as a serious player on the world stage.

–––
Chris Kilford is a former Army Officer and defence attaché who served in Afghanistan and Turkey. Currently he is a fellow with the Queen's Centre for International and Defence Policy.

Canada aims to deploy CAF to Mali by August: Sajjan

By: Rachel Aiello, CTV News 
@rachaiello

OTTAWA – The Canadian military is aiming to have peacekeepers on the ground in Mali by August, according to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan.

RCAF Door Gunner onboard a Griffon Helicopter over Iraq. 

On March 19 the federal government announced its intention to send peacekeeping troops and an aviation task force to the UN mission in Mali for a year-long deployment.

"We're looking at right now this summer, we’re aiming for August," Sajjan told host Evan Solomon in an interview on CTV's Question Period airing Sunday. "The goal is to actually have the rotation in place, around that time."

Canada is deploying two Chinook helicopters to provide transport and logistics, and four Griffon helicopters to offer escort and protection services.

Other specific details, including the number of troops that will be deployed, and the rules of engagement, are yet to be announced.

Sajjan said Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Jonathan Vance is currently doing "more detailed planning" and "analysis" to know specifically what will be needed.

"We have to be able to determine what type of planning figure we need to move forward on," Sajjan said. "Exactly where they’re going to be based and what’s actually needed there, that determination… all those things will have to be taken into account."

Sajjan also acknowledged that Mali “has become a very dangerous mission,” but assured Canadian troops will be ready for it.

According to the United Nations, there have been 162 multinational peacekeeper fatalities since the mission began in 2013.

Send Canadian forces into Mali with our Eyes Open

Opinion Column - The Hamilton Spectator

After months of wavering, Justin Trudeau's Liberals have finally committed Canadian peacekeepers to a dirty, dangerous mission in Mali.

The wisdom of the government's decision this week has already been challenged by critics who say this is not peacekeeping as Canadians have ever known it because much of this impoverished, West African nation is still torn apart by fighting.

There is no peace to be kept, they point out, fully aware Mali is the United Nation's most dangerous, ongoing mission and that 162 peacekeepers have died there since 2013.

Despite there being some truth in these words of warning, on balance Ottawa made the right call.

The Liberals campaigned in the last election with a pledge to renew Canada's peacekeeping commitments, but did little in their first two years in office, for which they were roundly criticized.

At the start of 2018, there were just 43 Canadian peacekeepers deployed on UN missions — the lowest number since Canada helped initiate those missions 62 years ago.

While defending Canada must be the priority for our military, there is a long and honourable tradition in this country of deploying our Armed Forces in tandem with our allies, not only to promote peace but also to end conflicts that claim innocent, civilian lives.

But is Mali the place for Canada to breathe new life into this tradition?

In theory, the Mali government and two coalitions of armed groups have agreed to a peace process. In reality, peace remains elusive.

Parts of the country are lawless and chaotic due to ongoing fighting that involves not only Islamist jihadists but rival ethnic groups. That instability could spread to neighbouring countries, igniting a regional crisis.


And just as al-Qaida insurgents in Afghanistan played a role in the infamous 911 attacks on the United States, so al-Qaida fighters in Mali could decide to export their violence to Europe or North America.

No wonder the UN sent 12,000 peacekeepers and 1,900 police officers into Mali to lay the groundwork for a lasting peace there. Most of this support comes from poor, African nations.

They should not have to shoulder the burden alone. As one of the world's wealthiest countries, Canada has a role to play.

Canada should not help Mali just so the Liberals can say they kept a promise — though it's welcome to see them doing this.

Instead, Canada should send troops to Mali to help that tormented nation, stabilize a shaky region and, quite possibly, protect our own continent from terrorists.

The plan is to deploy two Chinook transport helicopters and four Griffon attack helicopters to provide armed escort and protection in the fight against the Islamist militants in Mali. An infantry unit and military trainers will also go along.

This is a relatively modest yet significant, 12-month commitment that can be reviewed next year.

Our forces will be in danger, but less so because most of their work will be done in the air, not on the ground.

Of course Canadians should not blindly underestimate the risks. But we should not shirk a job that should be done, eyes-open.

Female Soldiers to Be Central Part of Mali Deployment

The Canadian Press, published in The Guardian 

Canada will deploy helicopters and troops – including female soldiers – to Mali in support of an ongoing UN peacekeeping mission, the government has announced.

An RCAF Griffon flies over a village in Iraq during OP IMPACT. Griffons will be deployed to Mali to provide escort to the Chinook transport helicopters. 

Defence minister Harjit Sajjan told reporters that Canada would deploy two Chinook transport helicopters and four Griffon attack helicopters to provide armed escort and protection in the fight against Islamist militants in Mali.

The 12-month deployment will also include an infantry unit and military trainers.

A date for Canada’s first deployment in Africa since its troubled mission to Rwanda in 1994 and the exact number of troops that will be sent have yet to be decided.

The foreign minister, Chrystia Freeland, said the unit heading to Mali would include female soldiers.

“One of our priorities is to increase women’s participation in peacekeeping,” she said.

The announcement is less ambitious than the Liberal government of the prime minister, Justin Trudeau, had initially planned. Shortly after coming to power in late 2015, Ottawa had indicated it would send up to 600 troops to Mali.

Ministers later put the plans on hold amid fears of casualties, angering allies who said they felt let down, and prompting some to speculate the delay could hurt Canada’s bid for a non-permanent seat at the UN security council.

In recent months, jihadists have ramped up their activities in central Mali, targeting domestic and foreign forces in outbreaks of violence once confined to the country’s north.
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Four UN peacekeepers were killed and four wounded in late February when a mine exploded under their vehicle in central Mali.

The peacekeeping mission, known by the acronym Minusma, currently has 12,000 military personnel and 1,900 police.

They have been deployed in Mali since 2013 to counter the jihadist insurgency and general lawlessness.

The Canadians, according to Sajjan, will conduct reconnaissance, facilitate medical evacuations for the 57 UN partner nations already on the ground in Mali, and help plan missions in the country.

James Bezan, defence spokesman for the official opposition Conservative party, accused the Liberals of sending troops to a highly dangerous country for partisan promises.

“This is about Justin Trudeau’s selfish political ambition to win a seat on the UN security council, and he is using our troops as political pawns,” Bezan told reporters.

Canada is running for one of the council’s 10 non-permanent seats in an election that will take place in 2020.

Canadian Peacekeepers head to Mali, a country broken by Civil War

GEOFFREY YORK, The Globe and Mail 
JOHANNESBURG
Originally Published: March 19, 2018

For a decade, Canada has pumped more than $1-billion in foreign aid and military support into the West African nation of Mali, trying to rebuild a fragile and dysfunctional state.

It has largely been a failed effort. Despite massive international support, Mali has fallen into turmoil, suffering first a military coup and then widening violence as its government steadily lost territory to northern separatists and Islamist militias.

Now Canada will try again. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan announced on Monday that Canada will send military helicopters to Mali to support the United Nations peacekeeping mission there. The one-year deployment is expected to include two Chinook helicopters for medical evacuations and logistical support, along with four smaller Griffons to serve as armed escorts.


It will be one of Canada’s first major peacekeeping efforts in Africa since the troubled missions in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s. The deployment will also include Canadian troops, although Mr. Sajjan said the number is not yet decided. Sources earlier told The Globe and Mail that 200 to 250 Canadian soldiers could be deployed to Mali as air crews, medical crews, support staff and special forces.

A French soldier of the operation Barkhane, an anti-terrorist mission in Sahel, patrols during a tactical flight on March 12, 2016 over Mali. PASCAL GUYOT/THE GLOBE AND MAIL

Mali is considered the most dangerous UN mission in the world, with 162 peacekeepers killed since 2013. Canada hopes to avoid casualties by deploying helicopters, which are much less vulnerable to attack.

But physical danger is only one of the challenges. The bigger question is whether a military effort can reconstruct a broken state, one of the most aid-dependent in the world, where the government has little effective control of the country.

By some estimates, two-thirds of Mali’s territory is under constant threat from armed groups, including Islamist extremists.

Scholars have described Mali’s government as a Potemkin façade, more fictional than real. “Donors have little to show for their efforts,” said a recent analysis by Catriona Craven-Matthews and Pierre Englebert, scholars at Pomona College in California who have studied Mali for years.

They estimate that international donors have spent an average of US$3-billion annually since 2013 to support Mali’s security and development – nearly a quarter of the country’s GDP. Yet the state remains weak. “Violence is on the rise, institutions remain dysfunctional, the military is inefficient, investments have been few, and corruption is rampant,” the two scholars wrote.

The last major overseas deployment of the RCAF Chinook helicopters was in Afghanistan, where the workhorse heavy-lift helicopters were used to avoid roadside IEDs. PHOTO: RCAF

Despite this, foreign support continues to pour into the country, largely because many countries have keen strategic interests in Mali.

For the United States, northern Mali is a dangerous source of Islamist fighters, including those who crossed the border into Niger and killed four U.S. soldiers last October.

For European countries, Mali is one of the main routes for the traffickers who bring migrants and drugs onto the continent.

For Canada, there are economic and humanitarian interests. Canadian mining companies have invested more than $1-billion in Mali’s mining industry. And both the Liberal and Conservative governments in Ottawa since 2006 have made Mali one of their favourite recipients of aid.

A decade ago, Ottawa saw Mali as a model of democracy and stability for Africa – an assumption that was later undermined by a coup, civil war and terrorism.

After choosing Mali as one of its “countries of focus” for development aid, Ottawa spent huge sums of money to prop it up. Mali has become one of Canada’s top five recipients of foreign aid, getting more than $100-million annually, including $125-million in 2016. This has made Canada the third-biggest bilateral donor of development aid to Mali, behind only France and the United States.

Canada forged an even stronger connection to Mali after the kidnapping of Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler and Louis Guay, who were held hostage by an Islamist radical militia in the deserts of northern Mali for several months in early 2009. Canada put heavy pressure on the Malian government to help negotiate their release.

Canada has also sent hundreds of soldiers to Mali since 2010 in a multimillion-dollar effort to help train the Malian army in counterterrorism, border security and other priorities.

Much of this training was led by the U.S. military under a US$500-million counterterrorism program. But one of the graduates of the U.S. training program, Captain Amadou Sanogo, shocked the Pentagon in 2012 by leading a military coup in Mali.

The coup forced Canada to suspend its aid to Mali for nearly two years.

Military solutions have failed to build a self-sustaining democracy in Mali. The country remains heavily dependent on troops from France, West Africa and the United Nations. It remains to be seen whether Canada’s helicopters can make any real difference in a dismal situation.

- With a report from Robert Fife in Ottawa

Is Mali the right job for the Canadian Forces?

By: Amanda Connolly, iPolitics

The UN mission is extremely dangerous — but it may play to the CAF’s skill set

The UN mission in Mali is the world’s most dangerous.

Sixty nine peacekeepers have been killed in attacks there since the mission started in 2013. The dynamics on the ground are complex to say the least, with a fledgling peace process being propped up by the blue helmets. A broader French counterterrorism mission across the Sahel is fighting to keep Islamist terrorists from again seizing control of Mali’s north as they did in 2012 amid the chaos of an army coup in the capital. And the country is ground zero for a network of criminal drug and people-smuggling rings that stretch across the region.

That’s the bad news. The good news — at least from Canada’s perspective — is that a Canadian peacekeeping mission in Mali could actually help the situation on the ground.

As speculation mounts across the defence industry that Canada will soon announce a contribution to the mission in Mali, experts say it’s worth considering the ways in which, despite the risk, the mission could benefit from the unique capabilities of Canada’s military.

“Mali has a legitimate peace process ongoing and it needs to be fostered in order for the country not to break out into war again,” said Walter Dorn, a professor of defence studies at the Canadian Forces College and chair of the Master of Defence Studies program at the Royal Military College. He studies peace operations.

“I think that the mission is proving quite successful at stabilizing the situation in Mali and that it’s indispensable for the peace process to move forward. So supporting the mission in Mali would make a key contribution to Africa.”

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said in August that Canada will commit 600 troops and about 150 police officers to UN peace support operations. Since then, there has been no specific commitment from the government to any particular mission, beyond an acknowledgement that the mission will be in Africa, that it will be a long deployment — and that it will be dangerous.

But as General Jonathan Vance, chief of defence staff, told the Senate defence and security committee last month, the fact that a mission is dangerous doesn’t mean it isn’t valuable.

“A risky mission that has great potential for success may be a mission that you want to invest in, and in the military, we do risk,” said Vance on September 21. “We’re good at that, if we can mitigate it. If the risk is not mitigatable and is out of all proportion and at the same time there’s no hope of moving forward, then it’s probably the wrong mandate and it would very likely be a mandate on which I would advise the government that it would need to do more work with the UN before you would commit troops.”

And as Senator Mobina Jaffer pointed out in the same meeting, Mali is no Afghanistan.

Canada lost 158 members of the Canadian Forces during that nine-year war but developed extensive expertise in managing insurgent warfare. That knowledge could be useful in supporting allies already on the ground in Mali, given heightened recent tensions there due to terrorist attacks and social unrest.

“Mali fits the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces quite well,” said Dorn. “Because of our Afghanistan expertise, we can operate in areas where there are IEDs and we’re well aware of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. So the peace operation there, although it’s a different mode of operation … we still have the expertise in those kinds of environments from Afghanistan.”

Responding to recent attacks, the Mali mission recently expanded by an additional 2,500 troops, bringing the total number of international troops stationed there to just over 15,000.

Most of those soldiers come from African or non-Western nations like Bangladesh and China. Germany maintains a force of 570 soldiers, the largest Western contingent in the UN mission.

The mission now faces a critical equipment gap: The Dutch, citing operational strain, are scaling down and preparing to pull out their Apache attack choppers and Chinook transport helicopters early next year.

Given statements from Canadian officials in the past about the need to identify gaps in existing missions, that raises the question of whether Canada could fill at least part of that operational gap by providing Chinooks to assist with troop transport as it did with the French counterterrorism mission in 2014, when Canada sent Globemaster III strategic lifters.

Canada has 15 brand-new Chinooks, delivered in 2014 at a cost of some $4 billion and currently stationed out of CFB Petawawa, as well as Griffon helicopters mounted with machine guns during the war in Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau referenced that contribution of Globemasters during a press conference last week with French Prime Minister Manuel Valls. He was responding to a question about whether the subject of Mali came up during his talks with Valls. Asked whether that suggests the government sees the looming helicopter gap as an opportunity for Canada to fill an operational gap, a spokesperson for Sajjan said it’s still too early to say exactly what the mission will be.

(Credit: United Nations – Department of Field Support. Cartohraphic section)

“As the government looks to re-engage in peace support operations, we are looking at ‎all the ways in which Canada can contribute. As you saw with our expanded mission in Iraq, one of the things we look to do is find gaps in existing missions and look to filling them,” said Jordan Owens, press secretary for Sajjan. “But still too soon for me to confirm a location or specific contribution.”

Three other missions also come up frequently in discussions about a Canadian contribution: the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan.

And while iPolitics has reported in the past that South Sudan is not being considered by the government, both the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo present challenges that might suggest they wouldn’t be the best fit for a government looking to make a specific, focused impact.

“(Mali) is clearly one of the more difficult in a certain way, but it’s also one of the more clear-cut missions at the same time in the sense that South Sudan … Central African Republic, you’re wading into in essence a civil war (there) as opposed to a counterterrorist operation, which is really what’s happening in Mali,” said George Petrolekas, who served with the military in Bosnia, Afghanistan and NATO and is a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

“The Congo is the largest, best-financed and most enduring UN mission in Africa and it still hasn’t brought resolution to anything. South Sudan and Central African Republic are difficult for me because in a sense they’re civil wars going on and it’s not as clear-cut.

“Mali has its own difficulties, just because of the fact that it’s more of a fight as opposed to classical peacekeeping. So in the Congo, because of its size, we would just be a drop in a bucket of water. The presence wouldn’t necessarily be felt.”

Petrolekas also pointed to the recent increases in allegations of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic and hinted at the negative impact those could have on Canada’s international reputation.

There were 69 allegations made in 2015 against UN peacekeepers — an increase from 52 in 2014 and 66 in 2013 — roughly one-third of that number against peacekeepers in the Central African Republic and 16 against peacekeepers in the DRC.

“When you think of allegations that have been made against UN troops in other peacekeeping missions like in the Congo and the Central African Republic … it doesn’t mean that you’d be doing the same things but you’d be tarnished by the actions of others. There’s less of a chance of that, I think, in Mali,” Petrolekas said.

It’s also possible the mission will be a joint one, with Canadian troops split between several missions in Africa, Dorn suggested. He cautioned, however, that with the DRC being so far behind in development and basic infrastructure, the difficulties in measuring firm progress there might see a smaller contingent of troops deployed there, with a main force in Mali.

“In terms of meaningful impact, both missions would give great opportunities, so it’s quite possible that we’ll make a contribution to both missions,” he said. “I think the main effort will be in Mali.”

Peacekeeping in Africa: sober reflections

By: James Cox, CDA Institute 

Contrary to current media and public punditry, do not expect a major Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) deployment into Africa anytime soon. Some troops may go, as well as a few police and diplomats, but not enough to have any real effect.

Media jumped on the recent government announcement about re-engaging in United Nations peace support operations and focussed on the related announcement that up to 600 military troops and 150 police personnel could be made available for deployment. Defence commentators were only too happy to raise the volume on the subject.

Let’s step back a bit. Some sober reflection is required.

First, its important to remember that one of the government’s central policy planks during the last election, confirmed in the 2015 Speech from the Throne, was its intention to re-engage in United Nations (UN) peace support operations. Now, one of its priority aims is to gain a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In March, 2016, Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion addressed the United Nations Security Council and said:

"After almost 20 years, it is time for Canada to be at the Security Council to address global peace and security challenges. […] We seek a seat at the Security Council precisely because the world finds itself at a time when there is a pressing need to prevent violent extremism, to manage conflict and to respond to humanitarian crises. We know Canada can make a difference."

So, the recent government announcement should have come as no surprise, but it was both less deep and less aggressive than reported.

What government really announced was simply an apparent recommitment to support UN peace operations, to be managed – under the auspices of a new Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP), with a budget of $450 million over three years – by Global Affairs Canada.

PSOP is Canada’s “comprehensive, coordinated approach to support Canadian interests and UN peace efforts.” The announced details reflect whole-of-government terminology, calling upon diplomatic, development, law-enforcement and other assets, including military. A backgrounder identifies three core PSOP responsibilities:
Leadership on stabilization;
Support coordinated responses by the Government of Canada to conflicts and crises abroad; and
Design and deliver catalytic stabilization initiatives.

PSOP is simply a newer (Liberal) version of the former Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), however, the PSOP promotional text tends to shun militaristic hyperbole, stating its intent to “go beyond military roles and work closely with local authorities and a range of international and regional partners.”

The program aims to concentrate on early warning, conflict prevention, dialogue, mediation and peacebuilding, and the empowerment of women in decision making for peace and security. As stated in a government backgrounder, this whole-of-government effort combines diplomacy, deployment, training and capacity-building efforts, and includes conflict prevention, mediation, peace operations and peacebuilding efforts, all of which constitutes a comprehensive approach drawing on civilian, police and military resources, with protection of civilians as a core concern.

We need not be concerned about another large military deployment because, as PSOP notes, “The Canadian Armed Forces are prepared to contribute personnel across a range of available capabilities, which could [author’s emphasis] include ground troops, leadership for command and headquarters positions, air transport, engineering and medical expertise, military and police training, and capacity building, in order to make a meaningful contribution to peace operations.” This is hardly a call to arms. There is no hint of frontline action here.

Besides, much of Canada’s meagre combat power is committed elsewhere, most field units are disturbingly under-strength and many of the named capabilities do not exist in the Reserve Force. The cupboards, if not bare, are certainly lightly occupied.

Despite this, Defence Minister Harjit Singh Sajjan said, “Canada is committed to re-engaging in a full spectrum of multilateral peace operations. This is why we are making a significant pledge of military personnel and related capabilities for possible deployment to UN peace operations. Minister Sajjan went on to identify his ‘significant’ pledge of 600 troops without any further detail.

Many commentators quickly assumed that all or most of the 600 troops will be deployed on one complex and dangerous peace support mission in Africa, probably in Mali, maybe in South Sudan (both exceedingly difficult to support logistically). However, government pronouncements are far more non-committal than that. Government press notices say that the “exact size and composition of any future CAF deployment to a UN mission will be based on discussions with the UN and Canada’s partner nations, as well as an assessment of where Canada can best make a meaningful impact.”

Where will we go? What will we do? Defence Minister Sajjan has told us that his recent information-gathering visit to Africa provided a variety of authoritative opinions on where Canadian capabilities might best be deployed to have impact. But here’s the rub. If Canada proceeds to simply plug holes where no one else wants to go, it is hard to see exactly what worthwhile impact might be had. Moreover, this government tends to prefer training and support contributions which, while helpful and perhaps gratifying, are never decisive.

Government aversion to anything remotely resembling a combat mission is a guarantee that no large Canadian military contingent will deploy within sound of the guns. In this way, any future Canadian mission will probably reflect, once again, Liberal government (present and past) habits of sprinkling Canadian missions across the globe, simply to show the Canadian flag and create the impression that Canada “is back.” Where a previous government refused to “go along to get along,” the motto of the current government could well be, “how do you like me now?” “Sunny ways” are simply stage lighting for a bit player.

Don’t get me wrong. Whether deployed singly or in small groups, Canadian military, law enforcement, diplomatic, development, or any other personnel will perform admirably, but let’s face it, even if all $450 million were spent on one mission, and all 600 military personnel and 150 troops were deployed on the same mission, it’s not big enough to have a decisive impact on any UN peace support operation. So one must wonder why government makes such a big thing out of not much at all. It’s not such a big deal.

It seems that narcissistic political leadership and partisan hubris, mixed with a reluctance to directly engage nasty adversaries will steer future Canadian contributions away from any really meaningful role. In these circumstances, one must wonder whether it is worthwhile to put Canadian lives in danger abroad, simply for appearances.

———
Dr. James Cox is a Research Fellow with the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He is a former Canadian Armed Forces Brigadier-General with extensive UN and NATO operational experience. He now teaches civil-military relations in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, at Carleton University.

Will a Sizeable Canadian military deployment to Mali make matters worse?

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch

Defence Watch received some views about the potential upcoming Canadian Forces mission to Mali from of an individual involved in the NGO community who has recently returned from that country. They have asked that their name not be published. Here is what that person has written to Defence Watch:

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is clearly seen as a party to the conflict by the many islamist groups, and by local powerholders profiting from the black market routes running through Northern Mali, but also increasingly to the north and south borders from Bamako.

MINUSMA was the expected passive UN force locked in by the financial and political interests of participating African contingents.

MINUSMA in Northern Mali has weak counter-IED capability, weak medical, weak engineering assets, and weak tactical ISR. They have had a weaker track record of protecting civilians who displaced themselves near UN bases. Canadians in MINUSMA would likely take casualties from IEDs or ambushes from local forces, so no happy story about blue helmets helping a transition to a peace that no local powerholder really supports. There’s no economy in Mali except the international assistance money they are getting to support this fight, and black market routes connecting Libya to Senegal to Ivory Coast for guns and drugs.

Given the context in Mali it is difficult to guess why the government can win a media victory with the Canadian public over sending more than a few advisers to MINUSMA, or a support company or two such as a role 3 hospital or engineers.


With MINUSMA’s track record something will happen soon that will cast a bad light on the mission (such as the performance of African contingents in making security worse for IDPs in South Sudan), which will expose the folly of placing CF combat assets under UN command run by African interests with little to no interest in tactical security of civilians.

International NGOs in Mali barely operate in the North, and the few that do, like the ICRC, distance themselves sternly from MINUSMA. So no easy media victory for the government in claiming that the Canadian mission will enable the delivery of aid. Whatever Canadians decide to do, it will always be overshadowed by the backroom efforts that the French are throwing around in aid, governance and foreign military support to the government.

The French seem to have an attitude to contain MINUSMA so as not to interfere with their strategic objectives and the influence networks in their former colony. The authorities in Bamako and the different clan-based politics are caught in a political struggle over the change of president sometime next year. So no happy story about governance and democracy promotion for Canadian aid either.

That struggle alone may generate more violence than the jihadist threat, leaving the CF with a weak operational situation as the UN mission gets evacuated and the narrative of the mission slips away from a story of a mission focused on north-south reconciliation and protecting governance from an islamist threat.

Where it would make some strategic sense for the CF to commit to Mali is if the mission is really in support of the US-French/Eurocorps (there are German and Belgian military deployed with the French not under UN command) counter-terrorism mission for West Africa.

AFRICOM may be asking Canada to shore up MINUSMA for better alignment to anti-extremists intelligence and influence activities. Working in continuation of US counter-terrorism objectives would make the most sense for the CF in Mali and with other Canadian commitments in Western Africa, but it would make a deployment under MINUSMA a travesty of the official aims of the UN mission and what will likely be couched in terms of absolute virtues by the government to sell the deployment to Canadians. Frankly the context in Mali is awful if the government hopes to score an easy PR win with the peacekeeping romantics in Canada. That security council seat may be a more substantial justification, but may come at a heavy price when something goes south in Mali to make the Canadian mission look bad.

Opportunities for a CF contingent to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance may be limited. There are few international aid agencies active in Northern Mali where Minusma is deployed, and NGOs and agencies such the International Committee of the Red Cross who are very active through the Mali Red Cross rely on their own contacts with local communities and all armed groups.

MINUSMA is a party to the conflict in Mali, and aid agencies hoping to maintain their neutrality to access beneficiaries and ensure the safety of their staff often stay away from Minusma and UN coordination mechanisms in their field operations.

My personal comment is that a sizeable CF deployment outside of few staff officers or a field hospital may very well decrease the security and access to beneficiaries for Canadian-funded aid activities in the South of Mali. The statement by Minister Bibeau in support of the mission makes it a bit odd, since there will be no direct contribution at best to Canadian aid project outcomes by deploying the CF in Mali, and at worst Canadian funded aid projects can become the soft targets of the increased Canadian security involvement in country.

The good news is that a CF deployment would likely come with additional money for Canadian agencies present in Mali, notably the Canadian Red Cross who have started a sizeable maternal and child health program in support of the Mali Red Cross and ministry of health North and South of Bamako.

Reconnaissance mission sent to study peacekeeping operations in Mali

By:Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press

OTTAWA — The federal government is sending a "reconnaissance mission" to take a closer look at the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Mali.

Officials insist the fact-finding mission, a small group of diplomats, military personnel and RCMP officers, does not mean the government has decided to send Canadian peacekeepers to the west African country.

But one expert says it does suggest that, despite its dangers, Mali is at the top of the list of peacekeeping missions that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau could announce as early as mid-September.

The Liberal government said last week that it will make up to 600 troops available for UN peacekeeping operations, including specialized units and equipment such as engineers, medical personnel and military aircraft.

Yet noticeably absent was any indication of which countries or UN missions the government was considering. Trudeau said the government would discuss the matter with the UN and other nations and decide based on where Canada could best contribute.

Defence Department spokesman Daniel Le Bouthillier would not provide specific details about the reconnaissance mission to Mali, citing security concerns.

But he said the delegation will meet counterparts from the Malian government as well as commanders of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, or MINUSMA, as it is known.

"The purpose of this reconnaissance mission is to develop our knowledge and understanding of MINUSMA in order to provide advice to the government," Le Bouthillier said in an email. "The overriding objective is to provide appropriate guidance and advice to the government."

Le Bouthillier said federal departments are working with the UN "to best assess where we can contribute military assets."

Aside from Mali, the government is also believed to be looking at missions in the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan visited at the beginning of August.

But Walter Dorn, an expert on peacekeeping at the Royal Military College of Canada, said Sajjan's visit to the DRC was different because it was political.

"This is more operational and planning," he said. "Sending a recon mission to Mali is a strong indication that Canada is putting it high on a list of possible deployments."

The government has not said when a decision will be made. However, Dorn is among those who feel the most likely scenario would be when the UN General Assembly opens in New York in mid-September.

Mali has long been seen as among the top candidates for a Canadian mission in Africa. MINUSMA was established in April 2013 after French and African Union forces pushed back rebel and Islamic militant forces that had taken control in the north of the country.

The current peacekeeping force numbers about 13,000 troops and 2,000 police and while it includes contributions from Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, most of the contingents are from countries in Africa and South Asia. The mission is extremely complex and includes everything from training local forces to protecting civilians, to counter-insurgency operations.

It is has also become the most dangerous UN peacekeeping mission in the world, with 105 peacekeepers killed over the last four years, including 31 this year alone. One peacekeeper from Chad was killed and four others were wounded when their vehicle hit a mine in northern Mali on Aug. 7.

Those dangers may cause some Canadians to shy away from Mali.

But a UN official in New York pointed out that Canada's recent experience in complex theatres of operation such as Afghanistan, combined with the Canadian military's advanced technical and operational capabilities, would prepare their units for deployments into challenging missions such as MINUSMA.

The Canadian military's francophone skills would also be important in a country such as Mali, the official said.

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Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press