Is Mali the right job for the Canadian Forces?

By: Amanda Connolly, iPolitics

The UN mission is extremely dangerous — but it may play to the CAF’s skill set

The UN mission in Mali is the world’s most dangerous.

Sixty nine peacekeepers have been killed in attacks there since the mission started in 2013. The dynamics on the ground are complex to say the least, with a fledgling peace process being propped up by the blue helmets. A broader French counterterrorism mission across the Sahel is fighting to keep Islamist terrorists from again seizing control of Mali’s north as they did in 2012 amid the chaos of an army coup in the capital. And the country is ground zero for a network of criminal drug and people-smuggling rings that stretch across the region.

That’s the bad news. The good news — at least from Canada’s perspective — is that a Canadian peacekeeping mission in Mali could actually help the situation on the ground.

As speculation mounts across the defence industry that Canada will soon announce a contribution to the mission in Mali, experts say it’s worth considering the ways in which, despite the risk, the mission could benefit from the unique capabilities of Canada’s military.

“Mali has a legitimate peace process ongoing and it needs to be fostered in order for the country not to break out into war again,” said Walter Dorn, a professor of defence studies at the Canadian Forces College and chair of the Master of Defence Studies program at the Royal Military College. He studies peace operations.

“I think that the mission is proving quite successful at stabilizing the situation in Mali and that it’s indispensable for the peace process to move forward. So supporting the mission in Mali would make a key contribution to Africa.”

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said in August that Canada will commit 600 troops and about 150 police officers to UN peace support operations. Since then, there has been no specific commitment from the government to any particular mission, beyond an acknowledgement that the mission will be in Africa, that it will be a long deployment — and that it will be dangerous.

But as General Jonathan Vance, chief of defence staff, told the Senate defence and security committee last month, the fact that a mission is dangerous doesn’t mean it isn’t valuable.

“A risky mission that has great potential for success may be a mission that you want to invest in, and in the military, we do risk,” said Vance on September 21. “We’re good at that, if we can mitigate it. If the risk is not mitigatable and is out of all proportion and at the same time there’s no hope of moving forward, then it’s probably the wrong mandate and it would very likely be a mandate on which I would advise the government that it would need to do more work with the UN before you would commit troops.”

And as Senator Mobina Jaffer pointed out in the same meeting, Mali is no Afghanistan.

Canada lost 158 members of the Canadian Forces during that nine-year war but developed extensive expertise in managing insurgent warfare. That knowledge could be useful in supporting allies already on the ground in Mali, given heightened recent tensions there due to terrorist attacks and social unrest.

“Mali fits the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces quite well,” said Dorn. “Because of our Afghanistan expertise, we can operate in areas where there are IEDs and we’re well aware of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. So the peace operation there, although it’s a different mode of operation … we still have the expertise in those kinds of environments from Afghanistan.”

Responding to recent attacks, the Mali mission recently expanded by an additional 2,500 troops, bringing the total number of international troops stationed there to just over 15,000.

Most of those soldiers come from African or non-Western nations like Bangladesh and China. Germany maintains a force of 570 soldiers, the largest Western contingent in the UN mission.

The mission now faces a critical equipment gap: The Dutch, citing operational strain, are scaling down and preparing to pull out their Apache attack choppers and Chinook transport helicopters early next year.

Given statements from Canadian officials in the past about the need to identify gaps in existing missions, that raises the question of whether Canada could fill at least part of that operational gap by providing Chinooks to assist with troop transport as it did with the French counterterrorism mission in 2014, when Canada sent Globemaster III strategic lifters.

Canada has 15 brand-new Chinooks, delivered in 2014 at a cost of some $4 billion and currently stationed out of CFB Petawawa, as well as Griffon helicopters mounted with machine guns during the war in Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau referenced that contribution of Globemasters during a press conference last week with French Prime Minister Manuel Valls. He was responding to a question about whether the subject of Mali came up during his talks with Valls. Asked whether that suggests the government sees the looming helicopter gap as an opportunity for Canada to fill an operational gap, a spokesperson for Sajjan said it’s still too early to say exactly what the mission will be.

(Credit: United Nations – Department of Field Support. Cartohraphic section)

“As the government looks to re-engage in peace support operations, we are looking at ‎all the ways in which Canada can contribute. As you saw with our expanded mission in Iraq, one of the things we look to do is find gaps in existing missions and look to filling them,” said Jordan Owens, press secretary for Sajjan. “But still too soon for me to confirm a location or specific contribution.”

Three other missions also come up frequently in discussions about a Canadian contribution: the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan.

And while iPolitics has reported in the past that South Sudan is not being considered by the government, both the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo present challenges that might suggest they wouldn’t be the best fit for a government looking to make a specific, focused impact.

“(Mali) is clearly one of the more difficult in a certain way, but it’s also one of the more clear-cut missions at the same time in the sense that South Sudan … Central African Republic, you’re wading into in essence a civil war (there) as opposed to a counterterrorist operation, which is really what’s happening in Mali,” said George Petrolekas, who served with the military in Bosnia, Afghanistan and NATO and is a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

“The Congo is the largest, best-financed and most enduring UN mission in Africa and it still hasn’t brought resolution to anything. South Sudan and Central African Republic are difficult for me because in a sense they’re civil wars going on and it’s not as clear-cut.

“Mali has its own difficulties, just because of the fact that it’s more of a fight as opposed to classical peacekeeping. So in the Congo, because of its size, we would just be a drop in a bucket of water. The presence wouldn’t necessarily be felt.”

Petrolekas also pointed to the recent increases in allegations of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic and hinted at the negative impact those could have on Canada’s international reputation.

There were 69 allegations made in 2015 against UN peacekeepers — an increase from 52 in 2014 and 66 in 2013 — roughly one-third of that number against peacekeepers in the Central African Republic and 16 against peacekeepers in the DRC.

“When you think of allegations that have been made against UN troops in other peacekeeping missions like in the Congo and the Central African Republic … it doesn’t mean that you’d be doing the same things but you’d be tarnished by the actions of others. There’s less of a chance of that, I think, in Mali,” Petrolekas said.

It’s also possible the mission will be a joint one, with Canadian troops split between several missions in Africa, Dorn suggested. He cautioned, however, that with the DRC being so far behind in development and basic infrastructure, the difficulties in measuring firm progress there might see a smaller contingent of troops deployed there, with a main force in Mali.

“In terms of meaningful impact, both missions would give great opportunities, so it’s quite possible that we’ll make a contribution to both missions,” he said. “I think the main effort will be in Mali.”

Will a Sizeable Canadian military deployment to Mali make matters worse?

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch

Defence Watch received some views about the potential upcoming Canadian Forces mission to Mali from of an individual involved in the NGO community who has recently returned from that country. They have asked that their name not be published. Here is what that person has written to Defence Watch:

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is clearly seen as a party to the conflict by the many islamist groups, and by local powerholders profiting from the black market routes running through Northern Mali, but also increasingly to the north and south borders from Bamako.

MINUSMA was the expected passive UN force locked in by the financial and political interests of participating African contingents.

MINUSMA in Northern Mali has weak counter-IED capability, weak medical, weak engineering assets, and weak tactical ISR. They have had a weaker track record of protecting civilians who displaced themselves near UN bases. Canadians in MINUSMA would likely take casualties from IEDs or ambushes from local forces, so no happy story about blue helmets helping a transition to a peace that no local powerholder really supports. There’s no economy in Mali except the international assistance money they are getting to support this fight, and black market routes connecting Libya to Senegal to Ivory Coast for guns and drugs.

Given the context in Mali it is difficult to guess why the government can win a media victory with the Canadian public over sending more than a few advisers to MINUSMA, or a support company or two such as a role 3 hospital or engineers.


With MINUSMA’s track record something will happen soon that will cast a bad light on the mission (such as the performance of African contingents in making security worse for IDPs in South Sudan), which will expose the folly of placing CF combat assets under UN command run by African interests with little to no interest in tactical security of civilians.

International NGOs in Mali barely operate in the North, and the few that do, like the ICRC, distance themselves sternly from MINUSMA. So no easy media victory for the government in claiming that the Canadian mission will enable the delivery of aid. Whatever Canadians decide to do, it will always be overshadowed by the backroom efforts that the French are throwing around in aid, governance and foreign military support to the government.

The French seem to have an attitude to contain MINUSMA so as not to interfere with their strategic objectives and the influence networks in their former colony. The authorities in Bamako and the different clan-based politics are caught in a political struggle over the change of president sometime next year. So no happy story about governance and democracy promotion for Canadian aid either.

That struggle alone may generate more violence than the jihadist threat, leaving the CF with a weak operational situation as the UN mission gets evacuated and the narrative of the mission slips away from a story of a mission focused on north-south reconciliation and protecting governance from an islamist threat.

Where it would make some strategic sense for the CF to commit to Mali is if the mission is really in support of the US-French/Eurocorps (there are German and Belgian military deployed with the French not under UN command) counter-terrorism mission for West Africa.

AFRICOM may be asking Canada to shore up MINUSMA for better alignment to anti-extremists intelligence and influence activities. Working in continuation of US counter-terrorism objectives would make the most sense for the CF in Mali and with other Canadian commitments in Western Africa, but it would make a deployment under MINUSMA a travesty of the official aims of the UN mission and what will likely be couched in terms of absolute virtues by the government to sell the deployment to Canadians. Frankly the context in Mali is awful if the government hopes to score an easy PR win with the peacekeeping romantics in Canada. That security council seat may be a more substantial justification, but may come at a heavy price when something goes south in Mali to make the Canadian mission look bad.

Opportunities for a CF contingent to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance may be limited. There are few international aid agencies active in Northern Mali where Minusma is deployed, and NGOs and agencies such the International Committee of the Red Cross who are very active through the Mali Red Cross rely on their own contacts with local communities and all armed groups.

MINUSMA is a party to the conflict in Mali, and aid agencies hoping to maintain their neutrality to access beneficiaries and ensure the safety of their staff often stay away from Minusma and UN coordination mechanisms in their field operations.

My personal comment is that a sizeable CF deployment outside of few staff officers or a field hospital may very well decrease the security and access to beneficiaries for Canadian-funded aid activities in the South of Mali. The statement by Minister Bibeau in support of the mission makes it a bit odd, since there will be no direct contribution at best to Canadian aid project outcomes by deploying the CF in Mali, and at worst Canadian funded aid projects can become the soft targets of the increased Canadian security involvement in country.

The good news is that a CF deployment would likely come with additional money for Canadian agencies present in Mali, notably the Canadian Red Cross who have started a sizeable maternal and child health program in support of the Mali Red Cross and ministry of health North and South of Bamako.

CAF to Niger? Background Information

Two weeks ago I published a post about the possibility of the Canadian Armed Forces heading to Africa with a list of possible destinations, for both UN or NATO missions. One of those regions was Niger.

Here is some background information on what is happening in Niger, and some recent visits by the CAF.

While the United Nations does not currently have a Peacekeeping force in Niger, many believe that Niger will be one of the next locations in Africa where the UN deploys next. Niger is located between two countries who are currently facing terrible violence; Mali and Nigeria. Boko Haram is also becoming a concern within Niger itself, as the terrorist group spreads from Nigeria.

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) is currently working in Niger with refugees from both Mali and Nigeria. Those fleeing Nigeria are fleeing Boko Haram

The main populations of concern in Niger in 2015 are: Malian refugees who have fled violence in their country since 2012 and are living in camps, refugee-hosting and urban areas; as well as refugees (Nigerian nationals) and returnees (Niger nationals who were living in Nigeria) who have fled violence in north-eastern Nigeria since May 2013, are dispersed in more than 100 villages, and are hosted by the local community.

In northern Mali, after a short period of calm, rising insecurity and tension have led to the arrival of approximately 4,200 new Malian refugees since May 2014. Meanwhile, since the beginning of 2014, more than 6,700 Malian refugees living in Niger have returned home. Niger is currently hosting approximately 37,000 Malian refugees. While conditions do not support massive returns home, UNHCR will, in consultation with host countries and Malian authorities, provide refugees willing to return home with information on the situation in areas of origin, as well as repatriation assistance.

The deteriorating security situation in north-eastern Nigeria has caused several population movements into Niger, including refugees from Nigeria and citizens of Niger who were living in Nigeria and have returned. New arrivals are spread across hundreds of towns and islands on Lake Chad on a vast territory with a poor road network. Accessing these populations poses significant operational and security challenges, and is costly.

When did the CAF first get involved? 

The first time the Canadian Armed Forces went to Niger was as part of Exercise Flintlock in 2013. The Harper Government announced that it would send the Canadian Special Operations Regiment to the region to help train the Niger military on counter-terrorist measures; as the country began to struggle with the conflicts in both Mali and Nigeria. 

CSOR training was provided because the soldiers from Niger receiving Canadian instruction may very well find themselves fighting the al-Qaeda-linked rebels of Mali in the near future. Niger is expected to be one of the three biggest troop-contributing nations, along with Nigeria and Burkina Faso, in a UN-sponsored West African military intervention in Mali.

The Canadian government, which is normally quick to trumpet overseas military efforts, was surprisingly silent on its West African training mission. Canada's deployment was supported by the US and other allies as part of Flintlock. The exercise, aimed at helped West African countries fight terrorism.

The annual Flintlock exercise takes place in different western African countries each year. Canada last participated in 2011. The 2012 exercise, which was supposed to take place in Mali, was cancelled because that country’s army was busy responding to attacks from Tuareg separatists.

The French military intervention on Friday, a dramatic shift from earlier plans for an African-led force, was a sign of the world’s growing fear that the Islamist rebels could topple Mali’s weakened government and turn the country into a haven for terrorists.

The CSOR returned to Niger for Flintlock in 2014 and again in 2015 - where their presence was more widely reported by CTV's W5 and when an attack by Boko Haram forced the CSOR to evacuate the area; which I reported here, in one of my posts in January, this year.

So what would a 2016 UN mission to Niger look like? No one is really sure. It could be an expanded training role; similar to Exercise Flintlock where the CSOR deployed from 2013-2015; or it could be a humanitarian role helping with the refugees; or both. Only time will tell. 

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Information in this post came from the UNHCR's webpage about its mission in Niger, and the 2013 report by the Globe and Mail, "Canada's Contribution to the Fight in Mali" 

CAF to Mali? Background Information

Earlier this week I published a post about the possibility of the Canadian Armed Forces heading to Africa with a list of possible destinations, for both UN or NATO missions. One of those regions was Mali.

What is going on in Mali you ask? Here is a little bit of a background on MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali)

(From the United Nations MINUSMA Webpage)

In mid-January 2012, a Tuareg movement known as the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), along with Islamic armed groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), in addition to deserters from the Malian armed forces, initiated a series of attacks against Government forces in the north of the country. The Tuareg rebellion was emboldened by the presence of well-equipped combatants returning from Libya in the wake of the fall of the regime there.

On 22 March, a mutiny by disaffected soldiers from the units defeated by the armed groups in the north resulted in a military coup d’état. A military junta, the Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’Etat, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, took power, suspended the Constitution and dissolved the Government institutions. The coup accelerated the collapse of the State in the north, allowing MNLA to easily overrun Government forces in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu and proclaim an independent State of Azawad on 6 April. Shortly thereafter, tensions emerged among the armed groups in the north and, by 18 November, Ansar Dine and MUJAO had driven MNLA out of the main towns of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal.

Immediately after the coup, on 27 March, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) appointed the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, to mediate in the crisis. On 6 April, the military junta and ECOWAS signed a framework agreement that led to the resignation of the then President, Amadou Toumani Touré, on 8 April and the appointment of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, as interim President on 12 April. The agreement provided for the establishment of a transitional Government, headed by a prime minister with executive powers. On 17 April, Cheick Modibo Diarra was appointed interim Prime Minister. On 20 August, the Prime Minister announced the formation of a Government of national unity.

Following the coup d’état, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, offered the support of the United Nations to the Malian authorities. As a result, the Mali interim authorities requested United Nations assistance to build the capacity of the Malian transitional authorities in the areas of political negotiation, elections, governance, security sector reform and humanitarian assistance.

Further consultations led to the deployment in mid-January 2013 of the United Nations Missions in Mali – a multidisciplinary United Nations presence which was authorized by Security Council resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012 in order to provide coordinated and coherent support to (i) the on-going political process and (ii) the security process, including support to the planning, deployment and operations of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. Under the terms of the resolution, the mission would support the political process and carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks, with a focus on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.

The Mission would operate under robust rules of engagement with a mandate to use all necessary means to address threats to the implementation of its mandate, which would include protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and protection of United Nations personnel from residual threats, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment. This could include the conduct of operations on its own or in cooperation with the Malian defence and security forces. French forces deployed in Mali were also authorized to intervene in support of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General.

Strength

Authorized strength
12,680 total uniformed personnel, including
11,240 military personnel, including 40 military observers
1,440 police (including formed units)
An appropriate civilian component

Current strength (29 February 2016)
11,781 total uniformed personnel
10,684 military personnel
1,097 police (including formed units)
585 international civilian personnel
661 local civilian staff
143 United Nations Volunteers

*NB: Statistics for international and local civilians are as of 31 July 2015

Has Canada Been Previously Involved? 

The answer to this question is fairly complex - but yes. At the request of the French Government, the Canadian Government authorized the strategic lift capabilities of the RCAF to help the French Forces reach Mali in a timely manner. 

In 2013, Frontline Defence ran the following article about Canada's involvement. 

BY BETHAN NODWELL

Jihadists are on the move in the sub-Sahara. The land-locked, developing country of Mali witnessed political deterioration that climaxed with a military coup in March 2012, and has remained in turmoil ever since. Former Libyan mercenaries and Al-Qaeda rebels exacerbated the crisis by capturing the country’s Tuareg region in the North, an area rich in uranium, gold and possibly oil. They were well armed, extolled a radical vision of Islam, and rapidly overcame the Malian army and the civilian population, imposing Sharia law.

Seeing Al-Qaeda’s rise in wealth and fortitude as a threat to their national security, Mali’s neighbours swiftly appealed to the international community for help. The response came in the form of UN Security Council Resolution 2085 permitting international intervention and “Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali.”

On 14 January 2013, following a request from the French Government, Canada committed one CC-177 transport aircraft, in a non-combat role, to transport equipment into the Malian capital of Bamako. Here, a Canadian Loadmaster and Traffic Technician load a French military fuel truck for delivery to Mali. (Photo: Sgt Matthew McGregor, CF Combat Camera)

Canada has been stepping up, in partnership with other Western and African allies to contribute equipment, skills and technology to help Mali persevere.

Canada committed one of its four CC-177 Globemaster transport planes in support of a French-led coalition mission in the West African country of Mali. Operation Serval is now in action.

The mandate of Canadian Air Task Force Mali specifically excludes combat and is limited to airlifting equipment and personnel. Since contracted for this mission two months ago, this C-17 and its 35-member crew have been working on a 24-hour work cycle. DND reports that, as of 15 March 2013, Air Task Force Mali had conducted 37 flights to deliver about 1,184,000 kilograms (2,605,000 pounds) of much-needed cargo.

During his first official visit, French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault thanked the Canadian government for the loan of its transport plane and Canada’s ongoing support. “[France] considers Canada an ally that is always there in the most difficult ­circumstances,” he said in a written response to the Globe and Mail. “In the case of our intervention in Mali, we asked [Canada] for logistic support and the response was in line with our friendship.”

Canada’s contribution of the CC-177 has been extended indefinitely. “It will remain there as long as we feel there is a need,” Prime Minister Stephen Harper ­confirmed at a joint press conference with Ayrault. Harper remains firm that Canada is not willing to commit troops to a combat mission in Mali, although a Canadian contribution to a UN-led peacekeeping force has not been ruled out entirely.

“In terms of our longer term engagement, I think you know well we are not looking to have a combat, military mission there. We will certainly be providing development and humanitarian assistance. But the details of what our long-term engagement may be are still the subject of discussions we’re having among our ministerial colleagues, our caucus, and as well obviously we’re talking to the opposition parties about their preferences as well,” said Harper.

Canada has a pre-existing, decades-long relationship with Mali. Most recently, members of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) travelled to Africa in 2011 to provide training to members of Mali’s special forces, as the country faced threats from Al-Qaeda insurgents.

Canada has approved an extra $13 million to the $70 million already being contributed to ongoing humanitarian and development assistance. Have we opened the door to ever-greater expectations? Will additional requests soon be forthcoming?

If a UN call to put boots on the ground goes out, how will we respond? Now is the time to be having those difficult policy discussions.

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Bethan Nodwell is a military spouse with a passion for politics, international relations and the defense industry.
© FrontLine Defence 2013

While it seems that Nodwell indicated in 2013, that the Canadian Government should begin discussing the possibility of sending the CAF to Mali; well it hasn't happened yet (at least publicly) and now, in 2016, it seems to be a big possibility as the Liberal Government seeks to "reengage" Canada internationally at the UN. 

CAF Preparing for Possible UN Mission to Burundi, Mali, Niger, or Burkina Faso and NATO Mission in Libya

Published today in the National Post, Matthew Fisher outlines where the Canadian Forces could possibly be deployed next.

When the Trudeau Government was elected in November of 2015, they indicated that they would return Canada to a Peacekeeping role internationally; and while I will not debate the notion of Peacekeeping here, it seems that at some point in the near future (believed to be in the mid-late 2016 calendar year) the Liberals will announce that the Canadian Armed Forces will deploy on at least one UN Peacekeeping Mission in Africa; despite the regions high risk, and the budget cuts to DND that are expected in today's 2016 Budget.

Matthew Fisher writes that the CAF could possibly see itself in Burundi, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, or Libya. Is there a possibility that the CAF could end up in more than one of these positions? Yes it is highly likely. While Minister of Foreign Affairs Dion has said the CAF will not enter Libya unless there is one Government; Minister of Defence Sajjan has indicated that as long as NATO has a long-term plan in Libya he would consider a training mission to help stop ISIS' advance in the country. Especially as  reports indicate support for the Government of National Accord (GNA), Libya's U.N.-backed unity government, is growing. However, opposition does still remain.

A Canadian Armed Forces Tactical Aircraft Security Officer provides a ring of security around a Canadian Armed Forces CC-177 Globemaster III aircraft at the airport in Bamako, Mali. (February 2013: CAF Combat Camera)

Here is Matthew Fisher's article:


There is no clear consensus in the military community about how the biggest spending ministry in the federal government — the Department of National Defence — will fare Tuesday when the Trudeau government unveils its first budget.

But there is agreement that Ottawa soon will commit the armed forces to a hazardous UN peacemaking mission in Africa. It is unlikely that funding for such an undertaking would be included in any calculations announced in the budget. If such a project is announced during the next 12 months, it probably will be taken, to use military parlance, “out of hide.” That is, from existing military spending.

The mission almost certainly will involve a country in French West Africa that many Canadians will never have had heard of, let alone know where it is on a map. It will be regarded in New York as the opening shot in Canada’s declared bid for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2021.

Many of those who serve reckon that after only five months in power it is too early for the Liberals to have figured out what military programs they intend to slash, delay, realign or cancel. But there may be news about spending on new navy ships and hints about creating what the government has described as a more agile force, which is widely regarded as code for downsizing.

The senior brass has been tightlipped about this. The official and unofficial line is that all is well between National Defence headquarters and the new leadership on Parliament Hill. That seems to be the case, notwithstanding disappointment over the withdrawal of RCAF warplanes from the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and the dubious declared logic behind it.

Conversations over the past few months with scores of soldiers outside the senior ranks and with those who served until recently indicate a widespread dread that serious cuts are likely in next year’s budget. And that by then, it will have become obvious that to pay for other government priorities, defence spending in Canada will be in retreat at a time when allies such as Britain and Australia — which face different but serious political and economic problems — have jacked up defence spending to deal with emerging threats to western security from Russia, China and ISIL.

The upshot, which will become known following a pending defence review, is a force intentionally designed to be less combat capable.

Of equal concern is how the government intends to pay for its pledge to return Canada to peacekeeping and establish closer relations with the UN. My experience with the UN in Africa, the Middle East and Asia is that it does a good (and thankless) job of providing food and humanitarian aid to those afflicted by war and natural calamities. But its peacekeeping operations have been a shambles.

Nowhere is this more true than in Africa. It is not only the rampant allegations of rape and corruption that have undermined UN peacekeeping operations there. It is that almost all of the troops are from Third World countries such as Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Togo, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Nepal, Thailand, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia and Zimbabwe. They are ill-equipped and most of them are poorly led and woefully unprepared to fight wars.

UN troops in Africa have either tended to stay in their barracks while collecting what for them are princely UN wages or have gone out into hazardous situations with bravado but not much else.

More than 1,300 peacekeepers have died worldwide since 2002 with more than 100 a year since 2008. About 40 per cent of the deaths have been in Liberia, Congo, Sudan, Mali and the Ivory Coast.

A mission in Burundi has been touted by some peacekeeping advocates in Canada. But even the African Union has refused to contribute troops to such a UN mission because the regime still in power has said any blue berets would be regarded as an invasion force.

The preferred option, given the growing danger posed by Islamic extremists in North Africa, is to be part of a UN or UN-approved mission in Libya. But Foreign Affairs Minister Stephane Dion, who seems to have the lead on defence decision-making for the government, has said Canada will not go unless Libya has only one government. Right now there are two and they detest each other.

A safer bet would be to fold Canadian troops into existing French missions in Mali, Niger or Burkina Faso. It is something France would heartily welcome.

With France committing more resources to fighting ISIL in the Middle East, the Germans, Belgians and Swedes are helping Paris out in Mali against ISIL’s new affiliate, al-Mourabitoun, and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

Wherever the Trudeau government sends its troops in Africa, and however it eventually plans to pay for them, it will be a difficult, inevitably hazardous undertaking.