Freeland to Announce UN Training Mission and Risks of Modern Peacekeeping

By: Murray Brewster, CBC News

A major component of the Liberal government's plan to return Canada to peacekeeping involves using Canadian soldiers to train and mentor other, less experienced United Nations forces, say defence and government sources.

The strategy, which would possibly be employed in some of the most dangerous parts of Africa, is a departure from traditional peacekeeping, which is popular in the public imagination.

And in the opinion of some defence experts, it bears some resemblance to the kind of capacity-building counter-insurgency mission the Canadian Forces carried out in Afghanistan for the better part of a decade.

Related:
Foreign minister's policy speech to prepare public for peacekeeping risks
Allies anxious as Liberals put peacekeeping decision on pause

"Capacity in training is a strength for Canada," said one official, who was unable to speak on the record because of the sensitivity of the file.

It is likely one of the reasons the Liberal government believes it must prepare the public for the risks of "modern peacekeeping."

Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland is slated to give a major foreign policy address in a few weeks' time, which will open the door to the delivery of the long-awaited defence policy review on June 7.

But it will also prepare the public for peacekeeping missions that could cost lives.

Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland is expected to start a push to educate Canadians on the risks of modern peacekeeping in a speech coming up in a few weeks. (Todd Korol/Canadian Press)

One of the scenarios envisions Canadian troops helping train African Union peacekeepers in a relatively safe place, such as the West African nation of Burkina Faso, and then transporting the combined force into the country where they would operate.

Canadian soldiers would also accompany their apprentices into field in order to support them, reinforce lessons and ensure they don't get into trouble. UN missions in that part of the world have been marred with allegations of rape and child sexual abuse.
Echoes of Afghanistan

The concept sounds similar to the operational mentoring and liaison teams that Canadian troops used to help build up the Afghan National Police in Kandahar.

The idea of being seen as a leader in training peacekeepers and the development of uniform standards is politically attractive to the Liberals, who are eager to push the "Canada is back" narrative on the world stage.

Sources say the plan has also been given "enthusiastic" buy-in among senior UN officials who are themselves eager to improve the quality of peacekeeping soldiers, many of whom are ill-equipped and from developing countries.

Troops and a tank from the Edmonton-based Lord Strathcona's Horse are shown during Operation Lion II in Khenjakak, Afghanistan in this file photo. (Murray Brewster/Canadian Press)

"The complexities of today's operations require a collective effort to enhance the training of uniformed personnel for United Nations peace operations," said a report prepared in September 2015 by former secretary general Ban Ki-moon, who also requested that contributing countries be certified in peacekeeping practices and that the UN support "the establishment of bilateral and regional training partnerships."

The decision on where to deploy roughly 600 troops and 150 police officers in support of UN operations has been in a holding pattern for months.

Originally announced last summer, it was supposed to be made by the end of 2016. But it remains in limbo, with one senior government official recently suggesting it could remain there until the fall.
Eyes on Africa

Mali is most often mentioned as a possible destination and has been the focus of repeated research trips by senior federal officials, including Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan.

The list has also included, at various points over the last year, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic.

While justifying the absence of a decision in March, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said deploying troops is a not a move to be taken lightly, but also noted Canada has had "a difficult history in Africa as peacekeepers."

He was referring to the disastrous missions to both Somalia and Rwanda in the mid-1990s.

The Canadian who led the Rwanda mission during that country's genocide said he applauds the government's determination to "wean" the public off the notion of classic peacekeeping, which is rooted in ceasefire observation missions.

But retired lieutenant-general Roméo Dallaire says Canada risks being on the wrong side of history if it hesitates or fails to make a significant contribution to peace and stability during a complex and ambiguous time in the world.

"It's not going to blow over. It's going to continue to be complex," Dallaire said. "And we have a lot of capabilities that we're simply holding back."

Canadians are among the best prepared for UN missions, he added, particularly with the introduction of new guidelines to deal with the use of child soldiers.

Roméo Dallaire says Canadians are among the best prepared for taking on UN missions. (Adrian Wyld/CP)

Regardless of the location, it is likely the troops will be deployed in mostly violent, unstable nations.

In the case of Mali, local insurgents are competing, sometimes at cross purposes, with international jihadist groups.

The U.S. Intelligence Community's "Worldwide Threat Assessment," released last week, noted that al-Qaeda is attempting "to promote unity among Mali-based jihadists" in the region, "increase military action, and speed up recruitment of fighters."

While there is a need to underline the peril, it must also be put in context, said Richard Gowan, research director for New York University's Center on International Cooperation.

"Mali is certainly is one of the most dangerous missions, and scores of peacekeepers have been killed in ambushes," Gowan told CBC News. "It should be said that the majority of those who have died were relatively poorly armed, poorly protected African troops.

Related:

Senators issue warning over potential Mali peacekeeping mission
Canada's mission in Africa to focus on 'peacemaking'

Dutch and German forces have operated there under the UN flag and occasionally have been targets. But Gowan notes that "their fatality rates are much, much lower."

"So if Canadian troops do go into Mali, they will face very great risk, but we are not likely to see casualty figures on the level of Afghanistan some years ago," he said.

Meanwhile, Central African Republic was rocked by a series of attacks over the past week that have forced more than 15,000 people to flee their homes.

And in the Democratic Republic of Congo, President Joseph Kabila's resolve to stay in power beyond his constitutional time limit has led to rising tension and the threat of popular violence in that country.

Canada Sending Police to Colombia to help with peacekeeping

By: Murray Brewster, CBC News 

Canada will contribute up to 10 police officers to the international effort to demobilize guerilla groups and monitor the ceasefire in Colombia, CBC News has learned.

Some of the officers are expected to be under the United Nations flag, while others would be part of a bilateral deployment, working directly with the South American country's national police force.

The plan, which fits into the Liberal government's overall renewed emphasis on international peacekeeping, was presented to Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale last July, according to briefing materials obtained under access to information legislation.

Goodale and Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion signed off, but the timing of the deployment has yet to be determined.

The Liberals' overarching peacekeeping strategy, which is anticipated to involve several locations and the deployment of up to 600 troops and 150 police officers, was widely expected to be announced before Christmas. But it was put off for further discussion and could come up at the cabinet retreat in Calgary later this month.

Mali, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo have been cited as possible locations for a UN mission involving Canadian troops. Troop deployment overshadows that of cops.

The question of where police might go has received less attention.

The briefing, which was written in mid-July of 2016, makes clear the Colombian deployment would be "resourced" out of the same existing pool of police officers the Liberals will tap into for their UN peacekeeping scheme.

The Colombia mission is expected to last up to March 2019.

In late June 2016, United Nations asked Canada to "contribute an unspecified number of Spanish-speaking police observers" to its contingent of 350 troops and police officers being assembled to monitor the ceasefire between the government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

But prior to the request, Canadian officials were already dealing with Colombia on a bilateral basis.

Canada was looking for opportunities to contribute to the peace process in the aftermath of the historic ceasefire, which effectively ended a 52-year insurgent war that claimed 220,000 lives.

The observer and disarmament mission would not be without risks, the briefing warned.

"Colombia continues to face significant challenges due to violence associated with guerilla (other than FARC) and paramilitary forces, land mines, organized crime and narco-trafficking groups," said the briefing.

Canada further opened the door to a request from Colombia during the North American Leaders Summit in Ottawa last June. Mexico announced around that time that it was planning to take part in the UN mission and open a peacekeeping training centre.
Old-style peacekeeping

A defence expert says, despite the caution, Colombia would be a benign mission compared with some of the other places the government is considering.

A contingent of police officers training to deploy to Haiti for a year stand at attention in Ottawa in 2013. The majority of police officers currently deployed on peacekeeping missions are in Haiti. (Patrick Doyle/Canadian Press)

When Canadians think peacekeeping, they often envision ceasefire observers, the kind of mission that rarely exists anymore, said Dave Perry, of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

Colombia is "more typical of historical UN operations," said Perry. "There are virtually no circumstances where you'd be sending people to observe a ceasefire by parties that want to stop fighting and put down arms and have an outside body to enforce that."

Sending police peacekeepers to Colombia does not preclude the Trudeau government from sending troops, it just makes less likely, Perry added, citing other military deployments — including missions in Latvia and Iraq.

The Liberals have also clearly telegraphed their intention of putting peacekeepers into West Africa.

According to the briefing, as of last summer there were 82 police officers serving on various international peacekeeping missions, the vast majority of them in Haiti.

But a chart attached to the memo shows that number of positions for missions in Ukraine, Cambodia, Philippines and Iraq remain unfilled.

CAF Disaster Assessment Team sent to Haiti: DART on Standby

By: David Pugliese, The Ottawa Citizen 

The Canadian government has sent a Canadian Disaster Assessment Team (CDAT) to Haiti and put aside up to $3 million as an initial humanitarian response for those in Haiti and other countries in the region affected by Hurricane Matthew.

“The CDAT will rapidly assess the situation, which is a critical step in ensuring that a Canadian response to the hurricane is coordinated, evidence-based and tailored to the needs on the ground,” the government stated in a news release. Canada is also supporting the United Nations disaster assessment teams in Jamaica and Haiti, who are still examining the situation and assisting local authorities.

Canadian military sources say the Disaster Assistance Response Team is getting ready to move out when they get the word.

Here are more details from the government news statement:

On October 4, 2016, Hurricane Matthew tore through Haiti, Jamaica, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

Over 1.24 million people are estimated to have been affected by Hurricane Matthew in Haiti.
Haiti was the hardest-hit country and requires attention in at least 11 communities around the Grand’Anse, Nippes and Sud areas, where there has been coastal flooding.

The role of the CDAT is to meet with local and international representatives to assess the needs on the ground and to identify potential follow-up response options for the Government of Canada.
The CDAT comprises three experts from Global Affairs Canada and three officers from the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Disaster Assistance Response Team Commander.

Boosting CAF UN Peace Operations: Proceed with caution

BY DAVID MCDONOUGH, CDA Institute,

David McDonough, CDA Institute Research Manager and Senior Editor, recently published an article in The Embassycommenting on the government’s promise to renew Canada’s role in UN peace operations. 

The new Trudeau government has shown an interest in renewing Canada’s commitment to United Nations peace operations. The ministerial mandate letter given to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion spelled out this promise quite clearly, even if neither went into much detail on how this commitment will be realized.

A key problem is the commitment’s lack of context. By itself, it is hard to argue that renewing Canada’s role in UN peace operations is a bad thing. But such policy options cannot be judged in a vacuum. They must be placed within a context that recognizes the national interest, competing policy priorities and limited resources available to achieve such priorities, as well as the inevitable trade-​offs that come with such a means-​ends chain. Such a commitment should more properly be assessed as part of the government’s recently announced defence policy review.

The three pillars of priorities

It’s useful to return to the key priorities outlined in the last defence white paper: defence of Canada, continental defence, and international security. In some respects, these three reflect a rising degree of discretion for Canadian decision-​makers: no discretion when it comes to Canada, very little for North America, and greater discretion in how we approach expeditionary operations abroad.

Clearly, UN commitments relate to international peace and security. Canadian decision-​makers need to ensure that their non-​discretionary priorities are achieved first—such as monitoring our coastal waters, aerospace surveillance and defence of North America, search and rescue, and protection of our Arctic sovereignty and resources—before opting for more discretionary missions abroad like UN peace operations.

Yet not all missions in the third pillar are created equal or are equally discretionary. Canada also has the option of working primarily with key allies in pursuit of international security, including the United States, key European countries in NATO, as well as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, among others. In so doing, Canada can better align its military role abroad with its interest in maintaining and strengthening relations with such countries.

The same cannot readily be said about UN operations, which might help burnish Canada’s reputation with the world body but where the national interest is hard to identify—a fact that will undoubtedly cause problems if and when a UN mission results in casualties.

A different, more dangerous, era

Such a possibility should not be discounted. Today’s UN missions are distinct from the past. Current missions retain the size and complexity of post-​Cold War operations, but now Blue Helmets can quickly become a participant in the conflict, such as when an “intervention brigade” was mandated to neutralize armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

We need to understand and appreciate that the game has changed. Future so-​called peace operations, including those established by the UN, will likely require robust military capabilities and entail possibly more dangerous operations, especially if more UN peacekeepers begin to fully apply their more proactive mandates.

Importantly, if Canada does undertake peace operations, it might be better served working with key allies and organizations like NATO. Canada would gain the additional benefit of working with like-​minded states with advanced, interoperable militaries that can bring considerably more firepower and sophistication to any mission. In NATO’s case, Canada would benefit from an organization with a strong command structure and extensive experience with robust peace or stabilization missions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

One should also remember the continuing gap between UN mandates and deployed forces. A good example is the hybrid UN-​African Union force in the Darfur region of Sudan, which despite a robust mandate adopted a non-​confrontational approach that has failed to halt attacks against both civilians and its own peacekeepers.

It might even be worse if peacekeepers began fulfilling their Chapter VII mandates to use force. Blue Helmets, not all of whom will be well-​trained or armed, will then likely be seen as more legitimate targets by non-​state armed groups with an increasingly sophisticated capacity for violence.

These missions can also not be easily separated from the wider post-​9/​11 environment, given the presence of jihadist groups from Boko Haram to Al Qaeda to ISIL (also called ISIS and the Islamic State) in numerous failed or failing states like Mali and Libya. This might increase the Canadian interest in undertaking such missions, but it also raises important dangers—from the possibility of our soldiers being specifically targeted to potential terrorist blowback both in Canada and to its interests overseas.

Context is key

This does not mean that Canada should eschew UN peace missions. But the Canadian government needs to take into account competing priorities and the possible dangers that could arise from such missions. Above all, strategic-​level thinking on the benefits, value, and possible costs and trade-​offs of undertaking these missions need to be carefully and diligently assessed.

In other words, if Canada chooses to undertake a significant UN mission, it needs to first ensure that this does not come at the expense of its non-​discretionary missions. Then it needs to assess its capacity to undertake such a mission in addition to its current operational tempo and, if that proves impossible, weigh the relative merits of a UN mission compared to other missions abroad, such as its role in NATO reassurance measures or as part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

Of course, Canada could try to avoid such trade-​offs by simply adding a significant UN role to its other commitments. But, absent a significant and sustained infusion of resources, this will prove exceedingly difficult.

What needs to be avoided at all costs is a fixation on UN peace operations that overshadows and supplants other priorities.This could endanger the non-​discretionary missions crucial for Canadian security and defence, as well as damage our relations with allies and long-​standing alliances like NORAD and NATO.

It could also have serious consequences to the future force structure of the Canadian Armed Forces. In light of budgetary shortfalls and recapitalization challenges, the government may be tempted to achieve cost savings by opting for an unbalanced force structure—one that is lightly armed, constabulary focused, and specializing in peace operations rather than combat-​capable, multi-​purpose, and joint.

Yet such a force would be ill-​suited for the range of missions (from constabulary to combat, and including robust peace operations) facing today’s CAF. It would also necessarily be manpower rather than capital intensive, meaning that the high personnel costs eating up much of the defence budget are unlikely to dissipate. As such, any cost savings will likely prove more illusory than real.

The strategic consequences of such a shorted-​sighted move will be severe and long-​lasting. Rather than simply affecting the government’s current choices, it would constrain the policy options available to Canadian decisions-​makers for decades to come. In that case, the Trudeau government’s adage that “Canada is back” may be remembered as more of a lament rather than the dawn of sunnier ways.

Originally published in The Embassy.

Dr. David S. McDonough is research manager and senior editor at the CDA Institute, and a research fellow at Dalhousie University’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.

CAF to Mali? Background Information

Earlier this week I published a post about the possibility of the Canadian Armed Forces heading to Africa with a list of possible destinations, for both UN or NATO missions. One of those regions was Mali.

What is going on in Mali you ask? Here is a little bit of a background on MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali)

(From the United Nations MINUSMA Webpage)

In mid-January 2012, a Tuareg movement known as the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), along with Islamic armed groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), in addition to deserters from the Malian armed forces, initiated a series of attacks against Government forces in the north of the country. The Tuareg rebellion was emboldened by the presence of well-equipped combatants returning from Libya in the wake of the fall of the regime there.

On 22 March, a mutiny by disaffected soldiers from the units defeated by the armed groups in the north resulted in a military coup d’état. A military junta, the Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’Etat, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, took power, suspended the Constitution and dissolved the Government institutions. The coup accelerated the collapse of the State in the north, allowing MNLA to easily overrun Government forces in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu and proclaim an independent State of Azawad on 6 April. Shortly thereafter, tensions emerged among the armed groups in the north and, by 18 November, Ansar Dine and MUJAO had driven MNLA out of the main towns of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal.

Immediately after the coup, on 27 March, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) appointed the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, to mediate in the crisis. On 6 April, the military junta and ECOWAS signed a framework agreement that led to the resignation of the then President, Amadou Toumani Touré, on 8 April and the appointment of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, as interim President on 12 April. The agreement provided for the establishment of a transitional Government, headed by a prime minister with executive powers. On 17 April, Cheick Modibo Diarra was appointed interim Prime Minister. On 20 August, the Prime Minister announced the formation of a Government of national unity.

Following the coup d’état, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, offered the support of the United Nations to the Malian authorities. As a result, the Mali interim authorities requested United Nations assistance to build the capacity of the Malian transitional authorities in the areas of political negotiation, elections, governance, security sector reform and humanitarian assistance.

Further consultations led to the deployment in mid-January 2013 of the United Nations Missions in Mali – a multidisciplinary United Nations presence which was authorized by Security Council resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012 in order to provide coordinated and coherent support to (i) the on-going political process and (ii) the security process, including support to the planning, deployment and operations of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013. Under the terms of the resolution, the mission would support the political process and carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks, with a focus on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.

The Mission would operate under robust rules of engagement with a mandate to use all necessary means to address threats to the implementation of its mandate, which would include protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and protection of United Nations personnel from residual threats, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment. This could include the conduct of operations on its own or in cooperation with the Malian defence and security forces. French forces deployed in Mali were also authorized to intervene in support of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General.

Strength

Authorized strength
12,680 total uniformed personnel, including
11,240 military personnel, including 40 military observers
1,440 police (including formed units)
An appropriate civilian component

Current strength (29 February 2016)
11,781 total uniformed personnel
10,684 military personnel
1,097 police (including formed units)
585 international civilian personnel
661 local civilian staff
143 United Nations Volunteers

*NB: Statistics for international and local civilians are as of 31 July 2015

Has Canada Been Previously Involved? 

The answer to this question is fairly complex - but yes. At the request of the French Government, the Canadian Government authorized the strategic lift capabilities of the RCAF to help the French Forces reach Mali in a timely manner. 

In 2013, Frontline Defence ran the following article about Canada's involvement. 

BY BETHAN NODWELL

Jihadists are on the move in the sub-Sahara. The land-locked, developing country of Mali witnessed political deterioration that climaxed with a military coup in March 2012, and has remained in turmoil ever since. Former Libyan mercenaries and Al-Qaeda rebels exacerbated the crisis by capturing the country’s Tuareg region in the North, an area rich in uranium, gold and possibly oil. They were well armed, extolled a radical vision of Islam, and rapidly overcame the Malian army and the civilian population, imposing Sharia law.

Seeing Al-Qaeda’s rise in wealth and fortitude as a threat to their national security, Mali’s neighbours swiftly appealed to the international community for help. The response came in the form of UN Security Council Resolution 2085 permitting international intervention and “Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali.”

On 14 January 2013, following a request from the French Government, Canada committed one CC-177 transport aircraft, in a non-combat role, to transport equipment into the Malian capital of Bamako. Here, a Canadian Loadmaster and Traffic Technician load a French military fuel truck for delivery to Mali. (Photo: Sgt Matthew McGregor, CF Combat Camera)

Canada has been stepping up, in partnership with other Western and African allies to contribute equipment, skills and technology to help Mali persevere.

Canada committed one of its four CC-177 Globemaster transport planes in support of a French-led coalition mission in the West African country of Mali. Operation Serval is now in action.

The mandate of Canadian Air Task Force Mali specifically excludes combat and is limited to airlifting equipment and personnel. Since contracted for this mission two months ago, this C-17 and its 35-member crew have been working on a 24-hour work cycle. DND reports that, as of 15 March 2013, Air Task Force Mali had conducted 37 flights to deliver about 1,184,000 kilograms (2,605,000 pounds) of much-needed cargo.

During his first official visit, French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault thanked the Canadian government for the loan of its transport plane and Canada’s ongoing support. “[France] considers Canada an ally that is always there in the most difficult ­circumstances,” he said in a written response to the Globe and Mail. “In the case of our intervention in Mali, we asked [Canada] for logistic support and the response was in line with our friendship.”

Canada’s contribution of the CC-177 has been extended indefinitely. “It will remain there as long as we feel there is a need,” Prime Minister Stephen Harper ­confirmed at a joint press conference with Ayrault. Harper remains firm that Canada is not willing to commit troops to a combat mission in Mali, although a Canadian contribution to a UN-led peacekeeping force has not been ruled out entirely.

“In terms of our longer term engagement, I think you know well we are not looking to have a combat, military mission there. We will certainly be providing development and humanitarian assistance. But the details of what our long-term engagement may be are still the subject of discussions we’re having among our ministerial colleagues, our caucus, and as well obviously we’re talking to the opposition parties about their preferences as well,” said Harper.

Canada has a pre-existing, decades-long relationship with Mali. Most recently, members of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) travelled to Africa in 2011 to provide training to members of Mali’s special forces, as the country faced threats from Al-Qaeda insurgents.

Canada has approved an extra $13 million to the $70 million already being contributed to ongoing humanitarian and development assistance. Have we opened the door to ever-greater expectations? Will additional requests soon be forthcoming?

If a UN call to put boots on the ground goes out, how will we respond? Now is the time to be having those difficult policy discussions.

====
Bethan Nodwell is a military spouse with a passion for politics, international relations and the defense industry.
© FrontLine Defence 2013

While it seems that Nodwell indicated in 2013, that the Canadian Government should begin discussing the possibility of sending the CAF to Mali; well it hasn't happened yet (at least publicly) and now, in 2016, it seems to be a big possibility as the Liberal Government seeks to "reengage" Canada internationally at the UN. 

Liberal Majority: What to Expect for the CAF

It is the morning after - and we now have another Majority government - no election until October 2020 (unless the fixed date election law changes)

So with a Liberal Majority will we see a return to the "Decade of Darkness" for the Canadian Armed Forces as was seen under the leadership of Jean Chretien? It is highly unlikely, as the world has changed a lot since the 2000, and the CAF is just as involved internationally now as we were then, albeit less involved in UN led missions. So what should we expect for the CAF under a Liberal government for the next 5 years?

The Liberals and Justin Trudeau pledge to boost Canada's support for International Peace and Security. The policy calls for a renewed commitment by Canada to Peacekeeping Operations. (I personally do not believe Peacekeeping exists, but Peace Enforcing, or Peace Making, but that is another rant all together)

The Liberals have said they will support Civilian Police Training Operations, particularly in French-Speaking nations where our highly Professional Military Police, RCMP and Civilian Police agencies can help developing nations maintain law and order.

They will lead an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations, and will insist that any peacekeepers involved in misconduct be held accountable by their own country and the United Nations.

They will recommit to supporting international peace operations with the United Nations, and will make the specialized capabilities – from mobile medical teams to engineering support to aircraft that can carry supplies and personnel  of the CAF available on a case-by-case basis.

For military spending, the Liberals will not let Canada’s Armed Forces be shortchanged, and we will not lapse military spending from year to year. They will also reinvest in building a leaner, more agile, better-equipped military, including adequate support systems for military personnel and their families. So perhaps no new money, but no new cuts, and current planned increases will take place. 

The Liberal Party will not by the F-35 Stealth Joint Strike Fighter. They will immediately launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft. The primary mission of our fighter aircraft should remain the defence of North America, not stealth first-strike capability. (My vote would be for the Dassault Rafael, which Dassault has offered to build in Canada = JOBS; it is also faster, cheaper, and dual engines) The Liberals will reduce the procurement budget for replacing the CF-18s, and will instead purchase one of the many, lower-priced options that better match Canada’s defence needs.

The money saved from the F-35 purchase will be invested in the Royal Canadian Navy - which despite the ship building contracts awarded by the Conservatives has seen a "Decade of Darkness" under Harper. Many will claim that is because the Navy was not highly active in the War in Afghanistan (2001-2014); but I contest that they were deployed in the Arabian Peninsula almost entirely throughout the War.  The Liberals say they will have the funds that we need to build promised icebreakers, supply ships, arctic and offshore patrol ships, surface combatants, and other resources required by the Navy. These investments will ensure that the Royal Canadian Navy is able to operate as a true blue-water maritime force, while also growing the economy and creating jobs.

They will immediately begin an open and transparent review process of existing defence capabilities, with the goal of delivering a more effective, better-equipped military. The Canada First Defence Strategy, launched by Stephen Harper in 2008, is underfunded and out of date. The Liberals will review current programs and capabilities, and lay out a realistic plan to strengthen the CAF.

The Liberals plan to develop the CAF into an agile, responsive, and well-equipped military force that can effectively defend Canada and North America; provide support during natural disasters, humanitarian support missions, and peace operations; and offer international deterrence and combat capability. (The CAF already does much of this, but we can look forward to more domestic operations)

The Liberals plan to  continue to work with the United States to defend North America under NORAD, and contribute to regional security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

They will do this by ensuring that equipment  is acquired faster, and with vigorous Parliamentary oversight; and  put a renewed focus on surveillance and control of Canadian territory and approaches, particularly our Arctic regions, and will increase the size of the Canadian Rangers.

The Liberals remain fully supportive of OPERATION REASSURANCE and OPERATION UNIFIER. However, they will make changes to OPERATION IMPACT. The RCAF involvement in the air campaign against ISIS will come to an end, but the Liberals plan to increase the number of trainers in Iraq (no specifics given yet) and will increase Canada's commitment to helping 25,000 Syrian refugees. Although no specif role for the CAF in the Syrian refugee crisis has been announced yet - the CAF can and will most likely play a role. 

The Liberals will restore funding for Canada’s four heavy urban search and rescue teams. Being able to respond swiftly and effectively to emergencies like ice storms, floods, wildfires, and building collapses is in our national interest. In the past, Canada’s four heavy urban search and rescue teams have proven invaluable in keeping Canadians and communities safe.To protect Canadians, our oceans, and our coastal economies, they will also re-open the Maritime Rescue Sub-centre in St. John’s, and the Kitsilano Coast Guard Base in Vancouver. No specifics yet on a new FWSAR for the RCAF.

The Liberals also plan to be much better to Veterans, who also seem to have been in a "Decade of Darkness" under the Conservatives, and invest in new career opportunities in a new Veterans Education Benefit program, at a  cost of $80 million per year. 

There is a lot here - so now we can sit back and watch for the next 5 years and see how things go. The CAF should be in good hands.

Feel Free to let me know what you think? Comment here or on Twitter, @Avro_ArrowRL201

Election 2015: We Continue to Debate the Peacekeeping Myth

In light of last nights Debate on Foreign policy - I decided to re-blog about a subject I have blogged about numerous times in the past - the Peacekeeping Myth that revolves around the Canadian Armed Forces. 

The Truth is, Canada was never a Peacekeeper to just keep the peace. We have stepped into Peacekeeping roles in order to protect our own interests and the interests of out Allies (NATO). Our Peacekeeping missions were a strategic warfare strategy that developed during the Cold War, and has died down since, 1991. This is why we are no longer a "Peacekeeping" nation. Canada's participation has always been in some way to bolster the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; albeit under a United Nations flag. 

The best place to start a review of Canada's so called Peacekeeping Past is with Dr. Sean M. Maloney's “Canada and UN Peacekeeping—Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970” This book is not an operation history of each mission, but was put together in order to clearly outline that Canada was peacekeeping in order to win the Cold War, and not peacekeeping in order to keep the peace. 

The Canadian Military Journal has also debated this subject, while the current page has been archived, because this debate is (believe it or not) that old - and supposed to be OVER!  http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/wagner-eng.asp
The Article, entitled "The Peaceable Kingdom?" used Maloney's work as a basis, as well as one of the greatest Canadian Historians, J.L. Granatstein's work “Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality.”