By: William S Geimer, Times Colonist
Re: “Military support for Afghanistan urgently needed,” comment, Oct. 6.
Chris Kilford’s plea for “just a little more” Canadian involvement in Afghanistan came as no surprise. It is only the latest verse of a song the military establishment has been singing for decades, with the U.S. as choirmaster.
If not singing, Kilford is surely whistling in the graveyard of foreign invaders. Since 1838, the British twice, the Russians and the U.S. have failed to subdue a people who stubbornly insist on settling their own disputes, sadly often with violence.
Kilford labelling everyone not on the U.S. side as terrorists is a tired device that will not work this time. There is little to choose between the Taliban and the collection of warlords the U.S. assembled.
The history of Canada in Afghanistan reveals just how misguided is Kilford’s position. Canada was lured into the most dangerous area, Kandahar, by a three-part bait-and-switch formula that the U.S. is still using today in Iraq.
Part 1, Bait: Appeal to what Canadians think they are — humanitarians and peacekeepers. Canada was initially offered what was billed as quasi-peacekeeping work in relatively safe Kabul. Then-defence minister Art Eggleton described it as a stabilization mission to assist in opening corridors for humanitarian assistance. Then-prime minister Jean Chrétien chimed in: The principal role that we hope to play … will be to make sure aid gets to the people who need it. Of course, we don’t want to have a big fight there.
Part 2, Switch: Use the undue influence of the military establishment to get Canadians into “real fighting.” Canada’s generals are deeply integrated with and envious of their American counterparts. The defence ministry chief of staff during the height of the war observed that Canadian brass have always been preoccupied, almost obsessed with their relationship with the U.S. military. Canada’s generals and admirals tend to be more concerned about their relationship with their American counterparts than they are with their own political master in Ottawa.
That concern played out in questionable conduct by Gen. Rick Hillier. In 2005, the Kabul mission was due to end. Hillier wanted a combat role for Canadian forces. He had candidly reminded us all, remember, that Canadian forces were not a social-service agency. Their job is to kill people.
Then-prime minister Paul Martin was more concerned with Darfur. Before he would consider Hillier’s plan for Afghanistan, he demanded a guarantee that Canadian forces could perform both missions. Hillier gave it, but reneged. Soon, the bulk of the fighting, dying and alienating civilians was in the hands of only the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. Other NATO nations put restrictions on use of their forces.
Part 3, Justify: Emphasize whatever element of the formula seems to work at the time. Cabinet minister Bill Graham went on a speaking tour explaining that Canadians were rebuilding a troubled country, winning hearts and minds as “warrior diplomats.” At the same time, Hillier was touting the mission as one to “kill detestable murderers and scumbags” in Kandahar who threatened western societies. As late as 2011, then-governor general David Johnston was assuring us with Part 1. Canadian forces were rebuilding schools and ensuring the peace that would permit boys and girls to have an education.
Kilford’s pitch is a bit of a hybrid: Let’s support Donald Trump’s campaign to kill “detestable murderers and scumbags” by re-involving the Canadian military — but only to help the Afghans help themselves. (Of course, we don’t want to have a big fight there.)
Don’t buy it. Canadians did build schools in Afghanistan. Canadian troops often did try to help civilians. The recently unveiled monument here emphasizes that and is a welcome change from the misleading war memorials that dominate the landscape. But that is not why we were in Afghanistan.
Graham gave the real reason after Canada declined to send troops to Iraq or join the Ballistic Missile Defence Program: Foreign Affairs’ view was that there is a limit to how much we could constantly say no to the political master in Washington. All we had was Afghanistan. On every other file, we were not onside.
Kilford laments that “domestic political considerations” keep us from “doing the right thing.” Let us hope so. With an increasingly delusional leader to the south, this is no time to fall for the formula again.
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Retired law professor William Geimer is a U.S. army veteran and the author of Canada: The Case for Staying Out of Other People’s Wars.
Showing posts with label Chris Kilford. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chris Kilford. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 18, 2017
Tuesday, March 29, 2016
Kilford: Military forgotten in big-spending Liberal budget
Opinion Piece Written by: Chris Kilford
Defence will never be party’s priority,
For the new Liberal government and despite plenty of evidence to the contrary, it appears that maintaining military hard power is, like … so yesterday.
Pity, then, the poor staff in National Defence Headquarters as they set about transforming our “multi-purpose, combat-capable” Canadian Armed Forces into something, well, less so.
With this latest federal budget, and with a larger than forecasted deficit, we now know the money for defence just isn’t there.
Instead, the capital spending needed to keep our existing military forces even barely afloat has been postponed until at least the next election in 2020.
Of course, the previous government also deferred big-ticket procurement spending. And to be fair, this government needs time to consider what our defence priorities will be and how best to meet them.
But then again, with deficit spending set for at least the next five years, it’s unlikely defence will ever be a spending priority.
Indeed, we appear to be re-visiting the past and heading back to a time very much like that in which then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau found himself almost 50 years ago. Shortly after the 1968 election, he launched a formal defence review, rejecting the military’s first draft “on the grounds that it amounted to nothing more than a reaffirmation of current policy” that was simply unaffordable but, more so, unnecessary.
What he wanted was “fresh thinking” but in truth his mind had already been made up. For him, defence spending was wasteful, especially when there were far more pressing domestic needs.
His real aim was to slash military expenditures as much as one could get away with, including withdrawal from NATO altogether. In the end, Canada’s NATO contribution was cut in half, important capabilities were shed and personnel numbers tumbled.
Pierre Trudeau was also very concerned that having Canadians train military forces in the developing world would lead to all sorts of foreign entanglements.
For example, the Canadian-trained and mentored Ghanaian military overthrew the government in 1966. So, in 1971, he put an end to foreign military training schemes.
Nor did he, unlike his son, think much of sending Canadian blue helmets overseas. Peacekeeping, according to his 1971 Defence White Paper, had “too often been frustrating and disillusioning.”
Presciently, the document noted that many conflicts “have their roots in subversion and insurgency, and therefore will not lend themselves easily to resolution through the use of internationally constituted peacekeeping bodies.” Not much has changed. Today’s peacekeeping missions, which more often involve UN troops in combat, continue to be thankless, miserable and never-ending.
What to do, then? Even when we do have an idea of what sort of military we need, finding the right balance between people, equipment, infrastructure and readiness is never easy. Military planners are also faced with numerous constraints.
Suggesting changes to the reserves or reducing the civilian workforce has always been a political hot potato, along with any talk of “divesting” bases.
Depriving Canadians of a chance to see the Snowbirds is also off the table, so no savings there. Nor can you opt for cheaper Chinese equipment.
Turkey tried that, and for some reason it just didn’t go over well in Washington.
Nevertheless, a government which appears to be in favour of a more robust and active foreign policy ought to be supported by a well-equipped, combat-capable armed forces. But this budget tells a different story. Canada is likely to end up with a much smaller, less responsive military than we have today, largely focused on the home front and the occasional, symbolic assignment abroad.
Major capabilities will wither or disappear. More importantly, so will our future policy options.
Defence will never be party’s priority,
For the new Liberal government and despite plenty of evidence to the contrary, it appears that maintaining military hard power is, like … so yesterday.
Pity, then, the poor staff in National Defence Headquarters as they set about transforming our “multi-purpose, combat-capable” Canadian Armed Forces into something, well, less so.
With this latest federal budget, and with a larger than forecasted deficit, we now know the money for defence just isn’t there.
Instead, the capital spending needed to keep our existing military forces even barely afloat has been postponed until at least the next election in 2020.
Of course, the previous government also deferred big-ticket procurement spending. And to be fair, this government needs time to consider what our defence priorities will be and how best to meet them.
But then again, with deficit spending set for at least the next five years, it’s unlikely defence will ever be a spending priority.
Indeed, we appear to be re-visiting the past and heading back to a time very much like that in which then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau found himself almost 50 years ago. Shortly after the 1968 election, he launched a formal defence review, rejecting the military’s first draft “on the grounds that it amounted to nothing more than a reaffirmation of current policy” that was simply unaffordable but, more so, unnecessary.
What he wanted was “fresh thinking” but in truth his mind had already been made up. For him, defence spending was wasteful, especially when there were far more pressing domestic needs.
His real aim was to slash military expenditures as much as one could get away with, including withdrawal from NATO altogether. In the end, Canada’s NATO contribution was cut in half, important capabilities were shed and personnel numbers tumbled.
Pierre Trudeau was also very concerned that having Canadians train military forces in the developing world would lead to all sorts of foreign entanglements.
For example, the Canadian-trained and mentored Ghanaian military overthrew the government in 1966. So, in 1971, he put an end to foreign military training schemes.
Nor did he, unlike his son, think much of sending Canadian blue helmets overseas. Peacekeeping, according to his 1971 Defence White Paper, had “too often been frustrating and disillusioning.”
Presciently, the document noted that many conflicts “have their roots in subversion and insurgency, and therefore will not lend themselves easily to resolution through the use of internationally constituted peacekeeping bodies.” Not much has changed. Today’s peacekeeping missions, which more often involve UN troops in combat, continue to be thankless, miserable and never-ending.
What to do, then? Even when we do have an idea of what sort of military we need, finding the right balance between people, equipment, infrastructure and readiness is never easy. Military planners are also faced with numerous constraints.
Suggesting changes to the reserves or reducing the civilian workforce has always been a political hot potato, along with any talk of “divesting” bases.
Depriving Canadians of a chance to see the Snowbirds is also off the table, so no savings there. Nor can you opt for cheaper Chinese equipment.
Turkey tried that, and for some reason it just didn’t go over well in Washington.
Nevertheless, a government which appears to be in favour of a more robust and active foreign policy ought to be supported by a well-equipped, combat-capable armed forces. But this budget tells a different story. Canada is likely to end up with a much smaller, less responsive military than we have today, largely focused on the home front and the occasional, symbolic assignment abroad.
Major capabilities will wither or disappear. More importantly, so will our future policy options.
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Chris Kilford is a fellow at the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy. He is also the former Canadian Defence Attaché to Turkey.
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