By Tony Battista and Dr. David McDonough, OnTrack Magazine (Vol 21, No. 2) Originally published by The CDA Institute
The Canadian government triggered some controversy with its most recent defence policy announcement – that it now plans to delay the open competition for the CF-18 replacement by five years, and instead opt to procure an interim fleet of 18 Super Hornets as a stopgap measure to fill what it says is a capability gap.
The subsequent news stories following this announcement have only raised further questions. It now appears this capability gap only arose following a policy shift in the government’s approach (and increase) in commitments, especially to its NATO and NORAD commitments. Without further information on the rationale, it is difficult to make any definite assessment about this decision.
Clearly, it is the government’s prerogative to set policy, although the timing of it, when the government was trying to justify a plan for interim Super Hornets, is certainly curious. One must then ask about the extent to which subject matter experts were consulted on this decision, and whether such a decision should more properly be part of the Defence Policy Review (DPR) – and the value of the DPR when such key decisions are taken outside of it?
Another equally troubling story is that the government has forced over 200 civil servants involved in the CF-18 replacement project to sign lifetime non-disclosure agreements. Given that there are already existing stringent measures to protect classified government information, such a draconian measure is certainly at odds over the government’s stated position on transparency and openness, and raises questions about the underlying intent of such a policy. Is it really only about protecting sensitive information or trade secrets? Or is it simply a way to prevent officials from criticizing the government’s handling of this file after they leave office?
Of course, much remains unknown about how the government will ultimately proceed with its plan. What fighter aircraft will realistically be available to compete in the CF-18 replacement competition in five years’ time? With the exception of the F-35, most of the other possible aircraft will already be at their mid-life point by that time. And will the US government even agree to sell interim Super Hornets? Lest it be forgotten, Lockheed Martin remains the single largest contractor for the American government, and there is little doubt that Washington has a vested interest in the future of the F-35 – and much less so with the Super Hornet, which is becoming a legacy aircraft for them.
Yet the most worrisome aspects of this decision is on the question of cost. How much will it cost to purchase an interim Super Hornet fleet? What is the additional cost of operating a mixed fleet? A possible answer to the former can be seen in Australia’s purchase of 24 Super Hornets for 6.1-billion (Australian $). A roughly similar amount could be expected. On the latter, it will undoubtedly be an expensive proposition – as noted in a Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) report that has (coincidentally?) disappeared from the DND/DRDC website.
And is the interim Super Hornet fleet to be a permanent fixture of the RCAF force structure? Or is it merely a bridging fleet that will be retired soon after the permanent CF-18 replacement are delivered? Of note, Australia had planned for a bridging fleet with its own Super Hornet purchase, which quickly emerged as a permanent mixed arrangement, with all its attendant additional costs. Then there is the matter of what is the requisite size our fighter fleet in light of the government’s increased commitments to NORAD and NATO – and whether the permanent CF-18 replacement will take that number into consideration?
Is Canada’s defence budget large enough to handle the governments reported and impending defence decisions? What conclusions can be made from the many procurements, as well as current and emerging military commitments (procurement of an interim fleet of fighter aircraft, a major building of new naval ships, increasing the CAF operational tempo with new deployments to Latvia and to a still unknown locale in Africa (possibly Mali), current anti-ISIL mission in the Mideast, and likely more money for recruiting, training, education, readiness, retention and transition)?
Moreover, what will the budgetary situation be like in five years, when Canada expects to choose a permanent CF-18 replacement fleet? Then, it will have to address other competing spending priorities in other areas of security and defence, but also on social programs, health, dealing with the effects of climate change and its challenges on the environment, a direr financial situation for many western countries, and social upheaval (extremism, nationalism, protectionism, etc), not to mention the resurgence of China and Russia?
As the PBO and others have pointed out, the existing budget is simply too small for the existing force structure. And the government has shown little interest in decreasing either personnel numbers or basing infrastructure to make things more manageable. Indeed, as its decision on the interim Super Hornets seems to indicate, it may have set itself on the road to acquiring more fighter aircraft than even its predecessor. That is not necessarily a bad outcome, and may indeed be a silver lining of sorts – as having more aircraft will allow the CAF greater flexibility in terms of readiness and operational deployments. But much depends on whether there will be sufficient funds to allow for such growth.
It seems clear: The Defence Budget Has to Go Up! Canada’s defence budget needs to grow starting with this next Federal Budget. As the recent Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence report on UN peacekeeping notes, the government needs to “ensure adequate funding is available to meet the operational priorities of the Canadian Armed Forces” – and this is as true with the government’s plan for peace support missions as it is with national priorities and commitments to NORAD and NATO.
And the window of opportunity for such growth may be limited. After all, the government plans on running deficits, but will likely need to start curtailing spending prior to the next election in three years. Otherwise, what will likely grow is a substantive commitment-capability gap, leaving behind an unpalatable central legacy of the current government with both a large deficit and an ill-equipped Canadian Armed Forces.
As a result, the next budget in 2017 may be the most feasible opportunity for the government to increase the baseline of the defence budget – and to put National Defence in a better position to deal with the expected military requirements of the foreseeable future. It also coincides with the arrival of the Trump administration in the United States, which many expect will make burden-sharing a centrepiece of its engagement with key allies.
A decision by the Trudeau government to increase defence spending starting with the next Federal Budget could go a long way to establish its credibility when it comes to security and defence policies, to look after Canada’s short and long-term security and defence needs, and to reassuring our American ally on this issue.
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Tony Battista is the Chief Executive Officer of the CDA and CDA Institute.
Dr. David McDonough is Research Manager and Senior Editor at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Security and Development (formerly CFPS) at Dalhousie University.
Showing posts with label Defence Procurement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Defence Procurement. Show all posts
Monday, February 6, 2017
Friday, November 25, 2016
Nossal: Super Hornets – How Trudeau played politics with defence procurement
By: Kim Richard Nossal, The Ottawa Citizen
We shouldn’t be surprised that Canada is going to buy an interim fleet of 18 Boeing Super Hornets.
The Liberal government has been desperately looking for a way out of the mess Justin Trudeau created when he decided it would be a good idea to play politics by promising in the middle of the election campaign that a Liberal government would not purchase the Lockheed Martin F-35 to replace the CF-18 Hornets that Canada has been flying since the early 1980s.
Trudeau promised that this decision would save billions of dollars that could be poured into naval procurement. This was always a rash promise, on so many levels.
If Canada doesn’t buy F-35s, then the Royal Canadian Air Force will not be as fully interoperable with the U.S. Air Force in the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command as it would be with them.
For the U.S. will be flying only one new fighter in NORAD in the 2020s and 2030s: the F-35, the result a congressional decision in 1994. (USAF F-22 Raptors also fly NORAD patrols, but the Americans won’t let even their closest allies buy these aircraft.) The RCAF’s Super Hornets can be networked with F-35s, but they are simply not as capable, and much more vulnerable.
If Canada doesn’t buy F-35s, Canadian aerospace firms will be cut out of Lockheed Martin’s global value chains. The F-35, with its long production run that extends well into the 2030s, offers considerable benefits to those who remain as global partners. Boeing, which lost the Joint Strike Fighter competition to Lockheed Martin in the early 2000s, cannot offer the Canadian aerospace industry the kind of benefits Lockheed Martin can.
Finally, Canada is part of a nine-nation multinational consortium that is producing the Joint Strike Fighter. In all, 11 of Canada’s close allies and friends will be buying, and flying, the F-35 in the next two decades: Australia, Britain, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and the United States. If Canada does not purchase the F-35, it will be out of step with all these allies in the decades ahead.
Given the rashness of the Trudeau promise, his minister of national defence, Harjit Sajjan, has been hunting for a way out. In the summer, Sajjan took a trip to Australia, and liked the so-called “Aussie option.” Australia, unlike Canada, is firmly committed to buying the F-35, but needed an interim fleet of fighters to fill in for their old F-111s while waiting for their F-35s to be delivered. They bought a fleet of 24 Super Hornets.
Embracing the Aussie option is a perfect solution for the Liberal government: it gets to keep Trudeau’s rash promise not to buy the F-35, at least for now; it gets to remain in the nine-nation Joint Strike Fighter partnership with benefits from being in Lockheed Martin’s global value chains if a future government buys the F-35; and it gets three “six-packs” of fighters that can work with USAF F-35s in NORAD or be deployed elsewhere.
Most importantly, it gets to kick a real decision about the CF-18 replacement down the road, well beyond the next election.
Now this may be a good way out of the mess that Trudeau stumbled into in 2015 playing political games with defence procurement, but it is going to be a huge and costly decision for Canadian taxpayers. The aircraft that Canada will be flying for the next decade may both have “Hornet” in their name, but running two fleets of jet fighters is likely going to be exceedingly costly.
And buying an almost embarrassingly tiny fleet of Super Hornets now just postpones the day when a government in the future will have to pony up for a replacement for the aging CF-18s. A future government will have to buy a fleet of at least 65 fighters.
The substantial tab for Trudeau’s gamesmanship – both now and into the 2020s – will be felt not only by the taxpayers, but also by the other services of the Canadian Armed Forces, particularly the Royal Canadian Navy. So much for saving on fighters to pour more into ships for the RCN.
Unfortunately, we have been here before. The Liberal government of Jean Chrétien played exactly the same kind of political game during the 1993 election, promising to cancel a helicopter contract signed by his predecessor, Brian Mulroney. The new Liberal government did so on its very first day in office, throwing away nearly $500 million. And we will not see all the replacements for the old Sea Kings arrive until the early 2020s.
The Conservative government of Stephen Harper played politics with the CF-18 replacement and completely botched it, not only adding significant costs to the replacement but also laying the groundwork for the games that Trudeau played in 2015.
It is too bad for the long-suffering taxpayers and the equally long-suffering members of the Canadian Armed Forces that the present prime minister didn’t look back to see how his father handled replacing fighter jets.
For Pierre Elliott Trudeau and his Liberal party, and those across the aisle in the Progressive Conservative party, didn’t play politics with defence procurement in the late 1970s – unlike some of their successors.
---
Kim Richard Nossal is a professor with the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University. His latest book, Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada, is available from Dundurn Press.
We shouldn’t be surprised that Canada is going to buy an interim fleet of 18 Boeing Super Hornets.
The Liberal government has been desperately looking for a way out of the mess Justin Trudeau created when he decided it would be a good idea to play politics by promising in the middle of the election campaign that a Liberal government would not purchase the Lockheed Martin F-35 to replace the CF-18 Hornets that Canada has been flying since the early 1980s.
Trudeau promised that this decision would save billions of dollars that could be poured into naval procurement. This was always a rash promise, on so many levels.
If Canada doesn’t buy F-35s, then the Royal Canadian Air Force will not be as fully interoperable with the U.S. Air Force in the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command as it would be with them.
For the U.S. will be flying only one new fighter in NORAD in the 2020s and 2030s: the F-35, the result a congressional decision in 1994. (USAF F-22 Raptors also fly NORAD patrols, but the Americans won’t let even their closest allies buy these aircraft.) The RCAF’s Super Hornets can be networked with F-35s, but they are simply not as capable, and much more vulnerable.
If Canada doesn’t buy F-35s, Canadian aerospace firms will be cut out of Lockheed Martin’s global value chains. The F-35, with its long production run that extends well into the 2030s, offers considerable benefits to those who remain as global partners. Boeing, which lost the Joint Strike Fighter competition to Lockheed Martin in the early 2000s, cannot offer the Canadian aerospace industry the kind of benefits Lockheed Martin can.
Finally, Canada is part of a nine-nation multinational consortium that is producing the Joint Strike Fighter. In all, 11 of Canada’s close allies and friends will be buying, and flying, the F-35 in the next two decades: Australia, Britain, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and the United States. If Canada does not purchase the F-35, it will be out of step with all these allies in the decades ahead.
Given the rashness of the Trudeau promise, his minister of national defence, Harjit Sajjan, has been hunting for a way out. In the summer, Sajjan took a trip to Australia, and liked the so-called “Aussie option.” Australia, unlike Canada, is firmly committed to buying the F-35, but needed an interim fleet of fighters to fill in for their old F-111s while waiting for their F-35s to be delivered. They bought a fleet of 24 Super Hornets.
Embracing the Aussie option is a perfect solution for the Liberal government: it gets to keep Trudeau’s rash promise not to buy the F-35, at least for now; it gets to remain in the nine-nation Joint Strike Fighter partnership with benefits from being in Lockheed Martin’s global value chains if a future government buys the F-35; and it gets three “six-packs” of fighters that can work with USAF F-35s in NORAD or be deployed elsewhere.
Most importantly, it gets to kick a real decision about the CF-18 replacement down the road, well beyond the next election.
Now this may be a good way out of the mess that Trudeau stumbled into in 2015 playing political games with defence procurement, but it is going to be a huge and costly decision for Canadian taxpayers. The aircraft that Canada will be flying for the next decade may both have “Hornet” in their name, but running two fleets of jet fighters is likely going to be exceedingly costly.
And buying an almost embarrassingly tiny fleet of Super Hornets now just postpones the day when a government in the future will have to pony up for a replacement for the aging CF-18s. A future government will have to buy a fleet of at least 65 fighters.
The substantial tab for Trudeau’s gamesmanship – both now and into the 2020s – will be felt not only by the taxpayers, but also by the other services of the Canadian Armed Forces, particularly the Royal Canadian Navy. So much for saving on fighters to pour more into ships for the RCN.
Unfortunately, we have been here before. The Liberal government of Jean Chrétien played exactly the same kind of political game during the 1993 election, promising to cancel a helicopter contract signed by his predecessor, Brian Mulroney. The new Liberal government did so on its very first day in office, throwing away nearly $500 million. And we will not see all the replacements for the old Sea Kings arrive until the early 2020s.
The Conservative government of Stephen Harper played politics with the CF-18 replacement and completely botched it, not only adding significant costs to the replacement but also laying the groundwork for the games that Trudeau played in 2015.
It is too bad for the long-suffering taxpayers and the equally long-suffering members of the Canadian Armed Forces that the present prime minister didn’t look back to see how his father handled replacing fighter jets.
For Pierre Elliott Trudeau and his Liberal party, and those across the aisle in the Progressive Conservative party, didn’t play politics with defence procurement in the late 1970s – unlike some of their successors.
---
Kim Richard Nossal is a professor with the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University. His latest book, Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada, is available from Dundurn Press.
Thursday, May 26, 2016
Taxpayers could be on hook for bill after trade ruling questions $834M army truck contract
By: Lee Berthiaume, National Post
OTTAWA — In a ruling that could cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, a federal trade tribunal has raised questions about the government’s handling of a military procurement project to buy desperately needed trucks for the army.
The ruling by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal represents the latest blow to Canada’s troubled military procurement system, which the Liberal government has vowed to fix without offering any details.
In July 2015, the Conservative government announced that Pennsylvania-based Mack Defense, the military arm of the famed big-rig maker, had won a contract valued at more than $834 million to provide the Canadian Army with 1,500 specialized trucks.
The vehicles were intended to replace a large part of the army’s existing truck fleet, which had been purchased during the 1980s and ’90s. Many of those older trucks have been parked or sent to the scrap heap because of their age and to save money on maintenance and repairs.
Related
Conservative, Liberal MPs trade blame in Commons for failed military equipment purchases
Liberals ‘absolutely’ committed to military but it needs a tighter focus, defence minister says
Dave Perry: Our broken military procurement system
But Wisconsin-based Oshkosh Defense, which submitted its own truck design to the competition, challenged the government’s decision to award the contract to Mack Defense. Oshkosh alleged the department responsible for managing government purchases, Public Procurement Canada, had been unfair during design testing.
Late last week, the trade tribunal released a ruling calling on Public Works to re-evaluate Oshkosh’s design. If the results show the company should have won, the ruling says, then the government should compensate Oshkosh “for the profits it would have received had it been properly awarded the contract.”
If for some reason re-testing cannot be done, the government and Oshkosh are urged to negotiate compensation for the company’s “lost opportunity.” If they are unable to reach an agreement within 40 days, they are to go back to the tribunal.
Fortunately for the army, which is expecting the first new trucks to be delivered next year, the tribunal did not call on the government to push the reset button. “The Canadian International Trade Tribunal will not recommend that the contract awarded to Mack Defense LLC be cancelled,” the ruling reads.
Public Procurement Canada did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Nonetheless, the ruling means taxpayers more than likely will have to foot the bill for the government’s error. It also reiterates the morass with which the entire military procurement system has been embroiled for years.
A large number of projects are facing delays, which has left the military lacking such vital equipment as resupply ships, or struggling to keep ancient equipment such as search-and-rescue planes in the air. Other projects are facing budget shortfalls that could result in fewer aircraft, ships and other pieces of equipment.
In addition, at a time of reduced military spending across the West, defence companies are fighting tooth and nail for every dollar. That includes resorting to legal challenges to try to scuttle the entire process in cases where their products lose.
The Liberal government has promised to fix the system, but has have offered few details on how that will happen. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan has referred only to the government’s ongoing defence policy review, which isn’t expected to produce any results until next year.
Defence chief Gen. Jonathan Vance similarly dodged questions Tuesday about fixing the system, saying only that the government wants to be “innovative, both in process and in terms of where we put our efforts in the future.” He suggested that “bodes well for the country and for the armed forces.”
In the federal budget in March, the government announced it was pushing off $3.7 billion in planned equipment purchases for the foreseeable future. The government said such a “re-profiling” was necessary to ensure money was available when needed, but others such as retired general Rick Hillier said it was a budget cut.
OTTAWA — In a ruling that could cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, a federal trade tribunal has raised questions about the government’s handling of a military procurement project to buy desperately needed trucks for the army.
The ruling by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal represents the latest blow to Canada’s troubled military procurement system, which the Liberal government has vowed to fix without offering any details.
 |
| The vehicles were intended to replace a large part of the army’s existing truck fleet, which had been purchased during the 1980s and ’90s. Photo: |
The vehicles were intended to replace a large part of the army’s existing truck fleet, which had been purchased during the 1980s and ’90s. Many of those older trucks have been parked or sent to the scrap heap because of their age and to save money on maintenance and repairs.
Related
Conservative, Liberal MPs trade blame in Commons for failed military equipment purchases
Liberals ‘absolutely’ committed to military but it needs a tighter focus, defence minister says
Dave Perry: Our broken military procurement system
But Wisconsin-based Oshkosh Defense, which submitted its own truck design to the competition, challenged the government’s decision to award the contract to Mack Defense. Oshkosh alleged the department responsible for managing government purchases, Public Procurement Canada, had been unfair during design testing.
Late last week, the trade tribunal released a ruling calling on Public Works to re-evaluate Oshkosh’s design. If the results show the company should have won, the ruling says, then the government should compensate Oshkosh “for the profits it would have received had it been properly awarded the contract.”
If for some reason re-testing cannot be done, the government and Oshkosh are urged to negotiate compensation for the company’s “lost opportunity.” If they are unable to reach an agreement within 40 days, they are to go back to the tribunal.
Fortunately for the army, which is expecting the first new trucks to be delivered next year, the tribunal did not call on the government to push the reset button. “The Canadian International Trade Tribunal will not recommend that the contract awarded to Mack Defense LLC be cancelled,” the ruling reads.
Public Procurement Canada did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Nonetheless, the ruling means taxpayers more than likely will have to foot the bill for the government’s error. It also reiterates the morass with which the entire military procurement system has been embroiled for years.
A large number of projects are facing delays, which has left the military lacking such vital equipment as resupply ships, or struggling to keep ancient equipment such as search-and-rescue planes in the air. Other projects are facing budget shortfalls that could result in fewer aircraft, ships and other pieces of equipment.
In addition, at a time of reduced military spending across the West, defence companies are fighting tooth and nail for every dollar. That includes resorting to legal challenges to try to scuttle the entire process in cases where their products lose.
The Liberal government has promised to fix the system, but has have offered few details on how that will happen. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan has referred only to the government’s ongoing defence policy review, which isn’t expected to produce any results until next year.
Defence chief Gen. Jonathan Vance similarly dodged questions Tuesday about fixing the system, saying only that the government wants to be “innovative, both in process and in terms of where we put our efforts in the future.” He suggested that “bodes well for the country and for the armed forces.”
In the federal budget in March, the government announced it was pushing off $3.7 billion in planned equipment purchases for the foreseeable future. The government said such a “re-profiling” was necessary to ensure money was available when needed, but others such as retired general Rick Hillier said it was a budget cut.
Wednesday, April 27, 2016
Procurement Problems led to Canada missing 2 attempts to by Helicopter Landing Ships
The Canadian Press
OTTAWA — The bureaucracy at National Defence helped scuttle two attempts by the Harper government to acquire helicopter landing ships over the last few years, documents show.
The most high-profile of the cases involved the sale by France of two Mistral-class warships, which had originally been built for Russia, but were on the auction block after the Kremlin's annexation of Crimea.
Documents obtained by The Canadian Press under access to information legislation show former defence minister Jason Kenney received conflicting advice from top civilian and military commanders, but decided to ignore it and made a last-minute, personal pitch to French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.
Defence experts say the memos and briefings makes the current defence policy review by the Liberals more important because they underscore how the lack of clear direction can lead to in-fighting among bureaucrats with competing visions of what is necessary.
Kenney and Le Drian held a teleconference last June, a few months before President Francois Hollande's government decided to sell the 21,000-tonne vessels to Egypt.
The former Conservative government was interested in acquiring landing ships, which can carry troops, equipment and helicopters, as a way to boost the military's ability to respond quickly to trouble spots and humanitarian disasters around the world.
The documents reveal that, prior to discussions with the French, the Conservatives examined the idea of acquiring large, surplus British Bay-class amphibious ships — a proposal defence bureaucrats also shot down.
OTTAWA — The bureaucracy at National Defence helped scuttle two attempts by the Harper government to acquire helicopter landing ships over the last few years, documents show.
The most high-profile of the cases involved the sale by France of two Mistral-class warships, which had originally been built for Russia, but were on the auction block after the Kremlin's annexation of Crimea.
Documents obtained by The Canadian Press under access to information legislation show former defence minister Jason Kenney received conflicting advice from top civilian and military commanders, but decided to ignore it and made a last-minute, personal pitch to French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.
Defence experts say the memos and briefings makes the current defence policy review by the Liberals more important because they underscore how the lack of clear direction can lead to in-fighting among bureaucrats with competing visions of what is necessary.
 |
| Jason Kenney speaks at a press conference for procurement of new naval vehicles on Tuesday, June 23, 2015. (Photo: The Canadian Press) |
The former Conservative government was interested in acquiring landing ships, which can carry troops, equipment and helicopters, as a way to boost the military's ability to respond quickly to trouble spots and humanitarian disasters around the world.
The documents reveal that, prior to discussions with the French, the Conservatives examined the idea of acquiring large, surplus British Bay-class amphibious ships — a proposal defence bureaucrats also shot down.
 |
| RFA Lyme Bay - a British Bay-class amphibious ship. |
In his advice over the Mistral sale, deputy defence minister John Forster acknowledged that having such a capability would be a "strategic asset" to Canada, particularly in the Arctic, and allow the country to be "more self-sufficient in international operations, reduce dependency on allies, and assume greater leadership roles."
Multiple arguments given against deal
But then he went on — in a June 19, 2015 briefing — to provide a litany of reasons why the Conservative government should not go ahead, notably because the ships did not fit within the existing defence investment plans and would put unforeseen money pressures on National Defence "in the magnitude of billions of Canadian dollars."
Forster told Kenney the same arguments were used a few years earlier to persuade the government not to pursue a deal with the British.
He suggested the navy didn't have enough sailors and those it had were not trained for such a ship. As well, jetty infrastructure would need to be updated and helicopters modified. Finally, there weren't enough bureaucrats to guide the acquisition.
The briefing suggested it would take up to six years before the brand new ships were up to Canadian standards in terms of communications and weapons. The documents also raised concern that buying ships from the French might conflict with the National Shippbuilding Strategy, a principal aim of which is to build warships in Canada.
Forster put forward the arguments, even though the documents show National Defence had an independent report that mostly argued the opposite — an analysis that was initially not provided to Kenney.
Dave Perry, an analyst with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, says officials seemed bent on giving more reasons not to proceed, than in providing a balanced perspective.
He said the concern about money was legitimate, but the Conservative cabinet wasn't even given the opportunity to reflect on pros and cons of adding an amphibious capability to the navy.
"My read of this is that there was interest up top, but it was torpedoed down below," Perry said. "The strongest thing was the funding issue, but the notes made clear that if extra incremental funding became available, the department had other priorities."
That, he said, is not the way it is supposed to work and it's the government that should be setting the direction.
Multiple arguments given against deal
But then he went on — in a June 19, 2015 briefing — to provide a litany of reasons why the Conservative government should not go ahead, notably because the ships did not fit within the existing defence investment plans and would put unforeseen money pressures on National Defence "in the magnitude of billions of Canadian dollars."
Forster told Kenney the same arguments were used a few years earlier to persuade the government not to pursue a deal with the British.
He suggested the navy didn't have enough sailors and those it had were not trained for such a ship. As well, jetty infrastructure would need to be updated and helicopters modified. Finally, there weren't enough bureaucrats to guide the acquisition.
The briefing suggested it would take up to six years before the brand new ships were up to Canadian standards in terms of communications and weapons. The documents also raised concern that buying ships from the French might conflict with the National Shippbuilding Strategy, a principal aim of which is to build warships in Canada.
Forster put forward the arguments, even though the documents show National Defence had an independent report that mostly argued the opposite — an analysis that was initially not provided to Kenney.
Dave Perry, an analyst with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, says officials seemed bent on giving more reasons not to proceed, than in providing a balanced perspective.
He said the concern about money was legitimate, but the Conservative cabinet wasn't even given the opportunity to reflect on pros and cons of adding an amphibious capability to the navy.
"My read of this is that there was interest up top, but it was torpedoed down below," Perry said. "The strongest thing was the funding issue, but the notes made clear that if extra incremental funding became available, the department had other priorities."
That, he said, is not the way it is supposed to work and it's the government that should be setting the direction.
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