By Tony Battista and Dr. David McDonough, OnTrack Magazine (Vol 21, No. 2) Originally published by The CDA Institute
The Canadian government triggered some controversy with its most recent defence policy announcement – that it now plans to delay the open competition for the CF-18 replacement by five years, and instead opt to procure an interim fleet of 18 Super Hornets as a stopgap measure to fill what it says is a capability gap.
The subsequent news stories following this announcement have only raised further questions. It now appears this capability gap only arose following a policy shift in the government’s approach (and increase) in commitments, especially to its NATO and NORAD commitments. Without further information on the rationale, it is difficult to make any definite assessment about this decision.
Clearly, it is the government’s prerogative to set policy, although the timing of it, when the government was trying to justify a plan for interim Super Hornets, is certainly curious. One must then ask about the extent to which subject matter experts were consulted on this decision, and whether such a decision should more properly be part of the Defence Policy Review (DPR) – and the value of the DPR when such key decisions are taken outside of it?
Another equally troubling story is that the government has forced over 200 civil servants involved in the CF-18 replacement project to sign lifetime non-disclosure agreements. Given that there are already existing stringent measures to protect classified government information, such a draconian measure is certainly at odds over the government’s stated position on transparency and openness, and raises questions about the underlying intent of such a policy. Is it really only about protecting sensitive information or trade secrets? Or is it simply a way to prevent officials from criticizing the government’s handling of this file after they leave office?
Of course, much remains unknown about how the government will ultimately proceed with its plan. What fighter aircraft will realistically be available to compete in the CF-18 replacement competition in five years’ time? With the exception of the F-35, most of the other possible aircraft will already be at their mid-life point by that time. And will the US government even agree to sell interim Super Hornets? Lest it be forgotten, Lockheed Martin remains the single largest contractor for the American government, and there is little doubt that Washington has a vested interest in the future of the F-35 – and much less so with the Super Hornet, which is becoming a legacy aircraft for them.
Yet the most worrisome aspects of this decision is on the question of cost. How much will it cost to purchase an interim Super Hornet fleet? What is the additional cost of operating a mixed fleet? A possible answer to the former can be seen in Australia’s purchase of 24 Super Hornets for 6.1-billion (Australian $). A roughly similar amount could be expected. On the latter, it will undoubtedly be an expensive proposition – as noted in a Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) report that has (coincidentally?) disappeared from the DND/DRDC website.
And is the interim Super Hornet fleet to be a permanent fixture of the RCAF force structure? Or is it merely a bridging fleet that will be retired soon after the permanent CF-18 replacement are delivered? Of note, Australia had planned for a bridging fleet with its own Super Hornet purchase, which quickly emerged as a permanent mixed arrangement, with all its attendant additional costs. Then there is the matter of what is the requisite size our fighter fleet in light of the government’s increased commitments to NORAD and NATO – and whether the permanent CF-18 replacement will take that number into consideration?
Is Canada’s defence budget large enough to handle the governments reported and impending defence decisions? What conclusions can be made from the many procurements, as well as current and emerging military commitments (procurement of an interim fleet of fighter aircraft, a major building of new naval ships, increasing the CAF operational tempo with new deployments to Latvia and to a still unknown locale in Africa (possibly Mali), current anti-ISIL mission in the Mideast, and likely more money for recruiting, training, education, readiness, retention and transition)?
Moreover, what will the budgetary situation be like in five years, when Canada expects to choose a permanent CF-18 replacement fleet? Then, it will have to address other competing spending priorities in other areas of security and defence, but also on social programs, health, dealing with the effects of climate change and its challenges on the environment, a direr financial situation for many western countries, and social upheaval (extremism, nationalism, protectionism, etc), not to mention the resurgence of China and Russia?
As the PBO and others have pointed out, the existing budget is simply too small for the existing force structure. And the government has shown little interest in decreasing either personnel numbers or basing infrastructure to make things more manageable. Indeed, as its decision on the interim Super Hornets seems to indicate, it may have set itself on the road to acquiring more fighter aircraft than even its predecessor. That is not necessarily a bad outcome, and may indeed be a silver lining of sorts – as having more aircraft will allow the CAF greater flexibility in terms of readiness and operational deployments. But much depends on whether there will be sufficient funds to allow for such growth.
It seems clear: The Defence Budget Has to Go Up! Canada’s defence budget needs to grow starting with this next Federal Budget. As the recent Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence report on UN peacekeeping notes, the government needs to “ensure adequate funding is available to meet the operational priorities of the Canadian Armed Forces” – and this is as true with the government’s plan for peace support missions as it is with national priorities and commitments to NORAD and NATO.
And the window of opportunity for such growth may be limited. After all, the government plans on running deficits, but will likely need to start curtailing spending prior to the next election in three years. Otherwise, what will likely grow is a substantive commitment-capability gap, leaving behind an unpalatable central legacy of the current government with both a large deficit and an ill-equipped Canadian Armed Forces.
As a result, the next budget in 2017 may be the most feasible opportunity for the government to increase the baseline of the defence budget – and to put National Defence in a better position to deal with the expected military requirements of the foreseeable future. It also coincides with the arrival of the Trump administration in the United States, which many expect will make burden-sharing a centrepiece of its engagement with key allies.
A decision by the Trudeau government to increase defence spending starting with the next Federal Budget could go a long way to establish its credibility when it comes to security and defence policies, to look after Canada’s short and long-term security and defence needs, and to reassuring our American ally on this issue.
----
Tony Battista is the Chief Executive Officer of the CDA and CDA Institute.
Dr. David McDonough is Research Manager and Senior Editor at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Security and Development (formerly CFPS) at Dalhousie University.
Showing posts with label Canadian Defence Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Canadian Defence Policy. Show all posts
Monday, February 6, 2017
Monday, November 21, 2016
Bland: Trudeau Cannot Neglect the Canadian Forces
By: Douglas Bland, Guest Author -Ottawa Citizen
The government of Canada has a duty to provide to citizens a comprehensive explanation of its national defence policies. After more than a year in office, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has yet to reveal his defence policy and its supporting multi-billion-dollar budget.
In April, the prime minister launched public consultations on security challenges, the role of the military in facing “current threats and challenges,” and what resources might be necessary to carry out its mandate – oddly, without defining what that mandate might be.
These consultations attracted 4,700 Canadians to public meetings and produced 20,200 “submissions.” The review ended in July and its conclusions were apparently presented to cabinet in October, but they have been withheld from the public. Indeed, Trudeau seems to have decided not to present a national defence policy to Parliament until sometime in mid-2017 or later.
Defence policy or not, the Liberal government, among other fundamental defence policy decisions, withdrew Canada’s CF-18 fighters from the battle against ISIL insurgents; committed hundreds of military advisers to near-combat operations in Iraq and other areas in that dangerous region without the courtesy of even a take-note debate in Parliament; sent or plans to send large units on vague missions in Eastern Europe; dithers over committing perhaps hundreds more military personnel to risky, ill-defined missions in Africa and perhaps elsewhere; confounded defence procurement strategies by, for example, cancelling plans to replace Canada’s aging CF-18 fleet and hesitating to confirm other major projects; and after a year in office, has failed to define its annual multi-billion-dollar defence budget.
The reality, however, is that Trudeau does have an active, but undeclared, traditional Liberal national defence policy founded on the longstanding Liberal defence bromide: You must not take the CAF seriously. It will not be required for the defence of the country, as the United States will protect us from enemy aggression.
Liberal governments were compelled by public opinion to build significant military forces during the First and Second World Wars and in the early years of the Cold War. After 1960, political support for a modern, robust Canadian Forces gradually, then rapidly, faded from the national political agenda.
The Liberal government’s 1964 White Paper On Defence raised “doubts” about the traditional structure of armed forces and looked to “organizational efficiencies” to reduce defence spending. Former prime minister Pierre Trudeau’s 1971 defence white paper belittled the traditional roles of armed forces, “(especially) at a time when national social and economic needs (were) considerable.” He concluded that “the size of the defence budget can only be made in the context of the Government’s (other) national priorities and programs” and cut budgets and capabilities yet again.
Prime minister Jean Chrétien’s 1994 defence white paper was clear and ultimately disarming: “Everything is being made leaner, everything is undergoing the closest scrutiny.” Deep cuts were made to budgets, infrastructure and administration, but most radically to operational capabilities and to plans and budgets intended to modernization of next-generation armed force.
The tradition continues. Trudeau’s national defence policy – if one is presented to Parliament – will also aim to produce, as he announced during the election, “a leaner, more agile” defence force, a target that can be achieved only by reducing CAF operational capabilities.
Informed observers expect that, as a minimum, Trudeau will reduce significantly the defence budget, cut the personnel strength of army and militia units; delay plans to rebuild the navy’s dilapidated submarine fleet; greatly restructure downward the navy’s shipbuilding program; and delay into the far future any decision to replace the CF-18 fleet.
If Trudeau believes, after the election of Donald Trump, that Canada can continue to free-ride on the defence policies and budgets of the United States, then he will be greatly disappointed after his first meeting with the president-elect.
Better for Canada’s security and relations with the United States if Trudeau immediately assured Trump that Canada intends to significantly modernize the Canadian Forces and shows him his government’s budget to do so.
The government of Canada has a duty to provide to citizens a comprehensive explanation of its national defence policies. After more than a year in office, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has yet to reveal his defence policy and its supporting multi-billion-dollar budget.
In April, the prime minister launched public consultations on security challenges, the role of the military in facing “current threats and challenges,” and what resources might be necessary to carry out its mandate – oddly, without defining what that mandate might be.
These consultations attracted 4,700 Canadians to public meetings and produced 20,200 “submissions.” The review ended in July and its conclusions were apparently presented to cabinet in October, but they have been withheld from the public. Indeed, Trudeau seems to have decided not to present a national defence policy to Parliament until sometime in mid-2017 or later.
Defence policy or not, the Liberal government, among other fundamental defence policy decisions, withdrew Canada’s CF-18 fighters from the battle against ISIL insurgents; committed hundreds of military advisers to near-combat operations in Iraq and other areas in that dangerous region without the courtesy of even a take-note debate in Parliament; sent or plans to send large units on vague missions in Eastern Europe; dithers over committing perhaps hundreds more military personnel to risky, ill-defined missions in Africa and perhaps elsewhere; confounded defence procurement strategies by, for example, cancelling plans to replace Canada’s aging CF-18 fleet and hesitating to confirm other major projects; and after a year in office, has failed to define its annual multi-billion-dollar defence budget.
The reality, however, is that Trudeau does have an active, but undeclared, traditional Liberal national defence policy founded on the longstanding Liberal defence bromide: You must not take the CAF seriously. It will not be required for the defence of the country, as the United States will protect us from enemy aggression.
Liberal governments were compelled by public opinion to build significant military forces during the First and Second World Wars and in the early years of the Cold War. After 1960, political support for a modern, robust Canadian Forces gradually, then rapidly, faded from the national political agenda.
The Liberal government’s 1964 White Paper On Defence raised “doubts” about the traditional structure of armed forces and looked to “organizational efficiencies” to reduce defence spending. Former prime minister Pierre Trudeau’s 1971 defence white paper belittled the traditional roles of armed forces, “(especially) at a time when national social and economic needs (were) considerable.” He concluded that “the size of the defence budget can only be made in the context of the Government’s (other) national priorities and programs” and cut budgets and capabilities yet again.
Prime minister Jean Chrétien’s 1994 defence white paper was clear and ultimately disarming: “Everything is being made leaner, everything is undergoing the closest scrutiny.” Deep cuts were made to budgets, infrastructure and administration, but most radically to operational capabilities and to plans and budgets intended to modernization of next-generation armed force.
The tradition continues. Trudeau’s national defence policy – if one is presented to Parliament – will also aim to produce, as he announced during the election, “a leaner, more agile” defence force, a target that can be achieved only by reducing CAF operational capabilities.
Informed observers expect that, as a minimum, Trudeau will reduce significantly the defence budget, cut the personnel strength of army and militia units; delay plans to rebuild the navy’s dilapidated submarine fleet; greatly restructure downward the navy’s shipbuilding program; and delay into the far future any decision to replace the CF-18 fleet.
If Trudeau believes, after the election of Donald Trump, that Canada can continue to free-ride on the defence policies and budgets of the United States, then he will be greatly disappointed after his first meeting with the president-elect.
Better for Canada’s security and relations with the United States if Trudeau immediately assured Trump that Canada intends to significantly modernize the Canadian Forces and shows him his government’s budget to do so.
---
Dr. Douglas Bland is professor emeritus, Queen’s University and a retired Canadian Armed Forces lieutenant-colonel.
Dr. Douglas Bland is professor emeritus, Queen’s University and a retired Canadian Armed Forces lieutenant-colonel.
Tuesday, November 1, 2016
Needed: A Canadian Defence Space Policy
By: WAYNE ELLIS and RICK PITRE
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 13, No 5)
It has now been almost three years since the Emerson Report was published – Volume 2 of which was specifically focused on Canada’s Space Sector. Since that time, the Canadian Government has produced the Space Policy Framework, and subsequently changed hands in the 2015 election. The two-part question is: are we further down the road; and, more importantly, are we going in the right direction?
The Snapshot
Over the past 10 years, Canada’s iconic space agency has had its share of challenges, having ushered in seven different leaders, permanent and interim, even though the position’s term is meant to be for five years. Over that same period, its budget has hovered around $300-350 million (Cdn), on average, with spending per capita below many of its G7-20 friends. And when it appeared there might be some hope on the horizon, with talk about a long-term space plan in 2009, that excitement waned all too quickly. Even so, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) has had some remarkable success with Radarsat 1 and 2, the James Webb telescope, Phoenix Mars Lander, Dextre (Canada Arm 2), its cadre of exceptional astronauts, and the soon-to-be-launched Radarsat Constellation mission.
The release of the Space Policy Framework a short while ago was an encouraging sign of positive change but, for the moment, one can only imagine what a truly national unifying space strategy supported by a stably-funded and purposely-focussed plan might achieve.
In a similar vein, amidst many of the same challenges – tight budgets, onerous procurement processes, and shifting political landscapes – the Department of National Defence (DND) has done yeoman’s work delivering extraordinary space-enabled capability for Canada and its allies. And to be fair, they too have done so without the benefit of a new Defence Space Policy that reflects today’s undeniable dependence on space to manage the complex environments, systems, and basic human needs of nations and peoples; that asserts Canada’s responsibility to provide assured and uninterrupted access to space; that underscores its responsibility to protect the vital links that deliver these essential capabilities and services; and that actively promotes Canada’s unique advantage as a global leader in space technology development.
It has been due to the patience and resilience of a small team with big ideas and the support of its leadership that Canadian military space has progressed, but its real potential will come when there is a renewed forward-looking policy to give it the official seal of approval it rightly deserves.
Much like the CSA, DND has also enjoyed some notable successes with Canada’s first military satellite, Sapphire, launched in 2013 and a second satellite, M3MSat, was successfully inserted into its target orbit in June and is undergoing Launch and Early Orbit Procedures (LEOP) to ensure all systems are nominal (or “normal” in space lingo). The next step will be to determine how best to operationalize it for government and possibly private use. In the meantime, RADARSAT-2 continues to provide world-class synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery and data products, while its future complementary capability, RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM), marches steadily towards completion and a planned launch in 2018.
While this is all great stuff, the real success of its efforts will come once all of the disparate pieces have been knitted together into a cleverly conceived, space-enabled program that makes sense, is affordable, and can be counted on to meet Canada’s evolving needs.
On the commercial side, satellite telecommunications leader Telesat continues to expand its owned and operated fleet of geostationary vehicles, while also beginning to explore LEO systems. MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates (MDA), specifically affected by the Ukraine-Russia conflict, has invested more heavily in the U.S. sector and most recently has replaced its Canadian CEO with an American one.
COM DEV International Ltd, in a largely unopposed move, was sold to U.S.-owned Honeywell, with exactEarth (formerly a jointly-owned COM DEV company, based in Cambridge, Ontario) spun off to chart its own path, and now poised to advance new growth in Automatic Identification System (AIS) services and smart applications in collaboration with U.S.-based Harris Corporation and Canadian-based Larus Technologies.
Vancouver-based Urthecast, previously known for its ISS-hosted cameras, now operates a two-satellite imaging constellation called Deimos, is working on the first publicly accessible high definition cameras installed on the International Space Station (ISS), and has ambitious plans to field a 24-satellite OptiSAR constellation – although its major backers are currently south of the Canadian border.
While the global preoccupations of our preeminent space companies are worthy of praise, we’d do them far better service with a well-managed home-grown market to truly showcase both their value and worth. For the moment, in spite of a few promising starts, we see no national strategy or commitment to truly embolden Canadian Space companies to be first and foremost leaders in their own backyards, before stepping out into other markets to test their mettle. We could do better, and we should.
Monitoring the Arctic
Still in the shadow of its Crimea annexation, Russia continues to support ISS trips for astronauts, but has also been hedging its space access bets by building a new spaceport in eastern Russia. Provocatively, it has also been accused of flying at least one of its space systems suspiciously-close to an Intelsat satellite in geostationary orbit and then close to another one later.
While much attention has been given to Russian transgressions in Crimea and the Ukraine, and rightly so, it is the rapid acceleration of their Arctic activities – in particular the staging of Russian military bases, and increased undersea activities, exploratory, mapping, and whatever else – that seems to have largely gone unnoticed or, at the very least, dismissed as nothing more than internal politics for Russian public consumption.
Keeping a watchful eye on the north, with the help of more persistent and cooperative space-enabled earth observation capabilities – that take advantage of the best in multispectral and voice-data payload technologies – sends the message that Canada is both serious about the north and, most importantly, capable and willing to monitor and protect it. Investment today is the insurance for tomorrow.
China’s forward march into space also continues unabated. Recently, they have unveiled new space station plans that include an invitation to the international community to leverage it for future research. This clearly flies in the face of the dubious ISS future (guaranteed out to 2024, but after that?); and U.S. intransigence towards cooperating more openly with China may heighten the anxiety around a low-Earth orbit accessibility gap for human launch and exploration.
Among the more than 8700 objects larger than 10 cm in Earth orbits, only about 6% are operational satellites – the remainder is space debris. A major concern is that impact by such debris could damage operational equipment such as a satellite or the International Space Station.
Expectations are high that China will have its own satellite navigation system, named Beidou, operational by 2020, which, if Europe’s Galileo constellation stays on track, may mean your multi-channel GPS device could have up to four systems to choose from. China has also been ‘talking the talk’ vis-à-vis space debris and its management/mitigation, but the continued impact from its (still largely unexplained) 2007 anti-satellite test significantly mars their credibility in this area.
Beyond that, China is largely believed to be investing in counter-space capabilities to assure its space forces access to the domain while also denying others.
With MDA’s steady transition to a US-based company with a Canadian subsidiary, will RCM be the last flagship of space capability to be developed in Canada?
Frustrations and Hope
Although there is still no official, comprehensive Canadian Space Program (the closest thing still being the Space Policy Framework), the Canadian government has at least begun to consider a few options, such as: a Sapphire follow-on capability; a future GEO and polar voice and data communications satellite system; and a future RCM follow-on system. But without a defined program with clear results and expectations, is the Canadian government gambling in the face of the current threat?
Dialogue with Russia is probably at an all-time low, and discerning China’s ‘real’ intentions across the space spectrum is never certain. In short, these two actors are not waiting for Canada to figure out its Space Program, nor its (related) procurement process.
To make matters worse, the struggling Canadian space industry has been forced to shift towards more international opportunities that may or may not align their technological capabilities with the near and far-term needs of Canada. This can be particularly detrimental when one considers that the innovative capacity of our space sector is its key strength, which means, a defective investment/procurement process is its key weakness.
Former CSA President Walt Natynczyk experienced some early success with bold steps to align a focused vision to an achievable reality – all with a view of helping ordinary Canadians, and its government, to understand the true value and potential of Space, first in terms of its extraordinary impact on our everyday lives, and ultimately why being in Space is far less a choice than an obligation. But General Walt was larger than life; and breathing the same enthusiasm into a Canadian Key Industrial Capability (KIC) such as Space was, is, and should be, is no single champion’s job.
Current CSA President Sylvain Laporte needs and deserves the support of a determined government. Will we see new life infused into the once-promising Space Advisory Group, or even the Parliamentary Space Caucus (an initiative that former Conservative MP Jay Aspin once championed)?
It falls to the government, no matter its stripes, to lead by example, and not simply to rest on its words. It has the opportunity – one might say an obligation – to demonstrate its resolve through concrete action, buttressed by well-conceived and directed policies that set immutable goals, and which drive the agenda forward to achieve the lasting results for Canada and its Space Community.
Will this be Canada’s Neil-Armstrong-moment to take that small, but so vitally important next step, or will it be left to watch on the sidelines as others increasingly leap ahead?
This fall, the Canadian Space Society will be hosting its 15th Annual Space Summit – a gathering of space industry, academia and government stakeholders – in Winnipeg, Manitoba, with the hope of invigorating new and necessary dialogue to move this important agenda forward.
===
Rick Pitre is a retired Brigadier-General and former Director General Space at DND. He is currently President of Terizons Consulting.
Wayne A. Ellis is Vice-President of the Canadian Space Society, and a Solutions Consultant with AppSpace Solutions.
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 13, No 5)
It has now been almost three years since the Emerson Report was published – Volume 2 of which was specifically focused on Canada’s Space Sector. Since that time, the Canadian Government has produced the Space Policy Framework, and subsequently changed hands in the 2015 election. The two-part question is: are we further down the road; and, more importantly, are we going in the right direction?
 |
| CASSIOPE (CAScade, Smallsat and IOnospheric Polar Explorer) is a Canadian Space Agency multi-mission satellite. The mission is funded through CSA and the Technology Partnerships Canada program. (Photo Credit: University of Calgary) |
The Snapshot
Over the past 10 years, Canada’s iconic space agency has had its share of challenges, having ushered in seven different leaders, permanent and interim, even though the position’s term is meant to be for five years. Over that same period, its budget has hovered around $300-350 million (Cdn), on average, with spending per capita below many of its G7-20 friends. And when it appeared there might be some hope on the horizon, with talk about a long-term space plan in 2009, that excitement waned all too quickly. Even so, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) has had some remarkable success with Radarsat 1 and 2, the James Webb telescope, Phoenix Mars Lander, Dextre (Canada Arm 2), its cadre of exceptional astronauts, and the soon-to-be-launched Radarsat Constellation mission.
The release of the Space Policy Framework a short while ago was an encouraging sign of positive change but, for the moment, one can only imagine what a truly national unifying space strategy supported by a stably-funded and purposely-focussed plan might achieve.
In a similar vein, amidst many of the same challenges – tight budgets, onerous procurement processes, and shifting political landscapes – the Department of National Defence (DND) has done yeoman’s work delivering extraordinary space-enabled capability for Canada and its allies. And to be fair, they too have done so without the benefit of a new Defence Space Policy that reflects today’s undeniable dependence on space to manage the complex environments, systems, and basic human needs of nations and peoples; that asserts Canada’s responsibility to provide assured and uninterrupted access to space; that underscores its responsibility to protect the vital links that deliver these essential capabilities and services; and that actively promotes Canada’s unique advantage as a global leader in space technology development.
It has been due to the patience and resilience of a small team with big ideas and the support of its leadership that Canadian military space has progressed, but its real potential will come when there is a renewed forward-looking policy to give it the official seal of approval it rightly deserves.
Much like the CSA, DND has also enjoyed some notable successes with Canada’s first military satellite, Sapphire, launched in 2013 and a second satellite, M3MSat, was successfully inserted into its target orbit in June and is undergoing Launch and Early Orbit Procedures (LEOP) to ensure all systems are nominal (or “normal” in space lingo). The next step will be to determine how best to operationalize it for government and possibly private use. In the meantime, RADARSAT-2 continues to provide world-class synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery and data products, while its future complementary capability, RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM), marches steadily towards completion and a planned launch in 2018.
 |
| RADARSAT, shown above during testing and assembly at the Canadian Space Agency’s David Florida Laboratory in Ottawa, is a Canadian remote sensing Earth Observation satellite program overseen by the CSA. (Photo: Communications Research Center Canada (CRC)) |
On the commercial side, satellite telecommunications leader Telesat continues to expand its owned and operated fleet of geostationary vehicles, while also beginning to explore LEO systems. MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates (MDA), specifically affected by the Ukraine-Russia conflict, has invested more heavily in the U.S. sector and most recently has replaced its Canadian CEO with an American one.
COM DEV International Ltd, in a largely unopposed move, was sold to U.S.-owned Honeywell, with exactEarth (formerly a jointly-owned COM DEV company, based in Cambridge, Ontario) spun off to chart its own path, and now poised to advance new growth in Automatic Identification System (AIS) services and smart applications in collaboration with U.S.-based Harris Corporation and Canadian-based Larus Technologies.
Vancouver-based Urthecast, previously known for its ISS-hosted cameras, now operates a two-satellite imaging constellation called Deimos, is working on the first publicly accessible high definition cameras installed on the International Space Station (ISS), and has ambitious plans to field a 24-satellite OptiSAR constellation – although its major backers are currently south of the Canadian border.
While the global preoccupations of our preeminent space companies are worthy of praise, we’d do them far better service with a well-managed home-grown market to truly showcase both their value and worth. For the moment, in spite of a few promising starts, we see no national strategy or commitment to truly embolden Canadian Space companies to be first and foremost leaders in their own backyards, before stepping out into other markets to test their mettle. We could do better, and we should.
Monitoring the Arctic
Still in the shadow of its Crimea annexation, Russia continues to support ISS trips for astronauts, but has also been hedging its space access bets by building a new spaceport in eastern Russia. Provocatively, it has also been accused of flying at least one of its space systems suspiciously-close to an Intelsat satellite in geostationary orbit and then close to another one later.
While much attention has been given to Russian transgressions in Crimea and the Ukraine, and rightly so, it is the rapid acceleration of their Arctic activities – in particular the staging of Russian military bases, and increased undersea activities, exploratory, mapping, and whatever else – that seems to have largely gone unnoticed or, at the very least, dismissed as nothing more than internal politics for Russian public consumption.
Keeping a watchful eye on the north, with the help of more persistent and cooperative space-enabled earth observation capabilities – that take advantage of the best in multispectral and voice-data payload technologies – sends the message that Canada is both serious about the north and, most importantly, capable and willing to monitor and protect it. Investment today is the insurance for tomorrow.
China’s forward march into space also continues unabated. Recently, they have unveiled new space station plans that include an invitation to the international community to leverage it for future research. This clearly flies in the face of the dubious ISS future (guaranteed out to 2024, but after that?); and U.S. intransigence towards cooperating more openly with China may heighten the anxiety around a low-Earth orbit accessibility gap for human launch and exploration.
 |
| (Image: Analytical Graphics, Inc) |
Expectations are high that China will have its own satellite navigation system, named Beidou, operational by 2020, which, if Europe’s Galileo constellation stays on track, may mean your multi-channel GPS device could have up to four systems to choose from. China has also been ‘talking the talk’ vis-à-vis space debris and its management/mitigation, but the continued impact from its (still largely unexplained) 2007 anti-satellite test significantly mars their credibility in this area.
Beyond that, China is largely believed to be investing in counter-space capabilities to assure its space forces access to the domain while also denying others.
 |
| (Images: Canadian Space Agency) |
With MDA’s steady transition to a US-based company with a Canadian subsidiary, will RCM be the last flagship of space capability to be developed in Canada?
Frustrations and Hope
Although there is still no official, comprehensive Canadian Space Program (the closest thing still being the Space Policy Framework), the Canadian government has at least begun to consider a few options, such as: a Sapphire follow-on capability; a future GEO and polar voice and data communications satellite system; and a future RCM follow-on system. But without a defined program with clear results and expectations, is the Canadian government gambling in the face of the current threat?
 |
| M3MSat, a joint project funded by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) and the CSA, was launched from India in June 2016. (Photo: Honeywell (Formerly COM DEV)) |
To make matters worse, the struggling Canadian space industry has been forced to shift towards more international opportunities that may or may not align their technological capabilities with the near and far-term needs of Canada. This can be particularly detrimental when one considers that the innovative capacity of our space sector is its key strength, which means, a defective investment/procurement process is its key weakness.
Former CSA President Walt Natynczyk experienced some early success with bold steps to align a focused vision to an achievable reality – all with a view of helping ordinary Canadians, and its government, to understand the true value and potential of Space, first in terms of its extraordinary impact on our everyday lives, and ultimately why being in Space is far less a choice than an obligation. But General Walt was larger than life; and breathing the same enthusiasm into a Canadian Key Industrial Capability (KIC) such as Space was, is, and should be, is no single champion’s job.
Current CSA President Sylvain Laporte needs and deserves the support of a determined government. Will we see new life infused into the once-promising Space Advisory Group, or even the Parliamentary Space Caucus (an initiative that former Conservative MP Jay Aspin once championed)?
It falls to the government, no matter its stripes, to lead by example, and not simply to rest on its words. It has the opportunity – one might say an obligation – to demonstrate its resolve through concrete action, buttressed by well-conceived and directed policies that set immutable goals, and which drive the agenda forward to achieve the lasting results for Canada and its Space Community.
Will this be Canada’s Neil-Armstrong-moment to take that small, but so vitally important next step, or will it be left to watch on the sidelines as others increasingly leap ahead?
This fall, the Canadian Space Society will be hosting its 15th Annual Space Summit – a gathering of space industry, academia and government stakeholders – in Winnipeg, Manitoba, with the hope of invigorating new and necessary dialogue to move this important agenda forward.
===
Rick Pitre is a retired Brigadier-General and former Director General Space at DND. He is currently President of Terizons Consulting.
Wayne A. Ellis is Vice-President of the Canadian Space Society, and a Solutions Consultant with AppSpace Solutions.
Friday, October 14, 2016
Canadian Defence Policy and Armed Intervention
By: Daniel Maillet, CAF Dispatch Author
In a recent briefing paper presented to The Simons Foundation, peace advocate Ernie Regehr presented his outline for how the Government of Canada should assess any future Peacekeeping, Peace Support, or Military Operation.
His paper is a direct Canadian link to his published work, Disarming Conflict: Why Peace Cannot Be Won on the Battlefield (2015) where Regehr outlines that military victories are extremely rare in the post-World War Two era, and they are in decline since the end of the Cold War.
Regehr states that while a foe can be military degraded through armed intervention, that does not guarantee the region will be governable, secure, or safer in the future. Therefore, before Canada deploys to what many consider extremely volatile regions as it returns to a Peacekeeping model for its armed forces, it needs to assess the overall political strategies of both the deployment and the UN's goals for the mission.
Regehr concludes, that while everyone admits peace support or peacekeeping operations offer no guarantee of success. But that does not mean they are useless, but it will take more than a pledge from Canada to re-engage in UN Peace Operations to correct any imbalance of Peace Operation trends.
You can read Ernie Regehr's complete article:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BxqdoHflB6JNNFhKTUxaajJGcnM
In a recent briefing paper presented to The Simons Foundation, peace advocate Ernie Regehr presented his outline for how the Government of Canada should assess any future Peacekeeping, Peace Support, or Military Operation.
His paper is a direct Canadian link to his published work, Disarming Conflict: Why Peace Cannot Be Won on the Battlefield (2015) where Regehr outlines that military victories are extremely rare in the post-World War Two era, and they are in decline since the end of the Cold War.
Regehr states that while a foe can be military degraded through armed intervention, that does not guarantee the region will be governable, secure, or safer in the future. Therefore, before Canada deploys to what many consider extremely volatile regions as it returns to a Peacekeeping model for its armed forces, it needs to assess the overall political strategies of both the deployment and the UN's goals for the mission.
Regehr concludes, that while everyone admits peace support or peacekeeping operations offer no guarantee of success. But that does not mean they are useless, but it will take more than a pledge from Canada to re-engage in UN Peace Operations to correct any imbalance of Peace Operation trends.
You can read Ernie Regehr's complete article:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BxqdoHflB6JNNFhKTUxaajJGcnM
Thursday, July 14, 2016
PM won't say if Canada to keep sending troops to Ukraine
By: Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press
KYIV, Ukraine -- Prime Minister Justin Trudeau wrapped up his latest overseas travels Tuesday with a visit to western Ukraine, where he will greet the Canadian Forces soldiers who have been training their Ukrainian counterparts since last summer.
Whether those troops will still be there next summer, however, was both an open question and a central issue Monday as Trudeau met with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.
The previous Conservative government deployed 200 Canadian military trainers to a base near the Ukrainian city of Lviv last year in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine.
The Canadians, alongside British and American troops, have been teaching the basics of soldiering, such as how to use their weapons and move as a unit, as well as more advanced skills such bomb disposal and medical training.
"We are giving significant support to the Ukrainian military to be able to be more effective in defending and reclaiming Ukrainian territory," Trudeau told a news conference where the two countries announced a new Canada-Ukraine free trade deal.
"We are very happy to be involved in and to be supporting the people of Ukraine."
Trudeau wouldn't say, however, whether the Liberal government -- fresh from committing hundreds of troops to form the core of a NATO battalion in Latvia -- will extend the training mission past its current expiry date in March.
Poroshenko said a professional military is essential for protecting his country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. "I have asked the prime minister to prolong the mandate of the mission," he said through an interpreter.
Asked to respond, Trudeau said Canada would co-ordinate with its international partners and allies on how best to help Ukraine in the future.
"We are right now focused on the training mission that is going so well for both Canadians and especially for the Ukrainian military," he said. "As the situation evolves, we will continue to monitor and look at the best way we can continue to support and help Ukraine."
Trudeau did promise more observers for a mission by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe monitoring ceasefire violations between Ukrainian and Russian-backed separatist forces in the country's east. Canada will increase its complement to the 700-strong OSCE mission from 25 to 50.
Canada will also send more police officers to help train the Ukrainian police.
Russia loomed large as Trudeau met with Poroshenko and other Ukrainian officials throughout the day. Some European allies are impatient that Ukraine is not doing enough to implement its commitments in the Minsk peace deal with the rebels and Russia, but Trudeau pointed the finger at Moscow.
"Russia has not been a positive partner," he said. "They have not been moving responsibly or appropriately on things like ceasefires or international observers."
For his part, Poroshenko said Ukraine has fulfilled 95 per cent of its political obligations and all of its security requirements under the agreement. He went on to accuse Russian "troops and mercenaries" of having launched an attack against Ukrainian positions earlier in the day.
Solidarity was a central theme to Trudeau's visit to Kyiv, where he met with Ukrainian leaders and civil society groups and paid homage to Ukrainians killed in mass atrocities by the Nazis and Soviets in the 20th century, and more recently in the country's 2014 revolution.
A key moment came when Trudeau and Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman visited a memorial to those killed in the Euromaidan, an uprising that ousted the pro-Russian president in the name of democracy. Surrounded by pictures of the dead, the two placed rose bouquets before a wooden cross bearing the image of Jesus before a moment of silence.
A short time later, in a meeting with Ukrainian parliamentarians, Trudeau talked about the importance of fighting for democracy.
"Many of us in the West have gone a long time without having to fight for democracy," he said. "Ukrainians reminded us how important democracy is, and how we can't take it for granted."
In a meeting with Groysman and his cabinet, Trudeau praised the Ukrainian government's progress towards democracy. In meetings with Ukrainian leaders and civil society representatives, however, he also emphasized the importance of championing the hopes and aspirations of average Ukrainians wanting a better future.
"Reforms never happen as quickly as everyone would like," Trudeau told the civil society roundtable session.
"But your job is not to make everything happen overnight, as you well know. Your job is to make sure that everything keeps moving forward as responsibly and as quickly as you can."
Trudeau and his oldest son Xavier also paid their respects to Ukrainians killed in past atrocities. They laid a bouquet of flowers at a memorial to tens of thousands of Ukrainians, many of them Jews, killed by the Nazis in Kyiv during he Second World War.
KYIV, Ukraine -- Prime Minister Justin Trudeau wrapped up his latest overseas travels Tuesday with a visit to western Ukraine, where he will greet the Canadian Forces soldiers who have been training their Ukrainian counterparts since last summer.
Whether those troops will still be there next summer, however, was both an open question and a central issue Monday as Trudeau met with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.
The previous Conservative government deployed 200 Canadian military trainers to a base near the Ukrainian city of Lviv last year in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine.
The Canadians, alongside British and American troops, have been teaching the basics of soldiering, such as how to use their weapons and move as a unit, as well as more advanced skills such bomb disposal and medical training.
"We are giving significant support to the Ukrainian military to be able to be more effective in defending and reclaiming Ukrainian territory," Trudeau told a news conference where the two countries announced a new Canada-Ukraine free trade deal.
"We are very happy to be involved in and to be supporting the people of Ukraine."
Trudeau wouldn't say, however, whether the Liberal government -- fresh from committing hundreds of troops to form the core of a NATO battalion in Latvia -- will extend the training mission past its current expiry date in March.
Poroshenko said a professional military is essential for protecting his country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. "I have asked the prime minister to prolong the mandate of the mission," he said through an interpreter.
Asked to respond, Trudeau said Canada would co-ordinate with its international partners and allies on how best to help Ukraine in the future.
"We are right now focused on the training mission that is going so well for both Canadians and especially for the Ukrainian military," he said. "As the situation evolves, we will continue to monitor and look at the best way we can continue to support and help Ukraine."
Trudeau did promise more observers for a mission by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe monitoring ceasefire violations between Ukrainian and Russian-backed separatist forces in the country's east. Canada will increase its complement to the 700-strong OSCE mission from 25 to 50.
Canada will also send more police officers to help train the Ukrainian police.
Russia loomed large as Trudeau met with Poroshenko and other Ukrainian officials throughout the day. Some European allies are impatient that Ukraine is not doing enough to implement its commitments in the Minsk peace deal with the rebels and Russia, but Trudeau pointed the finger at Moscow.
"Russia has not been a positive partner," he said. "They have not been moving responsibly or appropriately on things like ceasefires or international observers."
For his part, Poroshenko said Ukraine has fulfilled 95 per cent of its political obligations and all of its security requirements under the agreement. He went on to accuse Russian "troops and mercenaries" of having launched an attack against Ukrainian positions earlier in the day.
Solidarity was a central theme to Trudeau's visit to Kyiv, where he met with Ukrainian leaders and civil society groups and paid homage to Ukrainians killed in mass atrocities by the Nazis and Soviets in the 20th century, and more recently in the country's 2014 revolution.
A key moment came when Trudeau and Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman visited a memorial to those killed in the Euromaidan, an uprising that ousted the pro-Russian president in the name of democracy. Surrounded by pictures of the dead, the two placed rose bouquets before a wooden cross bearing the image of Jesus before a moment of silence.
A short time later, in a meeting with Ukrainian parliamentarians, Trudeau talked about the importance of fighting for democracy.
"Many of us in the West have gone a long time without having to fight for democracy," he said. "Ukrainians reminded us how important democracy is, and how we can't take it for granted."
In a meeting with Groysman and his cabinet, Trudeau praised the Ukrainian government's progress towards democracy. In meetings with Ukrainian leaders and civil society representatives, however, he also emphasized the importance of championing the hopes and aspirations of average Ukrainians wanting a better future.
"Reforms never happen as quickly as everyone would like," Trudeau told the civil society roundtable session.
"But your job is not to make everything happen overnight, as you well know. Your job is to make sure that everything keeps moving forward as responsibly and as quickly as you can."
Trudeau and his oldest son Xavier also paid their respects to Ukrainians killed in past atrocities. They laid a bouquet of flowers at a memorial to tens of thousands of Ukrainians, many of them Jews, killed by the Nazis in Kyiv during he Second World War.
Tuesday, May 24, 2016
Canada’s defence in crisis? Who cares?
BY CHRIS MACLEAN
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 11, No 3)
These questions, particularly the last one, keep surfacing lately, especially within the groups who are tasked with our safety; those who have chosen to serve and protect. In the last edition of FrontLine,Don Macnamara was reminding politicians that safeguarding Canadian citizens and protecting their way of life is the prime directive of government. This great responsibility stands firm, no matter what the polls suggest or how the social winds blow. This is one requirement for which Government must act without necessarily asking for approval of the masses. Some things are just expected of a leader.
Do Canadians know about the huge number of international issues that can affect our future security? Maybe a few. Do they ask if we are really prepared to deal with them? Why would they, when they assume the authorities have prepared?
Do they know (or care) that our national interests – security, sovereignty, prosperity, and a stable world order – are pre-requisites to the enviable standard of living enjoyed by the average Canadian? Of course they do. Do they take it for granted? Of course they do, after all, this is Canada – one of the great nations of the world, right?
How many of your neighbours really understand the implications of living in the second-largest country on Earth, with the world’s longest coastline on three oceans? How aware are Canadians that 40% of our national territory is that “True North” that we sing about – and that we really cannot defend it?
As for the defence of our country and the pursuit of a stable world order, do average Canadians have any idea of the major equipment crises facing its military? Sure, the military has taken the brunt of many cartoons depicting the sad state of equipping the Canadian Armed Forces, but the real target of those jokes should be the government that wields the decision-making authority.
One might assume that every federal politician would understand the importance of being properly versed and advised on matters related to the military, and that it would be incumbent on them to learn as much as they could so they can make informed decisions in Parliament. You would be wrong. Last month, two Liberal MPs cancelled delivery of their free copy of FrontLine Defence. They feel no more responsibility in this matter than my nephews do. Another two people at PCO also cancelled. How can we expect the general public to care about defence, when our very MPs and Privy Council office avoid anything about defence other than, possibly, what they are being spoon-fed?
MPs should not only be learning as much as they can about national defence, they should take great pains to explain it to their constituents.
How many politicians have any idea that the real crisis facing their Navy, in terms of available warships or the impact and limitations on multi-ship operations, is a result of the loss of its two support ships? Beyond that, having only xx warships for a maritime nation our size, and no real plan to replace them in a timely manner, nor any real idea how many we can afford (yes, those x’s were intentional), should be the stuff of a national scandal. Few know, but how many would care even if they knew?
Similar questions can be asked about the vehicles and modern weaponry needed by the Canadian Army. The fighter replacement of the RCAF is better known, but only due to controversy. Are Canadians aware that, in the not too distant future, replacement of air-to-air refuelling capabilities, as well as maritime patrol aircraft, are going to be required?
Major equipment should never be political issues; defence procurement should be done in the national interest. This is an essential question as the Government launches into its public consultations for a Defence Policy Review.
It is important that we avoid cynicism about the possible outcomes of the defence review by assuming it will be “same old thing”. For generations, Canadians and their dedicated servicemen and women have suffered from financial starvation combined with irrational procurement processes.
How can real military defence needs be met when governments continue, essentially, to set a budget and then figure out what it can buy without first determining what its national interests are so it knows if these purchases are necessary or not?
Does Canada have to wait for a huge domestic terrorism event before the public wakes up to the risks this country faces with an impoverished military? Our allies admire the performance of the CAF – but wonder why they are so few from such a large and wealthy country of such strategic relevance. It should not be necessary to frighten the population to create demand for a larger and better-equipped military. The government should recognize this without the need for a public outcry, because that won’t come until it is too late.
Is DND – with the largest ‘discretionary’ budget in government – viewed simply as a money tree that can be cherry picked for surpluses to be transferred to other departments? Do senior bureaucrats consider themselves part of the national security nexus? If not, why not, if the first responsibility of government is the security of Canada.
Is the nature of our globalized world recognized and understood by ALL government departments? If not, how can we ever achieve a ‘whole of government’ response to threats to Canada’s world order, prosperity and security and sovereignty issues and threats. Why is there not a Government document that assesses the international security environment and provides ‘policy guidance’ for all departments? Is it because our Government lacks interest, capability or competence to achieve what most other nations have?
Politicians are not elected because they understand the intricacies of international security affairs. Yes, some former military members have served in Parliament – very few until the current Parliament that has at least a half-dozen veterans. But defence policy has been a partisan activity, leading to budget and procurement changes with every new Government. Is there any good reason why a national security assessment and strategy cannot be produced on a non-partisan basis?
How do Canadians learn anything about defence? Media coverage by military specialists is slim – but there are others who, with limited knowledge and understanding, write with assumed authority, often misrepresenting situations and creating political issues that are subsequently addressed by politicians who do not understand the issues either.
So, will our MPs communicate with Canadians to inform them not only of the rationale for the number of soldiers, sailors and aviators we need to defend Canada, but also the implications of failing to do so?
It has been said that the most important social service a government can provide is the means to keep its citizens alive and free.
If Canadians do not know or do not care about the nation’s defence, clearly the first problems are national ignorance and national apathy. Those problems are unacceptable for a Canada that must survive and prosper in a dangerous world.
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 11, No 3)
These questions, particularly the last one, keep surfacing lately, especially within the groups who are tasked with our safety; those who have chosen to serve and protect. In the last edition of FrontLine,Don Macnamara was reminding politicians that safeguarding Canadian citizens and protecting their way of life is the prime directive of government. This great responsibility stands firm, no matter what the polls suggest or how the social winds blow. This is one requirement for which Government must act without necessarily asking for approval of the masses. Some things are just expected of a leader.
Do Canadians know about the huge number of international issues that can affect our future security? Maybe a few. Do they ask if we are really prepared to deal with them? Why would they, when they assume the authorities have prepared?
Do they know (or care) that our national interests – security, sovereignty, prosperity, and a stable world order – are pre-requisites to the enviable standard of living enjoyed by the average Canadian? Of course they do. Do they take it for granted? Of course they do, after all, this is Canada – one of the great nations of the world, right?
How many of your neighbours really understand the implications of living in the second-largest country on Earth, with the world’s longest coastline on three oceans? How aware are Canadians that 40% of our national territory is that “True North” that we sing about – and that we really cannot defend it?
As for the defence of our country and the pursuit of a stable world order, do average Canadians have any idea of the major equipment crises facing its military? Sure, the military has taken the brunt of many cartoons depicting the sad state of equipping the Canadian Armed Forces, but the real target of those jokes should be the government that wields the decision-making authority.
One might assume that every federal politician would understand the importance of being properly versed and advised on matters related to the military, and that it would be incumbent on them to learn as much as they could so they can make informed decisions in Parliament. You would be wrong. Last month, two Liberal MPs cancelled delivery of their free copy of FrontLine Defence. They feel no more responsibility in this matter than my nephews do. Another two people at PCO also cancelled. How can we expect the general public to care about defence, when our very MPs and Privy Council office avoid anything about defence other than, possibly, what they are being spoon-fed?
MPs should not only be learning as much as they can about national defence, they should take great pains to explain it to their constituents.
How many politicians have any idea that the real crisis facing their Navy, in terms of available warships or the impact and limitations on multi-ship operations, is a result of the loss of its two support ships? Beyond that, having only xx warships for a maritime nation our size, and no real plan to replace them in a timely manner, nor any real idea how many we can afford (yes, those x’s were intentional), should be the stuff of a national scandal. Few know, but how many would care even if they knew?
Similar questions can be asked about the vehicles and modern weaponry needed by the Canadian Army. The fighter replacement of the RCAF is better known, but only due to controversy. Are Canadians aware that, in the not too distant future, replacement of air-to-air refuelling capabilities, as well as maritime patrol aircraft, are going to be required?
Major equipment should never be political issues; defence procurement should be done in the national interest. This is an essential question as the Government launches into its public consultations for a Defence Policy Review.
It is important that we avoid cynicism about the possible outcomes of the defence review by assuming it will be “same old thing”. For generations, Canadians and their dedicated servicemen and women have suffered from financial starvation combined with irrational procurement processes.
How can real military defence needs be met when governments continue, essentially, to set a budget and then figure out what it can buy without first determining what its national interests are so it knows if these purchases are necessary or not?
Does Canada have to wait for a huge domestic terrorism event before the public wakes up to the risks this country faces with an impoverished military? Our allies admire the performance of the CAF – but wonder why they are so few from such a large and wealthy country of such strategic relevance. It should not be necessary to frighten the population to create demand for a larger and better-equipped military. The government should recognize this without the need for a public outcry, because that won’t come until it is too late.
Is DND – with the largest ‘discretionary’ budget in government – viewed simply as a money tree that can be cherry picked for surpluses to be transferred to other departments? Do senior bureaucrats consider themselves part of the national security nexus? If not, why not, if the first responsibility of government is the security of Canada.
Is the nature of our globalized world recognized and understood by ALL government departments? If not, how can we ever achieve a ‘whole of government’ response to threats to Canada’s world order, prosperity and security and sovereignty issues and threats. Why is there not a Government document that assesses the international security environment and provides ‘policy guidance’ for all departments? Is it because our Government lacks interest, capability or competence to achieve what most other nations have?
Politicians are not elected because they understand the intricacies of international security affairs. Yes, some former military members have served in Parliament – very few until the current Parliament that has at least a half-dozen veterans. But defence policy has been a partisan activity, leading to budget and procurement changes with every new Government. Is there any good reason why a national security assessment and strategy cannot be produced on a non-partisan basis?
How do Canadians learn anything about defence? Media coverage by military specialists is slim – but there are others who, with limited knowledge and understanding, write with assumed authority, often misrepresenting situations and creating political issues that are subsequently addressed by politicians who do not understand the issues either.
So, will our MPs communicate with Canadians to inform them not only of the rationale for the number of soldiers, sailors and aviators we need to defend Canada, but also the implications of failing to do so?
It has been said that the most important social service a government can provide is the means to keep its citizens alive and free.
If Canadians do not know or do not care about the nation’s defence, clearly the first problems are national ignorance and national apathy. Those problems are unacceptable for a Canada that must survive and prosper in a dangerous world.
Monday, May 2, 2016
Defence Review: Looking Forward rather than Mythologising the Past
By: Zachary Wolfraim, originally published online by the CDA Institute
CDA Institute guest contributor Zachary Wolfraim, a PhD candidate at King’s College London, warns against mythologizing the past in Canada’s defence policy review.
Historical narratives carry a lot of weight, both in domestic and international politics. The Liberal Party managed to utilize this in its 2015 election campaign, appealing to Canadian voters’ sense of what they saw as ‘traditional’ Canadian values. In particular, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau vowed to reorient and reinvigorate Canada’s foreign policy and defence policies. The Department of National Defence is now preparing to undertake a long overdue review of its priorities and has opened public consultations into what Canada’s new defence strategy should look like. While a commendable process to promote public engagement and transparency, the same narratives that swept the Liberals to power last year risk stifling new and innovative thinking on defence priorities.
Inherently, there is no problem with recalling Canada’s foreign policy traditions and narratives. Narratives help us to make sense of the world and more importantly, help us define how we see ourselves acting within it. Similarly, Canada’s allies understand and create their own narratives that help to establish a foundation of trust and cooperation grounded in predictable behaviour. These were disrupted by the Harper government, which sought to re-interpret Canada’s foreign policy story in a relatively dramatic way and reorient how Canada interacted with other nations. NATO, the United Nations, as well as a number of other organizations and institutions saw a moralistic, transactional bent to Canada’s international behaviour, eschewing many of the ‘traditional’ elements of Canadian diplomacy.
Until the Harper government, the characteristics of Canada as a middle power, an honest broker, and a multilateralist country have largely dominated the discourse of Canadian foreign and security policy since 1945. Canada’s traditional narratives in foreign policy and defence are arguably so ingrained within their respective departments as to be considered orthodoxy, even though in practice, international policy-making represents a much more complex reality.
The effectiveness of Canada as an international actor was nonetheless predicated on a shared understanding of this narrative between Canada and other nations. Consequently, Canada’s diplomatic tradition was referenced during the campaign – along with its history in international organizations like the United Nations – to condemn the Conservative government’s hawkish stance on foreign policy, which was criticized as having weakened Canada’s influence internationally. The Liberal position was ultimately a backlash against what many both in Canada and among Canada’s international allies saw as an unmooring of the country from its traditional positions in foreign policy.
In terms of future defence policy, the concern is that the pendulum may have swung too far in the opposite direction. In reaction to the Harper government’s reorientation of Canada’s international priorities, there is the possibility of potentially harming Canada’s foreign and security policies. Global Affairs Canada needs time to recover from the decade of micromanagement and budgetary restriction under the previous government. As it relates to defence, the military needs to straighten out procurement quickly and act to ensure that it maintains its current capabilities. While meeting NATO’s 2percent spending target would be ideal, this would only serve to ensure that Canada could maintain its existing capabilities. Sustained investment will be necessary to continue modernizing the Canadian Forces and ensure that it has equipment capable of countering a diverse range of future threats.
In much broader terms, this defence policy review needs to seriously examine the role that Canada seeks to play on the international stage. While the ‘middle power’ peacekeeper narrative continues to inform many popular understandings of Canada’s international engagement, many of its traditional tenets are outdated in the current security environment. In particular, the emphasis on the United Nations and peacekeeping present a significant problem given the dysfunction within the UN itself. This is compounded by the reality that traditional peacekeeping is no longer possible since the type of interstate conflict it was designed for has been supplanted by asymmetric and unconventional conflict. Unless Canada is willing to spearhead the Sisyphean task of UN reform and redesign peacekeeping for the 21st Century (tasks it may yet undertake) the government will need to re-energize its weakened relationship with NATO.
The relationship between Canada and NATO was strained somewhat due to the Harper government’s instrumental view of the organization. While NATO was considered a key forum during the Afghanistan operation, Canada’s relationship was fraught given the withdrawal from several important initiatives such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) as well as its drone programme (Allied Ground Surveillance). Canada has increasingly re-engaged withNATO as part of its response to Russian intransigence in Eastern Europe. NATO continues to be the world’s foremost body for security and defence and it remains in Canada’s interest to ensure that it retains this position and its relevance. An active and engaged Canada in NATO carries more weight on defence issues than does Canada in the United Nations.
In consulting the public about the future of Canadian defence, the Trudeau government runs the risk of being steered by the power of Canada’s narrative in an unpredictable fashion back towards familiar territory. There is a strong potential that the public will push for organizations and policies that fail to reflect the current state of global instability, which could undermine Canada’s ability to project itself internationally. Alternatively, it could lead to an interminable and introspective debate that could end up stifling or slowing down the necessary changes that need to occur in Canada’s foreign and security policies.
Policy-makers must effectively navigate a way forward, embracing the heritage the Liberals invoked, while leading the development of Canadian security and defence policy in a volatile international security environment.
Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD Candidate in the War Studies Department at King’s College London examining the role of narrative in foreign policy behaviour. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. (Image courtesy of The Canadian Press/Sean Kilpatrick.)
CDA Institute guest contributor Zachary Wolfraim, a PhD candidate at King’s College London, warns against mythologizing the past in Canada’s defence policy review.
Historical narratives carry a lot of weight, both in domestic and international politics. The Liberal Party managed to utilize this in its 2015 election campaign, appealing to Canadian voters’ sense of what they saw as ‘traditional’ Canadian values. In particular, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau vowed to reorient and reinvigorate Canada’s foreign policy and defence policies. The Department of National Defence is now preparing to undertake a long overdue review of its priorities and has opened public consultations into what Canada’s new defence strategy should look like. While a commendable process to promote public engagement and transparency, the same narratives that swept the Liberals to power last year risk stifling new and innovative thinking on defence priorities.
Inherently, there is no problem with recalling Canada’s foreign policy traditions and narratives. Narratives help us to make sense of the world and more importantly, help us define how we see ourselves acting within it. Similarly, Canada’s allies understand and create their own narratives that help to establish a foundation of trust and cooperation grounded in predictable behaviour. These were disrupted by the Harper government, which sought to re-interpret Canada’s foreign policy story in a relatively dramatic way and reorient how Canada interacted with other nations. NATO, the United Nations, as well as a number of other organizations and institutions saw a moralistic, transactional bent to Canada’s international behaviour, eschewing many of the ‘traditional’ elements of Canadian diplomacy.
Until the Harper government, the characteristics of Canada as a middle power, an honest broker, and a multilateralist country have largely dominated the discourse of Canadian foreign and security policy since 1945. Canada’s traditional narratives in foreign policy and defence are arguably so ingrained within their respective departments as to be considered orthodoxy, even though in practice, international policy-making represents a much more complex reality.
The effectiveness of Canada as an international actor was nonetheless predicated on a shared understanding of this narrative between Canada and other nations. Consequently, Canada’s diplomatic tradition was referenced during the campaign – along with its history in international organizations like the United Nations – to condemn the Conservative government’s hawkish stance on foreign policy, which was criticized as having weakened Canada’s influence internationally. The Liberal position was ultimately a backlash against what many both in Canada and among Canada’s international allies saw as an unmooring of the country from its traditional positions in foreign policy.
In terms of future defence policy, the concern is that the pendulum may have swung too far in the opposite direction. In reaction to the Harper government’s reorientation of Canada’s international priorities, there is the possibility of potentially harming Canada’s foreign and security policies. Global Affairs Canada needs time to recover from the decade of micromanagement and budgetary restriction under the previous government. As it relates to defence, the military needs to straighten out procurement quickly and act to ensure that it maintains its current capabilities. While meeting NATO’s 2percent spending target would be ideal, this would only serve to ensure that Canada could maintain its existing capabilities. Sustained investment will be necessary to continue modernizing the Canadian Forces and ensure that it has equipment capable of countering a diverse range of future threats.
In much broader terms, this defence policy review needs to seriously examine the role that Canada seeks to play on the international stage. While the ‘middle power’ peacekeeper narrative continues to inform many popular understandings of Canada’s international engagement, many of its traditional tenets are outdated in the current security environment. In particular, the emphasis on the United Nations and peacekeeping present a significant problem given the dysfunction within the UN itself. This is compounded by the reality that traditional peacekeeping is no longer possible since the type of interstate conflict it was designed for has been supplanted by asymmetric and unconventional conflict. Unless Canada is willing to spearhead the Sisyphean task of UN reform and redesign peacekeeping for the 21st Century (tasks it may yet undertake) the government will need to re-energize its weakened relationship with NATO.
The relationship between Canada and NATO was strained somewhat due to the Harper government’s instrumental view of the organization. While NATO was considered a key forum during the Afghanistan operation, Canada’s relationship was fraught given the withdrawal from several important initiatives such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) as well as its drone programme (Allied Ground Surveillance). Canada has increasingly re-engaged withNATO as part of its response to Russian intransigence in Eastern Europe. NATO continues to be the world’s foremost body for security and defence and it remains in Canada’s interest to ensure that it retains this position and its relevance. An active and engaged Canada in NATO carries more weight on defence issues than does Canada in the United Nations.
In consulting the public about the future of Canadian defence, the Trudeau government runs the risk of being steered by the power of Canada’s narrative in an unpredictable fashion back towards familiar territory. There is a strong potential that the public will push for organizations and policies that fail to reflect the current state of global instability, which could undermine Canada’s ability to project itself internationally. Alternatively, it could lead to an interminable and introspective debate that could end up stifling or slowing down the necessary changes that need to occur in Canada’s foreign and security policies.
Policy-makers must effectively navigate a way forward, embracing the heritage the Liberals invoked, while leading the development of Canadian security and defence policy in a volatile international security environment.
Zachary Wolfraim is a PhD Candidate in the War Studies Department at King’s College London examining the role of narrative in foreign policy behaviour. He previously worked as a consultant in NATO Headquarters on operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. (Image courtesy of The Canadian Press/Sean Kilpatrick.)
Friday, April 29, 2016
Fortress Canada: How much of a military do we really need?
Written by: David McDonough and Tony Battista, CDA Institute
As the Trudeau government pursues its review of Canada’s defence policy, an interesting debate is emerging in defence policy circles — between those who want to pull back from the world and those who think that would be a big mistake.
As the Trudeau government pursues its review of Canada’s defence policy, an interesting debate is emerging in defence policy circles — between those who want to pull back from the world and those who think that would be a big mistake.
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| Sapper Mathieu Riva Maille (front) and Sapper Tommy Cabana (rear) fire a round from an 84mm Carl Gustaf anti-tank recoilless rifle during Exercise RAFALE BLANCHE in Valcartier, Quebec February 4, 2016. |
Some have pointed to the safety and security offered by Canada’s geo-strategic location in North America as arguing for a homeland-focused defence policy. Thomas Juneau took up that thread last week, suggesting that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) should learn to “do less with less.”
Others have warned against using Canada’s relative security to justify a more modest military. By accepting such a “twisted logic,” as George Petrolekas calls it, we’d ignore not only the military requirements of non-discretionary missions at home and in North America, but also the hard power assets needed to pursue international peace and security.
Both sides make valid points. They also tend to overstate their positions.
It’s true that Canadians enjoy an island of safety in today’s global security environment, insulated from what’s happening in Ukraine, Syria and the South China Sea. This is partly a function of our geographically isolated position in North America; it’s also because we enjoy such a friendly relationship with our only close neighbour, the United States.
Indeed, observers have long been aware of Canada’s “involuntary security guarantee” from the superpower to the south. This guarantee may not be quite so ironclad today as it once was; ballistic missile defence is a good example of a gap in it. But in broad terms, America’s commitment to our defence does represent an important feature of the continental relationship.
Even during the darkest days of the Cold War, the only direct Soviet threat Canada faced was from strategic nuclear bomber and ballistic missile forces. And aside from some early continental efforts to establish a perimeter air defence network, we largely accepted that point of vulnerability — so long as America’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities remained intact.
Yet few would argue today that Canada should have used its relative security in the Cold War to justify either a reduction in its military capabilities or a sole focus on air defence. Instead, Canada found itself supporting the NATO “shield” with air and ground force deployments. We had two good reasons for doing that.
First, Canada’s approach to defence is often determined by our national interests abroad — from continental relations with the United States to trans-Atlantic ties with Europe. The fact that Canada enjoys safety from threats abroad could provide a foundation for Canadian defence policy, maybe even one that ultimately constrains its available strategic options. But it doesn’t have to.
Second, Canada recognizes that certain security developments abroad — while not having an immediate impact on Canadian and North American defence — might pose a more direct threat in the future. Which is why we’ve long preferred a “forward defence” approach in the pursuit of international peace and security.
Rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have.
These are the considerations that have shaped Canada’s defence policy since the Cold War, preventing a return to the isolationist impulses of the interwar period. Without them, it would have been all too easy for us to settle for a constabulary-type force backed by some air defence specialization.
So simply pointing to the conditions of Canada’s geo-strategic position — an observation that dates back at least to Raoul Dandurand’s 1924 claim that “we live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable material” — doesn’t really explain past Canadian defence policy. And using our isolation to chart our future security course would be strategically short-sighted; defence policy is as much about shaping military capabilities decades into the future as it is about deploying the resources we have now.
But it’s also a bad idea to stretch this argument too far. Basic conditions need to be met in the defence of Canada — and it would be difficult to accept “doing less with less” in such non-discretionary missions.
But no one is really arguing that Canada should settle for a reduced CAF unable to fulfil its domestic defence role. The real question is whether such domestic missions may have different — and less demanding — capability requirements than expeditionary operations. Naval ships that patrol coastal and Arctic waters, or aircraft that intercept foreign intruders, may not require the expensive higher-end capabilities needed for international missions.
And it’s not so easy to determine clearly where the needs of North American defence begin and end. There may be significant consequences to policy issues in which Canada has a serious interest — such as trade — if we’re seen by the Americans as a “freeloader”.
Our problem is that the perception is out there already: Canada has long taken advantage of the United States’ “involuntary security guarantees” to take a free ride on defence spending. We tended to allow the United States to absorb most of the cost of our air defence during the Cold War, we were initially reluctant to deploy forces to Europe (and sought to reduce that commitment in a hurry), and we were quick to embrace the so-called “peace dividend” of the post-Cold War period; in fact, it can be argued we sought that dividend in the early 1970s before partly reversing course.
As scholars like Joel Sokolsky have noted, Canada’s first question in military matters tends to be, “How much is just enough?” And we’ve never really faced serious consequences for our free-riding, making it a very hard habit to break.
So rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have. One area that should be explored is the size of our armed forces, and how much we spend on personnel compared to capital.
In a time of fiscal restraint, a fixation on military size can come at the expense of recapitalization requirements and fleet-replacement plans, to the detriment of the CAF. One need only look at regular force size versus spending levels between our key allies: Canada, with its relatively large force size and small defence budget, is an outlier.
One possible solution, of course, is to increase our defence spending. Given our relatively safe location, however, any arguments for a budget boost are likely to fall on deaf ears. The alternative is to right-size our forces to better ensure that the CAF remain multi-purpose and combat-capable — even if certain elements of the CAF (navy, air force, special forces) might benefit disproportionately from such a recalibration.
In that sense, having a smaller military doesn’t automatically mean global irrelevance. Instead, it could actually help safeguard Canada’s ability to continue taking both discretionary and non-discretionary military missions, at home and abroad. And making our military more efficient by recalibrating the force structure — even if that means a smaller regular force — would make the CAF more sustainable.
If Canada is really “back”, it has to be back with substance — and that includes our ability to meet our security and defence commitments in a credible way.
Author: David McDonough and Tony Battista
Dr. David McDonough is research manager and senior editor at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. Tony Battista is the chief executive officer of the CDA and CDA Institute. Views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the CDA Institute. View all posts by David McDonough and Tony Battista
Others have warned against using Canada’s relative security to justify a more modest military. By accepting such a “twisted logic,” as George Petrolekas calls it, we’d ignore not only the military requirements of non-discretionary missions at home and in North America, but also the hard power assets needed to pursue international peace and security.
Both sides make valid points. They also tend to overstate their positions.
It’s true that Canadians enjoy an island of safety in today’s global security environment, insulated from what’s happening in Ukraine, Syria and the South China Sea. This is partly a function of our geographically isolated position in North America; it’s also because we enjoy such a friendly relationship with our only close neighbour, the United States.
Indeed, observers have long been aware of Canada’s “involuntary security guarantee” from the superpower to the south. This guarantee may not be quite so ironclad today as it once was; ballistic missile defence is a good example of a gap in it. But in broad terms, America’s commitment to our defence does represent an important feature of the continental relationship.
Even during the darkest days of the Cold War, the only direct Soviet threat Canada faced was from strategic nuclear bomber and ballistic missile forces. And aside from some early continental efforts to establish a perimeter air defence network, we largely accepted that point of vulnerability — so long as America’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities remained intact.
Yet few would argue today that Canada should have used its relative security in the Cold War to justify either a reduction in its military capabilities or a sole focus on air defence. Instead, Canada found itself supporting the NATO “shield” with air and ground force deployments. We had two good reasons for doing that.
First, Canada’s approach to defence is often determined by our national interests abroad — from continental relations with the United States to trans-Atlantic ties with Europe. The fact that Canada enjoys safety from threats abroad could provide a foundation for Canadian defence policy, maybe even one that ultimately constrains its available strategic options. But it doesn’t have to.
Second, Canada recognizes that certain security developments abroad — while not having an immediate impact on Canadian and North American defence — might pose a more direct threat in the future. Which is why we’ve long preferred a “forward defence” approach in the pursuit of international peace and security.
Rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have.
These are the considerations that have shaped Canada’s defence policy since the Cold War, preventing a return to the isolationist impulses of the interwar period. Without them, it would have been all too easy for us to settle for a constabulary-type force backed by some air defence specialization.
So simply pointing to the conditions of Canada’s geo-strategic position — an observation that dates back at least to Raoul Dandurand’s 1924 claim that “we live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable material” — doesn’t really explain past Canadian defence policy. And using our isolation to chart our future security course would be strategically short-sighted; defence policy is as much about shaping military capabilities decades into the future as it is about deploying the resources we have now.
But it’s also a bad idea to stretch this argument too far. Basic conditions need to be met in the defence of Canada — and it would be difficult to accept “doing less with less” in such non-discretionary missions.
But no one is really arguing that Canada should settle for a reduced CAF unable to fulfil its domestic defence role. The real question is whether such domestic missions may have different — and less demanding — capability requirements than expeditionary operations. Naval ships that patrol coastal and Arctic waters, or aircraft that intercept foreign intruders, may not require the expensive higher-end capabilities needed for international missions.
And it’s not so easy to determine clearly where the needs of North American defence begin and end. There may be significant consequences to policy issues in which Canada has a serious interest — such as trade — if we’re seen by the Americans as a “freeloader”.
Our problem is that the perception is out there already: Canada has long taken advantage of the United States’ “involuntary security guarantees” to take a free ride on defence spending. We tended to allow the United States to absorb most of the cost of our air defence during the Cold War, we were initially reluctant to deploy forces to Europe (and sought to reduce that commitment in a hurry), and we were quick to embrace the so-called “peace dividend” of the post-Cold War period; in fact, it can be argued we sought that dividend in the early 1970s before partly reversing course.
As scholars like Joel Sokolsky have noted, Canada’s first question in military matters tends to be, “How much is just enough?” And we’ve never really faced serious consequences for our free-riding, making it a very hard habit to break.
So rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have. One area that should be explored is the size of our armed forces, and how much we spend on personnel compared to capital.
In a time of fiscal restraint, a fixation on military size can come at the expense of recapitalization requirements and fleet-replacement plans, to the detriment of the CAF. One need only look at regular force size versus spending levels between our key allies: Canada, with its relatively large force size and small defence budget, is an outlier.
One possible solution, of course, is to increase our defence spending. Given our relatively safe location, however, any arguments for a budget boost are likely to fall on deaf ears. The alternative is to right-size our forces to better ensure that the CAF remain multi-purpose and combat-capable — even if certain elements of the CAF (navy, air force, special forces) might benefit disproportionately from such a recalibration.
In that sense, having a smaller military doesn’t automatically mean global irrelevance. Instead, it could actually help safeguard Canada’s ability to continue taking both discretionary and non-discretionary military missions, at home and abroad. And making our military more efficient by recalibrating the force structure — even if that means a smaller regular force — would make the CAF more sustainable.
If Canada is really “back”, it has to be back with substance — and that includes our ability to meet our security and defence commitments in a credible way.
Author: David McDonough and Tony Battista
Dr. David McDonough is research manager and senior editor at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. Tony Battista is the chief executive officer of the CDA and CDA Institute. Views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the CDA Institute. View all posts by David McDonough and Tony Battista
Friday, April 22, 2016
Juneau: Canadian Forces face a reality check - Time to do less with less
By: Thomas Juneau, The Globe and Mail
Thomas Juneau is an assistant professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. From 2003 to 2014, he was an analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence. He is a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
The Liberal government announced on April 6 that it is launching public consultations to inform the drafting of its new defence policy. In launching the review, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan emphasized that defence policy must be shaped by the defence needs of the country.
This is as it should be. In practice, however, defence policy is more often than not hijacked by domestic politics, the capture of the process by bureaucratic and other interests, and the world view of whoever holds power at the time. Given that the timeline of weapons procurement is measured in decades, new governments are also boxed in by the actions – and inaction – of their predecessors.
What would be the foundation of the new defence policy if Mr. Sajjan’s wise guidance is followed? Contrary to the assessments of the opening chapters of the past two defence-policy documents under the Stephen Harper and Paul Martin governments, Canada is extraordinarily safe. Few countries in history have benefitted from a position as secure as ours.
This is not to suggest that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) do not serve a purpose. The country has some defence needs, notably in monitoring our borders and contributing to the defence of North America alongside the United States. The CAF are also an important tool to help Canada pursue influence abroad. Sound defence policy, moreover, cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that threats could arise in the future. But the reality that Canada is a fundamentally secure country implies that there is no strategic rationale for increasing today’s already small defence budget.
That today’s international security environment is not peaceful is irrelevant, or at least it should be. What matters is that there is no conventional direct military threat to Canada, neither now or for the foreseeable future, while other, lesser threats are limited.
It is a matter of when, not if, terrorists try to strike Canada again. But the best defences against terrorism are law enforcement and intelligence, not frigates and fighter jets. A resurgent Russia threatens Eastern Europe – but not Canada. We should keep an eye on the evolving balance of power in East Asia and should certainly increase our diplomatic and commercial presence there – but our defence interests are limited. Instability in the Middle East will continue for decades. But none of the region’s many conflicts pose a direct military threat to Canada.
In this context, Canada has the rare luxury of being able to use its military to pursue opportunities, not in response to direct threats. With its security guaranteed, Canada can and should aim to be a reliable ally to the U.S. and to NATO, and to support vulnerable partners in hotspots throughout the world. But this does not justify the investment of large amounts of additional money for defence.
The pursuit of Canada’s international interests would be best served through enhanced investments in diplomacy and development. For a fraction of the investments in major military kit, Canada can get a better bang for a smaller buck.
On the defence side, this implies that the CAF should, in the coming years and decades, do less with less. This may be unfortunate or unpalatable to some, but it is the logical consequence of the fundamental reality of Canada’s secure position. To better equip the CAF to support Canada’s international objectives, enhanced investments in defence diplomacy – notably in capacity-building and training programs – would provide the government with relatively inexpensive but highly valuable tools.
The foundation on which sound defence policy should be built, in sum, is a level-headed assessment of the defence needs of the country. Let us hope that the current policy review recognizes that on this basis, Canada is in a highly enviable position.
Thomas Juneau is an assistant professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. From 2003 to 2014, he was an analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence. He is a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
The Liberal government announced on April 6 that it is launching public consultations to inform the drafting of its new defence policy. In launching the review, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan emphasized that defence policy must be shaped by the defence needs of the country.
This is as it should be. In practice, however, defence policy is more often than not hijacked by domestic politics, the capture of the process by bureaucratic and other interests, and the world view of whoever holds power at the time. Given that the timeline of weapons procurement is measured in decades, new governments are also boxed in by the actions – and inaction – of their predecessors.
What would be the foundation of the new defence policy if Mr. Sajjan’s wise guidance is followed? Contrary to the assessments of the opening chapters of the past two defence-policy documents under the Stephen Harper and Paul Martin governments, Canada is extraordinarily safe. Few countries in history have benefitted from a position as secure as ours.
This is not to suggest that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) do not serve a purpose. The country has some defence needs, notably in monitoring our borders and contributing to the defence of North America alongside the United States. The CAF are also an important tool to help Canada pursue influence abroad. Sound defence policy, moreover, cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that threats could arise in the future. But the reality that Canada is a fundamentally secure country implies that there is no strategic rationale for increasing today’s already small defence budget.
That today’s international security environment is not peaceful is irrelevant, or at least it should be. What matters is that there is no conventional direct military threat to Canada, neither now or for the foreseeable future, while other, lesser threats are limited.
It is a matter of when, not if, terrorists try to strike Canada again. But the best defences against terrorism are law enforcement and intelligence, not frigates and fighter jets. A resurgent Russia threatens Eastern Europe – but not Canada. We should keep an eye on the evolving balance of power in East Asia and should certainly increase our diplomatic and commercial presence there – but our defence interests are limited. Instability in the Middle East will continue for decades. But none of the region’s many conflicts pose a direct military threat to Canada.
In this context, Canada has the rare luxury of being able to use its military to pursue opportunities, not in response to direct threats. With its security guaranteed, Canada can and should aim to be a reliable ally to the U.S. and to NATO, and to support vulnerable partners in hotspots throughout the world. But this does not justify the investment of large amounts of additional money for defence.
The pursuit of Canada’s international interests would be best served through enhanced investments in diplomacy and development. For a fraction of the investments in major military kit, Canada can get a better bang for a smaller buck.
On the defence side, this implies that the CAF should, in the coming years and decades, do less with less. This may be unfortunate or unpalatable to some, but it is the logical consequence of the fundamental reality of Canada’s secure position. To better equip the CAF to support Canada’s international objectives, enhanced investments in defence diplomacy – notably in capacity-building and training programs – would provide the government with relatively inexpensive but highly valuable tools.
The foundation on which sound defence policy should be built, in sum, is a level-headed assessment of the defence needs of the country. Let us hope that the current policy review recognizes that on this basis, Canada is in a highly enviable position.
Thursday, April 14, 2016
Hillier: Defence Cuts have left Canadian military in ‘fragile’ shape
By: Lee Berthiaume, Ottawa Citizen | April 13, 2016
OTTAWA — Rick Hillier says the Canadian military is “fragile” after years of budget cuts and delayed equipment purchases. And while he stopped short of saying the force is on the verge of another “decade of darkness,” he didn’t rule it out completely.
“If the funding doesn’t materialize, the Canadian Armed Forces are going to have very tough time,” the retired general said. “It’s going to be really challenging. So I won’t give a label to it yet. I’ll wait and see.”
Hillier, who famously coined the term to describe the years of deep cuts in military spending and personnel under the Chrétien Liberals, starting in the mid-1990s, recently spent an hour talking to the Ottawa Citizen about the state of the military and the Trudeau government’s new defence review.
Military officials, industry representatives and defence experts have largely welcomed the review, saying a medium- to long-term assessment of Canada’s defence requirements is overdue. But the Liberals also promised a “leaner, more agile” military, prompting fears of a stripped-down force.
Hillier, who is still widely respected in military circles for having led the Forces out of that decade of darkness as chief of defence staff in 2005-08, agrees a review is overdue and could help address some of the major issues that have plagued the Canadian Forces in recent years. But it could also make things worse.
“Every time we run operations now we’re strained and we’re stretched and we’re scraping from other places,” he said. “I use fragility in that way. The funding issue makes everything fragile. You can’t hire enough people, you can’t get the equipment.
“What comes out of the defence review will either increase that fragility or perhaps crack it, or else it can make the confidence grow much, much stronger.”
Hillier said he has a great deal of respect for Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, a former lieutenant-colonel in the military reserves. But he was “disturbed” by the Liberal government’s decision last month to withhold nearly $4 billion that had been earmarked for new military equipment.
That measure was announced in the federal budget, and continued a trend started under the Conservatives.
“(The government) said it’ll come back later,” Hillier said. “I never believed that as chief of defence staff. If it’s not in the fiscal framework, it’s not there. So that’s a $4-billion cut that occurred. That came mostly out of the acquisition capital funding, where we desperately need to spend even more.”
Hillier was also extremely critical of Canada’s slide to the bottom-third of NATO allies in terms of defence spending. All NATO allies committed in 2014 to spend two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, but Canada is spending less than one per cent.
Sajjan recently defended Canada’s record, noting it was contributing to many operations abroad. But Hillier, who would like to see the military grow to 75,000 men and women in uniform, said such operations will become harder to sustain as long as the government refuses to increase spending.
“Right now we’re trying to do too much with too few people,” he said. “Because of our unwillingness as a nation to fund the Canadian Armed Forces with more resources, we are asking the people in uniform to carry more than their fair share of the burden.”
Related
Harjit Sajjan defends Canada’s military budget after Donald Trump slams NATO ‘free riders’
Liberals ‘absolutely’ committed to military but it needs a tighter focus, defence minister says
Retired Canadian general aims blunt message at Liberal government ahead of defence review
Hillier also noted that no one could have predicted in the 1990s Canada would be involved in a sustained war in Afghanistan. Building up the capacity for such missions takes years — and he believes the military will only be called upon to deal with more and more threats around the “very violent, aggressive” world in coming years.
While the government could decide to maintain current funding levels, Hillier said the result would be a much smaller Canadian military.
“So you can have a capable military that’s smaller, but you’re limited to one small mission somewhere and therefore the effect of this Group of Seven nation, which is a founding member of NATO and a founding member of the UN, is going to be marginalized,” he said.
“At some point in time, if you want to do what this nation wants to do, you’ve got to have more dollars and you’ve got to have more people.”
OTTAWA — Rick Hillier says the Canadian military is “fragile” after years of budget cuts and delayed equipment purchases. And while he stopped short of saying the force is on the verge of another “decade of darkness,” he didn’t rule it out completely.
“If the funding doesn’t materialize, the Canadian Armed Forces are going to have very tough time,” the retired general said. “It’s going to be really challenging. So I won’t give a label to it yet. I’ll wait and see.”
Hillier, who famously coined the term to describe the years of deep cuts in military spending and personnel under the Chrétien Liberals, starting in the mid-1990s, recently spent an hour talking to the Ottawa Citizen about the state of the military and the Trudeau government’s new defence review.
Military officials, industry representatives and defence experts have largely welcomed the review, saying a medium- to long-term assessment of Canada’s defence requirements is overdue. But the Liberals also promised a “leaner, more agile” military, prompting fears of a stripped-down force.
Hillier, who is still widely respected in military circles for having led the Forces out of that decade of darkness as chief of defence staff in 2005-08, agrees a review is overdue and could help address some of the major issues that have plagued the Canadian Forces in recent years. But it could also make things worse.
“Every time we run operations now we’re strained and we’re stretched and we’re scraping from other places,” he said. “I use fragility in that way. The funding issue makes everything fragile. You can’t hire enough people, you can’t get the equipment.
“What comes out of the defence review will either increase that fragility or perhaps crack it, or else it can make the confidence grow much, much stronger.”
Hillier said he has a great deal of respect for Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, a former lieutenant-colonel in the military reserves. But he was “disturbed” by the Liberal government’s decision last month to withhold nearly $4 billion that had been earmarked for new military equipment.
That measure was announced in the federal budget, and continued a trend started under the Conservatives.
“(The government) said it’ll come back later,” Hillier said. “I never believed that as chief of defence staff. If it’s not in the fiscal framework, it’s not there. So that’s a $4-billion cut that occurred. That came mostly out of the acquisition capital funding, where we desperately need to spend even more.”
Hillier was also extremely critical of Canada’s slide to the bottom-third of NATO allies in terms of defence spending. All NATO allies committed in 2014 to spend two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, but Canada is spending less than one per cent.
Sajjan recently defended Canada’s record, noting it was contributing to many operations abroad. But Hillier, who would like to see the military grow to 75,000 men and women in uniform, said such operations will become harder to sustain as long as the government refuses to increase spending.
“Right now we’re trying to do too much with too few people,” he said. “Because of our unwillingness as a nation to fund the Canadian Armed Forces with more resources, we are asking the people in uniform to carry more than their fair share of the burden.”
Related
Harjit Sajjan defends Canada’s military budget after Donald Trump slams NATO ‘free riders’
Liberals ‘absolutely’ committed to military but it needs a tighter focus, defence minister says
Retired Canadian general aims blunt message at Liberal government ahead of defence review
Hillier also noted that no one could have predicted in the 1990s Canada would be involved in a sustained war in Afghanistan. Building up the capacity for such missions takes years — and he believes the military will only be called upon to deal with more and more threats around the “very violent, aggressive” world in coming years.
While the government could decide to maintain current funding levels, Hillier said the result would be a much smaller Canadian military.
“So you can have a capable military that’s smaller, but you’re limited to one small mission somewhere and therefore the effect of this Group of Seven nation, which is a founding member of NATO and a founding member of the UN, is going to be marginalized,” he said.
“At some point in time, if you want to do what this nation wants to do, you’ve got to have more dollars and you’ve got to have more people.”
Friday, April 1, 2016
Perry: Our broken military procurement system
Written by David Perry, The National Post
Every two years, apparently, the Department of Finance announces that Canada’s system for procuring military equipment is under-performing.
The 2016 budget had little to say about defence, but what it did say was depressing. A total of $3.716 billion in funding that was set aside for capital projects is being removed from the fiscal framework over the next five years, and reallocated out into the future. The funding, intended to buy ships, aircraft and vehicles for the military in the short term, has been shoved out into the distant future, to be used between 2021 and 2045.
Sadly, this is a reoccurring theme. The same thing happened in 2012 and again in 2014. In those years, the Harper government similarly pushed that exact same pot of funding into the future. In total, the Tories deferred $6.7 billion in funding pledged for major defence purchases. At the time, there was significant speculation then-prime minister Stephen Harper had done so as part of the effort to balance the budget.
Since Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s “modest” deficits will total $113 billion over five years, this shifting of procurement funds is certainly not part of an effort to curb spending. Rather, it reflects a system of procuring defence equipment that simply cannot deliver on schedule. The funds can be moved largely because they “cannot be spent due to unforeseen delays in planned projects.” In essence, no matter how badly the equipment is needed, the government just isn’t able to get this money out the door on schedule.
he Budget Plan contains at least a partial explanation why this is. The cumulative military recapitalization plans outlined by the Martin and Harper governments were extremely aggressive. They were intended to procure tens of billions worth of new equipment in a few years. But adhering to that schedule would have required a major expansion of the procurement system’s capacity.
Instead, a procurement workforce that lost a huge amount of capacity during the 1990s grew only marginally during the 2000s, and was then hammered by Harper’s attempts to balance the books. At the same time, longstanding problems defining and communicating military requirements and costing projects persisted, and new, more onerous policies regarding investment planning and managing major projects were introduced, which meant that procuring military equipment took more time and effort. Major problems with the procurement of military helicopters and fighter jets flagged by the auditor general contributed to a loss of trust in the bureaucracy, resulting in new governance regimes that added further steps to the procurement process. As a result, the aggressive schedules proved increasingly unrealistic.
This all drives home the importance of the commitment the budget makes to improving the process for making major defence purchases over the coming year. No matter what form the revised defence policy takes, it will require further, significant spending on military re-capitalization. Turning the available funding into actual military equipment requires sustained attention from the government.
The creation of an ad hoc cabinet committee for major procurement files is a positive indication of a commitment to improve the system. This needs to be matched by increasing the capacity of the system by growing the workforce and increasing its level of expertise. As part of the defence policy review, our true priorities need to be identified and have resources concentrated on moving them forward.
Finally, few areas of government stand to benefit more than defence procurement from the government’s pledge to reorient toward actual outcomes. Inordinate focus is placed at present on complying perfectly with policies interpreted to demand zero risk to the government, rather than the actual acquisition of military equipment.
If this situation doesn’t change, the 2018 budget will be telling the exact same story of a defence procurement system unable to deliver what Canada needs.
National Post
Dave Perry is a senior analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Every two years, apparently, the Department of Finance announces that Canada’s system for procuring military equipment is under-performing.
The 2016 budget had little to say about defence, but what it did say was depressing. A total of $3.716 billion in funding that was set aside for capital projects is being removed from the fiscal framework over the next five years, and reallocated out into the future. The funding, intended to buy ships, aircraft and vehicles for the military in the short term, has been shoved out into the distant future, to be used between 2021 and 2045.
Sadly, this is a reoccurring theme. The same thing happened in 2012 and again in 2014. In those years, the Harper government similarly pushed that exact same pot of funding into the future. In total, the Tories deferred $6.7 billion in funding pledged for major defence purchases. At the time, there was significant speculation then-prime minister Stephen Harper had done so as part of the effort to balance the budget.
Since Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s “modest” deficits will total $113 billion over five years, this shifting of procurement funds is certainly not part of an effort to curb spending. Rather, it reflects a system of procuring defence equipment that simply cannot deliver on schedule. The funds can be moved largely because they “cannot be spent due to unforeseen delays in planned projects.” In essence, no matter how badly the equipment is needed, the government just isn’t able to get this money out the door on schedule.
he Budget Plan contains at least a partial explanation why this is. The cumulative military recapitalization plans outlined by the Martin and Harper governments were extremely aggressive. They were intended to procure tens of billions worth of new equipment in a few years. But adhering to that schedule would have required a major expansion of the procurement system’s capacity.
Instead, a procurement workforce that lost a huge amount of capacity during the 1990s grew only marginally during the 2000s, and was then hammered by Harper’s attempts to balance the books. At the same time, longstanding problems defining and communicating military requirements and costing projects persisted, and new, more onerous policies regarding investment planning and managing major projects were introduced, which meant that procuring military equipment took more time and effort. Major problems with the procurement of military helicopters and fighter jets flagged by the auditor general contributed to a loss of trust in the bureaucracy, resulting in new governance regimes that added further steps to the procurement process. As a result, the aggressive schedules proved increasingly unrealistic.
This all drives home the importance of the commitment the budget makes to improving the process for making major defence purchases over the coming year. No matter what form the revised defence policy takes, it will require further, significant spending on military re-capitalization. Turning the available funding into actual military equipment requires sustained attention from the government.
The creation of an ad hoc cabinet committee for major procurement files is a positive indication of a commitment to improve the system. This needs to be matched by increasing the capacity of the system by growing the workforce and increasing its level of expertise. As part of the defence policy review, our true priorities need to be identified and have resources concentrated on moving them forward.
Finally, few areas of government stand to benefit more than defence procurement from the government’s pledge to reorient toward actual outcomes. Inordinate focus is placed at present on complying perfectly with policies interpreted to demand zero risk to the government, rather than the actual acquisition of military equipment.
If this situation doesn’t change, the 2018 budget will be telling the exact same story of a defence procurement system unable to deliver what Canada needs.
National Post
Dave Perry is a senior analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Wednesday, March 23, 2016
Budget 2016: Defence Takes a Hit
Written by JDM - CAFDispatch Author
Quotes from Dave Perry supplied by the Huffington Post
Published March 23, 2016
While I will boldly admit, I tend to lean fiscally conservative on a number of issues; I have no issue with running deficits. Especially in times of economic uncertainty, to help our economy, and to create jobs. So the infrastructure spending, first nations, or old age security spending does not bother me. However, it is the indefinite delay in close to $4 billion in defence procurement that does.
During the 2015 Election, the Liberals promised to re-outfit the Canadian Forces; while ensuring "More Bite, less Tail" for its command and operation structure...well not it seems that will not be the case.
In the 2016 Budget announced yesterday on Parliament Hill, the Finance Minister Morneau announced that the re-equipping of the Canadian Armed Forces will be delayed until after the next election. (For those who don't know the Canadian System - that is not until at least 2020 or later)
This delay is post-poining $3.7 Billion in already planned purchases - New Ships for the Navy, New Aircraft for the RCAF, and new vehicles for the entire CAF. However, Minister Morneau insists it’s not a cut to military funding, which the Liberals promised to maintain during the last election. Which in part is true; as they have pledged to maintain the 3% increase annually to keep up with inflation...so really it means no extra money.
The Liberals are not the first government to do this. The Conservatives did the same thing in two previous budgets; defence analyst Dave Perry of the Canadian Gobal Affairs Institute says the cumulative total of postponed defence purchases has now reached $10.4 billion! For the previous government, the postponement had a lot to do with the balancing the budget, Perry indicated.
What is the reasoning behind these dalays? The Liberal promise of a new Canadian Defence Review; or White Paper as they have been called. Morneau said the Liberals need a year to figure out Canada's defence priorities. "In order to make sure we have the funds available at the time when they need those funds, we've reprofiled some in the fiscal framework," he told a news conference prior to tabling the budget in the House of Commons."So, when we need the money, the money will be in the fiscal framework. So, we believe that is the appropriate action to take to ensure our military has the appropriate equipment, the planes and the ships they need."
The political significance of this delay, according to Perry, is that National Defence will be expecting its money at time when the Liberals will likely have to get serious about cutting the deficit, which is projected this year at $29.4 billion, and a plan to have it falling to $14.4 billion by 2020-21.
"They're literally going to have an issue five years from now because that's when the bill arrives," said Perry, who indicated that the military is at the point where it needs concrete guarantees that the money will be spent.
Quotes from Dave Perry supplied by the Huffington Post
Published March 23, 2016
While I will boldly admit, I tend to lean fiscally conservative on a number of issues; I have no issue with running deficits. Especially in times of economic uncertainty, to help our economy, and to create jobs. So the infrastructure spending, first nations, or old age security spending does not bother me. However, it is the indefinite delay in close to $4 billion in defence procurement that does.
During the 2015 Election, the Liberals promised to re-outfit the Canadian Forces; while ensuring "More Bite, less Tail" for its command and operation structure...well not it seems that will not be the case.
In the 2016 Budget announced yesterday on Parliament Hill, the Finance Minister Morneau announced that the re-equipping of the Canadian Armed Forces will be delayed until after the next election. (For those who don't know the Canadian System - that is not until at least 2020 or later)
This delay is post-poining $3.7 Billion in already planned purchases - New Ships for the Navy, New Aircraft for the RCAF, and new vehicles for the entire CAF. However, Minister Morneau insists it’s not a cut to military funding, which the Liberals promised to maintain during the last election. Which in part is true; as they have pledged to maintain the 3% increase annually to keep up with inflation...so really it means no extra money.
The Liberals are not the first government to do this. The Conservatives did the same thing in two previous budgets; defence analyst Dave Perry of the Canadian Gobal Affairs Institute says the cumulative total of postponed defence purchases has now reached $10.4 billion! For the previous government, the postponement had a lot to do with the balancing the budget, Perry indicated.
What is the reasoning behind these dalays? The Liberal promise of a new Canadian Defence Review; or White Paper as they have been called. Morneau said the Liberals need a year to figure out Canada's defence priorities. "In order to make sure we have the funds available at the time when they need those funds, we've reprofiled some in the fiscal framework," he told a news conference prior to tabling the budget in the House of Commons."So, when we need the money, the money will be in the fiscal framework. So, we believe that is the appropriate action to take to ensure our military has the appropriate equipment, the planes and the ships they need."
The political significance of this delay, according to Perry, is that National Defence will be expecting its money at time when the Liberals will likely have to get serious about cutting the deficit, which is projected this year at $29.4 billion, and a plan to have it falling to $14.4 billion by 2020-21.
"They're literally going to have an issue five years from now because that's when the bill arrives," said Perry, who indicated that the military is at the point where it needs concrete guarantees that the money will be spent.
The CAF is facing a huge "rusting-out" issue. The RCN is already without AOR Vessels, and its fleet is aging and is not expected to be replaced before the mid-2020s. The RCAF CF-18's have already had their life expanded twice; and will need to be retired by 2025, unless billions more is spent retrofitting them a third time. The Army is looking for new troop transports as it retires it fleet of LAVs and just finished retrofitting its fleet of Leopart-2 Tanks for the war in Afghanistan.
"I think if I was National Defence, I would hope you'd already have the money in the bank, instead of having to rely on a promise of some year, some time in the future they'll be able to acquire this stuff," concluded Perry.
"I think if I was National Defence, I would hope you'd already have the money in the bank, instead of having to rely on a promise of some year, some time in the future they'll be able to acquire this stuff," concluded Perry.
All this at a time when the Government plans to redeploy the CAF on UN Peacekeeping missions around the world; where equipment will take on more damage, and require replacements even sooner.
Tuesday, March 1, 2016
With Federal Deficit Soaring - Are Cuts to CAF Coming?
Written by Matthew Fisher, The National Post
Whatever the new government announces in its first budget on March 22, Canadian Forces operational readiness, training and maintenance will probably suffer in order to free up funds for units that have to deploy.
That is the opinion of Dave Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, who may be the best informed independent expert on Canadian defence spending. But, as the affable 33-year-old political scientist admitted with a smile, he probably wins the title by default.
Although defence spending is the single biggest departmental item in the federal budget, Perry is almost the only person in the country not working for government or the military who closely tracks the roughly $20 billion spent on national defence, and understands the big picture of the funding and technologies required to respond to current and emerging threats.
The Trudeau government faces hard choices about how much money it gives to the military — with the federal budget deficit soaring, a larger military training mission in Iraq and possible missions in northern Africa, huge bills in prospect for new warships and warplanes, and growing pressure from NATO to increase spending because Canada spends less per capita on defence than any major alliance member.
Ottawa has provided few hints about spending plans, but during last fall’s election campaign the Liberals indicated they expected $3 billion in “efficiencies” from all ministries. Perry said this means the Department of National Defence could contribute about $600 million a year in savings in three years.
Harjit Sajjan, the defence minister, has pledged the number of men and women in uniform will stay more or less the same.
“Because fixed personnel costs take 50 per cent of out of the budget, if you keep the size of the force the same, the cuts elsewhere (in the department) would be fairly consequential,” Perry said.
“The pot from which the $600 million will be taken is not that big. It could have a big impact on force readiness and operational effectiveness. They are going to have to restrict training funds, maintenance, repair and the purchase of spare parts — what regular forces and special forces need to make their equipment usable.”
Military spending was cut in the early days of the Harper government before it established a budget escalator that got funding this year back to about where it had been. It would be harder to find $600 million in savings now because the earlier cuts and freezes had already “imposed a fair bit of fiscal pain,” Perry said. “There is less fat than previously.
One of the many unknowns is whether the Iraq training mission will be paid for from existing funds or “incremental funding because you can’t cover it under a normal budget,” Perry said, adding the cost will be “fairly significant. For past Liberal budgets, if there were big operations like this, they would top up the budget. I hope they have some extra money for that, but I am not sure that is the case.”
Given the fiscal squeeze, he wondered how the military could afford new equipment “when everyone knows they are having trouble moving forward to acquire big-ticket items – ships and jets – as well as upgrades to protect against new technologies.” Improvements are required for satellite and cyber capabilities, and North American surveillance, detection and warning systems built in the 1980s.
There are 200 such capital projects but most are not nearly as expensive as the ships and jets, Perry said, although “they are potentially more expensive in their totality than the big, shiny things. From peace support to humanitarian aid to war fighting you need baseline investments in areas such as surveillance and cyber counter-measures. I am not sure how fully-seized the government is about how expensive the military is.”
One of the hottest political potatoes in Ottawa remains the tens of billions of dollars the next fighter jets and surface combat ships will cost. Perry praised the decision this week to combine the ship building competition into one process, rather than two, because this would mean the navy gets badly needed ships a few years earlier than expected. However, he finds it hard to believe the government’s campaign rhetoric it could “save tens of billions” from the $40 billion earmarked for the F-35 by buying another aircraft.
A defence policy review is due to be published by the end of this year. Aside from the $600 million in efficiencies being looked for in the existing fiscal plan, inherited from the Harper government, Perry said he expected there would be no major impact on defence funding in next month’s budget. But once the policy review was complete, a harsher reckoning is likely in the 2017 budget.
“We have not been hearing a lot about what the government’s (defence spending) priorities might be,” he said. Nevertheless, “I think the bean counters at defence are quite worried. My worry is that there are not enough people over there counting beans.”
Whatever the new government announces in its first budget on March 22, Canadian Forces operational readiness, training and maintenance will probably suffer in order to free up funds for units that have to deploy.
That is the opinion of Dave Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, who may be the best informed independent expert on Canadian defence spending. But, as the affable 33-year-old political scientist admitted with a smile, he probably wins the title by default.
Although defence spending is the single biggest departmental item in the federal budget, Perry is almost the only person in the country not working for government or the military who closely tracks the roughly $20 billion spent on national defence, and understands the big picture of the funding and technologies required to respond to current and emerging threats.
The Trudeau government faces hard choices about how much money it gives to the military — with the federal budget deficit soaring, a larger military training mission in Iraq and possible missions in northern Africa, huge bills in prospect for new warships and warplanes, and growing pressure from NATO to increase spending because Canada spends less per capita on defence than any major alliance member.
Ottawa has provided few hints about spending plans, but during last fall’s election campaign the Liberals indicated they expected $3 billion in “efficiencies” from all ministries. Perry said this means the Department of National Defence could contribute about $600 million a year in savings in three years.
Harjit Sajjan, the defence minister, has pledged the number of men and women in uniform will stay more or less the same.
“Because fixed personnel costs take 50 per cent of out of the budget, if you keep the size of the force the same, the cuts elsewhere (in the department) would be fairly consequential,” Perry said.
“The pot from which the $600 million will be taken is not that big. It could have a big impact on force readiness and operational effectiveness. They are going to have to restrict training funds, maintenance, repair and the purchase of spare parts — what regular forces and special forces need to make their equipment usable.”
Military spending was cut in the early days of the Harper government before it established a budget escalator that got funding this year back to about where it had been. It would be harder to find $600 million in savings now because the earlier cuts and freezes had already “imposed a fair bit of fiscal pain,” Perry said. “There is less fat than previously.
One of the many unknowns is whether the Iraq training mission will be paid for from existing funds or “incremental funding because you can’t cover it under a normal budget,” Perry said, adding the cost will be “fairly significant. For past Liberal budgets, if there were big operations like this, they would top up the budget. I hope they have some extra money for that, but I am not sure that is the case.”
Given the fiscal squeeze, he wondered how the military could afford new equipment “when everyone knows they are having trouble moving forward to acquire big-ticket items – ships and jets – as well as upgrades to protect against new technologies.” Improvements are required for satellite and cyber capabilities, and North American surveillance, detection and warning systems built in the 1980s.
There are 200 such capital projects but most are not nearly as expensive as the ships and jets, Perry said, although “they are potentially more expensive in their totality than the big, shiny things. From peace support to humanitarian aid to war fighting you need baseline investments in areas such as surveillance and cyber counter-measures. I am not sure how fully-seized the government is about how expensive the military is.”
One of the hottest political potatoes in Ottawa remains the tens of billions of dollars the next fighter jets and surface combat ships will cost. Perry praised the decision this week to combine the ship building competition into one process, rather than two, because this would mean the navy gets badly needed ships a few years earlier than expected. However, he finds it hard to believe the government’s campaign rhetoric it could “save tens of billions” from the $40 billion earmarked for the F-35 by buying another aircraft.
A defence policy review is due to be published by the end of this year. Aside from the $600 million in efficiencies being looked for in the existing fiscal plan, inherited from the Harper government, Perry said he expected there would be no major impact on defence funding in next month’s budget. But once the policy review was complete, a harsher reckoning is likely in the 2017 budget.
“We have not been hearing a lot about what the government’s (defence spending) priorities might be,” he said. Nevertheless, “I think the bean counters at defence are quite worried. My worry is that there are not enough people over there counting beans.”
Thursday, February 18, 2016
Change Needed in Canadian Defence Policy - Should we be looking at Australia?
Published in today's National Post, Matthew Fisher has written an interesting article explaining how Australia decides its matters of national security and overall defence policy. The intent of his article is to perhaps convince Canadians that we would be better off if Canada changed how it dealt with national security issues, military spending, and procurement; and took a lead from the non-partisan way Australia has been working for years.
Fisher's main arguement is that Australia has adapted a non-partisan forum for deciding issues of national security and its overall defence policy because it is geographically isolated from its allies, and therefore must make swift defence decisions. Australia cannot afford to take decades to decide on procurement; like Canada has been doing now on its FWSAR, CF-18 replacement, and the replacement fleet for the Royal Canadian Navy.
You can read his article below and decide for yourself.
Australians figured out decades ago that national defence was too important to be left to the whims of competing political parties and their leaders.
While Canada has long dithered about what fighter jets to buy, Australia has acquired F-35s and F-18 Super Hornets with little political fuss or public outcry, Matthew Fisher writes, due to an all-party consensus that a common and consistent vision on national security is top priority.
What has evolved Down Under is an all-party consensus that robustly defending Australia is a top-level national interest. Decisions on strategic policy, defence budgets and procurement policies reflect that. A common vision on security supersedes everything.
There is a strong public expectation political parties and their leaders will set aside their differences and work together.
No matter which party is in power in Canberra, major defence policies have remained the same. There was been little parliamentary squabbling or controversy over such issues as the deployment of Royal Australian Air Force F-18 Hornets and Super Hornets to bomb the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, while training more Iraqi security forces than Canada has done or is proposing to do.
Nor do opposition parties seek election in Australia by campaigning to undo many of the outgoing government’s defence policies. Continuity in security strategy and philosophy are considered far too important. Even the media and defence analysts tend to be agreed on this. So debates on national defence often end up being about different shades of grey.
Australia provides the best straight-up comparison with Canada because both are large, thinly populated countries and share the Westminster political system and traditions. But while Canada has dithered for years about what fighter jets and warships to buy next, with little political fuss or public outcry Australia has acquired F-35s and F-18 Super Hornets. Its navy has commissioned a huge new assault ship, with another on the way, and is committed to spending more than $15 billion on a fleet of submarines to be built in Japan, Germany or France.
Such purchases often become political footballs in Canada because some politicians demand the money be spent in their jurisdictions. Australia can avoid such expensive partisan nonsense because the public has little patience for politicians trying to gain advantage from important decisions about the country’s security.
The usual explanation for Australia’s striking unity on security issues is that it is far from friends in a distant corner of the world while Canada expects the U.S. to pay most of its defence bills.
This is at least partly true, but consensus on national security has also been obvious for decades in Britain and France, and even in small Nordic countries with liberal traditions such as Norway, Sweden and Finland. In the U.S., there is still fairly broad political backing whenever a president commits troops overseas.
Canada has not had a broad public or political consensus on major military matters for some years. The most notable exception to this drift, which set in after the Korean War, was the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan. John Manley’s report, whose recommendations were accepted by Parliament in 2008, called for combat troops in Kandahar to be provided with helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle support, and combat help from a U.S. army infantry battalion.
Lt.-Gen. Michel Gauthier, who was responsible for the prosecution of Canada’s combat mission in southern Afghanistan during its most difficult years, points out it was not only incoming Liberal governments that tried to reverse the security policies of those they were replacing. For the first time in more than half a century the Paul Martin government decided to send ground troops to fight overseas in 2005. Within a few months, it was out of power.
“Canadians had instead elected the Harper government and its main military plank was to do more in the Arctic, not Afghanistan” he said. “The Conservatives had to immediately adjust to NATO and working in coalitions.”
Stephen Harper was no fan of peacekeeping or the United Nations. Justin Trudeau champions peacekeeping and internationalism. So does the New Democratic Party, which has a strong pacifist bent and would like the military to be defanged.
Without taking a position on these opposing views, Gauthier said, “You can’t turn around national security policy on a dime. Procurement takes 20 years and development of military capacities takes 15 to 20 years. There has to be some kind of consistency in a country’s national security vision. Defence and foreign policy derive from agreed interests and values.”
Armed forces in a democracy must abide by the decisions made by those whom the public elects. There is no question about that.
But it would be mighty helpful if Canada’s political parties understood, as Australians do, why there is a compelling need for continuity in defence policy and could forge a consensus about what the country’s strategic interests and values are. There is no chance that will happen as long as they do not regard national defence as a priority.
Fisher's main arguement is that Australia has adapted a non-partisan forum for deciding issues of national security and its overall defence policy because it is geographically isolated from its allies, and therefore must make swift defence decisions. Australia cannot afford to take decades to decide on procurement; like Canada has been doing now on its FWSAR, CF-18 replacement, and the replacement fleet for the Royal Canadian Navy.
You can read his article below and decide for yourself.
Published by Matthew Fisher, National Post, Thursday February 18, 2016 Edition
While Canada has long dithered about what fighter jets to buy, Australia has acquired F-35s and F-18 Super Hornets with little political fuss or public outcry, Matthew Fisher writes, due to an all-party consensus that a common and consistent vision on national security is top priority.
What has evolved Down Under is an all-party consensus that robustly defending Australia is a top-level national interest. Decisions on strategic policy, defence budgets and procurement policies reflect that. A common vision on security supersedes everything.
There is a strong public expectation political parties and their leaders will set aside their differences and work together.
No matter which party is in power in Canberra, major defence policies have remained the same. There was been little parliamentary squabbling or controversy over such issues as the deployment of Royal Australian Air Force F-18 Hornets and Super Hornets to bomb the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, while training more Iraqi security forces than Canada has done or is proposing to do.
Nor do opposition parties seek election in Australia by campaigning to undo many of the outgoing government’s defence policies. Continuity in security strategy and philosophy are considered far too important. Even the media and defence analysts tend to be agreed on this. So debates on national defence often end up being about different shades of grey.
Australia provides the best straight-up comparison with Canada because both are large, thinly populated countries and share the Westminster political system and traditions. But while Canada has dithered for years about what fighter jets and warships to buy next, with little political fuss or public outcry Australia has acquired F-35s and F-18 Super Hornets. Its navy has commissioned a huge new assault ship, with another on the way, and is committed to spending more than $15 billion on a fleet of submarines to be built in Japan, Germany or France.
Such purchases often become political footballs in Canada because some politicians demand the money be spent in their jurisdictions. Australia can avoid such expensive partisan nonsense because the public has little patience for politicians trying to gain advantage from important decisions about the country’s security.
The usual explanation for Australia’s striking unity on security issues is that it is far from friends in a distant corner of the world while Canada expects the U.S. to pay most of its defence bills.
This is at least partly true, but consensus on national security has also been obvious for decades in Britain and France, and even in small Nordic countries with liberal traditions such as Norway, Sweden and Finland. In the U.S., there is still fairly broad political backing whenever a president commits troops overseas.
Canada has not had a broad public or political consensus on major military matters for some years. The most notable exception to this drift, which set in after the Korean War, was the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan. John Manley’s report, whose recommendations were accepted by Parliament in 2008, called for combat troops in Kandahar to be provided with helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle support, and combat help from a U.S. army infantry battalion.
Lt.-Gen. Michel Gauthier, who was responsible for the prosecution of Canada’s combat mission in southern Afghanistan during its most difficult years, points out it was not only incoming Liberal governments that tried to reverse the security policies of those they were replacing. For the first time in more than half a century the Paul Martin government decided to send ground troops to fight overseas in 2005. Within a few months, it was out of power.
“Canadians had instead elected the Harper government and its main military plank was to do more in the Arctic, not Afghanistan” he said. “The Conservatives had to immediately adjust to NATO and working in coalitions.”
Stephen Harper was no fan of peacekeeping or the United Nations. Justin Trudeau champions peacekeeping and internationalism. So does the New Democratic Party, which has a strong pacifist bent and would like the military to be defanged.
Without taking a position on these opposing views, Gauthier said, “You can’t turn around national security policy on a dime. Procurement takes 20 years and development of military capacities takes 15 to 20 years. There has to be some kind of consistency in a country’s national security vision. Defence and foreign policy derive from agreed interests and values.”
Armed forces in a democracy must abide by the decisions made by those whom the public elects. There is no question about that.
But it would be mighty helpful if Canada’s political parties understood, as Australians do, why there is a compelling need for continuity in defence policy and could forge a consensus about what the country’s strategic interests and values are. There is no chance that will happen as long as they do not regard national defence as a priority.
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