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Showing posts with label Canadian Armed Forces. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Canadian Armed Forces. Show all posts

Thursday, May 17, 2018

DND Planning $1 Billion Additional HQ Building Near Nortel Site

By: David Pugliese, The National Post 

The Department of National Defence is planning a new $1.1 billion building in Ottawa’s west end, even while employees are settling into its $800-million headquarters complex at the former Nortel campus.

The department has set its sights on what it calls a new operational headquarters, which it expects to host 4,500 civilian and military personnel. That facility will be in addition to the headquarters at what was once the technology company’s campus on Carling Ave. which will house almost 9,000 employees. DND also intends to keep its massive complex at 101 Colonel By Drive in downtown Ottawa.

The new operational headquarters, to be constructed in the mid-to-late 2020s, will be located close to the Nortel site and will be home to various commands including the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and the Canadian Joint Operations Command, DND spokesman Daniel Le Bouthillier confirmed.

The office of the vice-chief of the defence staff will also be located in the new building. “In order to centralize these efforts, the Department of National Defence requires a modern facility that enables secure joint operational command, control, communications, coordination and capabilities for operational planning and control of Canadian Armed Forces operations domestically, continentally and globally,” said Le Bouthillier.

The plan will see employees moving into the new operational headquarters starting around 2029, after which DND would vacate its facility at Star Top Rd. in Ottawa’s east end. It is not clear whether another department would move into that building, which is owned by a private company and leased by the federal government.

The government announced last week it wants to hire an architectural and engineering firm to design the new 75,000-square-metre facility — an advance notice so interested parties could apply for the security clearances necessary to bid on the contract.

In making a case to spend the original $800 million on the Nortel complex, senior DND officials claimed there would be substantial savings from consolidating employees in the one location, arguing that the 42 DND and Canadian Forces office locations in Ottawa and Gatineau would be reduced to seven or fewer, leading to savings of $750 million in office rent alone over the subsequent 25 years. No mention was ever made of the need for an additional purpose-built facility.

Former Nortel campus off of Carling Ave in Ottawa, Ontario on Monday Sept. 26, 2016. Tony Caldwell / PostmediaFormer Nortel campus off of Carling Ave in Ottawa, Ontario on Monday Sept. 26, 2016. Tony Caldwell / Postmedia
But Le Bouthillier said the Liberal government’s new defence policy outlined the need to have a single operational hub to enable the key military commands to produce accurate and timely advice, improving command and control for military decision makers, increasing information sharing and boosting the protection for key military personnel in case of a natural disaster or other security incidents. The specific location of the new headquarters will be determined during the options analysis phase of the project, but it will be in close proximity to the Carling site, he said.

Between the Nortel campus and the new headquarters, more than 13,000 of the 20,500 DND employees and Canadian Forces personnel working in locations throughout Ottawa and Gatineau will eventually be concentrated in Ottawa’s west end. To date, only 3,600 of the planned 9,000 staff have moved into the former Nortel complex, the relocation process running about two years behind schedule.

Some DND employees and Canadian Forces personnel have voiced concern over the move to the Carling Ave. site, pointing out that many live in Orléans and the commute will be long. A June 2011 briefing note prepared for then-deputy minister Robert Fonberg described the Carling site as a “relatively remote location.”

Some DND civilian employees have opted to take jobs with other federal departments rather than work in the west end of Ottawa, but the government was unable to provide details about exactly how many have done so.

Wednesday, December 13, 2017

New Fire Trucks for CAF

DND PRESS RELEASE

Canada’s new defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, reaffirms the government’s commitment to providing the women and men of the Canadian Armed Forces with the support and equipment they need to do their jobs. Member of Parliament Neil Ellis announced on behalf of Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan that 8 Wing Trenton is the first location to take possession of the new fire trucks.

Known as the Aerial Fire Fighting Vehicle (AFFV) these modern trucks provide fire fighting capabilities, rescue and casualty evacuation to a height of 35 meters. They feature a casualty recovery platform that previous vehicles didn’t have. The vehicles were procured to fight fires on modern infrastructure found on Bases and Wings including fires in ammunition and fuel containment areas.

The new fire trucks will replace some of the current vehicles that have been in use since the mid-90s and that have exceeded their life expectancy. They will add to those firefighting fleets that do not have the capabilities the AFFV will bring.

In June 2016, a contract was awarded to Aréo-Feu based in Longueuil, Québec to supply the vehicles. A total of nine new vehicles will be delivered to Bases and Wings across Canada. The last vehicle is expected to be delivered in April 2018, with an option to purchase three more vehicles.

“Modernizing the equipment the Canadian Armed Forces rely on to do their jobs is a key priority for the Government of Canada. I am pleased to see that the new Aerial Fire Fighting Vehicle is being delivered to Bases and Wings across the country,” said Defence Minister Harjit S. Sajjan.

“It is great news that the first delivery of the new Aerial Fire Fighting Vehicle occurred here at 8 Wing Trenton. More importantly, this is good news for the firefighters and emergency services workers who will use this modern vehicle in service to the 8 Wing Trenton community,” said Neil Ellis, Member of Parliament for Bay of Quinte.

The $18.7 million contract for these vehicles was awarded to Aréo-Feu based in Longueuil, Québec, after a fair, open and transparent competition.

A total of nine new vehicles will be delivered to Bases and Wings across Canada with an option for three more. First delivery began in November 2017 with final delivery expected for April 2018.

The following Bases and Wings will each receive one new Aerial Fire Fighting Vehicles: 4 Wing Cold Lake, 3 Wing Bagotville, 8 Wing Trenton, 19 Wing Comox, 14 Wing Greenwood, CFB Suffield, CFB Shilo, CFB Gagetown and CFB Esquimalt.

Wednesday, November 23, 2016

Mason: Why UN Peacekeeping is worth the Risks

By: Peggy Mason, Toronto Star 

Pages of newspaper ink are being spilled to highlight the risks in any of the UN peacekeeping missions Canada might be considering — from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Mali to the Central African Republic. What has been missing from all the commentary and government pronouncements, though, is a coherent argument for why UN peacekeeping is a job worth the all-too-evident dangers.

This is too bad because there are solid reasons for Canada to re-engage. While UN peacekeeping is no miracle cure and there are no guarantees of success, when done right and properly mandated and resourced, UN peacekeeping offers the best chance for a society emerging from violent conflict.

Peacekeeping is the front end of a complex, long-term process of helping conflicting parties create the necessary conditions — political, socio-economic, security — for sustainable peace.

At the centre of this effort is the peace process. Complex political problems always lie at the heart of violent conflict and require political solutions that are negotiated and agreed to by the parties. A capable security force will be essential in both the peace negotiation and implementation phases, but it is a supporting element of the overall mission nonetheless.

As the Afghanistan debacle has so dramatically and tragically illustrated, no amount of military “robustness” and professionalism on the part of international military forces can make up for the lack of a credible peace process.

The statistical evidence is also clear: looking at all past wars of the last quarter-century, only 15 per cent have ended decisively on the battlefield, and in these cases the rebels prevailed at least as often as the governments they fought. All the rest ultimately had to be settled at the negotiating table.

Precisely because of the primacy of the peace process, today’s multi-dimensional UN peace operations — which involve military, police and civilian contingents — are much more than military operations charged with providing a safe and secure environment. Their civilian components are mandated to facilitate the peace process, promote the rule of law, and support the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance.

Increasingly mandates, like that for MINUSMA in Mali, also include security assistance to the transitional government so it can reassert its authority nationwide. This military assistance is in concert with support for national political dialogue and reconciliation efforts.

For a collective enterprise of this magnitude to succeed — as UN peacekeeping does more often than not — the international effort must be perceived as legitimate and impartial. And it must have the broadest possible international support within a coherent legal and operational framework.

Only the UN Security Council can mandate such an operation and only the UN Organization can lead the mission if is to be internationally acceptable. Headed by a civilian in the role of Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), with all the other components, including the military and police, reporting to him or her, the very structure of the UN peacekeeping mission reflects the centrality of the peace process. This stands in sharp contrast to NATO-led military missions, even where authorized by the UNSC to assist in stabilizing a conflict.

NATO-led stability operations lack the perceived legitimacy and impartiality of UN-led operations precisely because their political and military leaders are seen to represent a very specific set of powerful countries and interests. Not only does this undermine coherence in the international effort; it also constitutes a gift to spoilers on the ground decrying alleged “foreign occupation.”

An integrated mission under the overall authority of the SRSG also allows UN command and control to be decentralized to the operational level. This contrasts with the centralized, top-heavy and opaque command structure operating in NATO.

Many current UN missions may have comprehensive mandates to build sustainable peace but they manifestly lack the professional forces and equipment to do the job. That’s a major concern.

Re-engagement by Canada and other Western countries is therefore long overdue and welcome. This is why 10 leading civil society organizations in their submission to the Defence Policy Review, entitled “A Shift to Sustainable Peace and Common Security,” call on Canada to make UN peacekeeping a Canadian defence priority.

But they also caution that specialized interdisciplinary peacekeeping training for Canadian forces, particularly commanders and their staff, is an indispensable precondition if there is to be effective Canadian engagement.
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Peggy Mason is President of the Rideau Institute and a former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament to the UN, with over 20 years of experience in peacekeeping training.

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Canada’s defence in crisis? Who cares?

BY CHRIS MACLEAN
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 11, No 3)

These questions, particularly the last one, keep surfacing lately, especially within the groups who are tasked with our safety; those who have chosen to serve and protect. In the last edition of FrontLine,Don Macnamara was reminding politicians that safeguarding Canadian citizens and protecting their way of life is the prime directive of government. This great responsibility stands firm, no matter what the polls suggest or how the social winds blow. This is one requirement for which Government must act without necessarily asking for approval of the masses. Some things are just expected of a leader.

Do Canadians know about the huge number of international issues that can affect our future security? Maybe a few. Do they ask if we are really prepared to deal with them? Why would they, when they assume the authorities have prepared?

Do they know (or care) that our national interests – security, sovereignty, prosperity, and a stable world order – are pre-requisites to the enviable standard of living enjoyed by the average Canadian? Of course they do. Do they take it for granted? Of course they do, after all, this is Canada – one of the great nations of the world, right?

How many of your neighbours really understand the implications of living in the second-largest country on Earth, with the world’s longest coastline on three oceans? How aware are Canadians that 40% of our national territory is that “True North” that we sing about – and that we really cannot defend it?

As for the defence of our country and the pursuit of a stable world order, do average Canadians have any idea of the major equipment crises facing its military? Sure, the military has taken the brunt of many cartoons depicting the sad state of equipping the Canadian Armed Forces, but the real target of those jokes should be the government that wields the decision-making authority.

One might assume that every federal politician would understand the importance of being properly versed and advised on matters related to the military, and that it would be incumbent on them to learn as much as they could so they can make informed decisions in Parliament. You would be wrong. Last month, two Liberal MPs cancelled delivery of their free copy of FrontLine Defence. They feel no more responsibility in this matter than my nephews do. Another two people at PCO also cancelled. How can we expect the general public to care about defence, when our very MPs and Privy Council office avoid anything about defence other than, possibly, what they are being spoon-fed?

MPs should not only be learning as much as they can about national defence, they should take great pains to explain it to their constituents.

How many politicians have any idea that the real crisis facing their Navy, in terms of available warships or the impact and limitations on multi-ship operations, is a result of the loss of its two support ships? Beyond that, having only xx warships for a maritime nation our size, and no real plan to replace them in a timely manner, nor any real idea how many we can afford (yes, those x’s were intentional), should be the stuff of a national scandal. Few know, but how many would care even if they knew?

Similar questions can be asked about the vehicles and modern weaponry needed by the Canadian Army. The fighter replacement of the RCAF is better known, but only due to controversy. Are Canadians aware that, in the not too distant future, replacement of air-to-air refuelling capabilities, as well as maritime patrol aircraft, are going to be required?

Major equipment should never be political issues; defence procurement should be done in the national interest. This is an essential question as the Government launches into its public consultations for a Defence Policy Review.

It is important that we avoid cynicism about the possible outcomes of the defence review by assuming it will be “same old thing”. For generations, Canadians and their dedicated servicemen and women have suffered from financial starvation combined with irrational procurement processes.

How can real military defence needs be met when governments continue, essentially, to set a budget and then figure out what it can buy without first determining what its national interests are so it knows if these purchases are necessary or not?

Does Canada have to wait for a huge domestic terrorism event before the public wakes up to the risks this country faces with an impoverished military? Our allies admire the performance of the CAF – but wonder why they are so few from such a large and wealthy country of such strategic relevance. It should not be necessary to frighten the population to create demand for a larger and better-equipped military. The government should recognize this without the need for a public outcry, because that won’t come until it is too late.

Is DND – with the largest ‘discretionary’ budget in government – viewed simply as a money tree that can be cherry picked for surpluses to be transferred to other departments? Do senior bureaucrats consider themselves part of the national security nexus? If not, why not, if the first responsibility of government is the security of Canada.

Is the nature of our globalized world recognized and understood by ALL government departments? If not, how can we ever achieve a ‘whole of government’ response to threats to Canada’s world order, prosperity and security and sovereignty issues and threats. Why is there not a Government document that assesses the international security environment and provides ‘policy guidance’ for all departments? Is it because our Government lacks interest, capability or competence to achieve what most other nations have?

Politicians are not elected because they understand the intricacies of international security affairs. Yes, some former military members have served in Parliament – very few until the current Parliament that has at least a half-dozen veterans. But defence policy has been a partisan activity, leading to budget and procurement changes with every new Government. Is there any good reason why a national security assessment and strategy cannot be produced on a non-partisan basis?

How do Canadians learn anything about defence? Media coverage by military specialists is slim – but there are others who, with limited knowledge and understanding, write with assumed authority, often misrepresenting situations and creating political issues that are subsequently addressed by politicians who do not understand the issues either.

So, will our MPs communicate with Canadians to inform them not only of the rationale for the number of soldiers, sailors and aviators we need to defend Canada, but also the implications of failing to do so?

It has been said that the most important social service a government can provide is the means to keep its citizens alive and free.

If Canadians do not know or do not care about the nation’s defence, clearly the first problems are national ignorance and national apathy. Those problems are unacceptable for a Canada that must survive and prosper in a dangerous world.

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

Auditor General Highlights Issues with Reserve Force

By David Pugliese, The Ottawa Citizen

Auditor General Michael Ferguson released a number of reports this morning. A couple of his findings deal with the Canadian Forces. Here are mini summaries of those reports as outlined by theCanadian Press news service (more details to follow as they come):

“Individual units of the Canadian Army’s reserve units lack sufficient soldiers — just 14,000 instead of a needed 21,000 — as well as access to key equipment for domestic missions and clear guidance on training, counter to National Defence’s stated goal.

Between the 2012–13 and 2014–15 fiscal years, the number of Canadian Army reservists has dwindled by about five per cent, or about 1,000 soldiers per year.”

More from Canadian Press:

Michael Ferguson’s latest audit conducted a detailed examination of the problems faced by the military’s part-time branch and found that even though there are 21,000 positions on the books, only 13,944 reservists are considered active and ready for service.

The federal government’s stated goal is to have a reserve force of 27,000.

The audit goes into detail about how National Defence has not only failed to recruit for the part-time force, but reservists are quitting at a rate faster than they can be replaced and doing so before they are fully trained.

“In late 2015, National Defence set a goal to increase the Army Reserve by 950 soldiers (five per cent) by 2019. In our opinion, this goal will be difficult to achieve given the present rate of attrition,” said the auditor’s report.

The sweeping review also looked at training and found that many reservists don’t receive certain basic weapons training, such as the use of a pistol or grenade launcher.

They have been woefully unprepared for some duties in combat zones, such as convoy escort and force protection, and ill-equipped for missions at home like responding to forest fires and floods.

When there is a domestic emergency, reserve units are expected to assemble trained units of up to 600 soldiers, but Ferguson’s report noted that they were thrown into the field over the last few years — specifically in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba — without everything they needed, including essential items.

“When we reviewed these reports, we found many instances of key equipment lacking, such as reconnaissance vehicles, command posts, and communications equipment,” the audit said.

“We found that the Canadian Army has not defined the list of equipment that all army reserve units should have for training their soldiers and teams for domestic missions. This means that army reserve units may have to rely on other Canadian Armed Forces units to provide this equipment, but we were told that it is often not available.”

The former Harper government was keen on highlighting the participation of reservists, notably the Canadian Rangers, in annual Arctic exercises. In 2013, it staged a series of photo-ops with then-prime minister Stephen Harper shooting rifles and mingling with the troops, who are drawn from indigenous northern communities.

The audit says the army made a special effort to equip them, but even there Ferguson’s report found support wanting.

“Following recent training exercises, these groups reported that they did not always have access to the equipment they needed to be self-sufficient, such as reliable communications and vehicles larger than light snowmobiles,” said the report.

National Defence, in its response, agreed with the criticism and said it is working on the equipment issue.

Ferguson also tore a strip off the government over how it balances and pays for reservists, some of who are being called up to full-time duty. Under the law, a part-time soldier can be converted to full-time status for periods of between 180 days and three years.

But those jobs can be —and often are — renewed for longer periods of time. It was one of the criticisms in retired lieutenant-general Andrew Leslie’s 2011 report, which was meant to overhaul administration at National Defence.

Ferguson’s report goes a step further showing that as many as 1,704 part-time soldiers are on full-time duty, but the money to pay for them is being taken from the reserve budget.

“This means that the Canadian Army spent about 27 per cent of its overall army reserve pay and operating expenses on these full-time contracts, leaving less available for other army reserve activities,” said the report.

Friday, April 29, 2016

Fortress Canada: How much of a military do we really need?

Written by: David McDonough and Tony Battista, CDA Institute 

As the Trudeau government pursues its review of Canada’s defence policy, an interesting debate is emerging in defence policy circles — between those who want to pull back from the world and those who think that would be a big mistake.

LF03-2016-0008-13
Sapper Mathieu Riva Maille (front) and Sapper Tommy Cabana (rear) fire a round from an 84mm Carl Gustaf anti-tank recoilless rifle during Exercise RAFALE BLANCHE in Valcartier, Quebec February 4, 2016.
Some have pointed to the safety and security offered by Canada’s geo-strategic location in North America as arguing for a homeland-focused defence policy. Thomas Juneau took up that thread last week, suggesting that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) should learn to “do less with less.”

Others have warned against using Canada’s relative security to justify a more modest military. By accepting such a “twisted logic,” as George Petrolekas calls it, we’d ignore not only the military requirements of non-discretionary missions at home and in North America, but also the hard power assets needed to pursue international peace and security.

Both sides make valid points. They also tend to overstate their positions.

It’s true that Canadians enjoy an island of safety in today’s global security environment, insulated from what’s happening in Ukraine, Syria and the South China Sea. This is partly a function of our geographically isolated position in North America; it’s also because we enjoy such a friendly relationship with our only close neighbour, the United States.

Indeed, observers have long been aware of Canada’s “involuntary security guarantee” from the superpower to the south. This guarantee may not be quite so ironclad today as it once was; ballistic missile defence is a good example of a gap in it. But in broad terms, America’s commitment to our defence does represent an important feature of the continental relationship.

Even during the darkest days of the Cold War, the only direct Soviet threat Canada faced was from strategic nuclear bomber and ballistic missile forces. And aside from some early continental efforts to establish a perimeter air defence network, we largely accepted that point of vulnerability — so long as America’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities remained intact.

Yet few would argue today that Canada should have used its relative security in the Cold War to justify either a reduction in its military capabilities or a sole focus on air defence. Instead, Canada found itself supporting the NATO “shield” with air and ground force deployments. We had two good reasons for doing that.

First, Canada’s approach to defence is often determined by our national interests abroad — from continental relations with the United States to trans-Atlantic ties with Europe. The fact that Canada enjoys safety from threats abroad could provide a foundation for Canadian defence policy, maybe even one that ultimately constrains its available strategic options. But it doesn’t have to.

Second, Canada recognizes that certain security developments abroad — while not having an immediate impact on Canadian and North American defence — might pose a more direct threat in the future. Which is why we’ve long preferred a “forward defence” approach in the pursuit of international peace and security.

Rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have.

These are the considerations that have shaped Canada’s defence policy since the Cold War, preventing a return to the isolationist impulses of the interwar period. Without them, it would have been all too easy for us to settle for a constabulary-type force backed by some air defence specialization.

So simply pointing to the conditions of Canada’s geo-strategic position — an observation that dates back at least to Raoul Dandurand’s 1924 claim that “we live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable material” — doesn’t really explain past Canadian defence policy. And using our isolation to chart our future security course would be strategically short-sighted; defence policy is as much about shaping military capabilities decades into the future as it is about deploying the resources we have now.

But it’s also a bad idea to stretch this argument too far. Basic conditions need to be met in the defence of Canada — and it would be difficult to accept “doing less with less” in such non-discretionary missions.

But no one is really arguing that Canada should settle for a reduced CAF unable to fulfil its domestic defence role. The real question is whether such domestic missions may have different — and less demanding — capability requirements than expeditionary operations. Naval ships that patrol coastal and Arctic waters, or aircraft that intercept foreign intruders, may not require the expensive higher-end capabilities needed for international missions.

And it’s not so easy to determine clearly where the needs of North American defence begin and end. There may be significant consequences to policy issues in which Canada has a serious interest — such as trade — if we’re seen by the Americans as a “freeloader”.

Our problem is that the perception is out there already: Canada has long taken advantage of the United States’ “involuntary security guarantees” to take a free ride on defence spending. We tended to allow the United States to absorb most of the cost of our air defence during the Cold War, we were initially reluctant to deploy forces to Europe (and sought to reduce that commitment in a hurry), and we were quick to embrace the so-called “peace dividend” of the post-Cold War period; in fact, it can be argued we sought that dividend in the early 1970s before partly reversing course.

As scholars like Joel Sokolsky have noted, Canada’s first question in military matters tends to be, “How much is just enough?” And we’ve never really faced serious consequences for our free-riding, making it a very hard habit to break.

So rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have. One area that should be explored is the size of our armed forces, and how much we spend on personnel compared to capital.

In a time of fiscal restraint, a fixation on military size can come at the expense of recapitalization requirements and fleet-replacement plans, to the detriment of the CAF. One need only look at regular force size versus spending levels between our key allies: Canada, with its relatively large force size and small defence budget, is an outlier.

One possible solution, of course, is to increase our defence spending. Given our relatively safe location, however, any arguments for a budget boost are likely to fall on deaf ears. The alternative is to right-size our forces to better ensure that the CAF remain multi-purpose and combat-capable — even if certain elements of the CAF (navy, air force, special forces) might benefit disproportionately from such a recalibration.

In that sense, having a smaller military doesn’t automatically mean global irrelevance. Instead, it could actually help safeguard Canada’s ability to continue taking both discretionary and non-discretionary military missions, at home and abroad. And making our military more efficient by recalibrating the force structure — even if that means a smaller regular force — would make the CAF more sustainable.

If Canada is really “back”, it has to be back with substance — and that includes our ability to meet our security and defence commitments in a credible way.


Author: David McDonough and Tony Battista

Dr. David McDonough is research manager and senior editor at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. Tony Battista is the chief executive officer of the CDA and CDA Institute. Views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the CDA Institute. View all posts by David McDonough and Tony Battista

Friday, April 22, 2016

Juneau: Canadian Forces face a reality check - Time to do less with less

By: Thomas Juneau, The Globe and Mail 


Thomas Juneau is an assistant professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. From 2003 to 2014, he was an analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence. He is a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

The Liberal government announced on April 6 that it is launching public consultations to inform the drafting of its new defence policy. In launching the review, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan emphasized that defence policy must be shaped by the defence needs of the country.

This is as it should be. In practice, however, defence policy is more often than not hijacked by domestic politics, the capture of the process by bureaucratic and other interests, and the world view of whoever holds power at the time. Given that the timeline of weapons procurement is measured in decades, new governments are also boxed in by the actions – and inaction – of their predecessors.

What would be the foundation of the new defence policy if Mr. Sajjan’s wise guidance is followed? Contrary to the assessments of the opening chapters of the past two defence-policy documents under the Stephen Harper and Paul Martin governments, Canada is extraordinarily safe. Few countries in history have benefitted from a position as secure as ours.

This is not to suggest that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) do not serve a purpose. The country has some defence needs, notably in monitoring our borders and contributing to the defence of North America alongside the United States. The CAF are also an important tool to help Canada pursue influence abroad. Sound defence policy, moreover, cannot entirely dismiss the possibility that threats could arise in the future. But the reality that Canada is a fundamentally secure country implies that there is no strategic rationale for increasing today’s already small defence budget.

That today’s international security environment is not peaceful is irrelevant, or at least it should be. What matters is that there is no conventional direct military threat to Canada, neither now or for the foreseeable future, while other, lesser threats are limited.

It is a matter of when, not if, terrorists try to strike Canada again. But the best defences against terrorism are law enforcement and intelligence, not frigates and fighter jets. A resurgent Russia threatens Eastern Europe – but not Canada. We should keep an eye on the evolving balance of power in East Asia and should certainly increase our diplomatic and commercial presence there – but our defence interests are limited. Instability in the Middle East will continue for decades. But none of the region’s many conflicts pose a direct military threat to Canada.

In this context, Canada has the rare luxury of being able to use its military to pursue opportunities, not in response to direct threats. With its security guaranteed, Canada can and should aim to be a reliable ally to the U.S. and to NATO, and to support vulnerable partners in hotspots throughout the world. But this does not justify the investment of large amounts of additional money for defence.

The pursuit of Canada’s international interests would be best served through enhanced investments in diplomacy and development. For a fraction of the investments in major military kit, Canada can get a better bang for a smaller buck.

On the defence side, this implies that the CAF should, in the coming years and decades, do less with less. This may be unfortunate or unpalatable to some, but it is the logical consequence of the fundamental reality of Canada’s secure position. To better equip the CAF to support Canada’s international objectives, enhanced investments in defence diplomacy – notably in capacity-building and training programs – would provide the government with relatively inexpensive but highly valuable tools.

The foundation on which sound defence policy should be built, in sum, is a level-headed assessment of the defence needs of the country. Let us hope that the current policy review recognizes that on this basis, Canada is in a highly enviable position.

Thursday, April 21, 2016

Petrolekas: Canada risks Global Irrelevance with smaller Military

By; George Petrolekas, The Globe and Mail 

George Petrolekas served with the military in Bosnia, Afghanistan and NATO and is a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

Trial balloons being floated around the defence policy review make one believe that the ultimate goal is to justify a greatly reduced armed forces; reduced in size, reduced in roles and reduced in reach.

There is a certain twisted logic underpinning these goals. In short, Canada is a fundamentally secure country, geographically immune from conventional military threats: Russian expansionism is a European problem; Mideast instability can be contained by others; China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea doesn’t affect Canada; and a host of other irritants can be addressed by minimal investments or alliances.

Paradoxically, the result would achieve the opposite of the “Canada is back” mantra the Prime Minister has been so fond of saying. We might be back only to find that no one pays much attention.

There are three roles for the Canadian Forces from which its missions, structure and equipment are derived, these being the defence of Canada and the security of our citizens, the defence of North America, and contributions to international peace and security.

The defence of Canada overlaps significantly with the defence of North America, but it imposes bare minimums of capability on land, air and sea. We must be able to detect whatever floats or flies near our 11,000 kilometre border (excluding the U.S. border). It is not simply about military threats but about illegal fishing vessels, illegal migration, polluting vessels, errant aircraft – to not discount those with malign intent, search and rescue and disaster response. That means aircraft and even drones to monitor our territory. Detection is not enough, hence fighters that can be dispatched, ships sent out to sea and an army that has to move anywhere inside the country.

Fighters or ships deploying to the Arctic means refuelling aircraft and replenishment vessels. To move soldiers requires transport aircraft, deployable shelters and the like. When it comes to the defence of Canada and the sheer distances involved, there is no doing less with less.

In assisting Canadians during the ice storm of 1998, around 14,000 soldiers were deployed from all parts of the country to Ontario and Quebec. In the same year, to find Swissair Flight 111 off the coast of Nova Scotia required a submarine and several ships. To host the Vancouver Olympics required more than 5,000 soldiers to provide security plus naval and air assets. To halt illegal fishing or to seize narcotics vessels requires a Navy with ships capable of intercepting, boarding and seizing vessels.

Beyond Canada, the defence of North America, means we must carry our share in relation to the United States. Canada cannot be perceived as a freeloader or the weak back door. Over 70 per cent of our trade is with the U.S., and any apprehensions about not carrying our weight would have dramatic repercussions on more than just our southern border. A Canadian Forces that is not interoperable with the U.S. would negatively affect perceptions of Canada as a full partner in North American defence; that also means being cognizant of U.S. concerns with missile defence.

These are not conceptual abstracts. They are simple realities and realpolitik.

Doing less with less seem aimed at our contributions to international peace and security. Discussions of niche roles are illusory at best. Canada’s disaster-assistance niche capability is empowered by hard-power assets – ships, planes, helicopters and superbly trained troops. Without the latter, the former is window dressing.

Yes, Canada can return to peacekeeping – but traditional peacekeeping no longer exists. Any forces we send have to be combat capable at the very least to protect themselves. Regardless, any overseas mission requires a Navy even better outfitted than today and an air force that not only moves our soldiers but protects them from the air.

Sunny ways will not alter impressions that Canada does not matter much anymore if Canada strives to do less with less – no matter how many times we repeat the opposite to ourselves. Words count for little with friends and allies – only deeds.

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

CAF Looking for New Weapons Simulator Despite Underused Multi-Million Dollar System

By: David Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen

A decision in 2003 to purchase a training system for the Canadian military that is comparable to a sophisticated version of laser tag came with an original price tag of $137 million, but ended up costing $209 million.

The Canadian military spent $209 million on a high-tech weapons simulator but five years passed before the system was used for the role it originally had been purchased for, and even then troops did not take part in all of the training the government paid for.

Despite that, the army is looking to spend up to $249 million on a new, similar system.

In 2003, the army convinced the Liberal government it needed the Weapons Effects Simulation (WES) system to properly train its troops against similarly equipped armies fielding infantry units, tanks and armoured vehicles.

The $137-million contract went to the U.S. firm Cubic Defence, which was supported by SNC Lavalin of Montreal.

The WES system is comparable to a more sophisticated version of laser tag: lasers and radios simulate weapons fire, with hits being recorded by computerized sensors attached to soldiers, tanks or other vehicles, the military explained.

Under the Conservative government, the cost increased to $209 million as amendments were made to the contract.

But by the time the WES system was delivered, the Canadian Forces were heavily involved in fighting insurgents in Afghanistan who didn’t use armoured vehicles or tanks.

The army then switched to using the WES system for some of its Afghan training, but there were problems.

“It was not until 2013 that the land training authority started using the WES system for force-on-force training exercises as initially intended in the contract,” concluded a recently released Department of National Defence audit.

As part of the deal, the military entered into a $73-million service contract, in which company support for exercises was prepaid.

During the first seven years, the Canadian Forces didn’t use up all its training allotment, but the contractors were paid nonetheless.

The auditors estimated the arrangement cost taxpayers between $8 million and $12 million. In other cases, army units were not fully aware such support services — along with the prepaid exercise time — were available.

“These exercises were not fully utilized but were paid for in fixed fees in accordance with the contract,” the auditors said.

The Canadian Forces also put $61 million of WES equipment back into the hands of the contractor so it could provide support to army units, but the Defence Department had trouble tracking where the gear went, the auditors added. The loan was seen as one of the largest in the Canadian Army. “A loan agreement has not been established between DND and the contractor for the WES equipment as per the contract requirement,” auditors warned.

Capt. Graham Kallos, a spokesman for the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in Wainwright, Alta., said the WES system is now being used for large-scale military training operations involving armoured vehicles and tanks.

But the audit noted there were performance problems with the gear in the first of those large-scale exercises dubbed Maple Resolve. Details about the problems with the equipment, however, were censored from the audit.

Still, the army and the auditors have deemed the WES system an effective training tool.

Last year in the government’s defence acquisition guide, which lists future military procurement programs, a replacement for the WES system was proposed.

The cost of that is estimated to be between $100 million and $249 million. The army hopes to examine what it needs for such a purchase starting next year and hopes to award a contract in 2021.

But it is unclear how such a project would be affected by the Liberal government’s recently launched review of defence priorities.

Wednesday, February 24, 2016

CAF To Expand Arctic Training Centre

Written by David Pugliese, Defense Watch 

As Russia continues to boost its military presence in the Arctic, the Canadian Forces is planning to expand its Arctic training centre, turning the remote installation into a hub that can support operations, both defence- and science-oriented, year-round if needed.

Canada opened the centre in 2013, with the military sharing the Resolute Bay facility with Natural Resources Canada (NRC), which uses the site for polar research. The centre was originally a NRC facility that was expanded to house and support 120 soldiers. Training exercises, such as the recently finished Arctic Ram, are held in the winter months.

But now the Forces wants to provide more space for equipment and to allow for operations year-round. “We need to build (on) what we’ve got right now in terms of capacity,” said Lt.- Col. Luc St-Denis, who co-ordinates training at the centre.

“January to April is a small season. There is potential for more than that, especially in the springtime and summertime.” Other countries are also expanding their presence in the Far North. Russia’s defence ministry recently completed a military base on an island in its territory in the Arctic Ocean.

That installation, the second one in the Arctic to be built by the Russians, is designed to operate year-round and house around 150 soldiers. Russia also plans to eventually build 13 airstrips and six smaller bases in its Arctic territories as it looks to exploit minerals, gas and other natural resources in the region. St- Denis said the Canadian military also wants to develop additional training locations, such as small-arms ranges, in the Resolute Bay area, with the agreement of the local community and the government of Nunavut. entre would see “more storage, more capacity to get more equipment in, pre- positioning more equipment so we don’t spend a fortune on airlift or chartered aircraft,” St-Denis explained. “It is very expensive to bring stuff here.”

The centre is currently equipped with trucks and tracked vehicles for over-snow travel. St-Denis said incinerators could also be built to dispose of waste and keep the environmental impact on the area to a minimum. “We support scientific research,” he explained. “We want to do more with that. It is a logistics capability. We’ve got the warehouse and the kit.” But any expansion could take years because of the short construction season in the region.

It’s also unclear how the new Liberal government will proceed with defence policy in the Arctic.

Under former prime minister Stephen Harper, the Conservative government put much emphasis on expanding the military’s presence in the Far North. It announced a number of projects, although not all have proceeded smoothly. The construction of a new icebreaker hasn’t yet begun, falling behind schedule. So has the construction of a fleet of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships. A proposed naval facility at Nanisivik, Nunavut, has been downgraded in scope because of a lack of money. And the purchase of new aircraft to replace the RCAF’s 40-year-old Twin Otter planes used in the Arctic has also been delayed.

But a number of Conservative government initiatives for the Arctic, including the expansion of the Canadian Rangers and the creation of Arctic Response Companies, have proceeded. In addition, it was the Conservatives who developed the Arctic training centre, which opened in August 2013.

Monday, February 8, 2016

Canada in Iraq: Canada's Kurdish Conundrum

This past weekend, the Ottawa Citizen ran the following report about Canada's current mission in the Middle East, and the possible ripple effects it may have on the region, whether we indented it too or not.

Canada’s military support for the Kurds brings unintended consequences in northern Iraq, writes David Pugliese. Every single course in the Canadian Armed Forces, regardless what rank level you go up to, always starts with ethics and values and that is the same level and standard we apply when we do our training.

A Canadian Special Forces Member supervises a training exercise with the Kurdish Pesherga (DND Photo) 
Harjit Sajjan, whenever he is asked what direction Canada will take in fighting Islamic extremists in Iraq, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan points to what he calls the “ripple effect.”

The Liberal government, he says, wants to ensure that its actions don’t make matters worse. In Afghanistan, for instance, the West’s support for corrupt individuals helped drive some of the population into the arms of the Taliban.

In Iraq, Islamic extremists took advantage of grievances felt by some groups and recruited those individuals into their ranks, explains Sajjan, a former Canadian Forces officer and Afghan war veteran. This time will be different, he says. “When we look at the decisions we make, the policies we create, we have to figure out what ripple we’re creating,” Sajjan said recently at a foreign policy conference in Ottawa. “We may not be able to control all the ripples that are out there, but we can control the ripples that we create.”

Can we? The ripples Canada is making in Iraq now, even before it announces its next steps, may already be flowing in directions we did not intend.

Since the fall of 2014, Canada has been providing equipment and military training to Kurdish troops in northern Iraq. Canadian special forces have been working closely with the Kurds, providing them with skills needed to field a modern army.

And while the Kurds have used that training to fight Islamic extremists, such skills will also be useful in the future for another goal that Canada does not endorse: their plan to separate from Iraq. “The problem with training foreign forces is that you never know what they will put those skills to use for in the future,” said Walter Dorn, a professor with the Royal Military College. “With the Kurds there is the danger we are supporting a secessionist movement.”

The Liberals still have to decide how they want to proceed with the Iraq mission, an announcement that is imminent. Military sources say the government is leaning towards keeping the Canadian military’s aerial refuelling aircraft within the U.S.­led coalition, as well as providing more surveillance planes. Canadian troops could also provide training to Iraq’s army.

But also high on the list of options is providing the Kurds even more training. A new Kurdish special forces unit could be developed with Canadian expertise. Canadian training could also be expanded to include Kurdish police, Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion has said.

When the Conservative government first committed Canada’s military to fighting the Islamic State (ISIL) in the fall of 2014, it said its goal was the protect the security of a unified Iraqi state. CF18 fighter jets have been providing support to Iraqi security forces as they try to take back land seized by ISIL.

But Canada’s military efforts in northern Iraq are another matter. There, the Kurdish people have their own semi­autonomous region, and the Kurdistan Regional Government, as it is known, is technically still aligned with the federal government in Baghdad.

The Liberals, like the Conservatives, maintain that Canada remains committed to a unified Iraqi state. But Canadian military officers privately acknowledge that, although it’s not their goal, they are indeed training an independent Kurdish army.

 “We are providing training to essentially an independent military force that may or may not be used in other ways down the road besides fighting ISIL,” said retired Lt.­Col. Chris Kilford, who until 2014 was Canada’s military attaché in Turkey.

Canada’s policymakers are aware of the problem of supporting the Kurds too much. But their alternatives are limited. The U.S. has spent billions of dollars and years training the Iraqi military yet it seems incapable of making many inroads against ISIL.

The Liberal government has suggested that one of its options could be providing aid to Lebanon and Jordan, to shore up those countries in a troubled region. That might be a safer bet – if one is trying to minimize ripples. The Kurds have never hidden their plans to eventually form an independent country.

In December, Sajjan meet with Kurdish President Massoud Barzani and his son Masrour, who heads the intelligence services of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Both are strong advocates for an independent Kurdistan. Massoud Barzani has suggested that Iraq is finished as a nation. It has already been broken up into various regions controlled by different forces or ethnic groups, such as the Kurds. Full independence is next on the agenda. “We are not pushing for forced separation,” Masrour Barzani said in July 2015 during an interview with Al­Monitor, a news site that covers developments in the Middle East.“We are talking about an amicable divorce.”

Indeed, the Kurds have emerged as the real winners from the chaos that has engulfed Iraq and Syria with the arrival of ISIL.

Western nations have seen them as reliable allies in the war and have provided them with air support, training, equipment and cash. As a result, the YPG, the Kurdish force that is battling ISIL, has been able to carve out its own mini­state in northeastern Syria.

 In July 2014, as the Iraqi army was in retreat from ISIL forces, the Kurds from northern Iraq moved to seize the Kirkuk oil fields. That gave them control of 40 per cent of Iraq’s oil and a steady flow of cash from oil sales to bolster their quest for independence. By seizing additional territory from ISIL, the Kurds have been able to consolidate the borders of what they see as their homeland.

Since then, Kurdistan has been exporting between 400,000 and 600,000 barrels of oil a day through a new pipeline it has built.

In November 2015, Falah Mustafa Bakir, the Kurdish region’s foreign minister, visited Calgary in search of Canadian support and investment, not only in its oil business but other areas such as agriculture. Iraq’s government is understandably not happy with the situation. Last June, Iraq’s government excluded the Kurds from a high­level meeting in Paris that was planning strategy for dealing with ISIL.

In October, Iraqi officials seized a military aircraft carrying weapons for Canadian special forces in Kurdistan. They claimed the Canadians were carrying supplies and weapons into the region without authorization from Iraq. The Canadian transport plane sat on the ground for four days and was eventually allowed to return to Kuwait with its cargo.

The Iraqis were clearly trying to send a signal that they still had some form of control over what was happening in the Kurdish autonomous region. The Kurds push for new territory has also increased tensions with Turkey. Turkey enjoys good relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government but other Kurdish factions are another matter. It has launched some attacks on YPG units in Syria near its border. Turkey considers YPG a terrorist group because of its affiliation to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.

The party’s armed wing, the PKK, has been waging a war against Turkey since 1984 as it fights for greater rights for Kurds in Turkey. In December, Turkish fighter jets attacked PKK supply camps in northern Iraq. Over the last several weeks, new fighting has erupted between Turkish troops and the PKK in the Turkish city of Diyarbakir. Human rights observers also point to a darker side to the Kurds’ consolidation of power in the region.

In January 2015, Human Rights Watch complained to the Kurdish Regional Government that its forces had barred Arabs displaced by fighting from returning to their homes. In addition, some of those Arab homes were turned over to Kurdish families. In July, the U.S.­based Foreign Policy magazine interviewed diplomats who warned that the Kurds were conducting ethnic cleansing of some of the areas they captured.

In October, Kurdish forces in Syria were accused of forcing out thousands of civilians, mainly Arabs, from their villages and demolishing their homes. A Kurdish official acknowledged at the time that some of its forces might have targeted civilians suspected of supporting the Islamic State but most of the expulsions were done for “security reasons.”

Then, in January 2016, Amnesty International reported that the same actions were underway in northern Iraq – where the Canadian ­trained Kurdish troops operated. Thousands of homes owned by Arab civilians had been blown up or burned down and tens of thousands of people forced out of their villages, Amnesty International’s report concluded.

The attacks against the civilians were in revenge for their perceived support of the Islamic State as well as a settling of scores from abuses that took place more than a decade ago under Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, according to the study.

The report, Banished and dispossessed: Forced Displacement and Deliberate Destruction in Northern Iraq, was based on investigations in 13 villages and towns as well as testimony from more than 100 eyewitnesses and victims of such forced displacement, Amnesty noted. Hilary Homes, a spokesperson for Amnesty International in Ottawa on security issues, said the report is corroborated by satellite imagery that revealed evidence of widespread destruction of the villages. “It would be very hard to see how this was militarily justified,” she said. “When you are doing this kind of deliberate destruction, punishing an entire community, that can very easily escalate to being considered war crimes.”

That destruction was carried out by Kurdish Peshmerga forces, or in some cases Yezidi militias and Kurdish armed groups from Syria and Turkey, operating in co­ordination with the Peshmerga. Tens of thousands of Arab civilians were forced to flee their homes, according to the report. They have been barred by Kurdish Regional Government forces from returning to the recaptured areas.

Donatella Rovera, a senior adviser with Amnesty International, who carried out the field research in northern Iraq, pointed out in a statement that the Kurds are also consolidating territorial gains in so­called “disputed areas” which the Kurdistan Regional Government has long claimed as rightfully its land. Homes said the Canadian government, as well as soldiers on the ground, must use the influence they have with the Kurds to force them to stop the mistreatment of the civilians. “If you’re interacting with those forces, I think you’re obliged to know what they’re doing,” she said. “You have an obligation to ensure that violations of human rights and humanitarian law aren’t occurring.”

 Defence Minister Sajjan, however, has remained vague. “Every single course in the Canadian Armed Forces, regardless what rank level you go up to, always starts with ethics and values and that is the same level and standard we apply when we do our training,” he said in response to the Amnesty report.

It’s unclear at this point what effect the ripples from Canada’s involvement in Kurdistan will ultimately have. In November, Kurdish forces, with support from coalition fighter jets including Canadian CF­18s, helped push ISIL out of the city of Sinjar.

The Kurdish flag – not Iraq’s – was erected over the city. “Long live Kurdistan,” Kurdish gunmen shouted as they fired their weapons into the air. Kurdish President Barzani has said the Kurds will never surrender any of the territory they now hold in Iraq.

 Just a few days ago – Feb. 2 – he announced his government would hold a referendum on independence, although he indicated at this point it is only to be used to gauge the will of the people. Barzani wants the referendum to be held by the fall and he cited Quebec’s quest for independence as one reasons why he and his fellow Kurds are entitled to their own country.

“If the people of Kurdistan are waiting for someone else to present the right of self­determination as a gift, independence will never be obtained,” Barzani explained to Kurdish journalists. “That right exists and the people of Kurdistan must demand it and put it into motion. “The same way that Scotland, Catalonia, and Quebec and other places have the right to express their opinions about their destiny, Kurdistan, too, has the right, and it’s non­negotiable,” he added.

 Kilford, the retired Canadian Forces officer, said Barzani’s call for a referendum will only further antagonize Iraq’s government. “There’s already a lot of tension there with the situation in Kirkuk,” said Kilford, who now teaches at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.

“It’s a delicate situation.” Some Iraqis, have already, indicated they won’t be standing on the sidelines if the Kurds try to separate. Iraqi Shia militia groups, who have been battling ISIL, say they will not rest until the Kurds are pushed out of Kirkuk. In November, there was a series of firefights between the Kurds and the Shia militias near the city of Tuz Kharmatu, south of Kirkuk.

In December, the Shia militias increased the number of troops near Kirkuk to around 400. Once ISIL is dealt with, a new round of fighting could take place, this time between various Iraqi factions and the Kurds. The training Canada is providing Kurdish forces could ripple into a tsunami of trouble.

Friday, February 5, 2016

CAF's Armoured Patrol Vehicle Delayed Again

By David Pugliese, Defence Watch 

Delivery of the Canadian military’s new armoured vehicles has been delayed once again after problems were found with the steering systems of the vehicles ordered under the $1.2-billion program.

The first of the Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicles was supposed to be delivered in 2014. But in April, the Citizen revealed that significant technical problems dogged the armoured vehicles. Department of National Defence officials said the vehicles would start being delivered early this year.

That has been pushed back again because of additional technical problems, DND confirmed Thursday. It hopes to get the first vehicle out in August.

At one time, the $1.2-billion Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) program was seen as a Conservative government procurement project that was proceeding smoothly.

Textron's armoured vehicle
TAPV from Textron (Photo: Handout - Textron Canada) 

The government announced the project in 2009 as part of its re-equipping of the Canadian Army. Canada plans to buy at least 500 new vehicles from Textron, a U.S.-based defence firm that has set up offices in Ottawa.

The TAPV program has “experienced a number of significant technical issues, particularly affecting vehicle mobility,” then-defence minister Rob Nicholson was told in August 2014. There have been problems with the suspension, steering and other items on the vehicle, according to a briefing document released under the Access to Information law.

The technical issues significantly delayed the test program, the document added. “These accumulating incidents, which relate to the vehicle’s ability to travel distances on medium cross country terrain, led the project office to conclude the existing testing could no longer continue.”

The government is purchasing the TAPV to give troops what it calls a high degree of protection and mobility on the battlefield.

Textron officials told the Citizen in late May that a new round of testing had started and was proceeding smoothly. All the previously identified problems had been dealt with, they added.

But testing had to be halted in September 2015. That was done to investigate the reliability of the steering system, said Department of National Defence spokeswoman Ashley Lemire.

The problem was solved and testing resumed last month. Testing is to be finished in May, said Lemire.

“The technical issues have been addressed by Textron Systems Canada,” she added. “Though the government of Canada does not have present concerns, the qualification program will be completed in accordance with the contract in order to confirm that the vehicle fully meets requirements.”

Canada has an option to buy an additional 100 TAPVs. The $1.2 billion project budget also includes the building of infrastructure for the new vehicles, as well as the purchase of ammunition and service support for the equipment.

dpugliese@postmedia.com

Friday, January 29, 2016

Canadian Army Facing Serviceability Issues with Fleet


The Canadian Army continues to see limited serviceability rates due to its aging fleets, according to the newly released Department of National Defence Plans and Priorities report. “The Canadian Army assesses its major vehicle and equipment fleet serviceability at 60 percent,” the report pointed out.

According to DND, the Canadian Army tried to sell a number of its surplus Buffalo and Husky vesicles to help with increasing serviceability rates; but were unable to find any buyers. The Canadian Army also owns a third vehicle in the Expedient Route Opening Capability suite; the Cougar, but it has no plans on selling this model.

That issue covers its major vehicle and equipment holdings. “Until replacements fleets are fielded, and in order to minimize the impact on readiness, the Canadian Army is actively prioritizing the usage of its fleets,” the report stated.

Despite on-going issues with aging fleets and the availability of qualified technicians, the Royal Canadian Air Force achieved an overall fleet serviceability rate of 93 percent, the report noted. Parts availability remains a concern for certain fleets, as serviceability levels can only being achieved by taking parts from other aircraft, which increases maintenance requirements, it added.

The Canadian Army Buffalo 


The Buffalo’s extendable arm is stowed in the travelling position.
A Canadian Army Buffalo. Photo: Canadian Army
The Buffalo is the second vehicle in the Expedient Route Opening Capability suite of vehicles and equipment, which support the detection, investigation and disposal of buried improvised explosive devices (IED). IEDs became the weapon of choice against Canadian Armed Forces deployed in Afghanistan.

The Expedient Route Opening Capability (EROC) Team is normally comprised of a section of engineers operating two Huskies, a Buffalo and a Cougar. The Husky is used to detect possible threats, the Buffalo is used to investigate what was detected, and the Cougar transports the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operators and their vast array of tools. These vehicles are based on a proven design that offers a high level of crew protection against explosive blast and ballistic threats.

The Buffalo uses its extendable arm to physically expose the potential target for verification.

The Canadian Army Husky

The pronounced V-shape of the Husky’s hull is designed to deflect blasts from under the vehicle.
A Canadian Army Husky. Photo: Canadian Army
The Husky is the first vehicle in the Expedient Route Opening Capability suite of vehicles and equipment, which support the detection, investigation and disposal of buried improvised explosive devices (IED). IEDs became the weapon of choice against Canadian Armed Forces deployed in Afghanistan.

The Expedient Route Opening Capability (EROC) Team is normally comprised of a section of engineers operating two Huskies, a Buffalo and a Cougar. The Husky is used to detect possible threats, the Buffalo is used to investigate what was detected, and the Cougar transports the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operators and their vast array of tools. These vehicles are based on a proven design that offers a high level of crew protection against explosive blast and ballistic threats.

The Husky possesses a landmine overpass capacity and is mounted with a full-width metal detector and a ground penetrating radar (GPR).

Thursday, January 28, 2016

CAF Reservist Shortfall

In the Ottawa Citizen this week, the CAF is experiencing a short fall, both in regular forces, and an even larger Reservist shortfall.

Here is the article written by David Pugliese, Defence Watch

SJ03-2016-0015-07
Reserve Members from Montreal Territorial Battalion Group participate in winter warfare training in Laval, Quebec during Exercise QUORUM NORDIQUE on January 23, 2016. Photo: CAF Combat Camera SJ03-2016-0015-07
The Department of National Defence’s Plans and Priorities report highlighted major issues with the Canadian Forces Reserves. The latest figures indicate a shortfall of 5,293 reservists. The total reserve strength is now 21,707.

Why has this happened?

Here is what the report states:

“The Reserve Force is a unique and valued component of the CAF. The Primary Reserve is currently below the Government of Canada-directed average paid strength due to a higher than forecasted attrition and challenges in meeting recruiting quotas. Mitigating actions are underway to improve recruiting success and to reduce voluntary attrition in order to re-establish and expand the Primary Reserve’s strength by 1,500 to a Government-authorized 28,500 personnel.”

“In addition, the CAF Regular Force recruiting plan includes the annual component transfer of 800 personnel from the Primary Reserve. Institutionally, a major review of Primary Reserve requirements will continue so as to ensure the allocation and employment of personnel is consistent with Defence priorities, is sustainable and remains within Government of Canada direction.”

The report also points to the percentage of reserve personnel occupations considered “manageable or healthy.” The target that the Canadian Forces was striving for in this regard was between 91 to 100 per cent. The actual number reached was 59 per cent, according to the report.

How is the DND/CF going to deal with this issue? Here is DND’s view from the report:

“For the Canadian Army Reserve, there is currently some geographic disparity in the number of soldiers unavailable to fulfill the requirements of the service. As a result, the Canadian Army will initiate a Regeneration Plan to determine the cause of personnel pressures linked to attrition and retention, with a view to producing actionable recommendations.

Overall the RCAF Air Reserve manning is at about 84 percent of its desired strength, which depicts a fairly healthy Air Reserve Force at this time, however the challenges to growth include higher than anticipated attrition rates, an aging population, and current recruiting processes. Mitigation strategies in place to help meet desired strength levels include dedicating an Air Reserve Chief Warrant Officer to address recruiting issues at the higher levels, as well as the development of alternative attraction and retention strategies, tailored by region where necessary.

By the close of year, 33 percent of RCN Naval Reserve classifications were considered healthy and meeting the established Reserve Manning Requirement (RMR). In light of the ongoing DND and CAF initiative to redefine the role of a strategic reserve coupled with the RCN review of the Naval Reserve occupational structure, a conscientious decision was made to target the sustainment of its current manning level as opposed to trying to achieve full RMR. For the 2014-15 recruiting period, the RCN achieved 75 percent of the initial established recruitment goal.”

Those who have been keeping an eye on the situation have raised a number of concerns that they believe led to the shortfall.

Retired colonel John Selkirk of the group Reserves 2000, which lobbies on behalf of reservists, told the Canadian Press that the problem has been building for years. He blamed the Conservative government’s cutting of reserve training budgets and an ineffective recruiting system that is geared towards bringing former full-time military personnel into the reserves. In addition, a change in how reservist trades are selected contributed to the problem, he added.

“Is it any wonder the militia is under strength? Not at all,” Selkirk told Canadian Press.

Wednesday, January 27, 2016

Future of RCN in Question With Defence Review

By: Marie-Danielle Smith
Published: Wednesday, 01/27/2016 12:00 am EST

An upcoming defence review will necessitate a hard look at what capabilities the Canadian military wants to maintain or develop in the future.

More Related To This Story (From Embassy News)

For the Royal Canadian Navy, which is arguably facing the biggest capability gap in the Canadian Armed Forces, current and former officials agree this could result in a major culture shift.

The question boils down to this: will the navy maintain a significant international presence in the future, or will it turn most of its focus inwards, to maintaining sovereignty in Canadian waters?

With a change in government and leadership changes at the top of the Canadian Armed Forces—including a naval command shift coming this summer—Vice-Adm. (Ret'd) Ron Buck, a former commander of the navy and vice chief of the defence staff, said in an interview that there’s an opportunity to start making decisions more cohesively.

And David Perry, a senior analyst for the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said he thinks the 2016 defence review will be an educational opportunity for cabinet ministers who might not know much about the navy to begin with.

“My guess is there’s not a lot of people in cabinet that have a fulsome understanding yet of what it is the navy currently does,” he told Embassy.

'Self-image' of force could shift

“The ability to go anywhere in Canadian waters to demonstrate sovereignty is a critical one,” retired Lt.-Gen. Michael Day told Embassy in a recent interview.

“Canada has the longest coastline in the world, or one of the longest in the world if you count the Arctic. Those are our sovereign waters. Do you want the capability to know what’s going on in those waters...and to be able to do something about it?” added Vice-Adm. Buck.

“To be blunt, I think it would be very difficult for any government of any stripe to say, ‘no, we don’t care, we’ll let somebody else do it.’”

Beyond these basic necessities, though, things get tricky.

Up until recently, the navy was Canada’s go-to service when something happened internationally, Mr. Perry said.

A Canadian frigate has typically been deployed near conflict zones or areas of instability—in the last few years, that’s meant off the coast of Libya or close to the Baltic countries. It “reassures our allies,” Mr. Perry said, to have a “dedicated military asset which has a number of different capabilities,” from surveillance to deploying humanitarian aid or sending out a helicopter detachment.

But going a step further, to give Canada a place of “relative prominence” within a naval coalition, the navy needs to be able to form “task groups” of three or four ships, with anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities. These groups give Canada international clout, said a defence official speaking on background.

But readiness has dropped, the official said. Destroyers and supply vessels have been retired. While Canada's fleet of Halifax-class frigates are expected to last until the 2030s, possibly into the 2040s, with refit programs, after which new Canadian Surface Combatants are expected to take over, long expensive defence procurements like these have a habit of slipping. The fear is that replacements might not arrive, or not enough would be built.

From a political perspective, the government might be satisfied to let go of the naval task group capability, meaning that it would retain a more modest ability to participate overseas.

“If we showed up with only one modern ship, that might satisfy the politicos, as they can argue that we’re doing our bit,” the official added. Domestic capabilities, in that case, could be prioritized. “The self-image of the force would shift from a combat-capable organization with global reach to a regionally-focused force that can provide a very modest presence in a single crisis area."

Procurements need to be more than 'public relations exercise'

The previous government’s major thrust towards generating naval capability, the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, was announced in 2011 and aims to maintain shipbuilding capabilities in Vancouver and Halifax. Some ships are already being built, among them six Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships.

Vice-Adm. Buck, while suggesting the "fundamental concept" of the NSPS is solid, said the issue was understanding the financial premium Canada is paying for trying to build the ships at home. The premium is paid in exchange for sovereignty, he said—not relying on outside suppliers—as well as industrial capabilities.

The drawback? Costs inevitably spiral up, up, up.

A recent example surrounds the Canadian Surface Combatants, a procurement project touted as the largest in Canada’s history. The government awarded the prime contractor designation to Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax, but Irving had already won the "umbrella" contract in 2011 to build new combat ships like the CSCs. The government had reserved the right not to award the two contracts to the same company, but then chose not to exercise that right, leading to criticism that it had sole-sourced the contract.

On top of that, the project has already faced delays, and costs are indeed skyrocketing. Though $14 billion of a $26.2-billion budget was initially devoted to building 15 new warships, independent firms predicted they would really cost more than $30 billion, CBC reported in December.

It’s the surface combatant project that, of the projects under the NSPS portfolio, is most likely to be revisited by the Liberal government, Mr. Perry suggested.

Capabilities are a 'Rubik's cube'

The defence official accused successive governments of procrastinating on naval capability to the point where everything is now happening at the same time, saying, “government is given to benign neglect because it doesn’t perceive the navy’s utility.”

“There has always been tension between various capabilities under the defence portfolio,” Mr. Buck said—the army, the navy and the air force can’t all be fully satisfied. “There’s never going to be enough money to do everything everybody wants. So it’s always going to be a compromise.”

In a report titled Smart Defence, University of British Columbia political science professor Michael Byers argued that Canada’s submarine program should be cancelled, calling them a “misadventure from the outset” and saying they weren’t useful enough to justify their cost.

Mr. Perry said he thinks that would be a mistake. The submarine fleet is “extremely relevant,” he said. Given the sightings of Russian submarines in Northern European waters, he said he would be “thoroughly unsurprised” to find similar activities were being conducted in Canadian waters.

“If that’s the case, then having a submarine of our own provides the most effective way of countering that potential activity,” he said, adding that Asian countries have been ramping up their submarine capabilities. Canada shouldn’t be left behind when so many other countries are developing this capability, Mr. Perry argued.

The defence official told Embassy that the navy would “dearly wish” to keep the submarine capability, even though it would be pricey.

“A replacement project would have to overcome biases within and without DND against a vessel that, by its very nature, operates in the shadows. Out of sight could mean out of mind at budget time,” the official said.

The Liberals have promised to maintain defence spending, including a three per cent budget escalator mandated by the Conservatives in their 2015 budget, but made no commitments to increase it. The defence review promised by minister Harjit Sajjan will initiate a “difficult conversation” about what the military should prioritize, and every decision will have repercussions on the rest of the force structure, Mr. Buck said.

“It’s a Rubik’s cube. Everything is interrelated.”

msmith@embassynews.ca
@mariedanielles

Friday, January 22, 2016

CAF Urban Warfare Training in Laval

JAN 22, 2016
FRONTLINE DEFENSE News

Exercise QUORUM NORDIQUE 2016 (Ex QN 16) is urban winter warfare training involving 600 reservists of the Montreal Territorial Battalion Group from January 22 to 24, 2016. The exercise will take place in an urban setting, in Laval, Quebec.

The Montreal Territorial Battalion Group is a team largely made up of reservists from 34 Canadian Brigade Group (34 CBG) units. This multidisciplinary team is responsible for supporting national operations in urban settings for the purpose of territorial defence in the event of a crisis.

Over the weekend, soldiers will practice military manoeuvres and combat procedures related to defence scenarios. Soldiers will have a chance to work as a team with units from Western Quebec. This combined arms training will help the units to enhance their ability to conduct operations. ·

This urban military exercise aims to hone the skills of participating soldiers by exposing them to varying environments and training conditions. These conditions ensure that Army members are flexible and ready for deployment at the request of the Government of Canada.

The reservists take active part in these kinds of activities to prepare for every eventuality. They contribute to Canada’s defence and security and provide vital support for the regular forces.

34 CBG is an army reserve formation of 2nd Canadian Division, headquartered in Montreal, Quebec. The reservists are part-time soldiers from diverse professional and academic backgrounds. Owing to the variety of their experience and skills, they enhance the professionalism and versatility of the Canadian Army. Ex QN 16 provides an additional opportunity to put their know-how to use.

Friday, November 6, 2015

Harjit Sajjan: New Minister of Defence

On Wednesday, Canada's new Defence Minister was announced. For the first time since Gordon O'Connor, the Defence Minister is a former member of the Canadian Forces - to some a great thing, while to others it could be problematic.

I think the new Defence Minister will usher in a new era for the CAF.

Meet Harjit Sajjan, the first Sikh Member of the Canadian Forces, who challenged the dress code book, to allow him to wear his turban, and keep his facial hair. Sajjan, went on to become the first Sikh Commander of a CAF Unit when he rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Canadian Army Reserve.

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Sajjan is a former police officer. He served as an office and detective for 11 years in the Vancouver area before joining the Army Reserve.  

During his time with the CAF he was deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina and served three separate deployments to Kandahar, Afghanistan. He received numerous recognition for his service, including the Meritorious Service Medal for reducing the Taliban’s influence in Kandahar Province. 

Sajjan was asked directly by former CAF Commander in Afghanistan Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Andrew Leslie to deploy to Afghanistan where he became an invaluable asset in the fight against the Taliban. Due to his Indian heritage, and his religion, many of the locals trusted Sajjan, and he was instrumental in gaining intelligence on Taliban locations. 

Sajjan's final deployment to Afghanistan came at the request of the United States. They had heard about his success with the locals, and Sajjan accepted a position as a Special Adviser to the American General in Kandahar. U.S sources say Sajjan is directly responsible for helping locate and in some cases eliminate close to 1,500 Taliban fighters. 

Cabinet position: Defence

Degree of difficulty: High

First challenge: Ending Canada’s combat mission in Iraq and Syria.

After that: The Minister will have to help oversee the process of withdrawing Canada from the U.S.-led F-35 stealth fighter jet program. That will also require the Canadian Forces and DND moving forward on a new project to purchase a replacement aircraft for the air force’s CF-18 fighter jets.

Also on the agenda: Dealing with the issue of sexual misconduct in the Canadian Forces and the implementation of the report by Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, since retired, and now a Liberal MP for Orleans. That report calls for cutting red tape at National Defence headquarters in Ottawa, finding savings that can be directed to key military roles and moving as many as 3,000 staff to jobs that support front-line operations.

Friday, October 30, 2015

Liberal Defence Plan: Lose/Move 1,000 NDQH "Managers"

Liberal MP Andrew Leslie (right) produced a study suggesting National Defence headquarters was top-heavy. He advised Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau (left) on defence matters.
Liberal MP Andrew Leslie (right) produced a study suggesting National Defence headquarters was top-heavy. He advised Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau (left) on defence matters. Photo: Canadian Press
Article by David Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen 
The Department of National Defence wants to eliminate the positions of around 1,100 managers in the Ottawa area as it tries to create what it calls a “lean headquarters.”

The initiative, based on recommendations from former Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, now the Liberal MP for Orléans, is expected to take several years.

The managers in question, both public servants and those in uniform, aren’t expected to lose their jobs. Instead, they would be moved to front-line positions or employment in priority areas.

DND estimates it has 5,200 “managers” as part of its headquarters in the National Capital Region. Under the plan, that number would drop to 4,087.

DND spokesman Dan Le Bouthillier said that for the purposes of the initiative, the term “manager” was used in its most generic sense. It refers to any manager, military or civilian, at any level who supervises the work of subordinate staff, even a single person.

The “lean headquarters” initiative originally talked about reducing the managers starting in 2014, with the process ending in Spring of 2016. But no reductions have been made yet.

“No changes to personnel have been implemented from the Lean HQ initiative to date, as we are still completing the analysis phase of this initiative,” said Le Bouthillier.

A consulting firm is currently analyzing three headquarters-based groups as part of a pilot study for the initiative. It is unclear when decisions on the employee moves would be made.

But Le Bouthillier said the initiative is complex and is expected to take several years.

A 2011 report by Leslie found that the size of the military and DND had gone from 112,377 in 2004 to 132,870 in 2010. Most of the growth was in headquarters jobs.

Leslie also outlined how DND’s presence in the National Capital Region jumped from 13,199 in 2004 to 18,168 in 2010. That was a 38-per-cent increase, with most of that going to headquarters positions. Leslie went on to become an adviser to Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau.

Trudeau has said that his government will move ahead with the recommendations from Leslie’s report so the military will have “more teeth and less tail.”

“We will reduce the size of administration within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces,” notes the Liberals’ defence platform, released during the election.

DND launched its defence renewal process in the fall of 2013 as it followed up on some of Leslie’s recommendations.

“By rationalizing the number of managers at headquarters and modernizing management practices National Defence will become leaner, with fewer layers and bureaucratic blockages, the decision making process will be expedited and staff will be more empowered to accomplish their assigned tasks,” the department’s defence renewal plan says.

The employees affected by the renewal efforts would be moved to priority initiatives and new military capabilities. For instance, the department and military is interested in expanding its capabilities in cyber security and space operations.

In an October 2011 appearance before the Senate defence committee, Leslie, by then retired, explained the importance of reducing headquarters overhead.

“Just under 20,000 people are paid by DND in the National Capital Region,” he said. “The size of the Royal Canadian Navy is under 20,000. We have more people in Ottawa doing headquarters and headquarters-like activity than we have in the entire Royal Canadian Navy.”

He noted that the navy was short about 1,000 sailors. “We know where they are; they are here in Ottawa,” Leslie said. “They are working in staff jobs.”

The renewal initiative has caused unease among the department’s main union.

John MacLennan, national president of the Union of National Defence Employees, has pointed out that more than 1,000 civilian jobs have been eliminated so far because of cuts ordered by the Conservative government.

In 2012, Prime Minister Stephen Harper told then-defence minister Peter MacKay to further reduce overhead in the department and the Canadian Forces, while not affecting military readiness.

But union officials pointed out that many of the jobs that were cut were jobs needed to support military operations. They included firing range safety officers, defence scientists, weapons specialists, radiation safety advisers. In addition, jobs held by lower-paid workers such as clerks, cleaners and kitchen staff were also eliminated.

Monday, August 17, 2015

Election 2015: Harper Promises Increase in Reserve Force

Today at a Campaign stop in Fredericton, New Brunswick Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that if the Conservatives are re-elected, they would increase the number of Reserves in the Canadian Armed Forces from 24,000 to 30,000 within the next four years. That is almost a decade faster than the current Canadian Defense Strategy, which lists 2028 as the date for the Reserves to hit the 30,000 troop level.

The Prime Minister announced that a Conservative government would streamline the recruitment process for Reserves, and more to a more Central training system in Ontario and the Great Lakes region, so Reserves can train closer to home.

Such a surge will help increase the effectiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces, especially in response to Canada's Sovereignty needs, national emergencies (floods, and forest fires), and to help protect Canada's coastal and offshore waters.

In the 2011 Election the Conservatives took 8 of the 10 Seats in New Brunswick, and he is hoping to do just as well this time around. Canada's largest Eastern Military Base is CFB Gagetown located just outside of Fredericton.

To read the original CBC News Article: Stephen Harper Pledges Reserve Increase