CAF Says Submarines can operate until mid-2020s

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch 

The Victoria-class submarines were expected to reach the end of their operational lives starting in 2022, according to documents obtained under the Access to Information law.

That could have been a major problem for the federal government as it is looking at planning a modernization program for the on-board systems on the class, starting in 2023 or 2024.

If the subs were to reach the end of their operational lives starting a year earlier, how would that have worked?

HMCS Victoria operating on the west coast. Photo by David Pugliese.

Defence Watch asked that question and has been informed that things have now changed. Department of National Defence spokesman Daniel Le Bouthillier said that the Victoria-class start to reach the end of their operational life in the mid-2020s. That later date was determined after DND officials did a more extensive examination of the submarine fleet life.

But there are still no details on what needs to be done to extend the life of the subs, how much that will cost, or when that will be done. “The Victoria-class Modernization (VCM) Program is currently in the Options Analysis stage, where the preferred modernization option is being selected,” Le Bouthillier noted. “Details of specific capabilities and milestones will be determined as the program evolves.”

Last year Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan praised the capability submarines provide Canada. “No other platform in the Canadian Armed Forces can do what a submarine can do,” Sajjan said. “No other platform has the stealth, the intelligence-gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance capability and the deterrence to potential adversaries that a sub does.”

But the Liberals have rejected a Commons defence committee recommendation that the Victoria-class subs, bought used in 1998 from the United Kingdom, be replaced with submarines capable of under-ice capabilities.

“The government has also committed to modernizing the four Victoria-class submarines to include weapons and sensor upgrades that will enhance the ability of the submarines to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and deliver necessary improvements of platform and combat systems to extend operational capability to the mid-2030’s,” the government response to the committee noted.

RCN Supply Ship Cost Increases by $1.1 Billion; Now over $3 Billion

By: David Pugliese, National Post 

At one point, the first ship was supposed to arrive in 2012. That date has changed a number of times. DND is now hoping for delivery in 2022 or 2023

Taxpayers will have to spend an additional $1.1 billion to build two new supply ships for the Royal Canadian Navy, the federal government has revealed.

The cost of building the Joint Support Ships, or JSS, had been pegged at $2.3 billion. However, the government ordered a review of that figure and in an email to Postmedia procurement minister Carla Qualtrough’s office confirmed the cost is now expected to be $3.4 billion.

Of the $3.4 billion price tag, the actual cost of building the two ships accounts for a little more than 60 per cent, Finn said. Pat Finn, the head of procurement at the Department of National Defence, said the new price tag includes items the government had not previously included. In some cases equipment for the ship has been purchased, so the government has a more accurate understanding of what it actually cost, Finn said in an interview Monday. The inflated figure also takes into account new infrastructure and delays with the program which have driven up its price as the cost of materials has increased over the years.

“The build period has changed quite dramatically,” Finn acknowledged.

Workers watch as the main girder of a new 300-tonne gantry crane is lifted into place at Seaspan Vancouver Shipyards in North Vancouver, B.C., on Wednesday April 2, 2014. Darryl Dyck/Canadian Press

At one point, the first ship was supposed to arrive in 2012. That date has changed a number of times with the government later hoping for a 2018 delivery and then a 2019 arrival for the first vessel.

DND is now hoping for the delivery of the first ship in 2022 or 2023. Construction of some initial portions of the vessels will begin at Seaspan Shipyards in Vancouver this summer, Finn said, which it hopes will head off any potential layoffs of skilled employees at the shipyard.

Finn said the new costing model for the JSS is more akin to the one used by the parliamentary budget office. That office had an even higher estimate for JSS when it concluded in 2013 that the final tally for taxpayers would be $4.13 billion.

The Joint Support Ships are seen as being critical for the navy, as they will provide fuel and supplies for warships at sea.

The navy retired its last two aging supply ships years ago, one after being damaged beyond repair in a fire, the other because of excessive corrosion. After their retirement the Canadian military had been relying on the Spanish and Chilean navies to provide it with supply vessels for short periods of time.

Because of the delays to the JSS program, the previous Conservative government entered into agreement with Davie Shipyards in Quebec to lease a commercial vessel converted into a supply ship. That ship, the MV Asterix, is at the heart of the federal government’s case against Vice-Admiral Mark Norman.

In March, the Norman was charged with a single count of breach of trust. The RCMP accused Norman of warning Davie in the fall of 2015 that Liberal cabinet ministers wanted to derail the Asterix project. When word of the Liberal plan leaked to the media, the resulting embarrassment forced the Trudeau government to back down on its plans and the conversion of Asterix proceeded.

Norman was put under investigation and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau predicted on two occasions the officer would ultimately end up in court.

Norman denies the charge and has said he looks forward to clearing his name. A date for the trial has not yet been set.

Asterix is considered a rare achievement in Canadian military procurement in that it was delivered on time and on budget. The supply ship is now at sea with Royal Canadian Navy and is headed to a major military exercise to begin later this month.

FWSAR Budget Jumped by $1B - but Bidders were Unaware

By: David Pugliese, The National Post 

The Canadian government made a last-minute, billion-dollar change to how much it was willing to spend on its new search-and-rescue aircraft fleet, but didn’t bother informing the bidders trying to win the contract to build the planes of the change in budget.

In December, the federal government announced it would spend $4.7 billion to buy a fleet of C-295 planes from Airbus, including long-term support for the planes. The losing bidder, Italian aerospace firm and Airbus rival Leonardo, had been under the impression Canada could only afford to spend $3.4 billion, so had tailored its bid to that amount.

Leonardo has gone to the Federal Court in Ottawa to ask a judge to overturn the contract, arguing that the C-295 aircraft cannot fulfill the search-and-rescue missions as outlined in the requirements provided to industry. But it is also angered by the last-minute budget switch.

“If we had been told that was the budget then our bid would have been much, much different,” said retired Lt.-Gen. Steve Lucas, who is a consultant for Leonardo. “We still haven’t been given a straight answer on how the budget jumped to $4.7 billion.”

The new details about the fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft program are emerging as the Liberal government prepares to announce its defence policy review, likely to include a plan to spend tens of billions of dollars on new equipment.

The Department of National Defence acknowledged in an email to the Ottawa Citizen that companies were provided with the $3.4 billion figure in the information they used to develop their bids. But DND now says that information was “incomplete.”

“The $3.4 billion was a notional figure based on original estimates from 2011,” the DND told the Citizen, and did not take into account the full costs.

Documents obtained by the Citizen also show that at various briefings for industry in the run-up to the bidding deadline, federal officials consistently used the $3.4-billion figure.

DND told the Citizen that the acquisition process looked at overall cost, the capability of the aircraft being offered and the economic benefits the bids offered to Canada. “The winning bidder built its strategy around this scoring system with emphasis on the capability which included the requirement for modern and effective technologically advanced systems, and a robust comprehensive in-service support program to ensure availability of aircraft when needed,” DND said.

But Leonardo representatives are questioning why they weren’t told about the change in budget and why Airbus had information that led them to submit a bid with a significantly higher pricetag.

“It’s strange that (Airbus) would bid more than $1 billion over the stated budget and not be worried about doing that,” said Lucas.

If Leonardo had been aware the Canadian government was willing to spend more than the $3.4 billion indicated, it too could have improved its bid with more capability on the aircraft and more benefits for Canadian companies, he said.

Lucas, the former head of the Royal Canadian Air Force, said it is unclear what extra capabilities and services Canada will get for the added $1.3 billion. Leonardo has asked the federal government for further details but, Lucas claims, it has not received adequate answers.

Airbus declined the Citizen’s request for comment, saying that the federal government should answer questions about the contract.

When the Liberal government awarded the contract to Airbus in December, cabinet ministers highlighted the importance of having the right aircraft for the job. “With this technology, we are giving our women and men in uniform the tools they need to continue to deliver effective and essential search-and-rescue operations,” Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said.

The new planes will replace the RCAF’s 40-year-old Buffalo aircraft and older model C-130s currently assigned to search-and-rescue duties.

The RCAF will receive 16 C-295s. Their delivery is expected in 2019 but it is unclear what would happen were the Federal Court to find in Leonardo’s favour and overturn the government’s deal with Airbus.

Canadian veterans say anti-malaria drug prescribed in Somalia ruined lives

By: GLORIA GALLOWAY, The Globe and Mail
Veterans who took part in the Somalia mission of the 1990s, which ended after the murder of a local teenager, blame the anti-malarial drug mefloquine for psychological damage that may have caused the tragedy and say Ottawa should reach out to others who have been affected.

A House of Commons committee heard from veterans on Thursday who say their lives have been permanently altered, and in some cases destroyed, by the pills they were required to take as part of a clinical trial involving members of the Canadian Forces who were deployed on the Somalia mission.

All of the men urged the government to create an outreach program that would educate both current and former military personnel, as well as civilian consumers, about the drug’s potential side effects.

Claude Lalancette was one of paratroopers with the Canadian Airborne Regiment who was sent to Somalia.

“This is where I can retrace the route of my mental-health issues,” Mr. Lalancette told the MPs on the committee. “We were young and so well-trained for this mission. But the intensity of our aggression and psychoses led to the closure of Canada’s elite – the Canadian Airborne Regiment.”

The regiment was disbanded in 1995 after what was known as the Somalia Affair. Master Corporal Clayton Matchee and Private Kyle Brown were charged in the beating death of Shidane Arone, a 16-year-old Somali.

“Clayton Matchee and Kyle Brown, they are victims,” said Mr. Lalancette, who blamed mefloquine for their actions. Mr. Brown was convicted of manslaughter in the teenager’s death and served a third of his five-year sentence. Mr. Matchee suffered brain damage when he tried to hang himself and was found unfit to stand trial.

Mefloquine is also sold under the brand name Lariam. A spokeswoman for the Department of National Defence has said it was given to 15,677 Canadian soldiers between 2001 and 2012.

Mr. Lalancette said his own symptoms include depression, irritability, hyper-vigilance, sleep disorders and aggression. “My temper goes from zero to 1,000 in an instant,” he told the committee.

He said he has given up driving because he cannot control his road rage. The drug, he added, has cost him his relationship with his children, his military job, pushed him into a life of poverty and prompted him to contemplate suicide.

All of the men talked about being diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, which they say has similar symptoms of mefloquine toxicity.

But the treatments for PTSD do not work for those whose brains have been damaged by the drug, said John Dowe, who was also in Somalia and now works with the International Mefloquine Veterans’ Alliance.

“In the absence of national action to identify and alarm soldiers and consumers of the latest knowledge about mefloquine,” Mr. Dowe said, “we are left to remember psychosis, murder, violence and suicide.”

In 1999, the federal Auditor-General said the drug had been improperly prescribed during the Somalia mission. “National Defence did not keep essential records or follow required procedures required to fulfill its obligations as a participant in clinical study,” that report said.

Different drugs that have fewer side effects than mefloquine are now more commonly prescribed to soldiers. But Canadian troops are still given mefloquine far more often that it is prescribed for troops in the United States.

The British military allows it only as a last resort after a report earlier this year cited the risk of severe psychological side effects.

Dave Bona of Saskatchewan, a former member of the Canadian Airborne, said he took the drug during the Somalia mission and again in Rwanda a couple years later, and the psychological effects have been profound.

Mr. Bona told the committee that he has tried to track down the 28 men who deployed in his platoon to Somalia and has been able to account for 10 of them. “Two have committed suicide, six have attempted it and there’s only one soldier that is actually doing well,” Mr. Bona said, “and that’s the one guy that I know did not take the drug.”

Canada not Required to provide a minimum number of jets to NATO: Report

OTTAWA — A Defence Department report says Canada is not required to provide a certain number of fighter jets to NATO, raising fresh questions about the Liberal government's rush to buy a new warplane.

The government has repeatedly stated the military does not have enough CF-18 fighter jets to both defend North America and fulfil its obligations to NATO, which is why a new airplane is needed sooner rather than later.

But a report published by National Defence's research arm in June 2014 says there is actually no minimum requirement for NATO, meaning any aircraft Canada does commit are completely optional.

A National Defence spokesman says while it's true NATO does not have a set minimum requirement for fighter jets, Canada nonetheless regularly commits aircraft to the alliance to ensure it remains strong and is able to meet any threat.

Defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute says the report highlights the many questions that continue to swirl over the Liberal government's plan to buy a new fighter.

Critics have accused the Liberals of making up stories of a fighter-jet shortage to justify buying a new plane other than the F-35 stealth fighter without a competition.

The Canadian Press

DND concludes public consultations for defence review

DND Press Release 

Defence Minister Harjit S. Sajjan today announced the conclusion of public consultations on the future of Canada’s defence policy, the largest such effort in more than 20 years.

“I want to thank Canadians, Parliamentarians, experts, academics, key international Allies and partners who contributed to this important discussion about the future of Canada’s defence policy," said Minister Sajjan. "I am confident that the information gathered over the last four months will help inform a new defence policy that balance priorities, responds to emerging challenges, and invests in the Canadian Armed Forces.”

The Department of National Defence (DND) launched these public consultations on April 6, 2016 to seek feedback from interested Canadians, international allies, and key stakeholders on the type of military Canada needs in order to represent Canada’s interests at home and abroad. Discussions focused on:

• the main challenges to Canada’s security
• the role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in addressing current threats and challenges
• the resources and capabilities needed to carry out the CAF mandate

DND has received approximately 20,200 submissions to the Defence Policy Review online consultation portal and over 4,700 participants have contributed comments and votes using the online discussion forum.

Moving forward, important choices will be made to ensure that DND and the CAF have what they need to confront new threats and challenges in the years ahead. Over the coming months, DND will be compiling and reviewing the information received from online submissions, stakeholder roundtables and discussions with Parliamentarians and key international Allies and partners. This will help inform the development of Canada’s new defence policy to be launched in early 2017.

JTF2 Planned Move Triples in Cost; now over $1B

By: David Pugliese, National Post

OTTAWA — The cost for a new Canadian special forces base planned for the Trenton, Ont., area has more than tripled and is now estimated to be more than $1 billion.

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Jon Vance has been warned that the project to move the Joint Task Force 2 commando unit from Ottawa to Canadian Forces Base Trenton is facing major risk in “cost and scope,” according to documents obtained by the Ottawa Citizen through the Access to Information law.

The unit had planned to leave its Dwyer Hill facility in Ottawa after 2019 for a new installation at CFB Trenton. Whether or not that happens is now unclear.

The previous Conservative government had authorized $346 million for building of the new JTF2 site and the move of the unit.

But special forces have significantly added capabilities to the proposed site, expanding it beyond its original scope, which has driven costs up to about $1.2 billion.

Concern has been building inside National Defence headquarters about the growing cost of the facility.

The Liberal government is in the midst of a defence review, which is expected to shift money to top military priorities and new initiatives. There is concern that if the costly JTF2 base proceeds, then funding will be drawn away from the army, navy or air force, a government source said.


The project continues to refine the scope to meet minimum operational requirements within budget constraints.

Department of National Defence spokesman Evan Koronewski said the project, which is in the design phase with architectural and engineering studies underway, has yet to receive further direction from government. “The project continues to refine the scope to meet minimum operational requirements within budget constraints,” he said in an email. “Once the design is substantially complete, the department will seek further direction from Treasury Board on the implementation plan.”

“This decision is not anticipated until late summer 2017,” added Koronewski. “Unfortunately, there are no other updates available at this time.”

Rick Norlock, the former Conservative MP for Northumberland–Quinte West, also hinted at the cost issues last year while he was still in government. “It’s now hugely more expensive than originally” planned, Norlock told CJBQ, a Belleville radio station.

Last year DND spokeswoman Ashley Lemire noted the initial cost estimate for the special forces base was done in 2006.

The military has been talking about the need for a new base for JTF2 since 2005. Among the options considered was an expansion of the existing Ottawa site or moving the unit to CFB Petawawa.

In 2008, the Conservative government announced JTF2 would be relocated to CFB Trenton, but in 2014, DND officials said the unit would remain at its Ottawa location at least until 2019.

Last year the Citizen reported that DND was looking for a one-year extension. It wanted to spend $17 million to hire a contractor to provide maintenance and support services for JTF2 at Dwyer Hill from 2017 to 2020.

In a controversial move, the Conservative government in 2012 expropriated a 90-hectare farm, near the Trenton base, that was owned by Frank Meyers. The farm had been in the Meyers family for more than 200 years and a bid to stop the expropriation failed.

The military took over the property, tore down barns, and built a berm and some access roads. Little else has been done with the land.

Meyers’ supporters have asked the Liberal government to return the property but it has declined to do so.

Once JTF2 vacates its Dwyer Hill installation, the site will be offered up within DND and then to other federal departments. After that it could be offered to provincial and municipal governments. “If there is no interest at these levels, the property will be sold on the open market through an open and fair process,” a DND spokeswoman has said.

Minister Sajjan announces investment in defence infrastructure at CFB Goose Bay

DND Press Release

As part of the Government’s commitment to ensure that Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel have the support they need, including safe and modern facilities in which to work and train, Defence Minister Harjit S. Sajjan today announced a $12 million investment for 5 Wing Goose Bay to improve critical infrastructure.

This investment in 5 Wing Goose Bay will permit the upgrade of the airfield through the replacement of ramps which have reached their life expectancy. These ramps are essential for NORAD flying operations. A site survey will be carried out this year and work will be completed in 2018.

“This announcement underscores the Government’s commitment to empower the Canadian Armed Forces with the resources they need to successfully carry out their missions — protecting Canadians’ interests, now and in the future. This investment will ensure our military has the right infrastructure to effectively defend Canada and North America. The local community will also benefit from the economic opportunities this project will provide.” - Harjit S. Sajjan, Defence Minister

As announced in Budget 2016, the Government of Canada will invest $200 million in infrastructure at CAF bases and other defence properties across Canada. The investments will allow the repair of airfields, hangars, live-fire ranges, jetties, armouries and military housing, as well as improvements to Northern infrastructure.

Through this investment, 5 Wing Goose Bay will replace the ramps located east of Hangars 7 and 8.
Sustained improvements to military infrastructure are necessary to provide the women and men of the CAF with the facilities they need to train and operate successfully, well into the future.

These infrastructure projects provide economic opportunities for local communities, which help to create new jobs and opportunities for businesses across the country.

Gagetown to get new IED disposal training facility

DND Press Release

As part of the Government of Canada’s commitment to ensure Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel have the support they need, including safe and modern facilities in which to work and train, Defence Minister Harjit S. Sajjan today announced $38 million in funding to improve critical infrastructure and training facilities at the 5th Canadian Division Support Base (5 CDSB) Gagetown.

The Department of National Defence will allocate $36 million to new training facilities for identifying and disposing of improvised explosive devices and other explosive ordnance. The development of skills sets for explosive ordnance disposal is essential to support Canadian military operations.

“As a proud former member of Canada’s military, I know how essential it is that the women and men of the Canadian Armed Forces have the facilities to train and develop the essential skills to do their jobs safely and effectively, said Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan. "These military infrastructure projects at Gagetown are so important, and these investments ensure our military is prepared to protect our security, both at home and abroad.”

The Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering at 5 CDSB Gagetown currently lacks sufficient space to conduct critical training. These investments in new training facilities will include buildings to house the main training centre, as well as upgrades to roads for field exercises. Suitable infrastructure will increase the quality of training, which is crucial for supporting operations.

An additional $2.3 million, part of the $200 million for defence infrastructure announced in the 2016 Federal Budget, will allow 5 CDSB Gagetown to repair a vital crossing located within another training area, and to upgrade the airfield’s lighting and storm water collection system. The airfield asphalt will also be replaced. Work on these projects is to begin later this summer.

The new explosive ordnance disposal facilities will conform to the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) silver level, and integrate green building concepts and sustainability into planning, investment analysis, and programming activities for operations.

As announced in the 2016 Federal Budget, the Department of National Defence will invest an additional $200 million in infrastructure at defence facilities across the country.

Sustained improvements to military infrastructure are necessary to provide the women and men of the CAF with the facilities they need to train and operate successfully, well into the future.

DND Micro Satellite Successfully Launched in India

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch 

Canada’s Maritime Monitoring and Messaging Microsatellite (M3MSat) was launched successfully Tuesday night on board an Indian rocket.

M3MSat is a tele-detection satellite, and its mission is to demonstrate and test the technology of three instruments. HANDOUT PHOTO / CANADIAN SPACE AGENCY

The launch was conducted by the Indian Space Research Organisation, from Sriharikota, India, along with another Canadian satellite owned by GHGSat Inc.

The M3MSat mission, which was developed for the Department of National Defence, will improve ship detection and marine traffic management in Canadian waters by testing new technologies.

The launch also included ‘Claire’, the first demonstration satellite by Montreal-based GHGSat Inc. That microsatellite will test a new way to measure greenhouse gas emissions from industrial facilities.

Claire is the world’s first satellite capable of measuring greenhouse gas emissions from sources on the scale of industrial facilities, GHGSat pointed out. GHGSat’s sensor technology has also been miniaturized to fit on a low-cost nanosatellite, enabling the company to offer commercial greenhouse gas measurement and monitoring services. GHGSat says it will use its technology to help industrial emitters in sectors such as oil and gas, power generation, mining, waste management and agriculture to measure, control and ultimately reduce their emissions.

The Case to Merge VAC and DND

By: Ryan Olshansky, CDA Institute 

CDA Institute Analyst Ryan Olshansky makes the case to merge Veteran Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence.

Transition has been an ongoing issue for veterans who have to deal with both the Department of National Defence (DND) and Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC). Our sacred obligation to veterans requires seamless transition to civilian life. Yet, with the rocky transition between VAC and DND remaining rampant, I suggest veterans would be better served if the two departments merged.

Veterans who begin their transition to civilian life jump through several hurdles to receive the benefits and services to which they are entitled. Once they are released by the military, veterans participate in a transition interview with VAC, where all the requirements for benefits and services are made clear. Responsibility is put on the veteran to collect the necessary medical records and to submit them alongside a completed application form. Given the sheer volume of applications, and the fact that many applications are incomplete or are missing records, decisions often take a few months.

Admittedly, VAC has made improvements to transition over the past couple of years. For example, VAC recently hired 101 more staff in disability benefits processing to support veterans with applications and to render decisions more quickly. Budget 2016 provided $78.1 million over five years to hire more case managers. VAC also recently created MyVAC Account, an online portal in which veterans can apply for benefits and services and track their applications online in the comfort of their own homes. Indeed, ever since the Auditor General issued a report in 2014 that said the Disability Benefits Program is “slow, and the application process is complex,” the Department has made tangible efforts to make transition easier and less stressful.

But these solutions still ignore a fundamental problem: silos between departments. Interdepartmental client-​exchange has proven to be a thorn in the side of veterans and the government alike. It has compromised standards of care, compounded wait times and added additional stress to veterans.

I do not think we should be surprised that standalone veterans’ affairs departments are mired in controversy around the world. Obviously, VAC has dealt with a number of issues the past few years. The United States Department of Veterans Affairs has been under intense scrutiny for long wait times. While the reasons are obviously multifold, it is clear that the transition of mentally and physically debilitated veterans into separate departments is difficult. The French government has paved a different path, where veterans’ affairs is administered by the Ministry of Defense. In France, the Minister of Defence is advised on veterans’ affairs policy by the Secretary of State for War Veterans. The Secretary of State is held to account politically, and French veterans enjoy the benefits of tightly integrated military and post-​military administrations.

One way to reduce these silos in Canada is to have an interdepartmental committee that standardizes and synthesizes all health-​related policies, processes and IT programs between VAC and DND. This would be a huge undertaking at which successive governments have not proven to be very good. A simpler way to deal with these silos is to eliminate them altogether and merge the two departments. Former Senator and retired general Romeo Dallaire posited in the Senate Committee on National Defence that VAC should be absorbed as a sub-​department in DND and be represented by an associate minister. He has a point. One soldier served under a single roof for their entire life makes eminent sense. A move to DND would simplify the points of contact for veterans and it would consolidate service providers. Veterans would get access to all health and wellness services offered to serving members. A merger would also benefit serving members; a single department with the goal of equality for all soldiers and veterans has the mandate to do away with the outdated policy of excluding many modern-​day veterans from guaranteed beds in long-​term care facilities.

Most importantly, it would provide for near immediate information sharing and consistent decisions. A medically released soldier would straightaway qualify for benefits that are equal to the injury that caused their release. Too many times a soldier is medically released from the military with a seriously debilitating injury – let’s say 70 percent, only to discover that it was measured by VAC at a lesser mark – maybe 35 percent. How is that fair? A merged department would be able to use consistent calculations when deciding benefits.

VAC’s mandate also includes commemoration, but they exercise that mandate in conjunction with DND and Heritage Canada, both of which are capable of growing their departments to celebrate veterans and historic battles, especially since VAC’s budget last year allocated less than one percent to commemoration.

There would be pushback from VAC staff located in Charlottetown; a move to National Defence or a separate merged department would require a good many to relocate to Ottawa. This is why a VAC-​DND merger will require a dose of good faith and political will, both of which the current government has in spades. It is not coincidental that Prime Minister Trudeau made the dual appointment of Minister Hehr to VAC and DND to deal with transition. To the Prime Minister’s credit, the first step in solving a problem is recognizing there is one.

Minister Hehr would be wise to heed the advice of General Dallaire, and if this government isn’t bold enough to swallow the pill and face internal backlash from public officials at VAC, then cries about the treatment of our veterans will amount to nothing more than crocodile tears.

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Ryan Olshansky is a former advisor to the Veterans Affairs Minister and the Associate Defence Minister. He recently graduated from Carleton University and is an Analyst at the CDA Institute. (Image courtesy of Justin Tang/​Canadian Press.)

Analyst: Liberal government’s fighter jet replacement process flawed

By Richard Shimooka

Defence Watch Guest Writer

As revealed on Sunday by the Ottawa Citizen, the Liberal Government is considering a sole source interim purchase of Boeing F/A-18E Super Hornets, in order to cover an expected capability gap between the retirement of the CF-18 and the purchase of a next generation fighter. Interestingly this follows on the heels of Canada’s NATO ally Denmark’s release of its evaluation of the options to replace its fleet of 44 F-16MLUs. The Danish government accepted the reports’ recommendations, and is now debating the budget it will put forward for a potential purchase.1 The two approaches are a study in contrasts, which calls into question the process and potential outcome of the Liberal government’s approach.

Denmark’s impetus for re-evaluating its initial decision to purchase the F-35 was similar to Canada history with the project. Their study was launched in March of 2013 amid political concerns over the project’s escalating costs and development challenges. The resulting report is a comprehensive evaluation prepared by military and civilian subject matter experts, combining binding data from manufacturers and government sources.

What makes the Danish process of particular interest for Canada is that the findings were released in a transparent manner. Although a number of nations have selected the F-35 over the past decade, the underlying analysis that lead to such a determination has remained conspicuously absent. This has occurred twice in Canada: the original 2010 DND assessment to select the F-35, and the 2014 National Fighter Procurement Secretariat report. The lack of any comparison analysis has been immensely confusing for the Canadian public, and left it with no ability to judge the features in this debate. This has helped turn opinions against the program, which the Liberal Party sought to exploit in the last election.

The Danish report provides an inconvenient critique of the potential Liberal decision to undertake the procurement of the Super Hornet. First it undermines the contention that the F/A-18E/F represents a low cost option for Canada. The original Liberal announcement to exclude the F-35 a potential competition was largely based on the belief that the Super Hornet or other options could be procured at nearly a third of the overall cost of the F-35. This utilized an erroneous cost analysis that applied out of date data of an aircraft without any key equipment, and left out mandatory fees and charges levied by the US government on foreign procurements. The Danish report clearly shows the F-35 is the lowest cost to both procure and operate, with a total lifecycle cost of only 70% that of the F/A-18E. This was a function of the F-35’s lower production cost, more efficient logistics and training system, and longer airframe lifespan. The F-35’s lower procurement cost was recently highlighted in a statement by the JSF project executive officer, General Bogdan, who emphasized his belief that the F-35s purchase cost drop to between 80~85 million dollars by 2019.2

In sum: Denmark found they required 38 Super Hornets to accomplish the same role as 28 F-35s over the same period, with the former’s fleet costing more to operate and being less capable. Although Boeing has questioned some of the analysis, subsequent clarifications by the Danish government, have made evident the process was done with thoroughness and integrity.3

Perhaps the most comprehensive area of the Danish evaluation was the capability assessment. It involved a broader examination of the international environment, Danish foreign and defence policy and how they related to Royal Danish Air Force’s future operations. A key feature of this section was a detailed analysis of their core allies’ military intentions (including Canada), which emphasized Denmark’s strong commitment to multilateral bodies, specifically the UN and NATO.

These highlighted missions were then further distilled down to six operational scenarios, in which the various fighter options were evaluated. The report found that in all but one category (where all the candidates tied) the F-35 was superior to the Super Hornet and Eurofighter. The latter two options were shown to be deficient in their ability to manage the increasingly complex threat environment of the future. Members of the RCAF’s CF-18 community have become aware of the potential lethality of these threats during their recent operations over Syria and Eastern Europe, where they encountered new Russian air defence systems.

The Danish report does not – obviously – have data that would be helpful to address the primary Canadian government justification for a potential Super Hornet purchase; preventing an apparent gap in capabilities due to the retirement of the CF-18 fleet. Leaving aside questions as to whether such a replacement is imminently required, the potential remedy itself is dubious. It is important to note that an interim buy would commit Canada to either a much reduced fighter force (as Super Hornets will be out of production in the next few years), or a mixed fleet with F-35s. This is a poor outcome, as the 2014 National Fighter Procurement Secretariat report opined; “a mixed fleet would provide less capability at a higher cost.”4

Canada’s approach to the F-35 has no relevant parallel among any other state. Australia’s initial purchase of Super Hornets occurred nine years ago to address the impending retirement of the F-111C, not their 71 F/A-18As (a contemporary Canada’s CF-18s with similar fatigue life issues). Their Hornets will be replaced by F-35s, with the first squadron of planes delivered in 2019 and the fleet declared operational in 2020. Canada could easily follow Australia’s lead and have an orderly transition to a F-35 fleet as fast as they could with the F/A-18E Super Hornet, at a lower cost and greater capability.

The Liberal government has repeatedly stressed that it will avoid playing politics with defence issues. However, the sole source selection of the F/A-18E/F, in any capacity, is simply a blatant form of political interference. While the Conservative government also attempted a sole-source selection of the F-35, they did so upon the recommendation of the military and bureaucracy. It is questionable whether that occurred here, as there is no military, economic or financial benefit for an interim purchase of the Super Hornet over the F-35. The only reason evident for the proposed purchase is to fulfill a questionable political campaign promise that was based on shoddy analysis.

And perhaps this is the greatest disappointment of the Liberal Government’s apparent decision. It entered into power with the promise to be better stewards of the public interest by practicing transparency and evidence based policymaking.5 Denmark has followed this path, resulting in a transparent process that has given credibility to its likely final selection of the F-35. Instead, the Liberal government seems intent in taking the opposite path, disregarding expert analysis and data from Government of Canada sources, as well as foreign reports like the Danish evaluation. It made an evaluation without a proper, credible procurement process, diminishing our international credibility and potentially saddling Canada with an inferior, higher cost aircraft – one that will leave the state and Canadian Armed Forces personnel exposed to greater threats in the future. This should not be allowed to pass.

1 http://www.fmn.dk/temaer/kampfly/Documents/type-selection-denmarks-new-fighter-aircrafts-english-summary5.pdf
2 http://breakingdefense.com/2016/02/bogdan-predicts-f-35s-for-less-than-80m-engines-included/
3 http://www.sldinfo.com/the-danish-parliament-and-the-new-fighter-moving-forward/
4 http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/tpsgc-pwgsc/P4-61-2014-eng.pdf
5 https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/06/a-fair-and-open-government.pdf

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Richard Shimooka is a defence analyst. His previous articles for the National Post and Defence Watch have argued that Canada should purchase the F-35

CDA Institute Analysis – “Trudeau’s Promises: From Coalition Operations to Peacekeeping and Beyond”

In this new CDA Institute Analysis, Stéfanie von Hlatky looks at the key considerations that should help guide the deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The following is an excerpt of the Analysis.

Academic and policy discussions on Canada’s future role in multinational military interventions inevitably refer back to the long war in Afghanistan. Canada’s involvement, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) evolved significantly over the years. Canada’s reputation as an alliance partner also improved noticeably in the process. As of 2006, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were known for operating with few caveats and were at the forefront of developing a viable whole-​of-​government approach as part of their design of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, despite obvious shortcomings.

Although the success metrics of the war in Afghanistan are hard to establish and the overall outcome of the intervention is inconclusive at best, the experience tells us a lot about Canada’s standing in alliance politics and what the CAF can be expected to do in the future as part of those coalitions, given the skills and expertise acquired during this war-​intensive period. Indeed, the CAF acquired diverse skills as the intervention called for both community engagement and warfighting, with a lot of necessary adaptations along the way.

Beyond the lessons learned from the previous war, Canada’s military role abroad should be guided by clear foreign and defence policy guidelines. The last defence policy statement dates back to 2008. With the economic recession hitting the country at about the same time, many of the plans outlined in the Canada First Defence Strategy had to be shelved. Now that there is a Liberal government in power, under the leadership of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, the Department of National Defence (DND) has been tasked with conducting a defence review. The review process includes public consultations across Canada, through the organization of events, roundtables, and discussions on social media. The result of this process will be unveiled in January 2017 and will provide greater clarity on Canada’s role in operations, force levels, readiness, and personnel issues.

This paper examines the conditions under which Canada should consider deploying the CAF and considers some of the motives that play into the decision-​making process. It does so by taking into account past and current CAF operations, as well as the defence priorities that have already been announced by the government. I argue that, moving forward, the Canadian government ought to think much more about the type of mission that is well suited for the CAF, where Canadian soldiers are most needed, as well as which allies and partners are best to work with.

Alliance Politics

One of the assumptions of this paper is that maintaining a reputation for reliability within an alliance setting is one of the main currencies of influence for a medium-​sized country like Canada. Therefore, decisions on the use of force are assessed in reference to Canada’s most important allies. That being said, it is worth asking whether Canada paid too high of a price to boost its reputation over the course of the Afghan War. In Afghanistan, but also more recently in Iraq as a member of the global coalition against the Islamic State, Canada strived to make military contributions that place it in the top tier of participating countries. As mentioned before, Canada is also seen as an alliance partner capable of deploying its armed forces with few restrictions on what they can do on the battlefield, meaning a higher tolerance for risky missions, which plays into allies’ qualitative assessments of burden-​sharing. The nightmare of coordinating national caveats was felt by ISAF commanders as they had to consider the various contributions made by each ally and partner, factoring in each nation’s rules of engagement and restrictions on their mobility in order to translate pledges into effective multinational military cooperation.

Given what Canada has invested in previous military interventions, the government would do well to invest in mechanisms that preserve allies’ coordination capacity and interoperability, either as part of NATO or US-​led coalitions. For NATO, the Secretary-​General has insisted on the utility of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) as the means through which NATO allies and partners can retain their capacity to work closely together, as refined through ISAF and Operation Unified Protector in Libya. The message was reinforced during the 2014 Wales Summit:

We continue to build on the experience gained in recent operations and improve our interoperability through the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). Today we have endorsed a substantial CFI Package consisting of six key deliverables, including the high-​visibility exercise Trident Juncture 2015, with 25,000 personnel to be hosted by Spain, Portugal, and Italy; a broader and more demanding exercise programme from 2016 onwards; and a deployable Special Operations Component Command headquarters.

Through CFI or military exercises led by the Alliance or individual nations, Canada has a stake in continuously sharpening its capacity to operate with other Western armed forces.

Why Participate in Military Operations?

The government of Canada, currently engaging in a comprehensive defence policy review, will examine how alliance ties can enhance the country’s foreign and defence policy goals, but the scope of the exercise is much broader. The review, which was launched by Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan in April 2016, is articulated around three issues: identifying the most pressing security challenges, defining the role of the CAF in meeting those challenges and finally, establishing the appropriate mix of capabilities needed by the CAF to accomplish their missions and tasks successfully. Therefore, as a point of departure, it is worth asking which security challenges or motives guide decisions on the use of force.

The primary motive for investing in the armed forces is national defence and, by extension, to contribute to regional and global security for the sake of international stability. In Canada, the absence of an existential security threat means the country’s military commitments are primarily assessed through alliance politics, especially the bilateral relationship with the United States. The US has a more expansive perception of threat than Canada, given its massive and global military footprint. Based on numerous treaty commitments and alliance ties, American armed forces have been deployed all over the world to defend US interests and partners, with the goal of ensuring international stability through the projection of its power. In Canada, decisions on the use of force are often taken as the result of US or NATO initiatives. Finally, the Canadian government may choose to use force for humanitarian purposes. The humanitarian logic of intervention can lead to operations ranging from disaster relief or peace support operations.

Click here to read the rest of the CDA Institute Analysis.

Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky is an assistant professor of political studies at Queen’s University and the Director of the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP). (Image courtesy of David Goldman/​Associated Press.)

Meggitt to provide surface and aerial targets to DND

*Originally published by Frontline Defence News

DND has awarded Meggitt Target Systems (MTAS) a five-year Standing Offer, worth up to $35 million, for surface and aerial target systems (with provisions for two additional years).

The majority of these targets will be manufactured at the company's manufacturing facility in Medicine Hat, Alberta, with production deliveries expected later this year.

The target systems selected include Hammerhead, an advanced, unmanned surface vehicle target that can form part of a swarm threat simulation of up to 16 vessels, and Vindicator, an aerial target that can present the appearance of various aircraft profiles to radar, for naval weapons development and personnel training.

MTAS’ Managing Director, Peter Longstaff commented: “The Canadian Armed Forces are a longstanding user of Meggitt target systems and we are delighted to be able to support their training and test and evaluation requirements locally.

Harper government funded Seaspan Shipyard to help with Contract

BY MARIE-DANIELLE SMITH

OTTAWA — The former Conservative government quietly helped fund improvements for a Vancouver shipyard that was scrambling to get ready for shipbuilding, despite saying it would not do so.

Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards received about $40 million in 2014-15 to get its engineering systems up to speed as it prepared to build non-combat vessels for the Canadian Coast Guard, documents suggest.

But one of the premises underlying the Conservative government’s enormous National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) — lauded by prime minister Stephen Harper’s government as the biggest defence program in Canadian history — is that shipyards would have to fund improvements to their shipbuilding infrastructure at no cost to Ottawa.

The existence of a government-funded program to help Seaspan, an association of western Canadian marine transportation companies, was revealed at a House of Commons committee meeting in December 2014.

Marty Muldoon, assistant deputy minister and chief financial officer at Fisheries and Oceans, told committee members $9.5 million of his department’s money was going to the “horizontal engineering program plan,” an initiative shared with the Department of National Defence.

That money was to help Seaspan “hit full stride in manufacturing capability or construction capability for our vessels,” he said.

“Basically, what we’re doing is investing in the shipyard’s capability to get itself up to capacity, to start churning out vessels.”

(Seaspan) went from a very small shipyard to a very large shipyard in a very short amount of time.

Though Public Services and Procurement Canada admits the contract is being used to help Seaspan create “material, engineering and production standards” for its yard, making systems consistent across “multiple projects,” it says this doesn’t count as the type of shipyard improvement forbidden under the agreement governing NSPS.

Jessica Kingsbury, a spokeswoman for PSPC, said this contract is “clearly distinguished” from capital investments Seaspan made to ready its yard for shipbuilding.

The horizontal engineering program plan is “in no way related to the criteria which the shipyards were required to meet, at their own cost, to achieve target-state,” she added.

Rather, it aims to co-ordinate and manage Seaspan’s non-combat package “more strategically,” through building a “program management capability.”

All three bids for NSPS contracts — from Halifax-based Irving, Seaspan and Quebec-based Davie — orginally included the guarantee that Ottawa wouldn’t pay to help the shipyards get ready for shipbuilding. Federal money would only go towards the shipbuilding projects.

But successful bidders Irving and Seaspan lacked capacity to start building ships when umbrella agreements were announced in 2011. Both negotiated to include clauses in the agreements, saying Ottawa would reimburse them for shipyard infrastructure if it decided to spend less than promised on new ships.

Irving and Seaspan also went to the provinces for money. Irving got a $304-million loan from Nova Scotia, $260 million of it forgivable, while Seaspan got only $40 million, for training from British Columbia.

No federal money was officially announced for either shipyard.

The agreement between Ottawa and Seaspan, dated Feb. 14, 2012, obtained by the National Post, says Seaspan agreed any improvements to shipyard capacity would be “paid for by the company entirely at its own expense” — unless Canada reneged on its commitments.

In November 2014, Seaspan announced a two-year, $170-million project to modernize its shipyard had finished “ahead of schedule and under-budget,” according to its website.

Still, recent job postings show it has continued hiring people to work on the “horizontal engineering program plan.”

The plan does not include improvements to physical infrastructure, but focuses on improving engineering systems, technical programs and management, says a consultant who worked for Seaspan from April to October 2014.

“It covered the whole spectrum of trying to stand up an engineering organization that was robust enough to support the overall shipbuilding objectives,” said Matt von Ruden, now director of vessels at Washington State Ferries.

Employees believed Ottawa was helping fund this work, he confirmed. “The government understood the need for this program, as far as I understand,” he said.

“(Seaspan) went from a very small shipyard to a very large shipyard in a very short amount of time.”

The fact government money was used for “systems” and “programs,” not physical infrastructure, may have made this a grey area under NSPS guidelines.

Several unusual contracts posted on the government’s Buy and Sell website from June 2014 to October 2015 appear to show money flowing into such programs.

For example, Public Services and Procurement Canada sourced just under $40 million in “engineering services” from the Vancouver shipyard.

Contracts are labelled as noncompetitive, representing the “best interests” and “value” to government. They differ from other contracts held by Seaspan, which are usually identified as being tied to a shipbuilding project.

The NSPS has an official budget of $39 billion, with $8 billion set aside for non-combat vessels.

Construction is expected to take at least 20 to 30 years, says the procurement department.

Seaspan began building the first of three offshore fisheries science vessels in June 2015 and the second in March. The three vessels, the first NSPS ships to come out of the improved Vancouver shipyard, are scheduled to be delivered by the end of 2017.

• Email: mdsmith@postmedia.com |
© Copyright (c) National Post

DND paralyzed as politicians, bureaucrats pass the buck: retired admiral

Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press

OTTAWA -- A retired admiral is telling the Trudeau government's defence review that National Defence is often paralyzed by timid bureaucrats and politicians who pass the buck on decisions.

Retired vice-admiral Bruce Donaldson, who until a few years ago was second-in-command of the military, says in a written brief that the system is set up to avoid risk and accountability.

"I suggest that there is a culture of risk intolerance that has infected the federal level -- financial in the case of public servants, and political in the case of ministers -- that has led government to prefer additional process, "third-party validation" of responsible officials' work, and serial delay to achieving results," Donaldson wrote.

He is referring to a trend that has developed since the political fiasco surrounding the F-35 stealth fighter purchase, which has seen government increasingly turn to outside experts and panels to assess and rubber-stamp its plans.

"Indeed, it appears that there is now a view that avoiding spending on intended outcomes is somehow a desirable 'result' for Canadians."

Instead, Donaldson says the net result is costly delays and failure to deliver necessary equipment and support.

Donaldson, who retired in 2013, also says the public has little understanding of federal finances, and doesn't realize that less money is spent on defence than in servicing the country's debt.

"Canadians lack any context for understanding the management of public funds at the federal level, and have been encouraged to view the expenditure of hundreds of millions -- or billions -- of dollars on military capability as inherently wasteful and unreasonable and has been encouraged to see spending on the military as wasteful."

He suggests government has done a poor job of educating citizens on the necessary cost of doing business as a country.

The Liberals held the first in a series of six public consultations this week in Vancouver as Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan attempts to craft an updated vision for the military.

It is the first time in over 20 years that citizens have been asked what role they believe the Canadian Armed Forces should be playing in the world and with what equipment.

The panel also heard from the country's leading organization representing defence industry contractors, which encouraged the Liberals to talk about more than just capabilities and hardware lists.

Christyn Cianfarani, head of the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries, says the defence review should commit the federal government to crafting a vision of how the defence industry can address the country's unique security and economic challenges.

Canada, unlike other countries, has not sat down and determined which industries are key national security assets. The notable exception is the shipbuilding industry, where the Harper government made a conscious decision to build both warships and coast guard vessels in the country, rather than off-shore.

Other nations, such as Britain, France, Japan and even Australia, have a more sophisticated relationship with their industries and weapons-makers and have decided to nurture and support key industrial sectors.

Cianfarani says she is not advocating anything as radical or expansive as the national shipbuilding strategy, which was also intended to stave off the collapse of the sector.

In an interview with The Canadian Press, she said more focus and organization could be put towards encouraging development in cyber-technology, Arctic mapping and communication, even unmanned aerial vehicles.

That could open up the Liberals to charges of picking winners and losers in the corporate world.

"I would rather have you pick a winner, than pick nothing and end up with losers," she said.

"In the absence of making a decision, inevitably the decision will be made for you. If we do not signal to foreign nations and foreign suppliers that there are things in Canada -- things we are willing to invest in -- then inevitably business will decide for you. Other nations will decide for you what you are left with."

DND fined $100,000 for diesel fuel spill from HMCS St. John’s

By: David Pugliese

Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) ST. JOHN’S conducts operations in the Davis Strait, east of Baffin Island on August 16 during Op NANOOK 12. Photo: CAF Combat Camera

The Department of National Defence was ordered on April 11 in Halifax Provincial Court to pay a penalty of $100,000 after the DND admitted violating the Fisheries Act.

The charges stem from a May 8, 2013, incident where approximately 9000 litres of diesel fuel was spilled from HMCS St. John’s into Halifax Harbour while the vessel was at anchor, according to the federal government.

More details from the government here:

This led to several reports of a large sheen in the harbour and a strong smell of diesel fuel in the surrounding area.

DND representatives reported the diesel fuel spill on the morning of May 8, 2013, and participated in efforts to contain and recover the spill over the next several days. On January 30, 2015, Environment and Climate Change Canada charged DND for an alleged violation of the Fisheries Act.

Of the $100,000 penalty, $98,000 will be directed to the Government of Canada’s Environmental Damages Fund.

The Environmental Damages Fund is administered by Environment and Climate Change Canada. The fund was created in 1995 to provide a way to direct funds received as a result of fines, court orders and voluntary payments to priority projects that benefit our environment.

Cyclone Lands at sea on HMCS Halifax for First Time

Written by: JDM, CAFDispatch Author, 

Published February 24, 2016 

The RCAF says it has reached a milestone for the CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopter project. The Cyclone fort the first time was fully manned by RCAF personnel, landed on a Canadian warship at sea. This took place on Jan. 27 with HMCS Halifax off the coast of Nova Scotia.

HMCS Halifax also participated in “ship helo operating limits” (SHOL) trials last year. Those tests went for five months. The SHOL trials  this year restarted in January.

A photo by a member of the Royal Canadian Navy, captures the Cyclone landing on the deck of HMCS Halifax.
Photo: CAF Combat Camera 

The Royal Canadian Navy, according to a Press Release from DND, says that HMCS Halifax will continue to operate with the Cyclone helicopter fleet for the remainder of the winter, conducting SHOL trials and furthering the ongoing integration of the Cyclone helicopter into naval operations. 

These updates were written by Sub-Lieutenant McCarthy, a member of HMCS Halifax’s crew, who provided updates on the program on DND's website.

ARCTIC RAM: CAF expanded Northern Presence

Members of the CAF during part of ARCTIC RAM-16. Photo: CAF Combat Camera

By: Braeden Jones Metro Published on Wed Feb 17 2016

Less than a decade ago, the Polar Continental Shelf Program (PCSP) compound northwest of Resolute on Cornwallis Island, Nu. could support about 62 people—today it can handle as many as 240 people.

“We’ve expanded four-fold in a very, very short time,” said acting PCSP Chief of Arctic Logistics Tim McCagherty.

Rapid expansion came thanks to cooperation integral to all operations in the high Arctic.

“If you’re not all working together, nothing happens,” McCagherty said. “Nobody stands alone in the Arctic.”

In this case, the cooperation is between his the PCSP—backed by Natural Resources Canada, Environment Canada, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans—and the Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre (CFATC), via the Department of National Defence (DND).

In 2007, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) received “the Canada First Defence strategy,” which mandated an increase in CAF Arctic presence and sovereignty defence.

“When (that) came up… the military turned around and said, ‘Okay, we’ve got to do an assessment of where we should place (a base of operations), and what should this facility do,” said Lt.Col Luc St. Denis.

The PCSP was established—albeit smaller—conveniently in the middle of the Canadian Arctic, and has one of the longest runways this far North, bar few, allowing for the kind of air projection vital to responding to sovereign threats almost anywhere North of Churchill.

McCagherty and company also offered 53 years of experience and an extensive network of contacts, pre-negotiated agreements, an established HF radio network and fuel caches.

“When we looked at all the factors, we needed mobility, we needed reach back to the south, we needed a central location and we needed good contacts,” St. Denis said of why CAF partnered the PCSP. “It was a win-win.”

He also said “training capability” was a primary need, hence the facility plan.

A planned expansion to the PCSP compound around 2009 allowed St. Denis an opportunity to propose the partnership, when he had his mandate and a $60 million budget to achieve his goals.

“I said… ‘I’ve got money, you’ve got the blueprint, what if we did a cut and paste, flipped it over and doubled the capacity to respond to my need?” St. Denis said.
He took the plan to DND in September 2010, it was approved by April 2011. Construction began the following summer and the ribbon was cut for the multi-departmental facility in 2013.

“That is something else,” St. Denis said. “The reason it worked is because of the partnership.”

McCagherty agreed with that sentiment.

“It’s kind of the case (of), ‘if you don’t bail and I don’t row, the both of us are going to sink in the boat,” he said. “So everybody has to work together and that relationship has been spectacular with the CFATC.”

From research to logistics

Today, the PCSP functions as a logistics provider. Originally founded in 1958, it was a base of operations for scientific research in the Canadian Arctic.

Now it provides support to more than 140 camps from the Resolute base, and has operated in more than 2,000 locations in the Canadian Arctic, touching every island there is.

It plans 18 months in advance by accepting submissions from researchers, public and government departments needing logistics support to work in their back yard. It provides flights, guides, accommodations and supplies to suit needs, and finds synergies between different operations to reduce costs.

The CFATC is managed by the Army, supports northern training to Army, Navy and Air Force members, and stages the CAF Arctic operations.

10th Anniversary of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command

DND Press
Article / February 2, 2016

On February 1, 2016, the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) celebrated its tenth anniversary.

In 2005, General Rick Hillier, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) asserted that “We need an integrated Canadian Forces that consists of maritime, air, land and special forces, woven together to make a more effective military.” Subsequently, he declared that he intended “on bringing JTF 2, along with all the enablers that it would need, to conduct operations successfully into one organization with one commander.” As result, on 1 February 2006, the CDS created CANSOFCOM as part of his larger transformation initiative. The Command included a headquarters, JTF 2, the Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU), the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR), and 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (SOAS).

CSOR Operators on Patrol in Afghanistan (Undated Photo DND)

Ten years into its existence, CANSOFCOM has proven itself as an integral national capability. It has conducted operations domestically and around the world, particularly in combat theatres and countries at risk. Throughout the past decade its members have demonstrated a high level of professionalism and expertise. Importantly, the Command has provided DND and the Government of Canada with a unique capability that is unmatched elsewhere in the Canadian Armed Forces or any other governmental department.

Canada’s history with special operations goes back to its beginnings as a French colony. Specifically, Canada’s SOF traditions can be traced back to la petite guerre conducted by the French-Canadian raiders during the struggle for colonial North America. Their daring and aggressive raids allowed the embryonic nation to punch above its weight in the battle for North America.

This tradition created a legacy that lives on to this day in the nation’s SOF forces. It was next resurrected in the Second World War as Canadians wrote a new chapter of national SOF history. Canadian participation in the British Special Operations Executive, responsible for sabotage and subversion in Occupied Europe, was the earliest example. Canada also created the Viking Force, its own version of the famous British Commandos, as well as the Royal Canadian Navy Beach Commando “W.” In addition, the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion, which boasted a 30 percent selection rate, as well as the Canadian component of the First Special Service Force, also known as the “Black Devils,” were stood up. Notably, all contributed to a proud national record in the conduct of special operations.

The special operations mandate in the post-war era fell to the Canadian Special Air Service Company, which existed between 1948 to 1949 and then to the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt), which spanned from 1968 to 1995. The Cdn AB Regt’s mandate was to deploy into an operational theatre within 48 hours to provide “a force capable of moving quickly to meet any unexpected enemy threat or other commitment of the Canadian Armed Forces,” as well as “special forces types of tasks.”

In was not until the mid-1990s, however, that Canada’s modern SOF capability began to truly take shape. On 1 April 1993, the Department of National Defence (DND) took over the national hostage rescue / counter-terrorism responsibility when it created Joint Task Force Two (JTF 2) to replace the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Special Emergency Task Force (SERT).

The deployment of a JTF 2 special operations task force to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attack in New York became a turning point for the unit, and for Canadian SOF at large. Much like many of its predecessors, JTF 2 carved its reputation in combat and earned its recognition internationally as a Tier 1 SOF unit. Continued combat duty in Afghanistan from 2005 to cessation of Canadian combat operations in 2011 simply reinforced its international credibility.