Federal Budget turns a blind eye to Canada's military needs

By David Krayden, National Post 

Opinion: Were the Liberals ever serious about their big defence plan? They cut defence spending in 2018 and are ignoring it in 2019

Last week’s federal budget offered relatively modest spending with targeted funding after years of spending from a government that seemed to believe the deficit will solve itself. Unfortunately, the Canadian Armed Forces again escaped the finance minister’s gaze and for the second consecutive year, national defence is conspicuous by its absence from the budget.

A Canadian soldier provides security as medics assist German troops during a medical evacuation demonstration on the United Nations base in Gao, Mali, on Dec. 22, 2018.Adrian Wyld/CP

You might recall the fanfare when Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan released the Liberals’ defence policy review in 2017: “Strong, Secure, Engaged.” It was already more than six months overdue and there was a feeling among defence analysts and most journalists that the Liberals had to deliver a document that suggested serious resolve.

HMCS Windsor, one of Canada’s Victoria-class long range patrol submarines, returns to port in Halifax on June 20, 2018. Andrew Vaughan/CP

Sajjan promised a whopping 70-per-cent increase in defence spending, pledging to drive funding up to $32.7 billion from $18.9 billion. Naval ships, combat-support vehicles and 88 fighter jets would be replaced through “an open and transparent competition.”

But there was one large disclaimer. All of this would happen over the next decade, assuming the realities of 2017 would remain constant during that period. How well would any government have done predicting the military needs of 1942 based on the geopolitics of 1932?

In any case, we’ve yet to see any indication that the Liberals were serious about the plan. They cut defence spending in 2018 and have ignored it in 2019.

A Canadian soldier prepares to leave base in Gao, Mali, on Aug. 1, 2018, to take part in an operation as part of the United Nations mission in that country. AFP/Getty Images

Was there an alternative motive to the 2017 defence review? Canada was still in the midst of NAFTA negotiations with an American president who was increasingly critical of our defence contribution, especially as it pertained to NATO. Donald Trump had repeatedly cited Canada as one of the deadbeat members of NATO that refuses to fund its military at two per cent of its GDP — despite having promised to do so and notwithstanding that we have done so in the past. With Budget 2019, Canada is no closer to meeting that pledge, spending 1.23 per cent of its GDP on national defence.

A photograph taken out the window of a Canadian Forces CC-150 Polaris tanker shows a CF-18 Hornet fighter jet being refuelled in the air over Vancouver on Feb. 18, 2010. Master Corporal Andrew Collins, 14 Wing Imaging

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s desultory approach to defence capital acquisition may well be defined by the fighter jet fiasco that grows more bizarre with every twist and turn of the story. It was the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien that joined the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter development program. It was Stephen Harper’s Conservative government that dithered on procuring the aircraft. It is the current Trudeau government that decided to start the whole process again. In the meantime, the Liberals considered buying some interim Super Hornets from Boeing before ultimately deciding to pick up some used Australian F-18s — just as the Royal Australian Air Force took delivery of its first F-35s.A

Perhaps the best speech of this year’s just-concluded Manning Networking Conference in Ottawa was delivered by former chief of defence staff Gen. Rick Hillier. Hillier, whose career was defined by integrity and a politics-be-damned leadership style, told the conservative gathering that if Canada “buys a fighter aircraft that is anything but the F-35, we will have lost our minds.”

The last prime minister who consistently funded the Canadian military was Louis St-Laurent. All successive administrations — Liberal and Conservative — have to varying degrees played the shell game with defence spending. While lauding a capital acquisition project here, they will starve another project over there to pay for it. While promising consistent funding, they will squeeze the military at the first opportunity when a fiscal need emerges elsewhere.


They will squeeze the military at the first opportunity

With defence procurement being so hamstrung by petty politics and policy inertia, no amount of government funding can guarantee a combat-capable military if those dollars are not efficiently and effectively spent. As Hillier said, “Our acquisition process in Canada, in particular for the Department of National Defence, is abhorrent. It is pointless to give the Department of National Defence increased spending if you then tie them in a Gordian knot where they can’t actually spend the money.”

Sadly, that’s exactly what we’re doing.

— David Krayden is a former Royal Canadian Air Force public affairs officer and legislative assistant on Parliament Hill. He has worked in print, radio and television journalism and is currently the Ottawa bureau chief for The Daily Caller, a Washington-based media outlet.

CAF Says Submarines can operate until mid-2020s

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch 

The Victoria-class submarines were expected to reach the end of their operational lives starting in 2022, according to documents obtained under the Access to Information law.

That could have been a major problem for the federal government as it is looking at planning a modernization program for the on-board systems on the class, starting in 2023 or 2024.

If the subs were to reach the end of their operational lives starting a year earlier, how would that have worked?

HMCS Victoria operating on the west coast. Photo by David Pugliese.

Defence Watch asked that question and has been informed that things have now changed. Department of National Defence spokesman Daniel Le Bouthillier said that the Victoria-class start to reach the end of their operational life in the mid-2020s. That later date was determined after DND officials did a more extensive examination of the submarine fleet life.

But there are still no details on what needs to be done to extend the life of the subs, how much that will cost, or when that will be done. “The Victoria-class Modernization (VCM) Program is currently in the Options Analysis stage, where the preferred modernization option is being selected,” Le Bouthillier noted. “Details of specific capabilities and milestones will be determined as the program evolves.”

Last year Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan praised the capability submarines provide Canada. “No other platform in the Canadian Armed Forces can do what a submarine can do,” Sajjan said. “No other platform has the stealth, the intelligence-gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance capability and the deterrence to potential adversaries that a sub does.”

But the Liberals have rejected a Commons defence committee recommendation that the Victoria-class subs, bought used in 1998 from the United Kingdom, be replaced with submarines capable of under-ice capabilities.

“The government has also committed to modernizing the four Victoria-class submarines to include weapons and sensor upgrades that will enhance the ability of the submarines to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and deliver necessary improvements of platform and combat systems to extend operational capability to the mid-2030’s,” the government response to the committee noted.

Opinion: Canada Should Consider Hybrid Submarines

By: Danny Lam, Frontline Defence

Outrageous cost estimates for nuclear-powered submarines tend to cloud Canadian thinking for recapitalizing its submarine fleet. The US Navy is presently building Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines for USD$2.6 billion per unit. At CAD $1.5 to $3B (assuming no cost overruns), DND’s proposal for extending the lives of its four Victoria class conventional submarines for another 6-18 years appears a comparative bargain. But there must be a better way.

Off-the-shelf submarine designs that are direct or equivalent replacements to the Victoria class, like the German Type 212s presently are in the 300 to 400 million euros range (U$350-470 million), Swedish Gotlands are in the U$200-300 million range, while the Japanese Soyru is around U$550 million. These costs are roughly comparable to the high end of extending the life of Canada’s existing fleet. However, they do not reflect foreign military sales “markup” and likely exclude the weapons suite – nor are these prices based on quantity.

If any of these candidates can be built in quantity – and an exception made to arcane Canadian military procurement rules that require the design to be manufactured wholly in Canada or have restrictive industrial and technological benefit demands – it is undeniably possible to substantially lower costs.

The first challenge to costs is volume. Development, or non-recurring engineering costs make up a sizable percentage of the cost of a small fleet. If an existing, proven, hull can be slightly modified, it is a major cost saver. That will require DND to end the habit of imposing onerous modifications that inevitably cause costs to explode like the CSC or Maritime Helicopter program. Another route to substantial cost savings is to share the development costs of major items like the propulsion and power plant with partners.

Nuclear propulsion was a major innovation in submarine technology. It significantly extends endurance to the point where it is limited only by food and consumables, and crew stamina.

Technologies like air independent propulsion (AIP) or lithium batteries that extend the endurance of diesel submarines but introduce major compromises in performance. But neither of these options are satisfactory for Canadian naval requirements.

With or without AIP, diesels are far too “short legged” – they are dependent on logistically complex supplies such as liquid oxygen that deplete quickly; and the engines are mechanically complex. These are distinct disadvantages given the long distances and extended under-ice missions that are unique to Canada.

Whenever a diesel “snorts”, it leaves a very visible plume of smoke and heat that is readily detectable. Radar can pick out periscopes or snorkels. Then there is the deafening noise of diesels, even when equipped with the latest quieting technologies. Thus, nuclear propulsion in some form is still the ideal for Canadian requirements.

The dominant paradigm for a modern nuclear-powered submarine is for a steam generating reactor driving turbines that directly drive the propulsor or propeller. The French Barracuda offers a limited hybrid design that enables electric propulsion for low speed cruising and turbo-mechanical drives at higher speeds. The Tullibee (SSN-597) and Glenard P. Lipscomb (SSN-685) were two nuclear-electricvessels that experimented with the technology, but it was not competitive against nuclear-steam turbo-mechanical for blue water operations. At the other end of the spectrum, a “mini” 400 ton nuclear submarine NR-1 was used for many key deep-ocean, bottom-exploration tasks.

Due to their endurance, nuclear submarines tend to be blue water, ocean-going vessels. Los-Angeles and Virginia class fast attack submarines displace 6-8,000 tons. French Barracudas are about 5,000 tons, UK’s Astutes are 7,000 tons, while the Shortfin Barracuda (conventional version) is about 4,000 tons. Compared to the Upholder/Victoria class at about 2,500 tons, they are large vessels.

A small nuclear-powered attack submarine that is large enough to support a good sized crew and carry unmanned systems would be ideal for Canada, but presently, none is available because nuclear submarines are historically optimized for stealth in blue water. Much of Canadian waters in the Arctic are relatively shallow, and along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts up to the continental shelf where Canadian submarines are most likely to operate. A fleet nuclear submarine (6-8,000 ton range) is neither necessary nor ideal for Canadian waters.

The dominant design for nuclear propulsion places a premium on sustained high speed, even though most submarines cannot do so while maintaining acceptable radiated noise levels. Sustained high speed, except for “getaway” or transit, is a capability that is rarely needed. Because nuclear reactors react relatively slowly to throttling, it also means that nuclear energy generates a large infra-red signature that is a much bigger liability in littoral vs. blue waters. Hybrids offer a novel solution.

A nuclear-steam-electric hybrid is a potentially attractive alternative to the dominant nuclear turbo mechanical drive. One or more modular reactors can be used to generate steam to drive a turbine generator. The ability to completely shut down a reactor module, and tightly match energy demand with supply, reduces the amount of excess (waste) heat dumped – don’t forget, that heat dump is detectable.

Machinery noise from the nuclear turbo-mechanical generator can be more readily controlled if the system is operated at (and optimized for a relatively narrow power band) with no requirements for rapid throttling as with a turbo-mechanical drive. Electricity generated can be stored in state-of-the-art lithium batteries. Reactor shielding can potentially make use of lead acid cells doing double duty. Electric power from batteries driving propulsors offer the prospect of extremely low radiated noiseand yet maintain a high degree of “throttlability” with only limited compromises in sustained high speed cruising that would be a function of the nuclear plant’s power ramp and maximum output. Making the propulsor jets steerable and eliminating control fins is an additional benefit in minimizing the active signature.

Building such a submarine within a small displacement (2,5-3,500 tons surfaced) 60 days endurance, transit speed of 20 knots, burst speeds above 30 knots, and state of the art signature management technologies and support for unmanned platforms would be cost prohibitive for all but the largest Navies.

Canada, however, has potentially very good technologies that can contribute to a joint venture for a new hybrid nuclear submarine design. The Canadian SLOWPOKE reactor has been operating in Canada since 1971 and is licensed for unattended operation. A later variant was rated for 2-10MW per module, just about ideal for a small nuclear-powered submarine. It is conceivable that the design can be freshened, miniaturized, compacted and “fitted” into an existing conventional submarine design displacing 2,500 to 4,000 tons, though quieting radiated noise of a small displacement submarine is challenging and require considerable ingenuity and technical competence.

Packaged with a turbo-generator plant, a SLOWPOKE reactor can also have many civilian applications such as being a steam generating plant for low GHG heavy oil extraction SAGD facilities, or a stationary energy plant for Northern communities. The more units deployed, the lower the fixed costs. That will also spread the political constituencies in favour of the program from just the coastal provinces to Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, Nunavut, and NW Territories: A major consideration given the political fault lines in Canada for a multi billion dollar program.

If Canada contributed a major portion of the development cost of a new modular nuclear power plant for a hybrid submarine, it can be used to negotiate a good price on the vessel. It will also be the only small naval reactor / power plant available that can potentially also be used on surface vessels like the Canadian Surface Combatant or civilian vessels – reducing GHG emissions from shipping potentially opens up lucrative markets for Canadian nuclear technology. Who might partner with Canada?

Germany, Sweden, France, Japan, Australia are all potential partners. Each nation’s existing or planned submarine designs are potentially good candidates, in fact, the French are already working on a new hybrid Barracuda variant for Australia. A collaboration with Japan, which has begun work on its next generation submarines, can contribute certain technologies, like lithium ion batteries (in which they excel). Any of these would deliver a state-of-the-art nuclear-powered submarine for a fraction of the cost of “going it alone” or the Australian “built in Australia” technology transfer model. The key will be that the new co-developed hybrid nuclear submarine must find additional markets beyond the needs of the partners.

The question is, can such a new vessel be built in quantity (more than 20) for less than US$700 million a copy?

Success in this program will forever banish the ghost of the DeHavilland Arrow.

It will be challenging, but Canadian ingenuity is up to it.

– Danny Lam

Liberals to spend $2.5-billion to keep Victoria-Class Submarines Operating Past 2030

By: Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press 

The Trudeau government is planning to spend billions more on the navy's four wayward submarines to keep them operating into the 2030s.

The plan to extend the lives of the troubled vessels is included in the Liberals' new defence policy and comes following calls from senior naval officers to save the controversial ships from the scrap heap.

The actual price of the plan was not revealed in the policy document, which was released to much fanfare last week, and National Defence refused to provide a price tag following multiple requests.

That is despite assertions from the Liberal government that the defence policy was fully costed and following promises of full transparency when it came to the overall plan.

"Detailed costing will be provided in the Defence Investment Plan to be published in due course," National Defence spokesman Daniel Le Bouthillier said in an e-mail.

Defence sources, however, have told The Canadian Press that keeping the submarines in the water for another decade will cost upwards of $2.5-billion.

Without upgrades, the first of the submarines will reach the end of its life in 2022, according to documents obtained last year through Access to Information, with the last retired in 2027.

Some have questioned the wisdom of spending more money on the four vessels, which have been plagued with problems since Canada bought them used from Britain in 1998.

While the Chretien government said at the time that it was getting a bargain by paying only $750-million, the ships have required constant repairs and upgrades just to make them seaworthy for a limited time.

And while a number of experts have called for Canada look to purchase new submarines, rather than upgrading the ones it has, others have said the country doesn't need such expensive vessels.

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan this week emphasized the Liberal government's view, previously expressed by senior naval officials, that subs are necessary for protecting Canada's security and sovereignty.

"No other platform in the Canadian Armed Forces can do what a submarine can do," Sajjan said during an event in Halifax on Monday.

"No other platform has the stealth, the intelligence-gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance capability and the deterrence to potential adversaries that a sub does."

Sajjan added that the government decided upgrading the existing subs – HMCS Chicoutimi, Victoria, Corner Brook and Windsor – was more "prudent" than purchasing new vessels.

The Liberals promised in their defence policy to invest an additional $62-billion in the military over the next 20 years, which includes increasing annual defence spending by 70 per cent over the next decade.

A large chunk of that new money will end up going towards replacing the navy's 12 frigates and three recently retired destroyers with 15 new warships at a cost of between $56-billion and $60-billion.

Previous estimates had pegged the cost of those vessels at $26-billion.

The four submarines continue to generate headlines for the wrong reasons, with the most recent Thursday when HMCS Chicoutimi was hit by another naval vessel while docked at CFB Esquimalt in B.C.

But Rob Huebert, an expert on maritime security at the University of Calgary, said the other three have been involved in a variety of tasks and mission in recent months – even if most Canadians don't realize it.

"The very nature of what they do means that (the military) can't talk about it," he said.

"They're actually exceeding what the navy was expecting them to do in terms of time at sea, interdiction of drugs and co-operation with the Americans. You can't talk about any of that, but it is occurring."

Rather than extend the lives of the submarines, Huebert said he would have liked to see the government start looking for replacements, but that wasn't possible given the huge costs of replacing the frigates.

"What we saw was the defence review was an intelligent decision to do what was necessary to lengthen the life of the subs while making sure the (new warships) are built," he said.

HMCS Windsor participates in NATO anti-submarine exercise DYNAMIC MONGOOSE

RCN Press Release

Her Majesty’s Canadian Submarine (HMCS) Windsor is taking part in Exercise Dynamic Mongoose 2016, a 10-day NATO anti-submarine warfare exercise, June 23 to July 2 in the Norwegian Sea.

HMCS Windsor (front right) steams in formation with other participants during the NATO anti-submarine warfare exercise Dynamic Mongoose on June 27, 2016 in the Norwegian Sea.

The exercise will see the participation of 3,000 sailors and aircrew from eight allied countries, including Canada, France, Germany, Norway, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The focus of the exercise is on detecting and defending against submarines. During the exercise, the submarines will have to travel from one location to another while surface vessels try to track them down and simulate an attack. The surface units will also have to travel between two transit points while under the threat of submarines.

“Submarines are the Royal Canadian Navy’s (RCN’s) ultimate war fighting capability and an essential component of a balanced combat-effective navy,” said Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd, Commander of the RCN. “Canada, with the largest maritime estate in the world, has interests well beyond our borders and continent, and should have tools that can declare exclusive control over a body of water at specific intervals, which is what submarine does. During this exercise, HMCS Windsor is proving once again the value of submarines and the capabilities of Canada’s Victoria Class.”

Last year, HMCS Windsor logged nearly 200 days at sea and is on track to do the same for 2016. The fact the boat has spent nearly two-thirds of its time conducting operations at sea represents the demands the RCN has for this valuable, strategic asset.