Canadian Submarines not part of international Arctic under-ice exercise

Kaila Jefferd-Moore, CBC News 

Royal Navy submarine HMS Trenchant after it had broken through the metre-thick ice of the Arctic Ocean to join two U.S. boats on a major exercise. Ice Exercise 18 (ICEX) is a series of demanding trials in the frigid climate of the Arctic Circle, designed to test submariners' skills in operating under the Arctic ice cap. No Canadian submarines took part. (MoD/Crown copyright 2018)

Over five weeks, the British submarine HMS Trenchant travelled beneath — and broke through — Beaufort Sea ice alongside two U.S. submarines.

It was there as part of the Arctic and Ice Exercise (ICEX) 2018, a U.S. Navy submarine arctic warfare exercise involving U.S., Canadian and British armed forces.

Taking place about 200 kilometres off the Alaskan coast in the Beaufort Sea, the exercise was designed, in part, for the U.S. Navy to practise and test the operational and tactical capabilities of its submarines under ice.

The Trenchant is one of the United Kingdom's Royal Navy submarines that has extensive under-ice capabilities.

"This exercise shows that our Royal Navy is primed and ready to operate in the harshest conditions imaginable, to protect our nation from any potential threats," Armed Forces Minister Mark Lancaster said in a Royal Navy news release.

The Royal Canadian Navy, however, cannot make the same claim about its submarines.

Canada's fleet of submarines, bought 20 years ago from the British Royal Navy, didn't join the latest ICEX operation. The Royal Canadian Navy's HMCS Windsor, Victoria, Chicoutimi and Corner Brook aren't designed for those kinds of under-ice uses.
Canada buys British submarines

Unlike their nuclear counterparts, Canadian submarines are limited to open water and near-ice-edge operations, an acknowledged concession due to budgetary realities. This is in part because they're diesel powered boats, and must come up for air periodically.

Both the U.S.and British navies have nuclear-powered submarines with the capacity to stay underwater for as long as a crew's food supply lasts. They can confidently travel under arctic ice.

Still, the Royal Canadian Navy has been involved in ICEX since 2011, according to naval communications adviser, Jennifer St. Germain. This year, Canada offered a "modest contribution" to ICEX 2018, sending "a naval communicator to support the exercises." That's one Canadian among a sea of many U.S. Navy and Royal Navy personnel.

The Royal Canadian Air Force also participated in the exercises, but did not respond to a CBC request for information on their involvement.

Sailors line up on Canadian submarine HMCS Corner Brook to salute Queen Elizabeth II during an international fleet review Tuesday, June 29, 2010 in Halifax. (Paul Chiasson/CP)

❄️ Submarine HMS Trenchant has broken through the ice of the #NorthPole. Here's the moment she punches through. ❄️

More pictures here: https://t.co/jaxxuzjo9d pic.twitter.com/rER6nUmaHr

— Royal Navy (@RoyalNavy) 

Canada relies on U.S. for security

Robert Huebert, a political science professor at the University of Calgary with a specific interest in arctic sovereignty and security, said the relationship between the U.S. and Canadian naval forces is one of the strongest in the world.

Without the ability to patrol and protect its arctic sovereignty, Canada relies on its allies — in particular the U.S. Navy — to help enforce it, Huebert explained.

Arctic sovereignty, according to Huebert, means "determining the boundaries within the region of the Arctic that Canada asserts having complete and absolute control [over]."

But the the ability of Canada's submarine fleet to work under ice isn't about sovereignty — it's about security, said Huebert.

"Sovereignty is about the international legal control, but security is about the enforcement ability."

Over the long term, Huebert said, it's important to keep an eye on China's naval forces, which now have icebreakers and an Arctic policy. He said it isn't hard to imagine that the Chinese will someday have under-ice submarine capabilities.

"It does bring up the question of sovereign control," Huebert said.
What does China's new Arctic policy mean for Canada?
A co-operative affair

Under the North American Aerospace Defence Command (Norad) agreement, the Canadian Armed Forces play a supportive role in the joint effort to patrol and protect North American arctic waters.

In 2017, the Canadian Armed Forces contracted Ocean Networks Canada to begin testing the feasibility of sensor-technology that would allow the navy to detect and track vessel traffic entering the Northwest Passage. This would replace the North Warning System that's been in use since the 1980s.

St. Germain said agreements with the Canadian Coast Guard on joint Arctic operations, and the addition of new Arctic patrol ships, mean the Royal Canadian Navy's "presence in the Arctic will increase in the near future."

Danish Arctic Patrol Ship coming to Halifax

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch 

Representatives from Canada’s defence industry are being invited to tour a Danish Arctic patrol ship that will be in Halifax April 4-5.

The EJNAR MIKKELSEN (EJMI) is one of three KNUD RASMUSSEN-class Arctic vessels, supplementing the four units of the larger THETIS-class, Lt. Col. Per Lyse Rasmussen of the Danish embassy in Washington, pointed out to Canadian industry.

The ship is similar in design to Canada’s Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships being built by Irving but it is smaller. What is also significantly smaller is the cost. Each AOPS is estimated to cost $700 million. The Danish ships are estimated to cost $70 million to $80 million each.

Here are some more details about the ship provided by Rasmussen to Canadian industry representatives:

EJMI is primarily used in the Arctic and specifically in the waters around Greenland as an Arctic Patrol Vessel. Main missions are surveillance, sovereignty enforcement, search and rescue, fishery protection and support to the local community. Other tasks include environmental monitoring, assistance to research and scientific studies, navigational tasks, ice reconnaissance, collection of weather and oceanographic data, icebreaking, explosive ordinance disposal and transportation of personnel and materiel. Additionally, EJMI also offers assistance to Greenland’s Home Rule Government, the Danish Meteorological Institute, the National Police of Denmark, Customs Authorities and many others.

Some useful facts about EJMI, which was named 13 September 2008 after one of the Danish polar explorers:

Length (total): 71,80 meters

Beam: 14,60 meters

Draught: 4,95 meters

Displacement (standard): 2,050 tonnes

Engines: Two MAN diesels 7.770 hp, three generators

Speed (eco): 12 knots

Speed (max): 17 knots

Icebreaking capability: about 3 feet (up to 5 feet)

Basic crew: 19 (up to 43/45)

Range at 12 knots: 7,050 nm

Container positions: 4 standard flex

Weaponry: One 3-inch Oto Melare gun, two 50-cal heavy machine guns, two light machine guns

Other facilities: Flight deck, hospital, SAR-vessel, RHIBs.

Photos Courtesy of the Danish Navy. 

What does China's new Arctic policy mean for Canada?

By: Jimmy Thompson, CBC News 

In January China released a white paper describing its Arctic policy in a rare public move.

The policy outlines plans to develop shipping routes, expand its research programs, pursue environmental protection and develop resources across the Arctic.

The Chinese icebreaker Xuelong, or Snow Dragon, docked Thursday in Shanghai, after an 85-day scientific quest across the Arctic Ocean. (Pei Xin, Xinhua/Associated Press)

"I'm a little shocked," said University of Calgary associate professor Robert Huebert.

"The Chinese do not issue white papers. This clearly illustrated how important the Arctic is to the Chinese."

Experts say the policy is attempting to tread a line — between respecting the sovereignty of Arctic nations, like Canada and the United States, and leaving room to gain from disputes in international law.

Like the Arctic Council, the document specifically refers to the rights of the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. It also references environmental protection, scientific research and international cooperation.

But it also repeatedly comes back to respect for international law, a choice that Huebert and Université Laval professor Frédéric Lasserre view as an attempt to articulate limits on Arctic states' sovereignty.
'It's this ambiguity over what China wants to do in the Arctic that's a bit troubling.'-Frédéric Laserre, professor at Université Laval

For example, the United States views the Northwest Passage as an "international strait" while Canada sees it as "internal waters" — a semantic difference that could mean major changes in how the waterway is managed and who has the right to use it.

Lasserre is co-author of China's Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada, a book coincidentally also released on Friday.

"We don't know how China places the hierarchy between Arctic states and international law," Lasserre said.

"It's this ambiguity over what China wants to do in the Arctic that's a bit troubling."

Huebert said China is especially interested in issues of sovereignty and access to shipping lanes, as growing and maintaining Arctic shipping is a "core Arctic interest."
A 'Near-Arctic state'?

China refers to itself as a "near-Arctic state" throughout the policy document.

The term that has no formal legal meaning.

However, it's been used in the past by non-Arctic countries that were eager to gain Arctic Council observer status.

China gained that status in 2013.

India has taken that a step further when applying for observer status, saying that its prehistoric geological connection to Antarctica qualifies it as a polar nation.

Lasserre said China's Arctic ambitions have largely been carried out thus far in Russia — with investments in a liquefied natural gas project in the Yamal oilfield and more interest in the Northern Sea Route by Russia than Canada's Northwest Passage.
New investments, new risks

But just last year, the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long completed a transit of the Northwest Passage.
'Be careful what you wish for.'- Robert Huebert, University of Calgary professor

In addition, Chinese state-owned firms have made tentative forays into Canadian mining.

The policy paper specifically refers to an increase in Chinese Arctic tourism, something Yellowknife has been an example of in recent years.

In 2016, Chinese tourists outnumbered Japanese for the first time ever in Yellowknife.

"They are clearly, clearly aware that there are new opportunities for investment in this region," Huebert said, adding that inviting Chinese investment in the Canadian Arctic could be a double-edged sword.

"Be careful what you wish for," he said.

"If the Chinese do start investing more [in Canada], if the Chinese do start sending more shipping — outside of the obvious economic benefits that would provide — what are some of the longer-term impacts in regards to the environment? In regards to the communities?"
'What do you intend to do?'

Both Huebert and Lasserre say the document is notable, in part, for what it leaves out.

"We're starting to see a little bit of Chinese naval activity, especially around the fringes of the Arctic, and that's always something that we have to keep an eye on," Huebert said.

Canada has begun making investments in its Arctic surveillance and security systems, including a new network of listening posts and the first of the Harry DeWolf Class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships currently nearing completion in Halifax.

For Lasserre, the solution is to keep a running dialogue as questions arise across the Arctic.

"I think that's what Arctic states should do in the future: ask clearly, 'What do you intend to do?'"

Smol: Canada is Weak in the Arctic

By: Robert Smol, CBC Opinions 

Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent boast of possessing an arsenal of undetectable nuclear weapons has not really had material effect on geo-political relations — yet. North American and European preoccupation of late has been less on Russia's military procurement than on the acute issue of the nerve agent attack on an ex-spy in the U.K.

On Monday, Canada and the U.S. both announced it would be expelling diplomats from its borders in response to the attack.

But despite this recent action, this country continues to bask in that ever-so-Canadian sense of delusion when it comes to understanding our place in a potential future Russian-American standoff. And while I do not want to sound like those old-fashioned "Russians are Coming" harbingers of hype, it is important that we take careful stock of our strategic military options in the case of a superpower spat — or worse.

For starters, the notion of a neutral, peaceful demilitarized Canada is a delusion. Whether we like it or not, Canada is perfectly placed to be the battleground of choice in a future conflict: we share a long and long-disputed Arctic border with an increasingly militaristic and hostile superpower.

Largely unpopulated, open and scantily defended, Canada's Arctic is the safest and shortest line of attack and counterattack in a potential conflict. To think that Russians, North Koreans or Americans will decide, out of courtesy, to hang a detour around the second-largest country in the world is dangerously naïve and irresponsible. And the United States will not necessarily protect Canada in the case of a ballistic missile attack, as Canada's senior officer in Norad reminded us last year.

We know that Russia is rather unabashedly building up its military presence in the Arctic. There are at least 18 recently constructed or upgraded Russian military bases along the Russian-Canadian Arctic border, along with its sizeable air force, nuclear submarines and 40 operational icebreakers with more under construction.

In terms of Canadian military assets in the region, we maintain a small signals intelligence facility on Ellesmere Island (CFS Alert), which is manned by approximately 60 personnel — not all of whom are serving military. In Yellowknife, Joint Task Force North maintains a small headquarters staff of approximately 70 personnel, with an area support unit of 50.
Boots in the snow

The Royal Canadian Air Force is represented in the region by a non-combat utility transport squadron flying four small CC-138 Twin Otter aircraft that came into operation around the time our prime minister was born. And apart from the southern Canada-based soldiers who occasionally stick their heads into the Arctic for short exercises, there is no permanent "boots in the snow" combat establishment ready to deal with a violation of our territory.

Meanwhile, the closest thing to a ground force on the Canadian side consists of a series of patrols of minimally trained reserve auxiliaries, The Canadian Rangers, who each receive all of 10 days training and are still carrying vintage World War II rifles.

Our government might try to assure us that the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship project, which is currently under construction, will provide a deterrent to possible Russian aggression. But the minimal armament for these boats will place these ships in a "constabulary role," according to the Royal Canadian Navy. Translation: they are not going into battle.

The hull assembly of Canada's first AOPS. This ship is not going into battle, writes Robert Smol. (Andrew Vaughan/Canadian Press)

We might tell ourselves that the specially trained Russian soldiers, warships and fighter bomber aircraft that are now rigorously training on bases such as Sredny Ostrov, Alexandra Land and Nagurskoye near ourdisputed northern border have no nefarious intentions, at least when it comes to Canada. But they are there, armed and ready, on our disputed border. So the question is: what are their intentions?

Just how much longer can we pretend that our strategically important and resource-rich Arctic will remain secure? Can we really afford to delude ourselves into thinking that our projection of ourselves as a "peacekeeping nation" will be enough for the superpowers to both respect Canada's claims to the Arctic and sidestep our territory in the event of war?

As time goes on, and other nations continue to stake their claim on the Arctic, the answer may soon not be ours to make.

Robert Smol served over 20 years in the Canadian Armed Forces. He is currently a teacher and freelance writer in Toronto.

This column is part of CBC's Opinion section. For more information about this section, please read this editor's blog and our FAQ.

Opinion: Canada Should Consider Hybrid Submarines

By: Danny Lam, Frontline Defence

Outrageous cost estimates for nuclear-powered submarines tend to cloud Canadian thinking for recapitalizing its submarine fleet. The US Navy is presently building Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines for USD$2.6 billion per unit. At CAD $1.5 to $3B (assuming no cost overruns), DND’s proposal for extending the lives of its four Victoria class conventional submarines for another 6-18 years appears a comparative bargain. But there must be a better way.

Off-the-shelf submarine designs that are direct or equivalent replacements to the Victoria class, like the German Type 212s presently are in the 300 to 400 million euros range (U$350-470 million), Swedish Gotlands are in the U$200-300 million range, while the Japanese Soyru is around U$550 million. These costs are roughly comparable to the high end of extending the life of Canada’s existing fleet. However, they do not reflect foreign military sales “markup” and likely exclude the weapons suite – nor are these prices based on quantity.

If any of these candidates can be built in quantity – and an exception made to arcane Canadian military procurement rules that require the design to be manufactured wholly in Canada or have restrictive industrial and technological benefit demands – it is undeniably possible to substantially lower costs.

The first challenge to costs is volume. Development, or non-recurring engineering costs make up a sizable percentage of the cost of a small fleet. If an existing, proven, hull can be slightly modified, it is a major cost saver. That will require DND to end the habit of imposing onerous modifications that inevitably cause costs to explode like the CSC or Maritime Helicopter program. Another route to substantial cost savings is to share the development costs of major items like the propulsion and power plant with partners.

Nuclear propulsion was a major innovation in submarine technology. It significantly extends endurance to the point where it is limited only by food and consumables, and crew stamina.

Technologies like air independent propulsion (AIP) or lithium batteries that extend the endurance of diesel submarines but introduce major compromises in performance. But neither of these options are satisfactory for Canadian naval requirements.

With or without AIP, diesels are far too “short legged” – they are dependent on logistically complex supplies such as liquid oxygen that deplete quickly; and the engines are mechanically complex. These are distinct disadvantages given the long distances and extended under-ice missions that are unique to Canada.

Whenever a diesel “snorts”, it leaves a very visible plume of smoke and heat that is readily detectable. Radar can pick out periscopes or snorkels. Then there is the deafening noise of diesels, even when equipped with the latest quieting technologies. Thus, nuclear propulsion in some form is still the ideal for Canadian requirements.

The dominant paradigm for a modern nuclear-powered submarine is for a steam generating reactor driving turbines that directly drive the propulsor or propeller. The French Barracuda offers a limited hybrid design that enables electric propulsion for low speed cruising and turbo-mechanical drives at higher speeds. The Tullibee (SSN-597) and Glenard P. Lipscomb (SSN-685) were two nuclear-electricvessels that experimented with the technology, but it was not competitive against nuclear-steam turbo-mechanical for blue water operations. At the other end of the spectrum, a “mini” 400 ton nuclear submarine NR-1 was used for many key deep-ocean, bottom-exploration tasks.

Due to their endurance, nuclear submarines tend to be blue water, ocean-going vessels. Los-Angeles and Virginia class fast attack submarines displace 6-8,000 tons. French Barracudas are about 5,000 tons, UK’s Astutes are 7,000 tons, while the Shortfin Barracuda (conventional version) is about 4,000 tons. Compared to the Upholder/Victoria class at about 2,500 tons, they are large vessels.

A small nuclear-powered attack submarine that is large enough to support a good sized crew and carry unmanned systems would be ideal for Canada, but presently, none is available because nuclear submarines are historically optimized for stealth in blue water. Much of Canadian waters in the Arctic are relatively shallow, and along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts up to the continental shelf where Canadian submarines are most likely to operate. A fleet nuclear submarine (6-8,000 ton range) is neither necessary nor ideal for Canadian waters.

The dominant design for nuclear propulsion places a premium on sustained high speed, even though most submarines cannot do so while maintaining acceptable radiated noise levels. Sustained high speed, except for “getaway” or transit, is a capability that is rarely needed. Because nuclear reactors react relatively slowly to throttling, it also means that nuclear energy generates a large infra-red signature that is a much bigger liability in littoral vs. blue waters. Hybrids offer a novel solution.

A nuclear-steam-electric hybrid is a potentially attractive alternative to the dominant nuclear turbo mechanical drive. One or more modular reactors can be used to generate steam to drive a turbine generator. The ability to completely shut down a reactor module, and tightly match energy demand with supply, reduces the amount of excess (waste) heat dumped – don’t forget, that heat dump is detectable.

Machinery noise from the nuclear turbo-mechanical generator can be more readily controlled if the system is operated at (and optimized for a relatively narrow power band) with no requirements for rapid throttling as with a turbo-mechanical drive. Electricity generated can be stored in state-of-the-art lithium batteries. Reactor shielding can potentially make use of lead acid cells doing double duty. Electric power from batteries driving propulsors offer the prospect of extremely low radiated noiseand yet maintain a high degree of “throttlability” with only limited compromises in sustained high speed cruising that would be a function of the nuclear plant’s power ramp and maximum output. Making the propulsor jets steerable and eliminating control fins is an additional benefit in minimizing the active signature.

Building such a submarine within a small displacement (2,5-3,500 tons surfaced) 60 days endurance, transit speed of 20 knots, burst speeds above 30 knots, and state of the art signature management technologies and support for unmanned platforms would be cost prohibitive for all but the largest Navies.

Canada, however, has potentially very good technologies that can contribute to a joint venture for a new hybrid nuclear submarine design. The Canadian SLOWPOKE reactor has been operating in Canada since 1971 and is licensed for unattended operation. A later variant was rated for 2-10MW per module, just about ideal for a small nuclear-powered submarine. It is conceivable that the design can be freshened, miniaturized, compacted and “fitted” into an existing conventional submarine design displacing 2,500 to 4,000 tons, though quieting radiated noise of a small displacement submarine is challenging and require considerable ingenuity and technical competence.

Packaged with a turbo-generator plant, a SLOWPOKE reactor can also have many civilian applications such as being a steam generating plant for low GHG heavy oil extraction SAGD facilities, or a stationary energy plant for Northern communities. The more units deployed, the lower the fixed costs. That will also spread the political constituencies in favour of the program from just the coastal provinces to Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, Nunavut, and NW Territories: A major consideration given the political fault lines in Canada for a multi billion dollar program.

If Canada contributed a major portion of the development cost of a new modular nuclear power plant for a hybrid submarine, it can be used to negotiate a good price on the vessel. It will also be the only small naval reactor / power plant available that can potentially also be used on surface vessels like the Canadian Surface Combatant or civilian vessels – reducing GHG emissions from shipping potentially opens up lucrative markets for Canadian nuclear technology. Who might partner with Canada?

Germany, Sweden, France, Japan, Australia are all potential partners. Each nation’s existing or planned submarine designs are potentially good candidates, in fact, the French are already working on a new hybrid Barracuda variant for Australia. A collaboration with Japan, which has begun work on its next generation submarines, can contribute certain technologies, like lithium ion batteries (in which they excel). Any of these would deliver a state-of-the-art nuclear-powered submarine for a fraction of the cost of “going it alone” or the Australian “built in Australia” technology transfer model. The key will be that the new co-developed hybrid nuclear submarine must find additional markets beyond the needs of the partners.

The question is, can such a new vessel be built in quantity (more than 20) for less than US$700 million a copy?

Success in this program will forever banish the ghost of the DeHavilland Arrow.

It will be challenging, but Canadian ingenuity is up to it.

– Danny Lam

Op NANOOK 2017 Kicks Off

DND Press Release

Operation Nanook 2017 begins today at locations in Labrador and Nunavut. Nearly 900 military and civilian participants will take part in the 10th iteration of Canada’s annual northern sovereignty operation.

Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, commits Canada to increase its presence and operational effectiveness in the North. Operation Nanook enables the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to continually enhance its ability to operate effectively in the North while improving coordination with whole-of-government partners in responding to northern safety and security issues.

28 Aug – Members of 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group demonstrate how to make an emergency shelter during survival skills training near Rankin Inlet, Nunavut during Operation Nanook 2016. (Photo: Petty Officer Second Class Belinda Groves)

“The highest level of safety and security in Canada’s North is essential and Joint Task Force (North) consistently strives to respond to all incidents, whether a natural disaster or protection of Canadian sovereignty. However, no single stakeholder is able to operate unilaterally in the vastness of Canada’s North; partnerships must be established and nourished in order to meet operational objectives. Operation Nanook 2017 will provide a unique opportunity for multiple agencies to work together to combat a notional threat to the security of the population of the Hamlet of Rankin Inlet, NU. The benefit of multi-agency planning, coordinated deployment and focused execution is enormous. It permits development of relationships and understanding of capabilities that is essential to ensure a timely response to a real life crisis,” said Brigadier-General Mike Nixon, Commander, Joint Task Force (North).

“The challenging and remote coastal zone of northern Labrador will test the ability of Joint Task Force Atlantic to command and control Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Air Force elements in mobility, surveillance and security tasks. Capitalizing on synergies with other government departments, communities, and industries, defence and security can be assured across Canada’s vast northern regions,” said Rear-Admiral John Newton, Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic and Joint Task Force (Atlantic).

For the first time in its history, Operation Nanook 2017 is comprised of two scenarios conducted by two separate Regional Joint Task Forces.

• In one scenario, conducted by Joint Task Force (North), the CAF will work with Other Government Departments and Agencies (OGDA) around Rankin Inlet, Nunavut to respond to a simulated barge fire and explosion.
• In the other scenario, conducted by Joint Task Force Atlantic, CAF members will work with its OGDA partners to respond to a security scenario in northern Labrador.

The Canadian North is the Least Defended Territory on Earth

By: Scott Gilmore, Macleans Magazine 

Never mind the Amazon, or even the Antarctic. Northern Canada is the global epitome of undefended territory.

There is no place on earth as poorly defended as the Canadian Arctic. But maybe that’s a good thing. We do enjoy pretending to be a nation of “peacekeepers” (in spite of the fact we currently do less peacekeeping than say, El Salvador or Gambia). Vimy Ridge, Juno Beach, Kapyong, Panjwaii: these are places typically not mentioned in polite company, and almost never spoken aloud by a Liberal government. When we talk about arming our military, we don’t even like to use the word “arm”—we say “procurement.”

So, perhaps it is fitting that the Canadian North is essentially the largest military-free zone in the world. To be fair, it is not utterly bereft of Canadian Forces. We have three very small bases. There are some radar installations (that use 1980s technology). There are the Rangers, of course, local volunteers who are given Second World War rifles, a hoodie, a ball cap and an annual photo op with whichever politician is shameless enough to fly north for 24 hours to emote about the Canadian North from the depths of his or her $1,200 Canada Goose parka. Our largest icebreaker— built in 1969—is currently undergoing it’s seventh refit. And, we have approximately 120 armed forces personnel, just enough to fill a Tim Hortons. All of this, of course, is spread over an area the size of Europe (except the icebreaker—it’s in Halifax).

The list of what we don’t have is considerably longer. There is no port, military or civilian. The closing of Churchill last year ended the fatuous notion that Canada has a third coast. No airbase. No search-and-rescue hub. No four-season ice-breakers. No ice-strengthened war-ships. In fact, our fleet is now so small and so rusted out it has lost the designation of being a “blue-water navy”, it is a coastal defence force—on calm days—if everything is working.

If you ask around Ottawa why this is, the answer is and always has been, “Because it’s hard.” Which is true. The Canadian North is remote, wild, undeveloped, like the Russian North for example. Facing a similar climate and geography, Moscow has only managed to build two infantry bases; nine naval ports; and seventeen airbases along its Arctic coast over the last 60 years.

RELATED: Putin, Trudeau and Canada’s Arctic problem

But the Canadian Arctic is more remote and difficult to access than Russia’s. It is more like the Amazonian rainforest—an expanse of jungle and swamp 25 per cent larger than the Canadian North. The Brazilians have almost nothing there, other than the Manaus Air Base, home to four air squadrons, and an airborne army battalion. And there are several naval facilities, including the Rio Negro naval base, 1,300km up the Amazonian river. That base has nine satellite facilities, as well as a helicopter squad and marines. The Brazilians also have a fleet of large riverine hospital ships that ply the remote backwoods of the jungle. But that’s it.

But the Brazilians spend 2.6 per cent of their GDP on the military. The economic choices of our political leaders have always been less guns and more butter (supply-managed, thank you). Regardless of our formal obligations to NATO that we spend two per cent on the Canadian Forces, our defence budget comes in at half that.

We have much more in common with Australia, a commonwealth democracy, managing a constant political struggle to maintain social services and infrastructure spending. It makes sense that we would be careful about our military deployments, frugal even. Consider how the Australian’s have chosen to defend the Outback. Other than a huge naval base in Darwin, and several air squadrons at the RAAF Tindal, another couple of air bases, a dozen training bases, an infantry battalion, and large radar installations at Alice Springs and elsewhere, the place is empty.

Even in Antarctica, at the bottom of the world, owned by no country, needing no defence, and subject to a treaty prohibiting military activity, there are dozens of research bases run by the armed forces of countries like Chile, Uruguay and even Pakistan. The search and rescue capabilities of McMurdo Station alone are greater than all of Canada’s north of the 60th parallel.

No, if you want to get away from it all, to go somewhere on the planet where no one will be able to rescue you—or stop you, or even know you’re there—you want Canada’s North.

But try to keep this quiet. We don’t want it overrun by adventure tourists. Or cruise ships like the Crystal Serenity, which went through last summer bringing its own rescue ship because Canada didn’t have one. Or resource companies, now free to roam over ice-free waters. Or the Chinese, who want to start sending cargo ships and oil tankers through on their way to Europe. Or the Russians, who are increasingly overflying NATO territory. Or our American allies, who announced in Congress this week they will not recognize Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.

No, let’s follow the leadership of Prime Minister Trudeau, who made sure the Arctic was only mentioned twice in the 360 priorities he gave his ministers, and who has bravely avoided drawing any attention to the North—visiting only once since taking office—and who has still not published an Arctic strategy. Let’s just not draw any attention to the fact we’ve utterly abandoned the Canadian North. What could possibly go wrong?

Will Super Hornet Acquisition Affect Arctic Sovereignty?

By: Matthew Fisher, The National Post

If the Liberal government goes ahead with its decision to purchase Super Hornet fighter jets instead of stealthy F-35s, Canada may be giving up its sovereignty over the High Arctic as it comes to depend on U.S. jets flying from airfields in Yellowknife, Inuvik, Rankin Inlet, Iqaluit and Alaska.

That was the unanimous opinion of half a dozen retired fighter pilots I spoke with recently, pilots with decades of experience flying over the continent’s northern margins and in senior positions at NORAD headquarters in Colorado: that Canada would be relegated to “second-tier status” in defending its own territory.

U.S. war planes such as the F-35 and F-22 would defend the bulk of Canada’s vast northern air space because they would be invisible to Russian radars and would be able to seamlessly share data and sensor information with each other and with airborne and ground command posts, the retired Canadian pilots said. Canada’s CF-18 Hornets and Super Hornets, operating much older technologies and much less able to deliver such complicated data fusion, would likely be tasked with defending North American cities far to the south or with shooting down any missiles that managed to penetrate the first line of defence, they said.

The 18 Super Hornets the Trudeau government has said it intends to buy are expected to cost between $5 and $7 billion. On Tuesday, the Canadian government sent a letter to its U.S. counterpart outlining what it’s looking for in a potential Super Hornet purchase, which the jets’ manufacturer, Boeing, will use to draft a formal proposal by this fall. If the price and timeline are right — and if the purchase would provide enough economic spinoff benefits for Canada — the Liberals hope to sign a contract by late this year or early next. The plan has drawn plenty of criticism.

“Will Canada be surrendering sovereignty? The simple answer is yes,” said Lt.-Gen. George MacDonald, who flew CF-18 Hornets from Bagotville, Que., for NORAD for five years and was the binational military alliance’s deputy commander before 9/11 and then served as vice chief of the defence staff in Ottawa before retiring in 2004. (He now works for CFN Consultants, which has as a client Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the F-35.)

“The Russians would be delighted to see Canada flying Super Hornets in the north,” said Gen. Tom Lawson, the retired former chief of the defence staff and ex-deputy commander of NORAD, who sometimes works as a consultant for Lockheed. “The Super Hornets will be a big, bright object on the radars of Russian early-warning aircraft. With the F-35, the Russians will not see them until they are too close.”

Gen. Jean Boyle, a former chief of defence and fighter pilot who was Boeing’s vice-president of international business when the Super Hornet was coming online nearly 20 years ago, says he can see the argument against using Super Hornets in the Far North. “In times of increased tension there is no doubt that NORAD would put its best assets, the (U.S. Air Force’s) F-35 and F-22, forward instead of a Super Hornet, to ensure the defence is thorough.

“My position, even when I was chief and ever since I was a colonel and started to understand national security, is that Canada should have a defence capability where we can defend all the northern and maritime approaches to our country, 100 per cent, that it is fully paid for by us and that there are no arguments on that point.”

“I am loathe to say we should buy the F-35 but skeptical about the capabilities of the Super Hornet,” Boyle said. “Having been with Boeing when it was developed, I am relatively aware of what the Super Hornet can do. It is fourth-generation compared to fifth-generation.”

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A fourth retired Canadian air force general, who had not worked for either Lockheed or Boeing but whose company does not allow employees to be quoted by name, concurred. He highlighted “survivability issues” for Super Hornet crews because they could be seen by enemy radars, and warned that new Russian cruise missiles would be “a game-changer” if not confronted by a fighter with cutting-edge technology.

None of the former pilots interviewed for this article were among the 13 retired air force three-star generals who recently sent a letter to the prime minister decrying the Super Hornet purchase.

“I don’t know what the government’s calculus is but if they look to the threats in the future we should go to a competition quickly,” Lawson said. “Enough information is already available to develop an operational requirement to have a competition within one year to 18 months and to have the first aircraft delivered within three years.”

That is approximately the same timeline the government has been using to justify the need for an emergency purchase of Super Hornets rather than F-35s. The RCAF told parliamentarians last year that it can safely fly its existing CF-18s until 2025.

The F-35 and Super Hornet were both “tremendous airplanes,” Boyle said. “My position is to not buy from an interim proposal. We should move forward with an open competition. Put them up against each other and make a decision.”

Russia suggests it wants thawed relations with Canada in Arctic

By: MIKE BLANCHFIELD, The Globe and Mail

A Russian politician who laments the decline of his country’s relations with Canada suggested Thursday that his homeland might be willing to play nice in its long-standing dispute over who controls the North Pole.

Igor Chernyshenko, a senator from the northern city of Murmansk, said Russia would respect any United Nations decision on who should control a swath of the Arctic seabed known as the Lomonosov Ridge, which extends across the North Pole.

Chernyshenko, who was at Carleton University in Ottawa for a conference on Canada-Russia relations, delivered the overture as an example of positive co-operation between two countries that have been at odds for nearly a decade.

The Russian embassy and Canada’s foreign ministry, Global Affairs Canada, organized the conference as an example of the Liberal government’s new foreign policy decision to re-engage with Russia because of its shared interest in the Arctic.

The previous Conservative government downgraded ties with Russia because of its unilateral annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014. In opposition, the Conservatives have vocally opposed the rapprochement, saying it represents “cosying up” to the “regime” of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Conservatives saw Russia’s Arctic ambitions as provocative, especially after the Russians planted a flag on the North Pole seabed in 2007.

The Liberals say it is time to move beyond that, citing the need to work with countries that have a shared interest in a frozen wasteland that’s rapidly thawing, leading to increased ship traffic, potential oil and gas exploration, as well as potential threats on the environment and security fronts.

Russia, Canada and Denmark have all filed competing territorial claims and it could take as long as 15 years for the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea to decide.

But the UN won’t have the final say because it will be up to the countries themselves to negotiate a settlement based on the assessment.

The visiting senator told that his country would negotiate the division of the territory, which researchers believe contains significant oil and gas deposits.

“We recognize international law and after the UN Commission makes its decision, Canada and Russia will positively decide on how to divide that up,” Chernyshenko said through an interpreter.

He lamented the decline in trade between the two countries, which has shrunk since ties were downgraded and Canada joined its allies in imposing sanctions.

“This is very sad.”

Russia’s envoy to Canada says the renewed Arctic co-operation could be the spark that reignites relations on a broader level, including possible co-operation on fighting terrorism, and deeper business ties.

“It’s very good our bilateral dialogue has been re-launched. Canada’s self-imposed isolation from Russia is over,” Alexander Darchiev, the Russian ambassador, said in an interview.

Not so fast, said Joseph Pickerill, a spokesman for Foreign Affairs Minister Stephane Dion.

“Russian and Canadian companies are free to pursue commercial opportunities in one another’s markets so long as their undertakings are in compliance with Canada’s sanctions regime,” Pickerill said in an email.

“However, our diplomatic re-engagement does not mean it is ’business as usual’ with Russia.”

Indeed, Canadian co-operation with Russia will have to be confined to the Arctic because of major differences on Ukraine and Russia’s backing of the Assad regime in Syria, said Whitney Lackenbauer, a St. Jerome’s University historian.

Military co-operation between the two countries is also a long way off, which means no Russian observation of Canadian military operations in the North or renewed meetings between their defence chiefs.

Any characterization of the two countries “as great partners, great friends, is not going to be appropriate,” he said.

University of British Columbia international law professor Michael Byers said Russia and Canada are capable of settling territorial disputes and working together on shared interests in the North, including dealing with challenges that will come with more shipping traffic.

The Russians are anxious to find partners in the Arctic because their economy has been “pummelled” by sanctions and the decline in world oil prices, Byers said.

“The Russians are desperate to see sanctions lifted. In that context, they’re very eager to improve relations in any domain.”

Canadian Arctic Capabilities

By: KEN POLE
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 13, No 5)

As global warming improves access to the region and its potential natural resources, improvements to Canada’s air, land, and sea military capabilities in the Arctic are covered in a five-nation review of the prospects of increased tensions. Published by the respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the review also looks at the capabilities of three other Arctic littoral states that are NATO members – the United States, Denmark and Norway – as well as Russia. The bottom line is that Russia is the only state that has “significantly” upgraded its Arctic military capabilities.

In the report entitled “Military Capabilities in the Arctic: A New Cold War in the High North”, Siemon Wezeman, a Dutch senior researcher in SIPRI’s arms and military expenditure program, points out that the Arctic littoral states have tended to have a “relatively restrained approach” to overlapping claims in the Arctic. He notes, however, that increases in the various military forces “provide cause for concern” and should be clarified.

“Forecasts of far-reaching climate change in the Arctic have stimulated new thinking about the security situation,” Wezeman says. “Some have identified the region as heading towards conflict, notably over natural resources, and official documents […] refer to the potential for military confrontation and indicate a perceived need to increase military capabilities accordingly.”

While affirming that all of these states have bolstered their military presence in the Arctic or increased capabilities for Arctic use, and are planning further strengthening of their military capabilities beyond their national territories, he suggests that while there is official recognition of the need to improve security and policing, the official positions stop short of a militarization of Arctic security issues.

Canadian Coast Guard Ship (CCGS) Pierre Radisson sails past an iceberg in the Hudson Strait off the coast of Baffin Island during Operation Nanook. (Photo: Sergeant Kevin MacAulay)

This, despite the “dramatic” extent to which Russia-NATO relations had deteriorated in recent years, a situation which Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev described as “a new cold war.” Russia’s intervention in Ukraine since early 2014, and its more assertive and even aggressive foreign policy had increased the other Arctic states’ concerns about Russia’s long-term goals.

In Canada’s case, the former Conservative administration in Ottawa had adopted a “use it or lose it” stance in pressing for economic exploitation of the Arctic. The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy put renewed emphasis on defending territorial sovereignty in the increasingly accessible Arctic. The Conservatives’ Northern Strategy the following year was matched by a limited expansion of special Arctic forces, increased training, and a limited amount of new equipment.

In the U.S., the Republican administration, as one of its last acts, in January 2009, updated a 1994 Arctic policy, which the Democrats essentially echoed in a National Strategy for the Arctic Region policy document in May 2013. “However, Arctic security concerns play only a minor role in overall U.S. defence policy,” Wezeman says, citing a 2010 National Security Strategy and a 2011 National Military Strategy which he says “mention the Arctic only in passing” and 2012 and 2015 strategy documents that effectively ignore the region militarily.

As for Denmark-Greenland, he notes that defence documents have included special mention of the Arctic, but that funding had not kept up with the vision.

In October 2012, the Greenland and Faroe Islands commands were merged into a new joint military Arctic Command headquartered in Nuuk, Greenland. “The Danish state auditing agency, Rigsrevisionen, concluded in October 2013 that the government had over the previous nine years provided insufficient funds and equipment for the Danish forces to fulfil their Arctic tasks, in particular SAR and environmental protection.” That situation is expected to be addressed in a “comprehensive analysis” sometime in 2017, including options for cooperation with the other Arctic countries.

March 2012 – Canadian soldiers regroup after conducting an attack on an enemy position in the mountains near Gratangsbotn, Norway during Exercise Cold Response, a Norwegian-led, invitational ­military exercise with participants from 14 nations. (DND Photo: Cpl Stuart MacNeil)

Turning to Norway, Wezeman affirms that its relations with Russia had been considered “very good”, with increased Arctic cooperation, including joint military exercises, but added that Russia’s military modernization and more assertive policies in Europe had “created uncertainty.”

A 2015 strategic military review, the “Norwegian Armed Forces in transition” outlines a stronger military presence in Finnmark, the northern part of Norway. The Norwegian defence budget has increased in real terms since 2009, and is projected to increase further until 2017 to cover the costs of ordered equipment (mainly F-35 combat aircraft). A new Defence White Paper is planned for 2016, which is expected to indicate a real-term decrease for 2018-2020.

Norwegian defence policy remains guided by the 2007 Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy, which gave priority to the north of Norway and Svalbard (often referred to in Norway as the ‘High North’) within national defence. Although strongly focused on Russia, it has shifted from emphasizing a potential threat to the whole of Norway to the potential for conflicting interests in the Arctic area. However, the increased military capabilities outlined in the 2015 review are mainly directed at a threat against Norwegian territory in the High North, and not in the extra-territorial Arctic. In August 2009 its armed forces headquarters moved from Jåtta in the south to Reitan, just north of the Arctic Circle; the headquarters of the Norwegian Army is even further north, in Bardufoss. While the Norwegian Navy remains based mainly in Bergen, in the south, the coast guard headquarters was moved north to Sortland in 2010.

Since 2006, Norwegian, NATO, and other allied troops have held biannual large-scale ‘Cold Challenge’ exercises in northern Norway. These have been directed at unspecified threats in cold environments but have also been good training opportunities for potential Arctic operations. In 2013 and 2015 Norway was the lead country for a new set of large military training exercises in the north of Scandinavia called the ‘Arctic Challenge’ (ACE). Involving Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, and other NATO air forces, ACE is to be held every two years.

Russia’s position on the Arctic has been set out in a couple of policy documents which look out to 2020 and beyond and highlight the region’s importance as a key source of natural resources and security issues resulting from increasingly long open-water periods that are generally attributed to global warming.

While those documents focus mainly on non-military challenges and ostensibly underline the importance of cooperation among all Arctic countries, others specifically highlight protecting military interests. “For the first time, the December 2014 Russian Military Doctrine includes the task of ‘protecting Russian interests in the Arctic’,” Wezeman points out. “The July 2015 Maritime Doctrine outlines specific security concerns, with a strong focus on security of the bases and units of the Northern Fleet in the Arctic.” Moreover, these documents make clear that Arctic forces would have protection of the northern regions of Russia as their main task.

To underline the growing importance of Arctic military security, on 1 December 2014 the Russian forces in the Arctic were included in a new Joint Strategic Command North. In addition to expanding the size of the Russian forces in the Arctic and modernizing their equipment, Russia has also increased Arctic training.

A substantial increase in its Northern Fleet capabilities is also ongoing. Many of the new ships can operate effectively in the harsh Arctic environment and are probably meant as escorts for the more active ballistic-missile-capable, nuclear-powered (SSBN) fleet of submarines. Indeed, the reduction in Arctic ice under which the SSBNs can hide is likely to further increase the need for escorts and patrol aircraft. Plans for new amphibious ships to increase power-projection capabilities have been seriously disrupted with the cancellation by France in 2015 of two Mistral amphibious assault / helicopter carrier ships ordered in 2010 and 2011, one of which was due to be included in the Northern Fleet.

Yamal, one of six Russian Arktika-class civilian, nuclear-powered icebreakers built between 1975 and 2007, break through ice for cargo ships and other vessels along the Northern Sea Route.

Capability Perspective

Even before the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea in early 2014, some media, politicians and researchers had begun to portray the changes in the capabilities of the Arctic littoral states as a significant military build-up and potential threat to security. Such messages seemed to be validated by the events in 2014 and the subsequent Russian intervention in support of rebels in eastern Ukraine.

While these and other actions have strained East-West relations to a level of distrust and tension not seen since the end of the cold war, the overall picture in the Arctic remains an almost shining example of proper state behaviour over contested claims.

The 2012 SIPRI review of the then ­current and projected military forces in the Arctic region pointed to a process of modernization and creation of new capacity to address challenges associated with environmental, economic and political changes anticipated for the region, rather than as a response to major threat perceptions in the Arctic. Conventional military forces, specially adapted to the harsh Arctic environment, were projected to remain small-scale, especially given the size of the Arctic region, and would remain in most cases considerably smaller than cold war levels.

This latest review of the existing and planned Arctic military capabilities of the five Arctic littoral states was undertaken in the context of increased East-West tension – the ‘new cold war’ as Medvedev described it. Like the previous review, it concludes that the changes in military forces, structure, and policies in the Arctic do not undermine the commitment of all five states to settling Arctic issues in multilateral discussions, negotiations and cooperation. Certainly, all five have continued the modernization, and in some cases expansion, of their military capabilities in or for the Arctic. However, these remain limited and have proceeded slowly.

Some of the changes – for example, the acquisition of new combat aircraft by Norway and Denmark, the strengthening of the Canadian Rangers, the main Norwegian land units moving to the north of Norway, or the new Russian Arctic units – have little or nothing to do with power projection into the areas of the Arctic with unclear ownership. Rather, they are for the purposes of patrolling and protecting recognized national territories that are becoming more accessible, including protection against illegal activities. Other changes – such as new but unarmed icebreakers – have more to do with protection of the environment, civilian shipping, and civilian research in support of national claims to an ‘extended continental shelf’ under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

While aircraft and ships play a much more important role for Arctic security than land forces, most of the extensive changes – such as the acquisitions of new combat aircraft or large surface combat vessels by Canada, Denmark and Norway – have a much more general rationale than increasing worries about potential military threats in the Arctic region.

HMS Illustrious (foreground) and HMS Bulwark near Harstad, Norway, participating in Exercise Cold Response. (MOD Photo: Martin Carney)

Russia’s expansion of its Northern Fleet and other land and air forces in the Arctic, the largest military force stationed in the region, also appear to be more a matter of providing protection for its SSBNs – as the Soviet Union did during the 1970s and 1980s – than a programme building up for a military struggle over Arctic resources.

This main conclusion notwithstanding, an increase of military forces in a region where several states claim maritime zones expected to contain extensive natural resources does give reason for concern, including the potential for unnecessary incidents and misunderstandings between claimants. In the general security environment since early 2014, of increasing tensions and mistrust between Russia and most of the rest of Europe and North America, responses to real or imagined threats and insults could certainly escalate. Moreover, there is the risk that the security tensions between NATO and Russia elsewhere may spill over into the Arctic region. Russia’s unscheduled large-scale exercises held in response to ACE 2015 are one example of how the security situation has changed since early 2014.

Thus, in order to help mitigate negative perceptions about security policies in the region, as well as the possibility of misunderstandings, the Arctic littoral states need to be even clearer about their military policies, doctrines and operational rules, and should include more military confidence-building measures in their bilateral or multilateral relations associated with the Arctic.

Could such positive steps in the Arctic also provide an impetus to duplicate this ‘Arctic spirit of problem-solving through cooperation and international law’ in other regions or issues of the current East-West confrontation? Time will tell.

===
Ken Pole is a contributing editor at FrontLine magazines.

Military Confrontation Over Arctic...Unlikely says SIPRI Report

By: Daniel Maillet, CAF Dispatch Author
October 20, 2016

In it's most recent publication the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an independent resource on global security, has examined the military capabilities of five of the most prominent arctic nations and posed the question, A New Cold War in the High North?

In its executive summary, the publication says, "Climate change is making the Arctic region—and its expected natural resources—more accessible. Overlapping claims by the fi ve Arctic littoral states—Canada, Denmark, Norway, the United States (all of which are members of NATO) and Russia—have raised concerns about future conflict in the region and have stimulated new thinking about the security situation in the Arctic. All fi ve states started to strengthen their military presence and capabilities in the Arctic even before the rise in tensions between Russia and NATO members observed since 2014. This increase in tensions has fuelled fears of the onset of a new ‘cold war’ and possible conflict in Europe. It has also resulted in a further build-up of military capabilities in the Arctic region."

"However, the actions taken by the five Arctic littoral states in the region and the offi cial documents released by those states in the past few years seem to suggest that the focus remains solely on the defence of current national territories. While this relatively restrained approach to overlapping maritime claims is to be welcomed, the increases in military forces provide cause for concern, and military confi dence measures and expanded cooperation should be high on the agenda for all five states."

The SIPRI report clearly states that while there are numerous who believe that the Arctic is headed towards conflict, most notably over natural resources; the actuality of military confrontation between any of the five states is unlikely.

The report clearly indicates that Canada is not alone in it's exhaustively slow military rebuild of its Arctic capabilities. The United States, Denmark, Norway, Canada, and Russia while all are heavily investing in a resurgence of military capabilities in the Arctic, all are doing so very slowly (much slower than planned) and are mainly doing so to protect their own borders, sovereignty, and secure a region that is becoming more and more accessible to non-Arctic nations. Therefore, an actual military confrontation over the Arctic in the near future is unlikely. Especially as the five Arctic nations (despite the state of Russian-West Relations) are still working diplomatically together on Arctic issues.

You can read the full report below:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxqdoHflB6JNUzRjUnAwdmkyeWM/view?usp=sharing

Ukraine warns Canada not to trust Russian co-operation over Arctic

By: Steven Chase, Globe and Mail 

A senior Ukrainian envoy is warning a thaw in diplomatic relations between Canada and Russia will primarily benefit Vladimir Putin – a caution that came as relations abruptly deteriorated between Moscow and Washington on Monday over Syria and nuclear arsenals.

Vadym Prystaiko, deputy foreign minister of Ukraine, is visiting Ottawa this week to discuss the future of his country, where Russia has controlled the Crimean peninsula since 2014, and bankrolls pro-Moscow militants that have destabilized eastern Ukraine.

Mr. Prystaiko, a former Ukrainian ambassador to Canada, said Kiev is grateful for all Canadians have done for his country, but is not happy to see the Trudeau government resume co-operation with Russia over the Arctic.

Canada and Russia are members of the Arctic Council, but the former Conservative government suspended all but low-level discussions with Moscow after the country annexed Crimea.

The Liberals announced last week that Canada and Russia will host an Arctic conference in Ottawa in November, saying shunning Moscow was an “irrationality” and illogical given that “between us we control 75 per cent of the North.” Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion says Canada will continue to voice “profound disagreement” over Russia’s conduct in Ukraine, noting Ottawa has increased sanctions on Moscow since the Liberals took power.

Mr. Prystaiko said engaging with Russia chips away at the international isolation that has bedevilled Mr. Putin since he took over Crimea. Russia was ejected from the Group of Eight forum of major industrialized countries and faces damaging sanctions.

“The Arctic Council is another way where [the Russian President] can break through the worldwide political blockade,” the Ukraine envoy said. “The guy is going for something else than just … the fate of seals or spills of oil.”

The Ukrainian official warned Canada cannot trust any of Russia’s commitments at the Arctic Council.

“Any rapprochement with Russians, before they behave in a civilized way, is too premature,” Mr. Prystaiko said. “Whatever the forum ... we are talking to the aggressor.”

Mr. Prystaiko pointed to Mr. Putin’s announcement on Monday that Moscow will suspend a treaty with Washington on cleaning up weapons-grade plutonium.

“How can you believe in the Arctic Council or document signed with Russia if they would break any agreement?

Russia’s move came just before the United States announced it was suspending one-on-one talks with Moscow toward ending the violence in Syria. Washington accused Moscow of not living up to its commitments under a ceasefire agreement.

Mr. Putin issued a decree suspending an accord concluded in 2000 that had committed the United States and Russia to shrink their nuclear arsenals and dispose of surplus plutonium originally intended for use in nuclear weapons.

The Kremlin said it was taking that action in response to unfriendly acts by Washington.

Under the Conservatives, Ottawa sent military trainers to western Ukraine to help that country’s soldiers upgrade their skills for the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The deployment is slated to end in 2017, but Ukraine hopes the Liberals will extend the mission. Several years ago, Ottawa gave Ukraine $400-million in low-interest loans and has donated tonnes of non-lethal military equipment. Canada also recently concluded a free-trade agreement with Ukraine.

Pro-Russian militants retain control of a portion of eastern Ukraine where Mr. Prystaiko said Moscow posted 6,000 soldiers to lead and support the rebels. The ruble is a circulating currency in this region, he said, and Kiev charges that Russia has been stealing valuable factory equipment and metallurgical coal from the area.

Furthermore, the conflict has blocked the most direct route for Ukraine’s exports to Asia.

“Imagine the United States is [going after you] you with military force, cutting out all trade you have with the United States and then they will decide to block, for example, exports to China,” Mr. Prystaiko said. “We used to send all our exports to China through the railroads over the Russian territory. Now they are blocking exports.”

Canadian firm wants to buy used Norwegian CC-130Hs for RCAF for use in Arctic

By: David Pugliese, The National Post 

A Canadian firm wants Ottawa to buy older transport aircraft from Norway, saying this could significantly boost the military’s capabilities in the Arctic relatively cheaply.

The five C-130H aircraft, modernized before they were put in storage in the U.S. and with about 50 per cent of their flying time remaining, could be acquired for about $60 million, says Tom Edmison, president of Total Corporate Aviation Services.

The deal would include tens of thousands of parts for the aircraft, which could also be used for the Royal Canadian Air Force’s existing C-130H transport planes.

“These aircraft have everything you need to operate in the Arctic,” said Edmison, a veteran pilot whose firm has offices in Calgary and Sidney, B.C.

“They’re fine airplanes. And the original replacement value for those parts is probably worth more than the airplanes.”

The proposal comes as the Liberal government, in the midst of its defence review, is seeking input on how to improve Canada’s military capabilities, including providing more of a presence in the Far North.

The original replacement value for those parts is probably worth more than the airplanes.

Edmison said the aircraft could be bought outright or acquired by Total Corporate Aviation Services, then leased to the government for Arctic operations, but flown by RCAF crews.

Some Canadian military leaders have complained about tight budgets, prompting industry to suggest innovative solutions.

Irving Shipbuilding of Halifax has proposed leasing a commercial vessel that would be converted to a multi-mission support ship for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The vessel would be offered on a five-year lease and have a 30-member civilian crew.

Ottawa has also entered into a lease arrangement with a sister firm to Davie Shipyards for a commercial vessel that is being converted into a refuelling and supply ship for the navy. The ship will be operated by a civilian crew, plus a few navy personnel to handle military-related duties.

Norway stored the C-130s after it bought newer J models of the same aircraft. It paid about $600-million for the four C-130J planes, plus associated equipment

The planes are being stored at a U.S. government facility in Tucson, Ariz., at a cost of $750,000 a year, so there is an economic reason to sell the planes, Edmison said.

The aircraft were originally maintained for Norway at a facility in Canada.

Edmison says his proposal offers a low-cost way of boosting Canada’s presence in the Far North over the shorter term until the military can decide how it can meet the government’s desire to establish more of a presence in the region.

“They’re low-time airplanes and they would fit perfectly to augment the Canadian military as a bridge to the future,” he added.

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The RCAF currently has 12 C-130H planes, said spokesman Maj. Alexandre Cadieux.

Renee Filiatrault, a spokeswoman for Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said she had not heard about the C-130H pitch, but would not be able to comment anyway on a specific proposal.

“We’re currently undergoing a defence policy review, which will help the government determine future direction and priorities so our military is well equipped and prepared in the years to come, including as it relates to the Arctic,” she said.

Any proposal to acquire used equipment is bound to face an uphill battle from Department of National Defence bureaucrats and air force officers, Edmison said.

“Of course they want to buy brand new planes but if they don’t have the money or if it is going to take years, then why not go this route?” he asked.

“For a relatively low cost, the air force gets a capability it needs.”

Reviewing Canada’s Arctic Capability: Suggestions for the Defence Policy Review

By: Adam Lajeuness, CDA Institute. 

CDA Institute guest contributor Adam Lajeunesse, a post-​doctoral fellow at St. Jerome University, offers suggestions on how the government can approach the Arctic in the context of the Defence Policy Review.

As the Liberal government undertakes its comprehensive defence review, eyes are inevitably turning to the Arctic, a region that held such a personal interest for former Prime Minister Stephen Harper and one which he so often used to burnish his nationalistic credentials. At first glance, Arctic defence policy would seem ripe for radical revision. The ‘use it or lose it’ mentality that Harper introduced early in his term often manifested in grandiose (by Canadian standards) displays of military power and rhetoric, sometimes presupposing foreign threats to Canadian sovereignty and Russian military threats to its security. For a Liberal government seeking a new détente with Russia as part of a broader push towards cooperation and dialogue over confrontation, there would seem to be room to swing away from the old Conservative defence philosophy that has defined the past ten years of Arctic military operations.

The reality of Canada’s Arctic security philosophy is, however, far more complicated than the broad brush depictions often used in the media. Despite the sometimes hawkish feelings generated by Harper’s statements on the North, and the frequent photoshoots of the prime minister and other VIPs in the Northwest Passage surrounded by warships, Canada’s Arctic security policy has been level-​headed, thoughtful, and restrained. Behind the headlines, CAF strategy and doctrine has repeatedly emphasised the absence of any military threat to the region, preparing instead for a wide range of unconventional scenarios – such as pollution prevention and support to civilian departments and agencies. What the Liberals will likely discover as they move forward is that they have little choice but to continue the Conservative approach to Arctic defence.

That assessment is based on the assumption that the geopolitical situation in the region will not deteriorate over the next decade. Such predictions are impossible to make with absolute confidence but the evidence suggests that it’s a safe bet. Russia, so often held up as a potential aggressor, has certainly been building its Arctic military capability, however that build-​up has mostly taken the form of ground force expansion, SAR, and local area defence – not power projection. Moscow is also the principal beneficiary of circumpolar stability as it seeks to attract hundreds of billions of dollars in Chinese and Indian (and perhaps if sanctions are lifted, Western) investment to the region. Russian military posturing is necessary for domestic consumption and for maintaining the siege mentality that keeps Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings high, but there is little that Russia can achieve through aggressive expansion into the Arctic Basin or anywhere beyond its own Arctic territory.

China is likewise unlikely to present any real military threat to the region. It has long sought a cooperative relationship with Arctic powers and, only recently, released a shipping guide instructing its vessel operators to respect Canadian law and regulation when in Canadian waters. China also lacks the technology and military platforms to operate safely in ice-​covered waters and appears to be in no hurry to spend the small fortune required to achieve that inessential capability.

Regardless of Russian or Chinese intentions or capabilities, conventional security is well in hand. NORAD provides adequate monitoring and fighter coverage of the North American Arctic and the US Navy maintains a subsurface capability and presence which began neatly sixty years ago. If Arctic defence policy is productively changed, it must be at the operational and tactical level, and here there is much that still needs to be adjusted. The Harper government’s great success was in defining the Forces’ direction and requirements – moving it away from its traditional warfighting role and into a support position. Implementation has, however, been slow, painful, and incomplete.

To begin with, the CAF’s Arctic forces require a more coherent training program, better communication, faster procurement, and a clearer sense of mission. The Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG) were stood up in 2007 to provide the Army with a force that it could confidently deploy in response to a variety of Arctic scenarios. In the years since, the ARCG have suffered from inconsistent training standards, poor harmonization of operating requirements, and a lack of higher-​level direction – with training and equipping having been delegated to the ARCG host divisions.

Equipping these forces has proven more challenging than should have been the case. Certain Arctic clothing and basic equipment still needs to be developed or purchased, while the Forces’ lack of light and heavy over-​snow vehicles (and its inability to maintain what it currently owns) can be attributed to bureaucratic inertia and a poor understanding within the Army of what its Arctic purpose and requirements really are. The distribution of the Army snowmobiles provide a perfect case in point. Rather than being concentrated in the hands of the ARCGs, the machines were parcelled out to the divisions in small groups, making large scale training impossible.

The Army has also shown an inability to learn many of the lessons observed during its annual Arctic exercises, something that can in part be chalked up to a lack of communication. Arctic deployed forces rarely communicate after the fact and there has been a general failure to compare notes between these units on what has worked and what has not. Siloed within different divisions, ARCG training is often undertaken in isolation where lessons are learned and relearned repeatedly.

The operational role of the Army’s Arctic forces , likewise, needs to be clarified. The ARCG, for instance, were described in their Master Implementation Directive as a rapid response force that could be assembled and deployed in the event of an emergency. The reality is that these reserve units could never be deployed quickly enough or sustained as a formed unit without extensive planning. Rather, these groups represent a reserve of basic Arctic capability that can be tapped when needed to provide perhaps half a dozen soldiers with the skills needed to provide mass to an Immediate Reaction Unit or another government agency. Their call out procedure should be refined and false planning assumptions purged from expectations of how the Army might use its forces outside of a planned exercise.

These are only a few examples of the CAF’s Arctic growing pains – indeed, there are many more issues of supply, training, and operational doctrine that still need to be addressed. None of these problems are really surprising however. Similar problems became apparent in the 1950s and again in the 1970s-​80s when the CAF undertook a similar expansion of its Arctic presence. It is understandable how an organization as large and complex as the Canadian military might move slowly to embrace a new and unfamiliar set of responsibilities.

Yet, in spite of these shortfalls, the government should recognize that the CAF’s overarching concept for Arctic operations is good and should be maintained. What is required is not a fundamental rethink but a renewed focus on turning the Forces’ existing high-​level strategic direction into something that is achievable, practical, and exercised on a regular basis.
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Dr. Adam Lajeunesse is a SSHRC postdoctoral fellow at St. Jerome’s University. He is currently working on a research program examining the history of Canadian military operations in the Arctic and the history of northern development, with a focus on hydrocarbon exploration from the 1960s to the mid-​1980s. (Image courtesy of the Canadian Army.)

Fisher: Super Hornets will force Canada out of its own Arctic

Critics of the F-35 will laugh and say this is hyperbole and melodrama. It is not. Keeping the U.S. safe is the top priority of every U.S. president. If Canada cannot or will not protect its Atlantic, Pacific and northern approaches, its NORAD treaty with the U.S. permits Washington to do so.

Russia announced last week that its air force will begin deploying its first stealthy T-50 fifth-generation jet fighters next year. Such a timeline is highly doubtful. But Vladimir Putin has no higher priority than acquiring stealth technologies and, within a decade, T-50s will be deployed at air bases across the top of Russia.

Once this happens, and with threats from T-50-launched cruise missiles and Russian and North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-35 will be far more able to shoot down than Super Hornets, the reality is that the U.S. will do whatever it has to to defend itself.

That will mean patrolling Canada’s margins with USAF F-35s, which will use fighter jet-capable airfields in Iqaluit, Rankin Inlet, Inuvik and Yellowknife built mostly with U.S. money in the 1980s.

Worse than that, Washington will insist that Canada’s Super Hornets stay in the rear.

The reason is clear. Four allied air forces operate in the Arctic. The U.S., Norway and Denmark, which defends Greenland and sometimes deploys fighter jets to a base they jointly operate with the USAF at Thule, will soon only be flying state-of-the art F-35s in the Far North. The other country, Canada, will not.

The F-35 is revolutionary in that it will basically be a flying computer with sensor fusion. F-35s flying hundreds of kilometres apart will be able to create a common battle picture. Being stealthy, they will secretly patrol far more safely while collectively surveying vast amounts of territory for information that they can instantly share with each other, spy and command aircraft and ground stations.

Once the Super Hornet is found, as it will be by a stealthy enemy, F-35s in the vicinity will become targets, too. That is why the U.S. will not want Canadian fighters operating anywhere near its warplanes in the north.

A new argument advanced by the government last week is that there is a “credibility gap” for NATO and Norad with the existing F-18 Hornets that must be immediately filled by an interim purchase of Super Hornets. NATO and Norad people have privately but emphatically insisted that no such crisis exists and will not exist for about a decade, so there is no reason for Canada to rush to make a decision.

As for this being sold as an interim buy, with a decision on the F-35 later, this is a red herring. Canada has neither the money nor the military infrastructure to support two fleets of fighter aircraft.

An older but still persistent argument to support the Super Hornets is that it will be safer to operate in the Far North than the one engine F-35s. Advances in civilian and military jet engine technology long ago made such thinking obsolete. Otherwise, the Pentagon would not have decided that only F-35s will fly from its most northern air base near Fairbanks, Alaska.

The Super Hornets’ advantages in range, payload and an extra engine are irrelevant if the aircraft is not survivable. The Super Hornet will not be invisible to radar so, at a certain point in the not too distant future, it will be shot down long before it can engage the enemy.

With the U.S. defending Canadian air space because of Ottawa’s refusal to buy F-35s, what the RCAF will eventually end up with in the north is a niche capability in air/sea rescue.

That Canada is prepared to cede its defence and sovereignty over all three maritime approaches to the USAF is one of the many reasons that there is extreme disappointment and disbelief across the upper reaches of Canada’s military community about what has been decided. What makes them furious is the government’s refusal to discuss the matter.

Finland has looked at the numbers that Denmark came up with after a competition in which it chose the F-35 over the Super Hornet. As a result, the Finns are believed to be close to deciding that they, too, will reject the Super Hornet in favour of the F-35. If Finland follows Denmark’s lead, it will become the 12th western-oriented air force in a row to choose the F-35 over the Super Hornet, with Canada the only exception.

Canadians should ask themselves: Is everyone who made those decisions — including those confronting similar security challenges in the Arctic — stupid? What is it that makes Canada so unique that it feels it can ignore the collective wisdom of all its allies and friends?

There are no two more important issues for a government than national defence and sovereignty. Such matters must be settled fairly and as transparently as possible. Have the promised open competition to decide what aircraft is best to defend Canada for the next half-century

By: Matthew Fisher, The Ottawa Citizen 

LONDON — The most questionable aspect of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s quixotic decision to renege on the promise of an open competition for Canada’s next fighter jet and suddenly ram through the sole-source purchase of Super Hornets — a decision Postmedia News has revealed it is close to making — is that, by doing so, Canada will end up surrendering sovereignty of its Arctic air space to the United States Air Force in about 10 years.

The CAF and the Arctic: Maintaining a Suitable and Sustainable Role

Published by the CDA Institute 

In this new CDA Institute Analysis, Adam MacDonald looks at the military requirements for Canada in the Arctic, concluding that the capabilities need to be suitable for the security environment and financially sustainable given other defence commitments. The following is an excerpt of the Analysis.

Due to its increasing accessibility resulting from climate change, the Arctic could become a contested and militarized arena in which states within the region and beyond attempt to secure and gain access to lucrative shipping routes and resources. Such an eventuality poses particular challenges to Canadian sovereignty and security. Stemming from such a characterization, the Harper government had long prioritized the Arctic as a defence issue, raising the spectre that Canadian sovereignty in the North could be irrevocably compromised – we either ‘use it or lose it.’

While silent on which potential adversaries were threatening to usurp Canadian ownership, the Harper government sought to restore a military presence in the Arctic by “placing more boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-​in-​the-​sky.” In his 2005 campaign, in particular, Harper promised a litany of Arctic-​specific defence projects to rectify the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) dearth of presence and operational experience in the region. The promotion of the ‘sovereignty at risk’ narrative seemed to justify the construction of a robust and permanent military presence in the Arctic. In reality, however, Canada requires a different type of military presence and capability suite than commonly perceived (or advocated).

Canada’s security challenges in the North do not emanate from a military threat but are rather largely constabulary in nature. Defending sovereignty is the perennial duty of the military but in the Arctic there is no credible, state-​based threat capable of challenging Canadian ownership of its waters and territories, with a few exceptions which are well managed. Despite its sometimes fiery rhetoric, the former Conservative government’s various Arctic policy documents reflected such an appreciation of the threat environment. With the near absence of state-​based threats, military requirement in the Arctic need to be suitable for this particular security environment and sustainable given the operating challenges of the region, as well as other competing military priorities.

At present, the military is focusing their Arctic efforts on increasing domain awareness via surveillance and maintaining a light regional footprint to facilitate Northern operations and, when required, support the deployment of southern based-​units which are increasingly training in the North, often in conjunction with other security agencies and regional partners. Deploying large contingents of combat capable forces is ill-​advised given the nature of the threat, prohibitively expensive given the harsh operating environment (especially the High Arctic), and potentially compromising other missions and mandates by drawing resources away.

The Arctic Security Environment

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance of the Arctic diminished significantly allowing for the construction of regional forums dedicated towards common interests, specifically climate research. Rapidly changing environmental conditions, however, are transforming the Arctic landscape by increasing accessibility to human activity to an unprecedented level. Amongst this uncertainty, issues of ownership and access have fueled the development of a narrative of the Arctic as moving away from a politically stable region to one of high geopolitical importance characterized by growing complexity, competition, and perhaps even rivalry. In such a narrative, the current regional architecture is simply unable to adjust and accommodate the expected scramble for resources and political influence.

Not surprisingly, a popular theme has been the growing ‘militarization’ of the Arctic over the past decade. There is no denying that all Arctic states are augmenting their military capabilities in their northern territories, including the stationing of combat-​capable units. As one commentator has remarked, “we may be entering the first stages of an Arctic arms race, in which competition and conflict may overwhelm our desires and rhetoric to have a cooperative régime for the developing circumpolar world.” The augmenting presence, capability development, and employment of military forces in the Arctic is an emerging reality, but their use is, by and large, within recognized national borders and waters.

Moreover, they are largely focused on exercising sovereign control to ensure compliance with state laws, border control, and search and rescue. Retaining combat forces to defend against state-​based threats in the Arctic is a marginal requirement at this time. Arctic countries are more concerned about increasing their domain awareness in parts of their jurisdictions characterized by large geographic areas, small and sparse populations, and a lack of infrastructure, surveillance, and response capacities.

The flurry of recent Russian military projects in the Arctic, including icebreaker construction and the re-​activation of air and army bases on their northern islands, are in part aimed at establishing unquestioned ownership of the Northern Sea Route, regardless of legal objections by the US that the waters constitute an international strait. This is not to suggest that developing a war-​fighting capacity in the Arctic is not an objective of Moscow. However, domestic political calculations and constabulary requirements have heavily shaped the makeup and operational nature of military developments thus far in the region. Some military developments in the Arctic, furthermore, are based on larger, extra-​regional factors. Modernization of the Russian Northern Fleet, for instance, is designed to upgrade their nuclear submarine deterrent and for global operations. Similarly, the US ground-​based interceptors in Alaska are meant to counter a missile attack from a rogue state, specifically North Korea.

Most commentators are quick to assert that militarization is becoming a dominant force driving regional politics, but are at a loss in not only providing an operational definition (e.g., what does ‘militarization’ mean?) but also in explaining how this process will contribute to the destabilization of the region beyond simplistic narratives (Russia versus NATO; non-​Arctic states versus Arctic states). There are no territorial disputes in the Arctic, with the exception of the relatively benign dispute over Hans Island between Canada and Denmark, and there is no evidence to suggest Russia or any other Arctic nation is moving to employ military forces over contested Extended Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) or to gain unobstructed access to polar shipping routes.

Click here to read the rest of the CDA Institute Analysis.

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Adam P. MacDonald is an academic based in Halifax, Nova Scotia specializing in geopolitical developments in the Arctic and East Asia. He is a regular contributor to the Canadian Naval Review, East Asia Forum and Frontline Defence.