Government Announces Purchase of 6th AOPS

By: Mairin Prentiss · CBC News

The federal government is purchasing another ship to be built in Halifax, the defence minister says a day after Ottawa awarded $7 billion in contracts to three shipyards for work on Royal Canadian Navy frigates — leaving concerns over an 18-month gap in work for Irving Shipyard employees.

The First Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship assembled at Halifax Shipyard - Irving Shipbuilding

The government will buy a sixth Arctic and offshore patrol ship for the navy, Harjit Sajjan said to a crowd at the Irving Shipyard in Halifax on Friday.

"The women and men of the Irving Shipyard build incredible ships and are essential for enabling the success of the Royal Canadian Navy," said Sajjan.

The government planned to purchase five Arctic and offshore patrol ships — with a possibility of a sixth — after scaling back its original plan of buying between six and eight vessels in 2014.

Public Services and Procurement Canada announced Thursday in a news release that it intends to sign contracts worth $7 billion with Davie in Lévis, Que., Irving Shipbuilding Inc. in Halifax and Seaspan Victoria Shipyards in Victoria for maintenance on 12 Canadian navy ships.

With the maintenance program split between three yards, workers in Halifax feared they would be laid off in between the end of the patrol ships program and the start of the Canadian Surface Combatant program.

Last month, Irving employees held a march in Halifax to protest the Liberal government's intention to split the contracts with other yards, saying it would result in job losses.

Irving Shipyard workers say sharing the work will mean layoffs. (Robert Short/CBC)

Friday's announcement appears to be aimed at allaying those fears.

In a news release, the Department of National Defence said the sixth ship will help sustain hundreds of jobs at Irving shipyards.

"Today's announcement is good news for the Royal Canadian Navy, but it is also good news for Canadians, our economy and the city of Halifax. This is a region with deep ties to our navy," said Sajjan.

"By adding a sixth Arctic and offshore patrol ship, we are ensuring that our Royal Canadian Navy remains an agile and responsive force for years to come, so that Canada can continue to assert and enforce our Arctic sovereignty," he said.

Irving officials had meetings in Ottawa on Thursday where they said they received the news.

But building another ship doesn't mean there won't be layoffs, said Kevin McCoy, the president of Irving Shipbuilding.

"Nothing is guaranteed until we have contracts in hand and I know hearing that might make some folks a little uneasy, but I am encouraged by our discussions yesterday particularly around Halifax class maintenance work. This is a big piece of solving about a three-year problem, but we now have about half the problem solved."

Irving will begin construction on the fourth Arctic and offshore patrol vessel later this year.

The Dismal State of Canada’s Navy

By: Claudia Nieroda, The NATO Association of Canada 

Canada’s navy is in deep, troubled waters. With the nation’s last destroyer retiring in 2017, we will be left without any large warships capable of defending and resupplying the remains of our naval fleet. The wear and tear, in addition to soaring replacement costs, has seen many ships decommissioned without timely replacements. The rusted decades-old ships that have persevered are prone to frequent mechanical breakdowns. Consequently, the Royal Canadian Navy today is ranked by Ken Hansen on the Canadian Naval Review as on the same level as Bangladesh’s maritime forces.

The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) was launched in June 2010 by the Harper Government in an attempt to restore the navy to its former glory. Following World War II, Canada had the fifth largest navy, but years of neglect left it in a disintegrated state. There remain a total of 29 warships, meaning vessels equipped with missiles and military weapons designed for combat and defense purposes. Canada’s last destroyer, the HMCS Athabaskan, is scheduled to retire in 2017, with no plans for another destroyer to replace it. With the largest coastline in the world and three oceans to patrol, the lack of naval armada is alarming.

The NSPS is meant to build, repair, and maintain the federal fleet. However, it does not appear that it is living up to its promise to bridge the significant gap that has been formed in Canada’s navy. Constant delays, budget cuts, and increasing production costs keep the NSPS from carrying out what it planned to do according to the original timeline.

Only six out of thirteen current icebreakers are capable of polar operations, but none are able to travel far in the Northern seas during the winter months. The NSPS commissioned the construction of a new icebreaker, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker, which was initially expected to be in service by 2017, but a series of delays will now have the ship joining the fleet in 2022. The government has issued an order for new Arctic/ Offshore Patrol Ships, such the HMCS Harry DeWolf, but the first of these will not be delivered until 2018. This means that the Arctic passages, such as the Northwestern Passage, will continue to be unsupervised and isolated during the winter season.

Budget cuts have led to what was supposed to be an Arctic deep-water port in Nanisivik, Nunavut, turned from a naval base into a refueling station. This refueling station will only be accessible during the few summer months and closed during the rest of the year. When the HMCS Harry DeWolf is ready to enter service, it will not have an Arctic base to operate from.

Currently, the navy is ill-equipped to meet the various treaty commitments with Canadian allies. It is unreasonable to assume foreign countries would be willing to protect Canada if it is common knowledge that the nation’s navy will be unable to come to their defense. This reputation may be detrimental to Canada’s security.

The importance of the navy is not just fundamental in the ability to defend freedom. While that is a crucial factor in today’s erratic global affairs, it is important that Canada’s navy be prepared to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises. For instance, if any civilian ship, such as the ferries that move passengers between Labrador and Newfoundland or Vancouver and Victoria, were to signal a distress call, the lack of naval units might lead Canada to depend on the U.S. Navy Coast Guard to back up the Canadian Coast Guard. If an earthquake struck one of the islands off of British Colombia, such as Haida Gwaii, similar problems might arise.

The navy is simply not equipped to respond to multiple crises at home, never mind additional crises abroad. The Canadian government would be hard pressed to fulfill the agreements with their treaty partners and allies in the defense capability, nor in humanitarian aid. It is crucial that Canadians do not take the reputation as a “peaceful” country for granted as geopolitical security can never be guaranteed. The NSPS needs to focus on the present state of the navy and how to expedite the planned improvements. We cannot simply wait 10 years for ships to be constructed; we need them now.

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 Nieroda Claudia Nieroda graduated from the University of Guelph with an Honours Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. Throughout her undergrad career, she participated in an exchange at the National University of Singapore, taking courses extensively in the field of International Relations. In her final year, she successfully wrote and defended a thesis paper exploring the advantages of soft-authoritarian regimes in South East Asia in terms of political and economic development. Claudia loves adventure and travel, visiting over 35 countries and 5 continents, and is currently pursuing a career in the field of international relations.

Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels to continue to operate even with delivery of AOPS

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch 

There has been a lot of speculation over the years on the fate of the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels. Much of it has centered on concerns they will they be pulled from service as the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships come [into service]. Defence Watch asked that question of Vice Admiral Ron Lloyd, the head of the Royal Canadian Navy.

Here’s what he had to say:

“No. We’ll continue to operate the MCDVs. The MCDVs are providing yeoman’s service for us. As we’ve gone through the Halifax Class modernization, we’re having tremendous success with their ability to participate in Joint Interagency Task Force South, the counter-narcotics operation. They are also a vehicle by which we can introduce our sailors to leadership opportunities early in their career. And the MCDVs do a marvellous job of doing that going forward.”

“We have two in a deep maintenance period at any given time,” he added. “And then we have ten at various levels of readiness available for operations.”

HMCS Brandon is a Canadian Kingston-class maritime coastal defence vessel commissioned in 1999.

The CAF and the Arctic: Maintaining a Suitable and Sustainable Role

Published by the CDA Institute 

In this new CDA Institute Analysis, Adam MacDonald looks at the military requirements for Canada in the Arctic, concluding that the capabilities need to be suitable for the security environment and financially sustainable given other defence commitments. The following is an excerpt of the Analysis.

Due to its increasing accessibility resulting from climate change, the Arctic could become a contested and militarized arena in which states within the region and beyond attempt to secure and gain access to lucrative shipping routes and resources. Such an eventuality poses particular challenges to Canadian sovereignty and security. Stemming from such a characterization, the Harper government had long prioritized the Arctic as a defence issue, raising the spectre that Canadian sovereignty in the North could be irrevocably compromised – we either ‘use it or lose it.’

While silent on which potential adversaries were threatening to usurp Canadian ownership, the Harper government sought to restore a military presence in the Arctic by “placing more boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-​in-​the-​sky.” In his 2005 campaign, in particular, Harper promised a litany of Arctic-​specific defence projects to rectify the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) dearth of presence and operational experience in the region. The promotion of the ‘sovereignty at risk’ narrative seemed to justify the construction of a robust and permanent military presence in the Arctic. In reality, however, Canada requires a different type of military presence and capability suite than commonly perceived (or advocated).

Canada’s security challenges in the North do not emanate from a military threat but are rather largely constabulary in nature. Defending sovereignty is the perennial duty of the military but in the Arctic there is no credible, state-​based threat capable of challenging Canadian ownership of its waters and territories, with a few exceptions which are well managed. Despite its sometimes fiery rhetoric, the former Conservative government’s various Arctic policy documents reflected such an appreciation of the threat environment. With the near absence of state-​based threats, military requirement in the Arctic need to be suitable for this particular security environment and sustainable given the operating challenges of the region, as well as other competing military priorities.

At present, the military is focusing their Arctic efforts on increasing domain awareness via surveillance and maintaining a light regional footprint to facilitate Northern operations and, when required, support the deployment of southern based-​units which are increasingly training in the North, often in conjunction with other security agencies and regional partners. Deploying large contingents of combat capable forces is ill-​advised given the nature of the threat, prohibitively expensive given the harsh operating environment (especially the High Arctic), and potentially compromising other missions and mandates by drawing resources away.

The Arctic Security Environment

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance of the Arctic diminished significantly allowing for the construction of regional forums dedicated towards common interests, specifically climate research. Rapidly changing environmental conditions, however, are transforming the Arctic landscape by increasing accessibility to human activity to an unprecedented level. Amongst this uncertainty, issues of ownership and access have fueled the development of a narrative of the Arctic as moving away from a politically stable region to one of high geopolitical importance characterized by growing complexity, competition, and perhaps even rivalry. In such a narrative, the current regional architecture is simply unable to adjust and accommodate the expected scramble for resources and political influence.

Not surprisingly, a popular theme has been the growing ‘militarization’ of the Arctic over the past decade. There is no denying that all Arctic states are augmenting their military capabilities in their northern territories, including the stationing of combat-​capable units. As one commentator has remarked, “we may be entering the first stages of an Arctic arms race, in which competition and conflict may overwhelm our desires and rhetoric to have a cooperative régime for the developing circumpolar world.” The augmenting presence, capability development, and employment of military forces in the Arctic is an emerging reality, but their use is, by and large, within recognized national borders and waters.

Moreover, they are largely focused on exercising sovereign control to ensure compliance with state laws, border control, and search and rescue. Retaining combat forces to defend against state-​based threats in the Arctic is a marginal requirement at this time. Arctic countries are more concerned about increasing their domain awareness in parts of their jurisdictions characterized by large geographic areas, small and sparse populations, and a lack of infrastructure, surveillance, and response capacities.

The flurry of recent Russian military projects in the Arctic, including icebreaker construction and the re-​activation of air and army bases on their northern islands, are in part aimed at establishing unquestioned ownership of the Northern Sea Route, regardless of legal objections by the US that the waters constitute an international strait. This is not to suggest that developing a war-​fighting capacity in the Arctic is not an objective of Moscow. However, domestic political calculations and constabulary requirements have heavily shaped the makeup and operational nature of military developments thus far in the region. Some military developments in the Arctic, furthermore, are based on larger, extra-​regional factors. Modernization of the Russian Northern Fleet, for instance, is designed to upgrade their nuclear submarine deterrent and for global operations. Similarly, the US ground-​based interceptors in Alaska are meant to counter a missile attack from a rogue state, specifically North Korea.

Most commentators are quick to assert that militarization is becoming a dominant force driving regional politics, but are at a loss in not only providing an operational definition (e.g., what does ‘militarization’ mean?) but also in explaining how this process will contribute to the destabilization of the region beyond simplistic narratives (Russia versus NATO; non-​Arctic states versus Arctic states). There are no territorial disputes in the Arctic, with the exception of the relatively benign dispute over Hans Island between Canada and Denmark, and there is no evidence to suggest Russia or any other Arctic nation is moving to employ military forces over contested Extended Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) or to gain unobstructed access to polar shipping routes.

Click here to read the rest of the CDA Institute Analysis.

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Adam P. MacDonald is an academic based in Halifax, Nova Scotia specializing in geopolitical developments in the Arctic and East Asia. He is a regular contributor to the Canadian Naval Review, East Asia Forum and Frontline Defence.

Former Vice-Admirals state RCN Needs at least 12 Surface Combatants

Surface Combatants
How Many, and What Capabilities?
BY RON BUCK and GARY GARNETT
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 13, No 1)

There has been significant recent media coverage about the renewal of Canada’s Surface Combatant fleet and what number of ships and the capabilities they should have. In its Speech from the Throne, the Government announced that an open and transparent defence review will be undertaken and should answer the fundamental question “What does the Government expect of its Navy”. Along with an approved program budget, the answer to numbers and capabilities will be determined.


Spanish combat ship Blas de Lezo and Portuguese multi-purpose ship Dom Francisco de Almeida sail with Canadian ship Winnipeg (foreground) during Operation Reassurance as part of Canada’s commitment to NATO assurance measures in Central and Eastern Europe.

Canada has three coasts, and having naval capability in the Atlantic and Pacific that can deploy to the Arctic along with some support facilities would meet a bare minimum sovereignty capability. The Arctic requirement will soon be met by the new Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships which are focused upon Canadian sovereignty.

The Liberal Platform stated: “These investments will ensure that the Royal Canadian Navy is able to operate as a true blue-water maritime force”. This means the ability to operate not only in our sovereign waters but throughout the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean with a capability to deal with more than constabulary threats.

The question then, is whether the Government wishes to maintain a naval role in contributing to global peace and security; a capability that has been used consistently over the past few decades by both Liberal and Conservative Governments. Based upon the Liberal Platform, it would seem highly likely that the Government would want the ability to make a significant contribution internationally.

Minimum Requirements
To calculate minimum ship numbers, there are two important contextual concepts that need to be understood.

First, to have a fully trained and ready ship/crew available for immediate tasking realistically requires a minimum of four ships/crews. The reasons, while complex, have been proven time and again. Anything less will either badly erode the institution (the Navy) or will result in not being able to meet assigned commitments.

Second, in terms of international naval operations, it is generally accepted that a nation providing one warship will have limited ability to lead/influence. If a nation provides more than one, it has frequent opportunity to lead, and much greater ability to influence mission objectives. The RCN has shown over recent decades that it is not only capable but is a preferred Alliance and Coalition leader.

The calculation then becomes: one Surface Combatant ready in the Atlantic and a second in the Pacific, plus a minimum of one Surface Combatant available for international tasking but realistically two to allow greater influence and to be able to simultaneously deal with major events in differing geographic areas. This result is a minimum of three – but more realistically four – Surface Combatants available on an ongoing basis. Based upon the 1:4 ratio this means the Surface Combatant fleet size must be between 12 and 16. Anything below these numbers will result in Canada’s ability to play any rapid and long term international role is severely impacted and could also potentially result in a loss of operational capability in either the broader Atlantic or Pacific.

Why this Capability?
These ships will be the only surface class that will be able to deal with more than rudimentary constabulary threats. This means they must be of sufficient size, sea worthiness, combat capability and endurance to deal both with sophisticated threats within our sovereign waters and throughout the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean.

The increase in capability required to seamlessly work with our allies is not large, but would translate into more than a self defence capability – to include the ability to command an Alliance or Coalition task force. These latter capabilities need only be fitted in three or four of the total ships.

Based on the Liberal Platform’s stated desire to contribute in a meaningful way internationally, the minimum Surface Combatant fleet size is clearly between 12 and 16; anything less would not meet Government commitments and would be a major reduction in Canadian naval capability.

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Vice-Admirals Gary Garnett and Ron Buck both served as Commander of Canada’s Navy and as Vice Chief of Defence Staff before retiring from the Canadian Armed Forces.

AOPS To Get Friend or Foe Identification

David Pugliese of the Ottawa Citizen wrote yesterday that the RCN's Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) will be getting Thales IFF Technology. 

An Artists Rendition of the (Under Construction) AOPS Photo: CBC 

Here is his Article:

Published on: October 7, 2015 | Last Updated: October 7, 2015 5:03 PM EDT

Thales has recently been contracted by Lockheed Martin Canada to supplying IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) interrogators and transponders for the Royal Canadian Navy’s Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships.

The Long Range IFF interrogator will enable AOPS to identify friendly aircraft and to ensure 360 degree cooperative civilian and military aircraft surveillance, Thales noted in a news release.

More details from the firm:

The contract won by Thales is based on the latest version of the BlueGate Long Range IFF interrogator products and new miniaturized transponder. It is fully compliant with the latest version of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) civilian standards and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) / US Department of Defense (DoD) military standards. 
By fulfilling the latest standards, the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships will be able to make surveillance without any restriction, in particular to on shore Civilian Secondary Surveillance Radars.

Thales has supplied over 19,000 IFF units for more than 100 types of aircraft, vehicles and naval vessels worldwide.

Construction Begins on AOPS

It has been 8 years since the Harper government announced the procurement of six Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) - construction of the first AOPS started Tuesday in Halifax.

Numerous employees celebrated the start of production.

Irving Shipbuilding released the following image for the press:



According to Irving the first AOPS will be complete in 2018, and be fully operational by 2019. The final AOPS will be complete by 2022.

Construction has actually started according to Irving - as many people cheered June 18, 2015 when a similar announcement was made - but that was only testing for test modules.

RCNs Arctic Patrol Ships to be armed with MK-38's

It was announced that Irving Shipbuilding has awarded the defence contract for Canada's Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) to BAE Systems for the ships self-defence purposes.

BAE will provide up to 6 modified 25mm MK-38 Machine Gun Systems for the AOPS's. The contract stipulates the first gun systems will be delivered in 2017 (the same date as the first AOPS), and one system per year after until the end of the contract - again the same time table as the remaining AOPS.

Lockheed Martin Canada given Arctic Patrol Ship Contract

Lockheed Martin Canada announced earlier today that it has been awarded the subcontract by Irving Shipbuilding Inc. as the command and surveillance integrator of the Royal Canadian Navy's new class of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS)

Lockheed Martin Canada is now one of the main AOPS Tier 1 supplier for delivering the Irving Shipbuilding Inc. AOPS. With a contract valued at more than $170 million, Lockheed Martin Canada is now responsible for key integration of data and information sources to increase the ships situations awareness, provide better command an control support.