Buying Vintage: Examining the Cost of Purchasing Used Australian F-18s

By Christopher Cowan & Dr. Andrew Davies, CDA Institute

Royal Australian Air Force F-18 Hornet pilots wave to the crowd as they taxi down the runway after performing during the Australian International Airshow at the Avalon Airfield near Lara southwest of Melbourne on February 24, 2015.PAUL CROCK/AFP/Getty Images

The CF-18 A/B Hornet (a Canadian-variant of the same design in service with Australia and many other nations) has been the core component of Canada’s air combat capability since it was first introduced in the 1980s. The type has served the country well in overseas missions (including over Iraq, Kosovo and Libya) and at home defending North American airspace.

The road to finding its replacement, however, has been a bumpy one for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the Government of Canada (GoC). After a few false starts, the GoC recently announced that it will move forward with its plan to finally find a replacement for the CF-18 and secure an ‘interim’ air combat capability of 18 second-hand Hornets from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) until the new jets arrive in the mid-2020s.

The GoC has been criticized heavily for its handling of the CF-18 replacement program, with many commentators highlighting the political machinations behind the supposed ‘capability gap’ that the ‘interim’ fighters were to fill. Nonetheless, the GoC has persisted with its plan, so it’s worth taking a look at what it means to buy ‘used’ aircraft.

Australia has a fleet of 71 Hornets. The first was delivered to the RAAF in 1984, roughly the same time that Canada received its first CF-18. The airframe of a F/A-18 A/B has a nominal age of 6,000 hours, which can be extended through service life management processes and structural upgrades. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) also flies F/A-18 A/B models (as well as C and D models), and has put a significant number of flight hours on their airframes. 91% of USMC Hornets have over 6,000 flight hours and 19% have over 8,000 hours, with a few aircraft approaching 10,000 flight hours.

The average RAAF legacy Hornet has flown around 4,200 hours (see page 114 in the linked document), allowing for approximately another 1,800 hours of flight time before it reaches the planned end of its service life in the early 2020s. That’s a fair amount of life left on the airframe—almost one-third of its nominal lifespan—but the RCAF may well end up with some of the RAAF’s older Hornets, which are being replaced by F-35s. Australia has done an excellent job managing its Hornet fleet; each aircraft has a through-life plan designed to minimize wear-and-tear on the airframe. It has been such a success that Australia’s legacy Hornets have seen a recent uptick in flight hours—including taking them into action over Iraq and Syria—at an age when most aircraft are being flown less often, not more. So while the Hornets the RCAF will receive will be ‘used’, they’ll likely still be in relatively good nick.

Despite being roughly the same age as the Australian Hornets, Canada’s fleet of CF-18s looks positively ancient in comparison. As of April 2016, the average CF-18 airframe had approximately 6,100 hours on it, with some airframes having over 7,000 hours on them. Structural upgrades have extended the lives of their airframes to 8,000 hours per aircraft—something that most RAAF Hornets lack. Keeping the CF-18 fleet going and relevant until replacement jets arrive in the mid-2020s will require a series of relatively minor, low-risk upgrades, but extending their lives past 2025 would likely require significant structural and avionics upgrades, so any further delay in the replacement program would be costly. And by the mid-2020s, the CF-18s will be significantly less capable than the aircraft operated by Canada’s main allies.

Getting the newly acquired RAAF Hornets up to speed once they arrive in RCAF hands will likely not be very difficult, given the cooperation between the two air forces on a number of sustainment and upgrade programs for their Hornet fleets over past few decades. There are minor differences between the two fleets—the Australian Hornets have a different avionics package for example—but the Australian Hornets should be a relatively easy fit into Canada’s air force.

Now for the kicker. According to the Australian Financial Review, the reported cost of the deal is CAD $497m (USD $388m), which works out to a unit cost of CAD $27.6m (USD $21.5m). If true, that’s an awful lot of money for used aircraft that will only be in RCAF service for around six to seven years. It’s also around one-tenth of the cost of the GoC’s now-abandoned USD$5.23 billion plan to acquire 18 new-build Super Hornets from Boeing. But the difference is that the ‘interim’ Super Hornets could’ve flown with the RCAF for 30 years, rather than six.

Nonetheless, the data suggests that the RAAF’s 18 legacy Hornets, while around the same vintage as the CF-18s, may have a fair amount of life left in them and likely won’t require significant modifications when they arrive to supplement the RCAF’s fleet. That’s good news for the RCAF, which will finally get some ‘new’ jets to take the load off of its aging fleet. In the end, this acquisition appears to be an expensive solution to an ‘interim’ problem that should’ve been avoided. While it’s strange that it will take the GoC another three to four years to decide on a replacement for the venerable CF-18, any progress is good progress in the world of Canadian defence procurement.
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~Christopher Cowan is a Research Analyst and Editor at the CDA Institute, while Dr. Andrew Davies is the Director – Defence & Strategy Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Ivison: CAF Budget hits Post-War Low

By: John Ivison, The Globe and Mail

Justin Trudeau will head to Sicily next month for a NATO meeting with Donald Trump and other allies. The defence department hopes to release its major policy review before then, but perhaps it would be just as well if the Prime Minister goes empty-handed.

The Americans want Canada to live up to its commitment to spend 2 per cent of GDP on defence, but new figures suggest this year the country will hit a post-war spending low of just 0.88 per cent. Last month’s federal budget said the defence policy review will put the Armed Forces on a “sustainable footing,” but there was no money in that budget — in fact, $933 million earmarked for capital spending was pulled out of the defence budget over a six-year period.

This is a bad omen for the prospects of a major cash infusion. In previous reviews, DND got the money first and then published a policy outlining how it would be used.

Multiple sources say that the military submitted its plan to the federal cabinet only to have it sent back to the department for some pruning.

One particular thorny issue is ballistic missile defence, the cost of which is almost impossible to gauge since the Americans won’t talk hard numbers until Canada agrees to sign on. Nobody in defence minister Harjit Sajjan’s office would talk about cabinet discussions but sources expect the review will fudge on the subject by simply asking the military to examine the issue more closely.


David Perry, a senior analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said he doesn’t believe the defence policy review is likely to assuage American concerns that Canada is a free-rider when it comes to defence.

“I’m not hearing they are dealing with a ton of money,” he said.

Before the federal budget, Perry wrote a paper suggesting the budget would establish the fiscal framework for the defence policy review. Ahead of similar exercises in 2005 and 2008, spending increases were included in the budget.

“If the outcome of the Defence Policy Review is an expansionist defence policy, and the minister of National Defence has indicated it will be, its short-term success depends on getting the needed funding put into the fiscal framework in the 2017 budget,” he wrote.

That didn’t happen — in fact, the government withdrew $8.48 billion from the fiscal framework over the next 20 years, to help pay for other priorities.

Trudeau — and his predecessor Stephen Harper — have long argued that share of GDP devoted to defence is not a good measure of Canada’s commitment to NATO.

“While the argument has merit, it would likely carry more weight if the share of our GDP devoted to defence were not in decline,” said Perry.

At $18.7 billion, defence spending is also at a new low in terms of share of total program expenditures at 6.11 per cent.

The same Senate defence committee report that found Canada is approaching a post-war low point in spending concluded that the Canadian military is “chronically underfunded,” pointing out that the Forces need more than $2 billion in new money, just to maintain current operations.


Support in cabinet for a major increase in defence spending is clearly tepid

“As the world becomes a more complex place, especially with rogue regimes and non-state actors seeking and acquiring biological, nuclear and chemical weapons, and mobile missile launch capability, Canada should not rely on others to protect our national interests and defend our sovereignty,” the report said, as it recommended Canada sign up for BMD and double defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP over the next 11 years.

There are no signs that the defence policy review will reflect similar thinking.

Canada has committed to some 600 soldiers for a still-undefined peacekeeping mission in Africa; 450 troops are already in Latvia; a further 830 personnel are contributing to the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Gen. Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staff, said the Canadian Forces are fully capable of doing what has already been announced. But it would be a career-limiting move for a general to suggest otherwise.

Support in cabinet for a major increase in defence spending is clearly tepid, and closing the funding gap does not appear to be a priority for the Prime Minister.

Yet his most important foreign policy task is to have a close working relationship with the President of the United States.

If Trudeau turns up in Sicily with a defence plan that indicates Canada is not serious about paying its own way, he will be greeted by a turbulent President Trump, one in transition between Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.

Counter Argument to Vimy Paper #33: The F-35 and the CF-18 Replacement Debacle

On September 15th, 2016 - I published the Executive Summary of the CDA Institutes latest Vimy paper by Mr. Skimooka and the F-35 and the Canadian Procurement Process. I said then that it was heavily biased towards the F-35. Alan Williams has since published a counter argument and challenged Shimooka's essay.

The CDA Institute decline to publish the report.

It was published yesterday by Defence Watch. 

By Alan Williams

Defence Watch Guest Writer

In Mr. Shimooka’s Vimy Paper, “The Fourth Dimension: The F-35 Program, Defence Procurement, and the Conservative Government, 2006-2015”, he purports to present a history of the events surrounding the F-35 debacle. Unfortunately, in my view it is a flawed study reflecting Mr. Shimooka’s failure to grasp some of the basic principles of defence procurement and his acceptance of Lockheed Martin’s version of costs.

Below are just a few examples:

PROCESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Example 1

On page 12, Mr. Shimooka writes that there were several unique challenges for the Canadian government.

“The first involved how to properly manage an acquisition process given the unusual nature of the JSF Partnership. With its cooperative development approach, the F-35 did not conform to any other program within the bureaucracy’s experience. The government would need to guarantee two objectives simultaneously: managing a selection process that would ensure that Canada obtained the best possible replacement for the CF-18 (in terms of capability and cost), while cultivating the potential for tens of billions of dollars in opportunities for Canadian industry within the JSF program if the F-35 was selected as a replacement.”

Frankly, participating in the JSF program while simultaneously pursuing an open, fair and transparent competitive process presents no problem at all. As long as Canada remained a partner in the JSF program its industries were entitled to pursue and hopefully win significant contracts. Should Canada choose an aircraft other than the F-35, it would forego its opportunity to bid on contracts within the JSF program. Best estimates were that Canadian industry might garner up to $10-$12 billion in contracts. After all, nothing was guaranteed. However, any successful bidder would be required to guarantee industrial opportunities equal to or greater than the value of the contract, at least twice as great as under the JSF program. Furthermore, the Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development is in the position of ensuring that these jobs are high value jobs.

Example 2

On page 12, Mr. Shimooka identifies the selection process as the second major challenge for the government. Specifically,

“How to establish criteria for selecting a replacement, when one option is clearly more capable and will be used by most of Canada’s major allies?”

This too is a non-issue. First, the criteria or statement of requirements (SOR) needs to be based on the roles for the jet as articulated by the federal government. What is required is not necessarily the jet that has the most capabilities but the one that has the proven, operational capabilities that meet Canada’s needs. Note, I refer to proven, operational capabilities, not theoretical capabilities described on paper but not yet operationally approved.

Second, whether or not a jet is used by most of our allies is irrelevant. We should buy the jet that meets our needs not those of other countries. As for the issue of interoperability, we have and will continue to operate in theatres of operation with allies who bring a wide-range of aircraft to the fight. To this end, we regularly conduct military exercises or “war games” with our allies simulating operational situations and ensuring that notwithstanding the differing assets, we can communicate and work effectively together.

Example 3

On page 13, Mr. Shimooka writes,

“The 2006 assessment was fairly clear, suggesting the F-35 was likely the most capable and lowest cost option – and one that offered major industrial benefits for Canadian firms. The government accepted the recommendations, and on its basis signed the MOU in December of that year.”

The 2006 assessment was indeed pivotal, not in that it was used as the basis for signing the Phase III MOU. Rather, that it was used to support a recommendation made on Sept. 19, 2006 to the Minister of National Defence by the ADM (MAT) to purchase the F-35 – a crucial milestone that Mr. Shimooka omits.

There were two fundamental problems with this recommendation. First, in 2006 the F-35 was in its embryonic stages of development with its capabilities and its costs still unknown. To make such a recommendation at that time was indefensible. Second, in making such a recommendation, the ADM (MAT) abdicated his role and accountability as the individual responsible for acquisition within DND. Acquisition decisions are placed in the hands of civilian, rather than military, authorities to ensure objectivity and rigour before making recommendations up the line to ministers. In this case, the ADM (MAT) merely accepted the air force’s superficial analysis and ignored his duties.

This unsupportable recommendation launched the long downward spiral into what I refer to as the

F-35 debacle. Once accepted, neither the bureaucrats nor government leaders would back off the recommendation no matter what facts were available to them.

Example 4

Mr. Shimooka goes to great lengths to applaud the internal work at DND. On page four, he states:

“Nevertheless officials within DND, and later the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat worked to overcome these challenges, exercising due diligence with a rigorous evaluation process. The work of both included numerous safeguards to ensure the integrity of the entire approach. Although the effort was not flawless, the assessments made by these bodies were accurate and validated in subsequent years.”

Furthermore in his executive summary he writes,

“The federal bureaucracy, initially led by the Department of National Defence worked to undertake a proper evaluation of the CF-18 replacement program. Far from being exorbitantly expensive or technologically defective, it discovered the F-35 was the best option for Canada and recommended a sole source selection in 2010.” and that this study “is a story not of bureaucratic mismanagement or military bias.”

The reality is that no amount of internal analysis can substitute for an open, fair and transparent competition. First, internal analysis does not include the highly sensitive, secret operational information only provided through a competitive framework. Second, price and industrial benefits are factors in determining a successful bid and these can only be optimized and realized through a competition.

Furthermore, there is a vast difference between believing, rightly or wrongly, that “the F-35 is the best option for Canada” and recommending “a sole-source selection”. The former is an opinion. The latter is a procurement strategy that must comply with applicable legislation. Under section 506.12 (b) of the Agreement on Internal Trade, a sole-source option can be pursued if there is “an absence of competition”. In this case, it does not comply. There is no legal justification for a sole-source award.

If the F-35 did not exist, would we say that no other aircraft exists to meet our needs? Would we therefore not purchase any fighter aircraft replacement? Of course not! There can be no doubt that there are a number of alternatives to the F-35. These include Boeing’s Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Saab’s Gripen and EADS/BAE’s Eurofighter Typhoon. These are used by many of our allies and each, to a greater or lesser extent, can meet Canada’s fighter replacement needs. Which one can best meet Canada’s needs taking into consideration price and industrial and technical benefits can only be determined through a competition. Of course, if you have predetermined which aircraft you want, then you wire or fix the requirements to suit your needs. That is what occurred.

Contrary to Mr. Shimooka’s assertion, this indeed is a story of bureaucratic mismanagement and military bias.

COSTS

Example 5

On page 11, Mr. Shimooka writes that after a major replan of the JSF program, a target was established that “would see the aircraft cost approximately $75 million dollars a copy.” Frankly, the $75 million figure never was the price any purchaser would ever pay to purchase an F-35. Rather, it reflects one of the many costs that went into building the F-35. It is a tribute to Lockheed Martin’s ingenious marketing strategy that the public was led to believe that Canada would pay $75 million per aircraft. Sadly, our government and officials bought into this strategy and apparently so has Mr. Shimooka.

An analogy may help to explain Lockheed Martin’s deceptive cost communications strategy. How would you react if you were to enter a furniture store, ask a salesperson about the price for a chair and be told that direct labour cost was $75? You would likely be pretty upset. You would recognize that the $75 cost figure may or may not be correct but is not the price you would pay. The final price would be composed of direct labour, direct material, overhead and profit. You would feel that the salesperson is trying to deceive you.

As the attached U.S. Cost Definitions chart indicates, the $75 million referred to by Mr. Shimooka only represents the “recurring flyaway cost“ of the F-35. The final price that Canada will pay to purchase the aircraft will be composed of the recurring flyaway cost, the non-recurring flyaway cost, the weapon systems cost and the procurement cost.



By the way, according to the Selected Acquisition Report FY2017 referred to by Mr. Shimooka, if a buyer were to purchase the F-35A in 2016, the “recurring flyaway cost” for the jet would be $99.6 million. In 2012, these costs would have been $91.6 million.

THE OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICE (PBO) REPORT/

AUDITOR GENERAL (AG) REPORT

I am sure that officials in the PBO and AG can adequately defend their reports. However, it is important to note that neither of these reports would likely have been demanded were it not for the government’s misleading cost information. Anyone involved with defence procurement had to know that the government’s initial claim that it would cost $9 billion to acquire 65 jets and $7 billion to support them was ludicrous. The long-term support costs are typically 2-3 times as great as the initial acquisition cost. In this case the government was claiming the support costs were less than the acquisition costs!

CONCLUSION

Much as Mr. Shimooka may try to construct another narrative, the Conservative government’s decision to sole-source the F-35A, was a disaster of its own making. Resorting to a campaign of misinformation and a strategy to understate the costs of the program, the government lost all credibility.

At the outset, it launched a misinformation campaign, justifying its decision with statements it had to know were false. These included:

-Claiming the F-35 was the best plane at the best price;

-Claiming the F-35 was the result of a Canadian competition;

-Claiming the F-35 was needed for interoperability;

-Claiming the F-35 was needed for industrial benefits.

Later on, when it was forced to pause as a result of the PBO and AG reports, the government again resorted to subterfuge, developing a seven-point plan that was nothing more than a stalling strategy.

Finally, as its last attempt to foist the F-35A upon an unwitting Canadian taxpayer, the government attempted to undertake a clandestine deal with the U.S. Air Force. Not surprisingly, this duplicitous behavior was discovered and the government had to back off.

Understating of Costs

Parliament and the public simply wanted to know how much this program was going to cost. Instead of providing a full and fair response, the government continuously understated the costs, thereby inviting the intervention of the PBO and AG. The PBO and AG reports further damaged the credibility of the government by reinforcing the extent of the government’s deceit. From an initial government estimate of $16 billion, current estimates are that the program will cost Canadians over $40 billion.

The irony, of course, is that the F-35A may yet be the best aircraft to meet Canada’s needs. The only way of knowing for certain is through an open, fair and transparent competition, a competition based upon the government’s public articulation of the role it sees for our military and the role it sees for Canada’s fighter replacement. Acquiring aircraft through a sole-source contract is not only illegal but bad business. Costs are higher and industrial benefits are lower. Most importantly, only through a competition can we be certain that we have purchased the best plane to meet the needs of our men and women in the military.

In his conclusion, Mr. Shimooka contends that:

“Canadian political parties and the public have largely failed to grasp the underlying facts, and created a discourse that bore little resemblance to reality.”

Fortunately, the exact opposite was true. That’s why the Conservative government failed to achieve its objective.

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Alan Williams is a former ADM (MAT) at DND. He is now President of The Williams Group, providing companies with procurement expertise. In 2002 he signed the Memorandum of Understanding committing Canada to the second phase of the Joint Strike Fighter program. Mr. Williams is the author of two books, “Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View From the Inside” published in 2006 and “Canada, Democracy and the F-35” published in 2012. He can be reached at williamsgroup691@gmail.com.

Drozdova: Thoughts on Future Conflict and its impact on DND/​CAF

By: OKSANA DROZDOVA, CDA Institute 

The following is a summary of the CDA Institute Roundtable “Defence Policy Review Considerations: Thoughts on Future Conflict and its impact on DND/​CAF” held on 25 May 2016. These roundtable discussions are held under the Chatham House Rule. This summary reflects Analyst Oksana Drozdova’s perception of the discussion. The CDAInstitute thanks our Strategic Partners Lockheed Martin Canada and General Dynamics for their generous sponsorship of the 2016/​17 Roundtable Discussion Series.

The electoral platform of the current Liberal government was filled with promises, one of which was the pledge to exercise informed decision-​making. This particular pledge has recently been put to test with the launch of the Defence Policy Review (DPR). With a few roundtables already concluded, the first being held in Vancouver and subsequent ones already held in Toronto, Yellowknife, and Edmonton, informed observers of Canadian defence policy are still keen to share their ideas on the future of Canada’s defence policy.

A recent roundtable organized by the CDA Institute, titled Defence Policy Review Considerations: Thoughts on Future Conflict and its impact on DND/​CAF, provided a venue in which contributors shared their ideas as to which key aspects of the country’s defence policy should be addressed in the DPR.

With the Liberal government proclaiming “Canada is back,” it is still unclear how exactly the “comeback” is going to happen. On one hand, the Liberals want to bring Canada back as a champion of peacekeeping. On the other, security of sovereign territory and national interests, as well as commitments to the NATO allies require more resources. The theme that should figure most prominently in the crafting the DPR, at least in this early stage, is prioritization. Will we, as a nation, be able to sustain all these roles, and if not, which should be privileged above the others?

Indeed, the financial realities of budgetary considerations (fiscal constraints) will most likely, in one way or another, guide the pen of those creating the final draft of the renewed defence strategy. And when the time comes for making the decision, the question will inevitably arise: Which strategy, broad overhaul or strategic investment, is right for us?

Numerous arguments are in favour of both approaches. Indeed, the image of multi-​purpose combat capabilities has its appeal. A flexible, combat ready army is capable of standing on its own as well as contributing to allied efforts in a meaningful way. Moreover, access to a wide range of capabilities will allow Canada to strengthen its defence posture abroad and ensure its national security at home. Moreover, while ties with the US are strong, Canada cannot forever piggy back on the support of our better equipped ally. As such, the general opinion maintains that a truly secure Canada should be able to at least defend its own territory and interests without relying entirely on the assistance of its neighbour.

However, as was raised in these discussion, in our current economic state, broad based capabilities are not something Canada can afford. And, as tough choices will need to be made, concentrating on areas of expertise in which Canada excels will yield the most benefit. In prioritizing a particular defence niche, we should not conceive of it as a means to repel a specific threat; threats constantly change. On the contrary, we should develop specialized capabilities that would be flexible and widely applicable.

Furthermore, at their essence, broad-​based capabilities are chiefly designed to repel aggression from a state. This concept of warfare is largely outdated as the potential of a true ‘state on state conflict’ is highly unlikely. Indeed, cyber-​attacks, hybrid warfare, non-​state actors, and the consequences of climate change (most notably mass migrations) are the most prominent future sources of instability. Conversely, our current defence structure, which is predicated on the broad-​based capabilities model, is designed to repel an open state aggression and has been adapted to deal with fragile states and non-​state actors. Yet, other than Russia’s sabre-​rattling, there is no significant state threat that would force Canada to engage in ‘state-​on-​state’ warfare. With low chances of a direct state assault, certain areas of broad-​based capabilities, which also happen to weigh the most heavily on the defence budget, become under-​utilized.

With dozens of ongoing conflicts around the world, Canada has any number of choices when it comes to committing its military resources. Identifying the most pressing areas in which Canadian military involvement can make the greatest impact is of the essence. For instance, while Canada can renew its longstanding commitment to UN peacekeeping as promised, it seems unlikely it can at this time return to peacekeeping on the scale that it practiced in Cyprus and Bosnia. Instead, it should strive to offer targeted technical expertise and state-​building knowledge to missions worldwide. Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan provide a good example of how persistence and targeted military intervention can help maintain a fragile and much needed balance in an unstable region.

Western democracies are gradually learning and accepting that intervention has to be comprehensive in scope and long-​term in duration. With the pattern of global instability and threats constantly changing, it will be increasingly difficult to address threats earlier – the difficulty of understanding and responding to them will remain proportionate to their complexity. Instead, Western democracies need to build and promote internal capacities and societal resilience of fragile states. And since peacekeeping, or peacebuilding – as some experts prefer to call it, stating that it is not merely a question of semantics – is what many Canadians view to be a staple of our national identity, Canada’s commitment to those operations will have to be significantly furthered and augmented.

With future military threats becoming increasingly volatile and uncertain, our military strategy will require interaction with an ill-​defined combination of state and non-​state actors who are both declared and undeclared. Multilateral engagement and allied cooperation will thus become the most effective framework to address these complex issues. The reality is as true for the idea of pursuing independent foreign policy as it is for vigorous and interventionist multilateralism, in which the international community has certainly missed the tone and substance of Canada’s well-​honed role. And if we are indeed serious about “being back,” innovatively excelling in our strengths while cooperating with our allies in a meaningful way will allow for fruitful investment with tangible results the Canadian public can see and take pride in.
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Oksana Drozdova is an Analyst with the CDAInstitute currently working towards a Master’s degree at UOttawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA). Her research interests focus on International security, Eastern European studies and issues of statehood in political theory. (Image courtesy of Bruce Campion-​Smith/​Toronto Star.)

Preventing the Use of Children as Soldiers: A critical new operational capacity for the CAF

By: Dr. Shelly Whitman and Darin Reeves, CDA Institute 

CDA Institute guest contributors Shelly Whitman and Darin Reeves, the Executive Director and Director of Training at the Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative, respectively, comment on how the CAF can be better positioned to address child soldiers as part of a conflict mitigation strategy. This is based on their submission to the Halifax Defence Policy Review round-table.

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) should build upon its recent, proven experiences within the broad spectrum of operations conducted at home and around the world, bridging uniformed military and civilian defence workers, civilian aid agencies and the governments of Canada and Canadian partners, with a re-​conceptualization of the human security frontier.

Working together with other Canadian diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental assistance efforts, the CAF should as part of its “whole-​of-​government” approach be empowered to make the protection of children and youth a priority, as was seen when Canada hosted the first international conference on war-​affected children in 2000. This approach recognizes Canada as a middle power to whom all states, from the least developed to the most powerful, can rely upon as “honest brokers”; emphasizes Canada as a champion for the promotion of human rights; and permits us to reclaim a special place in the world of human security.

Realistic, contemporary threats to Canadian security have emerged both from domestic and international sources. A common theme shared among these threats has, unfortunately, been the exploitation of children and youth by those with ill-​intent, whether taking advantage of porous borders and ethnic strife, failing political institutions, economic disparity or extremism. The recruitment and use of these children, whether as child soldiers or as part of a criminal enterprise, has exploited children not in spite of their age – but because of it. In addition, the recruitment and use of children is an early warning indicator for mass atrocities that has yet to be fully recognized by the international community. This recognition by Canada presents a very unique opportunity to promote tangible action that can contribute significantly to overall conflict mitigation.

This reality is no longer confined to failed and failing states abroad, but has reached back and affected Canadian households and Canadian interests. Assessing and addressing the effect of this recruitment and use of children as soldiers and members of criminal enterprises on Canadian defence policy is a complex issue, one that engages the whole of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CAF across their spectrum of responsibilities – defence of Canada and continental North America, the advancement of national interests, and support to peace and security operations internationally and law enforcement agencies domestically.

However, this issue is also broader than DND and the CAF, engaging Canadian law enforcement, border services, and other concerned federal and provincial agencies. By recognizing the unique challenges posed by children and youth recruited and used as soldiers and in criminal enterprise, training to address these challenges, and working cooperatively with concerned agencies and partners, the CAF will be uniquely poised to confront this issue at its earliest stages abroad, support and build capacity at home, and take a lead humanitarian role in the protection of children and human rights around the world.

It is also critical that we begin to see how better to utilize Canadian Police expertise both for international missions as well as to resolve domestic threats that have international linkages and consequences. Deployment of Canadian police personnel to peacekeeping operations has steadily declined to an all-​time low. Yet the contributions that can be made by Canadian police officers to help build capacity in conflict zones, to train, mentor and lead by example in both Francophone and Anglophone contexts has not been truly understood. Corruption in many police forces around the world, combined with the very nature of police operations that requires more contact with civilian populations, means there is a critical juncture to impact change by well trained and vetted Canadian police personnel.

The recruitment and use of children as soldiers internationally has been shown to share many commonalities with the recruitment and use of children in criminal enterprise. In being prepared to support Canadian law enforcement and civilian authorities, the CAF must be ready to face this phenomena. This readiness, honed around the world and across the spectrum of conflict from the earliest days of peacekeeping through to the subsequent period of peacemaking and full combat operations within an environment of “whole-​of-​government” engagement, will enable the CAF to take on a multitude of roles in support of contemporary operations, including:
As trainers and capacity builders to other forces in a prophylactic approach to regional and domestic violence and instability by instructing in the effective, lawful and humanitarian establishment of security conditions and the protection of civilians through a child-​centric approach;
By focusing on the demonstrated link between the recruitment of child soldiers and subsequent outbreak of the worst forms of violence, Canadian intelligence, empowered and knowledgeable in the phenomena of child soldiers, will be well suited to foresee conditions leading to regional instability. By seeing the early warning signs of impending violence, conflicts that historically have employed the worst forms of humanitarian abuse can be prevented or contained, leading to earlier resolution of conflict and reduced humanitarian need.

It should also be noted that resource or personnel constraints need not be a hindrance to advancing this new niche for theCAF. It is entirely possible that experienced CAF veterans, who are looking to stay engaged in meaningful work, can be a resource to compliment the training and capacity building role of CAF in this realm. As an example, based on the work of our own organization, the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative (“the Dallaire Initiative”) is partnering with Wounded Warriors Canada to train CAF veterans in a skills transition program that is specifically designed to assist the Dallaire Initiative’s training and doctrinal outreach around the world. This could be equally extended to retired Canadian police personnel.

In working within the contemporary world of UN peace operations, operations in support of Canadian interests at home and abroad, and other missions to counter threats to international peace and security, CAF personnel are increasingly being exposed to the very worst forms of violence and abuse of the most vulnerable members of any society – children. Studies have demonstrated a significant link between exposure to children in armed conflict by soldiers and subsequent rates of associated operational stress injuries. By educating and training CAF personnel in recognizing and constructively addressing the phenomena of child soldiers, they are better prepared to face this psychologically and emotionally corrosive reality. To quote our founder, LGen Roméo Dallaire (ret’d), “The abuse of youth as instruments of war is a reality that can’t be resolved on the day you face them in the field.”

The Canadian government has now very publically stated its desire to reengage at the United Nations. It is important that Canada has a clear strategy for what this reengagement may look like. Given the CAF roles outlined above combined with civilian expertise in Canada, we have an opportunity to align ourselves with key priorities of the United Nations while also claiming our niche in the world. The UN Secretary-General’s commitment to a “Rights Upfront” approach can be augmented with a “Child Rights Upfront” approach that is championed by Canada.
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Dr. Shelly Whitman is the Executive Director of the Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative based at Dalhousie University. Darin Reeves is the Director of Training for the Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative based at Dalhousie University. (Image courtesy of National Defence and the CAF.)

A Mixed Fighter Fleet for Canada? Super Hornets, F-​35s, and the challenge of comparisons

By: Dr. Peter Layton, CDA Institute 

Every country has an F-​35 story it seems. Both Australian and Canadian force structure planning has been blighted by the aircraft’s problems and long delays. In 2007 Australia opted for a bridging capability – against Air Force advice – and acquired the F-​18F Super Hornet. Canada now appears to be similarly considering a bridging capability, perhaps also against Air Force advice, and possibly acquiring Super Hornets.

USAF F/A-1 Super Hornets.

Sounds much the same, at first glance. But Australian and Canadian requirements have some fundamental differences, and just as importantly time has moved on. 2016 is not 2007.

For Australia, the F-​18F acquisition has been a good experience; the aircraft arrived on time and under budget. Neither are surprising in that the aircraft was an off-​the-​shelf buy rather than an F-​35 developmental program. The in-​service F-​18A Hornet aircrew found converting to the Super Hornet easy and quick, with the US Navy (USN) training system providing a good head start.

The maintenance and support, however, was a much more complex matter. The current variant Super Hornet technology is considerably more advanced than the 1980s vintage Hornet. In many respects the Super Hornet’s technology is closer to the F-​35 than the F-​18A; it is really more of an F-​35 Lite than a ‘super’ Hornet.

In being more advanced, the Super Hornet’s operating costs are much greater than those of the older Hornet. Apples to oranges comparisons are hard given different fleet sizes and other factors, but are probably more than twice as much per aircraft (see p. 120 of a recent Australian Strategic Policy Institute report). In this, a major project lesson learned by the Australian acquisition organisation is that, while off-​the-​shelf jets can be quickly acquired, “the establishment of a sustainment solution is a challenge and requires early management oversight.” Half the Super Hornet fleet had been delivered within three years but reaching the final operational capability state, when everything is bedded down, took 5½ years from government approval.

It must also be remembered that the F-​18 that Australia and Canada bought was developed from the US Air Force’s (USAF) Lightweight Fighter technology evaluation program. The F-​18 began life as an air-​to-​air fighter first and a bomber second. The F-​35 is the reverse with air-​to-​ground the primary requirement and air-​to-​air secondary. By dent of excellent sensors, datalinks, stealth, and millions of lines of code, the F-​35 overcomes the airframe deficiencies that arise from this upbringing, albeit at the cost of great complexity and perhaps a certain operational brittleness.

In contrast, the F-​35 and the Super Hornet are both alike in being originally designed as strike fighters. Unsurprisingly, both offer broadly similar capabilities and neither are highly manoeuvrable dogfighters. In wars-​of-​choice such as fightingISIS in Iraq the differences between the aircraft in terms of operational effect might be marginal.

Given this, maybe a Canadian Super Hornet bridging capability makes some sense. It would take the pressure off having to make an F-​35 decision – at a time when the aircraft design remains unstable, maintenance systems are immature, operating costs uncertain, and the US’s chief tester is still publishing scary flight test reports. On the other hand, the F-​35 program office is progressively addressing technical issues, unit costs are coming down, more aircraft have been ordered by various countries, and the USAF looks set to declare an initial operational capability this year.

Yet this might not be the kind of capability most want or are expecting. As more becomes known about the software, it seems that the F-​35 might not be fully operationally ready until Block 4 is implemented. This Block may also see some key hardware changes, such as bringing the Electro-​Optical Targeting System (EOTS) up to a suitable standard. Block 4 should be ready early next decade. Buying F-​35s before then might mean expensive upgrades before they even enter delivery flight-​test. Unfortunately for the F-​35, buying later is always cheaper and always brings a better standard aircraft.

In Canada, another consideration is whether there will be a capability gap between the new fighters’ introduction to service and the last old Hornet retiring, by 2025 or even earlier. It should be recognised that the transition period will see a dip in capability and some years when deploying a squadron overseas would severely tax the RCAF, especially on the personnel front. Individuals can’t be at home bringing a new fighter on board while fighting offshore. Moreover 2025 is not far away in major project terms. It took Australia almost six years to fully bed down a technically well-​understood, off-​the-​shelf fighter. The F-​35 is in nothing like the same state; even if contracting this year, meeting the 2025 deadline would be a near-​run thing if Canada wanted a seamless transition from one aircraft type to the other.

But hold everything. The F-​35 program, while too big to stop, may not be too big to fail, at least in the air-​to-​air arena. (Its air-​to-​ground capabilities appear robust by comparison.)

Enter stage left the shadow of the future. Air superiority is becoming contested again in both East Asia and Europe. As the RAND Corporation warns, “continuous improvements to Chinese air capabilities make it increasingly difficult for the United States to achieve air superiority within a politically and operationally effective time frame.” The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, considering China’s full range of defence capabilities – including its rapidly advancing fighter fleet – observes: ” at the current rate of U.S. capability development, the balance of military power in the region is shifting against the United States.”

In this vein, the USAF in Europe commander recently noted: “The advantage that we had from the air, I can honestly say, is shrinking.… This is not just a Pacific problem. It’s as significant in Europe as it is anywhere else on the planet … I don’t think it’s controversial to say they’ve closed the gap in capability.”

Most worryingly, USAF’s head office has determined that the “projected force structure in 2030 is not capable of fighting and winning against …potential adversary capabilities.” The growing fleets of F-​35s in service with America and its allies seems inadequate to ensure air superiority beyond 2030. Future control of the air is in doubt.

What to do is uncertain. Whatever Canada buys now appears unlikely to be operationally viable in the air-​to-​air role beyond 2030 or so. The USAF is suggesting an expedited program to get some suitable ‘system of systems’ into service before then – maybe even 2025 – so air superiority can be maintained long term. What these systems might be remains unknown.

One option is for Canada to ignore this reality, press on and buy F-​35s to replace the Hornets by 2025. This is not necessarily a bad approach. The F-35’s air-​to-​air capabilities might be doubtful long-​term against advanced fighters but should be adequate for contributing to NORAD where the threats will hopefully be meagre. The F-35’s air-​to-​ground capabilities should be suitable for participating in NATO and future coalitions of the willing. In this case, the American alliance will be primarily relied upon to ensure control of the air.

Some will say – probably correctly – that this sounds like spending vast sums of money to buy a second rate air combat force and that ‘hope is not a strategy.’ Yet Canada’s (and Australia’s and most European NATO nations) Cold War fighter contribution was arguably in this vein. But you have to ask if you’re buying a doubtful capability anyway, is there any reason not to go for the lower cost Super Hornet option then.

Another alternative is to buy say 30 Super Hornets now, retain 30 CF-​18 Hornets, and wait until mid-​next decade to decide what to do. By then America’s intentions concerning new air superiority systems will be clearer and perhaps – a big ‘perhaps’ – Canada could buy into a long-​term robust solution. This offers at least a chance Canada may remain an ally important for more than just geographical proximity. If however this air superiority path does not eventuate, is unaffordable, or not releasable to close allies, by the mid-​2020s better and cheaper F-​35 versions will be available to round out Canada’s fighter force in terms of numbers. Importantly, also by then, the F-​35s operating costs will finally be known, allowing a more accurate assessment of whether a mixed fleet really is more expensive than a single type one. It may not be.

The later approach stresses hedging and is suitable for uncertain times but takes a dark view of the future where strategic circumstances are deteriorating. The other option is more of a big bet built on the hope the geopolitical situation in next few decades is better than seems to be likely now. The choice between these two options is not easy but indicates the F-​35/​Super Hornet issue is more complex than it seems at first. Which is more sensible? More pragmatic? Some deep thinking is required.
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Dr. Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University in Queensland, Australia. (Image courtesy of Staff Sgt. Aaron Allmon, U.S. Air Force.)

CDA Institute Analysis – “Trudeau’s Promises: From Coalition Operations to Peacekeeping and Beyond”

In this new CDA Institute Analysis, Stéfanie von Hlatky looks at the key considerations that should help guide the deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The following is an excerpt of the Analysis.

Academic and policy discussions on Canada’s future role in multinational military interventions inevitably refer back to the long war in Afghanistan. Canada’s involvement, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) evolved significantly over the years. Canada’s reputation as an alliance partner also improved noticeably in the process. As of 2006, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were known for operating with few caveats and were at the forefront of developing a viable whole-​of-​government approach as part of their design of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, despite obvious shortcomings.

Although the success metrics of the war in Afghanistan are hard to establish and the overall outcome of the intervention is inconclusive at best, the experience tells us a lot about Canada’s standing in alliance politics and what the CAF can be expected to do in the future as part of those coalitions, given the skills and expertise acquired during this war-​intensive period. Indeed, the CAF acquired diverse skills as the intervention called for both community engagement and warfighting, with a lot of necessary adaptations along the way.

Beyond the lessons learned from the previous war, Canada’s military role abroad should be guided by clear foreign and defence policy guidelines. The last defence policy statement dates back to 2008. With the economic recession hitting the country at about the same time, many of the plans outlined in the Canada First Defence Strategy had to be shelved. Now that there is a Liberal government in power, under the leadership of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, the Department of National Defence (DND) has been tasked with conducting a defence review. The review process includes public consultations across Canada, through the organization of events, roundtables, and discussions on social media. The result of this process will be unveiled in January 2017 and will provide greater clarity on Canada’s role in operations, force levels, readiness, and personnel issues.

This paper examines the conditions under which Canada should consider deploying the CAF and considers some of the motives that play into the decision-​making process. It does so by taking into account past and current CAF operations, as well as the defence priorities that have already been announced by the government. I argue that, moving forward, the Canadian government ought to think much more about the type of mission that is well suited for the CAF, where Canadian soldiers are most needed, as well as which allies and partners are best to work with.

Alliance Politics

One of the assumptions of this paper is that maintaining a reputation for reliability within an alliance setting is one of the main currencies of influence for a medium-​sized country like Canada. Therefore, decisions on the use of force are assessed in reference to Canada’s most important allies. That being said, it is worth asking whether Canada paid too high of a price to boost its reputation over the course of the Afghan War. In Afghanistan, but also more recently in Iraq as a member of the global coalition against the Islamic State, Canada strived to make military contributions that place it in the top tier of participating countries. As mentioned before, Canada is also seen as an alliance partner capable of deploying its armed forces with few restrictions on what they can do on the battlefield, meaning a higher tolerance for risky missions, which plays into allies’ qualitative assessments of burden-​sharing. The nightmare of coordinating national caveats was felt by ISAF commanders as they had to consider the various contributions made by each ally and partner, factoring in each nation’s rules of engagement and restrictions on their mobility in order to translate pledges into effective multinational military cooperation.

Given what Canada has invested in previous military interventions, the government would do well to invest in mechanisms that preserve allies’ coordination capacity and interoperability, either as part of NATO or US-​led coalitions. For NATO, the Secretary-​General has insisted on the utility of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) as the means through which NATO allies and partners can retain their capacity to work closely together, as refined through ISAF and Operation Unified Protector in Libya. The message was reinforced during the 2014 Wales Summit:

We continue to build on the experience gained in recent operations and improve our interoperability through the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). Today we have endorsed a substantial CFI Package consisting of six key deliverables, including the high-​visibility exercise Trident Juncture 2015, with 25,000 personnel to be hosted by Spain, Portugal, and Italy; a broader and more demanding exercise programme from 2016 onwards; and a deployable Special Operations Component Command headquarters.

Through CFI or military exercises led by the Alliance or individual nations, Canada has a stake in continuously sharpening its capacity to operate with other Western armed forces.

Why Participate in Military Operations?

The government of Canada, currently engaging in a comprehensive defence policy review, will examine how alliance ties can enhance the country’s foreign and defence policy goals, but the scope of the exercise is much broader. The review, which was launched by Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan in April 2016, is articulated around three issues: identifying the most pressing security challenges, defining the role of the CAF in meeting those challenges and finally, establishing the appropriate mix of capabilities needed by the CAF to accomplish their missions and tasks successfully. Therefore, as a point of departure, it is worth asking which security challenges or motives guide decisions on the use of force.

The primary motive for investing in the armed forces is national defence and, by extension, to contribute to regional and global security for the sake of international stability. In Canada, the absence of an existential security threat means the country’s military commitments are primarily assessed through alliance politics, especially the bilateral relationship with the United States. The US has a more expansive perception of threat than Canada, given its massive and global military footprint. Based on numerous treaty commitments and alliance ties, American armed forces have been deployed all over the world to defend US interests and partners, with the goal of ensuring international stability through the projection of its power. In Canada, decisions on the use of force are often taken as the result of US or NATO initiatives. Finally, the Canadian government may choose to use force for humanitarian purposes. The humanitarian logic of intervention can lead to operations ranging from disaster relief or peace support operations.

Click here to read the rest of the CDA Institute Analysis.

Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky is an assistant professor of political studies at Queen’s University and the Director of the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP). (Image courtesy of David Goldman/​Associated Press.)

Partners for Peace: Assessing Canada’s return to peacekeeping

Published by: Geoff Tasker, CDA Institute and Partners for Peace

CDA Institute Analyst Geoff Tasker recently attended the Partners for Peace seminar held at the University of Ottawa on17 May 2016. The following post takes a look at what was discussed at the event and assesses the challenges facing Canada’s return to peacekeeping.

Following the federal election, the new government wasted no time in announcing to the world that “Canada is back.” This re-​entry into world affairs reflected what many Canadians view as a staple of our national identity; a mandate for legislators to develop and implement policy around “UN peace operations.” For the time being, however, the details about this prospective commitment are largely unknown. It is one thing for Canada to say it once again wants an active role in the peacekeeping business and quite another to implement an updated policy which can convince a skeptical public, largely disillusioned after years of heavily reported failures, that this is something still worth investing in.

It is this idea of learning from both our successes and mistakes that motivated the recent Partners for Peace seminar held at University of Ottawa. Organized by the Embassy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands in partnership with Global Affairs Canada and the Centre for International Policy Studies, the event provided a venue for panel contributors and observers to openly discuss ideas and share experiences from the world of peacekeeping in hopes of aiding both countries as they re-​engage with the now significantly dated concept.

With approximately 130,000 personnel currently serving in missions around the world, UN peacekeeping has not vanished in recent years. With the nature and form of conflict ever changing, however, the question then becomes how can the UN be reformed to adapt peacekeeping to fit in the current world order and what role should Canada play in the process?

It is, unfortunately, no secret that UN peacekeeping has had its share of rocky endeavors over the past two decades. Incidents such as Rwanda and the current crisis in South Sudan linger in the minds of both the public and policy-​makers alike. Regardless, observers at the event were also quick to point out the multiple success stories which have helped stabilize regions and prevent countless deaths.

No one in attendance, however, was under the illusion there was not room for drastic improvement and adaptation. The question is how, in what way, and at what cost?

The most critical aspect highlighted in each of the event’s panels was the need for the UN to become more adaptive in how it views such operations and what can actually be achieved. Multiple presenters brought attention to the ever changing nature of conflict and warfare. Inter-​state violence is largely, for the time being at least, subsumed by intra-​state violence and terrorism/​criminality that do not respect conventional borders. While this shift in scope may have decreased the level of destruction and deaths in violent conflicts, it has also created untold sufferings, large displacements of people, and changed the game in regards to how interventions or mediations can take place.

The image of UN blue helmets standing between two warring nations is a thing of the past. Perhaps, in its place might emerge the idea of conflict prevention through continuous dialogue with all involved belligerents, if dialogue can be had. As the conflict in Syria has shown, combatants in today’s deadliest conflicts are diverse, multi-​regional, and often make for highly undesirable partners. Nevertheless, some form of dialogue with most regional actors and host nations is crucial if one hopes to achieve eventual stability. Many presenters stressed that focusing solely on the physical protection of civilians – a singular goal that has often fueled peacekeeping’s negative perception – is no longer enough. Creating a secure political, economic and social environment for civilians living in these conflict zones may be the only way to obtain some form of lasting peace; to achieve this, all parties need to be brought to the table.

Panelists were in agreement on the need for the UN to promote greater integration between the countries contributing to such efforts. The lack of communication and cooperation between member states fueled by their individual political objectives was identified by multiple panelists as the primary factor holding back the entire process. A more integrated approach, the panelists argue, allows for different states to assist in different capacities, moving command and objectives away from singular actors into a common UN mandate.

For Canada, currently assessing how its specialized “niche capacities” can be used most effectively, an integrated approach with other countries plays to our strengths. The idea is not without issues however. The more skeptical of the panelists endorsed the idea of an integrated approach, but stressed it could only work if all members had a clear idea on the scope and objectives of the mission. If intelligence is not shared, the result can be disastrous for both UN personnel and civilian populations.

Yet, while integration sounds nice on paper, how can individual state political objectives take a backseat to a UNmandate? The answer almost universally touched on by all panelists is, in theory, quite simple: training.

For Canada at least, the return to an emphasis on training carries great appeal – in light of its experience with peacekeeping, stability operations, as well the training expertise generated by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre that only ceased operating in 2013. Peacekeepers being trained under a set curriculum would not only ensure a standard for personnel and better guarantee appropriate conduct in the field, but would also allow the UN to reliably delegate greater decision-​making responsibility to troops on the ground. A common criticism has been that the “stove-​pipe” nature of UNdecision-​making restricts the flexibility of active peace support forces, preventing peacekeepers from effectively adapting to evolving situations. While standardized training will not entirely remove this bureaucratic obstacle, it will help to generate forces on the ground who are knowledgeable in key dimensions of the mission – this opens up the possibility of effectively decentralizing decision-​making to forces in the field and allowing for more proactive action on the part of peacekeepers themselves.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to conceive how universal peacekeeper training could ever become reality, let alone actually overcome state political biases. There are many roadblocks standing in the way of such an initiative, but the main obstacle is funding. The current UN budget could not sustain such a wide reaching project; individual member states would have to support it, which will inevitably mean that some states (especially those who foot the bill) will have more of a final say on the project objectives.

This reality is as true for the idea of a training program as it is for all aspects of UN peacekeeping. If any action is to be truly multilateral in its implementation, it is going to have to deal with both diverse political objectives and a possible unwieldy UN bureaucracy. The alternative, however, is to fall back on the so-​called “coalitions of the willing,” where actions can be taken quickly but are ultimately fueled by political objectives outside the scope of the UN.

If Canada truly wants to re-​enter the world of peacekeeping interventions, it will have choose between these options. Both scenarios come with challenges but such is the reality of peacekeeping as a whole. That the world is better with UNpeacekeeping missions than without them was not up for debate at the seminar. Panelists were quite clear that even the smallest improvements can have real impact on the outcome of such missions. If we are in fact serious about “being back,” it might be in our best interests to lead the way in helping to ensure such initiatives are actually effective – not simply because peacekeeping is expected of us, but because it then becomes something ultimately worth investing in.

Geoff Tasker is an Analyst with the CDA Institute currently working towards a Master’s degree at UOttawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA). His research interests focus on international security and defence policy as well as conflict mediation and humanitarian intervention. (Image courtesy of Mike Kouxommone.)

The CAF and the Arctic: Maintaining a Suitable and Sustainable Role

Published by the CDA Institute 

In this new CDA Institute Analysis, Adam MacDonald looks at the military requirements for Canada in the Arctic, concluding that the capabilities need to be suitable for the security environment and financially sustainable given other defence commitments. The following is an excerpt of the Analysis.

Due to its increasing accessibility resulting from climate change, the Arctic could become a contested and militarized arena in which states within the region and beyond attempt to secure and gain access to lucrative shipping routes and resources. Such an eventuality poses particular challenges to Canadian sovereignty and security. Stemming from such a characterization, the Harper government had long prioritized the Arctic as a defence issue, raising the spectre that Canadian sovereignty in the North could be irrevocably compromised – we either ‘use it or lose it.’

While silent on which potential adversaries were threatening to usurp Canadian ownership, the Harper government sought to restore a military presence in the Arctic by “placing more boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-​in-​the-​sky.” In his 2005 campaign, in particular, Harper promised a litany of Arctic-​specific defence projects to rectify the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) dearth of presence and operational experience in the region. The promotion of the ‘sovereignty at risk’ narrative seemed to justify the construction of a robust and permanent military presence in the Arctic. In reality, however, Canada requires a different type of military presence and capability suite than commonly perceived (or advocated).

Canada’s security challenges in the North do not emanate from a military threat but are rather largely constabulary in nature. Defending sovereignty is the perennial duty of the military but in the Arctic there is no credible, state-​based threat capable of challenging Canadian ownership of its waters and territories, with a few exceptions which are well managed. Despite its sometimes fiery rhetoric, the former Conservative government’s various Arctic policy documents reflected such an appreciation of the threat environment. With the near absence of state-​based threats, military requirement in the Arctic need to be suitable for this particular security environment and sustainable given the operating challenges of the region, as well as other competing military priorities.

At present, the military is focusing their Arctic efforts on increasing domain awareness via surveillance and maintaining a light regional footprint to facilitate Northern operations and, when required, support the deployment of southern based-​units which are increasingly training in the North, often in conjunction with other security agencies and regional partners. Deploying large contingents of combat capable forces is ill-​advised given the nature of the threat, prohibitively expensive given the harsh operating environment (especially the High Arctic), and potentially compromising other missions and mandates by drawing resources away.

The Arctic Security Environment

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance of the Arctic diminished significantly allowing for the construction of regional forums dedicated towards common interests, specifically climate research. Rapidly changing environmental conditions, however, are transforming the Arctic landscape by increasing accessibility to human activity to an unprecedented level. Amongst this uncertainty, issues of ownership and access have fueled the development of a narrative of the Arctic as moving away from a politically stable region to one of high geopolitical importance characterized by growing complexity, competition, and perhaps even rivalry. In such a narrative, the current regional architecture is simply unable to adjust and accommodate the expected scramble for resources and political influence.

Not surprisingly, a popular theme has been the growing ‘militarization’ of the Arctic over the past decade. There is no denying that all Arctic states are augmenting their military capabilities in their northern territories, including the stationing of combat-​capable units. As one commentator has remarked, “we may be entering the first stages of an Arctic arms race, in which competition and conflict may overwhelm our desires and rhetoric to have a cooperative régime for the developing circumpolar world.” The augmenting presence, capability development, and employment of military forces in the Arctic is an emerging reality, but their use is, by and large, within recognized national borders and waters.

Moreover, they are largely focused on exercising sovereign control to ensure compliance with state laws, border control, and search and rescue. Retaining combat forces to defend against state-​based threats in the Arctic is a marginal requirement at this time. Arctic countries are more concerned about increasing their domain awareness in parts of their jurisdictions characterized by large geographic areas, small and sparse populations, and a lack of infrastructure, surveillance, and response capacities.

The flurry of recent Russian military projects in the Arctic, including icebreaker construction and the re-​activation of air and army bases on their northern islands, are in part aimed at establishing unquestioned ownership of the Northern Sea Route, regardless of legal objections by the US that the waters constitute an international strait. This is not to suggest that developing a war-​fighting capacity in the Arctic is not an objective of Moscow. However, domestic political calculations and constabulary requirements have heavily shaped the makeup and operational nature of military developments thus far in the region. Some military developments in the Arctic, furthermore, are based on larger, extra-​regional factors. Modernization of the Russian Northern Fleet, for instance, is designed to upgrade their nuclear submarine deterrent and for global operations. Similarly, the US ground-​based interceptors in Alaska are meant to counter a missile attack from a rogue state, specifically North Korea.

Most commentators are quick to assert that militarization is becoming a dominant force driving regional politics, but are at a loss in not only providing an operational definition (e.g., what does ‘militarization’ mean?) but also in explaining how this process will contribute to the destabilization of the region beyond simplistic narratives (Russia versus NATO; non-​Arctic states versus Arctic states). There are no territorial disputes in the Arctic, with the exception of the relatively benign dispute over Hans Island between Canada and Denmark, and there is no evidence to suggest Russia or any other Arctic nation is moving to employ military forces over contested Extended Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) or to gain unobstructed access to polar shipping routes.

Click here to read the rest of the CDA Institute Analysis.

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Adam P. MacDonald is an academic based in Halifax, Nova Scotia specializing in geopolitical developments in the Arctic and East Asia. He is a regular contributor to the Canadian Naval Review, East Asia Forum and Frontline Defence.

CDA Instutute Releases Vimy Paper on BMD

Originally published by Frontline Defence 

The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute) has released Vimy Paper 31: "Canada, NORAD, and Missile Defence: Prospects for Canadian Participation in BMD" by David McDonough.

The Canadian government recently launched its Defence Policy Review, expected to be completed by early 2017. The Department of National Defence also released a consultation paper that offered an overview of the issues facing the Canadian Armed Forces and key questions meant to guide public consultations as part of this review process. Of note, the document raised the previous government's 2005 decision to refuse participation in the US ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, and asked whether it was time to revisit this decision "given changing technologies and threats?"

This Vimy Paper explores the debate about Canada's possible participation in US missile defence plans, and assesses the advantages and possible disadvantages of such a commitment. The paper begins by examining the Canadian role in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), particularly the implications if NORAD fails to be directly involved in BMD. It then looks at the possibility of Canada receiving some protection in a BMD system, possible scenarios in which such protection would be required, and the likely contributions necessary if Canada wants to participate in missile defence and receive a modicum of protection. Lastly, the paper disentangles and assesses some of the key arguments used by critics against BMD.

By directly participating in BMD, Canada would reinforce the status of NORAD, strengthen the Canada-US defence relationship, and potentially ensure an important element of protection against ballistic missile threats. Canada will likely have to offer an "asymmetrical" or "in-kind contribution" if it hopes to receive protection afforded by the BMD system, so the question of cost needs to be further assessed. Lastly, criticism of BMD have often been either overstated or hampered by a degree of logical inconsistency or dissonance. As the Vimy Paper concludes, for these reasons, Canada should begin discussions with the United States on this issue - to better ascertain the costs Canada may be expected to shoulder for participation and ultimately to become an official participant in BMD.

The paper is available at the following link:
http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/Vimy_Papers/Vimy_Paper_31.pdf