The Sea King - A Fond Farewell

By Peter Mallett, Lookout Newspaper at CFB Esquimalt

When the Royal Canadian Air Force’s remaining Sea King helicopters are phased out, retired Major Paul O’Reilly admits it will be akin to losing a close friend.

That’s because he spent much of his 34-year career flying the Cold War-era, Sikorsky-built twin-engine amphibious helicopter—first acquired by Canada on May 24, 1963—on and off the decks of Royal Canadian Navy warships.

Onboard a ship at sea, a Royal Canadian Air Force CH-124 Sea King helicopter is silhouetted by the sun setting at deck level. PHOTO: Sergeant René Dubreuil

Major O’Reilly, 71, believes saying goodbye to them will be a teary affair. “You can’t help but get a little bit misty-eyed. For any pilot who flies an aircraft,” he says, “you grow attached to it as the years roll by, and you would forever recognize it instantly.”

Today, he spends two days a week volunteering at the Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt Naval and Military Museum. He is a military history buff and a founding member of the Vimy Flight group, which, in 2017, took First World War replica planes to the 100th anniversary ceremony in Vimy, France.

His love of history, and living some of it, gives him an interesting perspective on the Sea King.

In 1987, Major O’Reilly was a pilot on board Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship Huron as she sailed through the Panama Canal from 12 Wing Shearwater, Nova Scotia, heading to Esquimalt, British Columbia’s harbour with two Sea Kings onboard. They were the first two helicopters to arrive for naval operations on Canada’s West Coast.

“I’m surprised they are still here,” he says. “When I came out to the West Coast with the first Sea Kings, the whole idea was these aircraft would last three or four years and a new, more modern helicopter would show up and we would move to that.”

A hasty replacement for them in Canada did not happen, and so the decades went by.

“One of the reasons why they lasted so long was because with constant technological upgrades over the years they could still do the job. Why would you change and get a new aircraft when the one you are using does everything the Navy wanted it to do?” he asks.

The Sea King’s compact design, combined with fold-up rotor and tail, enabled it to fit neatly in the hangar of a warship after landing on the deck, and its amphibious hull enabled it to conduct water landings in an emergency.

“They got the job done because they handled well,” says Major O’Reilly. “The flight deck on most ships was about 48 by 78 feet [14.6 x 23.8 metres], so the biggest challenge with the Sea King, as with other helicopters of their size, was landing it as the ship bobbed up and down in the water, especially in stormy seas. Your timing had to be perfect so the ship’s company could hook the helicopter in with its Beartrap system.”

The Beartrap haul-down mechanism was developed in Canada. It uses a line and probe lowered from the helicopter to the deck and then attached to the ship; the Beartrap then winches the helicopter down to a solid and safe set-down.

“The Royal Canadian Navy was at the forefront of learning how to put a big helicopter on a small ship,” he continues, “and these helicopters were much more capable than smaller ones because they could travel longer, carry more supplies, and had a more sophisticated suite of detection equipment.”

CH-124 Sea King technicians work on HMCS Iroquois’ embarked Sea Kings in the deck hangar on February 1, 1981. PHOTO: DND Archives, HSC81-74-29

But their usefulness has gradually been eclipsed by new helicopters with modern technology. Today, very few countries still use Sea Kings. That includes the British military, which said farewell to its remaining Sea Kings in 2016, and the U.S. military, which replaced them 12 years ago.

“The main reason the helicopter is being phased out,” says Mr. O’Reilly, “is because nobody makes the engines or replacement parts anymore, making it next to impossible to make repairs.”

2018 marks the replacement of the Sea Kings with CH-148 Cyclones, which are being phased into service. As the future generation of aviators prepares to take to the cockpits of the new Cyclone, Major O’Reilly’s advice to them is “expect the unexpected”, as with any new technology. “But I have a feeling this one may also stand the test of time.”

The final Sea King flight in the RCAF will take place by December 31, 2018. The official retirement ceremony is Saturday, December 1, 2018 at 443 Maritime Helicopter Squadron in British Columbia; where a fly past will take place. The Sea King has operated for 55 years in Canadian military service. As part of the celebrations, there will be a fly-past, according to the Canadian Forces.

Liberals Press Ahead with Second-Hand F-18s Amid Questions Over Who Will Fly Them

The Canadian Press - The Kingston Whig-Standard 

The Trudeau government pressed ahead with its plan to buy second-hand fighter jets from Australia on Tuesday despite withering fire from the federal auditor general, who warned that the military might not have anybody to fly them.

A pilot prepares for take off in a CF-188 Hornet aircraft at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania during Operation REASSURANCE on Sept. 27. Last week, the auditor general released a report highlighting the pilot shortage faced by the Canadian Air Force and continued problems with procuring new fighter jets. CPL. DOMINIC DUCHESNE-BEAULIEU/POSTMEDIA

Six years after blowing up the Harper government’s plan to buy new F-35s without a competition, auditor general Michael Ferguson targeted the Liberals’ own attempts to buy jets. He first picked apart the government’s aborted plan to purchase “interim” Super Hornets to bolster Canada’s aging CF-18 fleet, and then its current plan to buy used Australian fighters.

The government says those extra fighters are needed to address a shortage of CF-18s until a state-of-the-art replacement can be purchased and delivered — a lengthy process that will run through 2032, at which point the CF-18s will be 50 years old.

But the auditor general’s office arrived at a very different conclusion: The military doesn’t need more planes because it doesn’t even have the pilots and mechanics to operate what it already has. What it really needs, the office found, is more people.

“The shortage of personnel in relation to technicians means that they don’t have enough technicians to prepare and maintain the planes,” Casey Thomas, the principal auditor on the fighter jets study, told reporters on Tuesday.

“And they have 64 per cent of the pilots that they need, so they don’t have enough pilots to fly the planes . . . What National Defence actually needed was to increase its personnel.”

The auditor general’s report also flagged concerns that the government’s plan to sink $3 billion into the current CF-18s and additional Australian fighters to keep them flying to 2032 won’t be enough, as the money won’t actually improve the aircrafts’ combat systems.

Without more money, which some analysts have suggested could mean hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars more, Canada’s fighter-jet fleet will become even more obsolete, to the point where the plans might not be any use at home or overseas.

Yet only a few hours after the auditor general’s report was released, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan announced that the Liberals had signed a contract to buy the 18 second-hand jets from Australia. Officials have pegged the cost at around $500 million.

Sajjan also said he had directed officials to look at options for upgrading the combat systems on the CF-18s and Australian fighters, which he acknowledged would mean investing more money into aging fighter jets.

Missing from the announcement: Any new funding or other initiative to increase recruiting and retention of pilots and technicians.

Instead, Sajjan said the government and military have already introduced several initiatives through the Liberals’ defence policy last year, such as giving tax breaks to military personnel deployed on overseas missions, to give them reasons to stay.

At the same time, the minister sidestepped questions about recruitment, saying the military can’t reduce its standards for new pilots. He noted that commercial airlines are also facing a significant pilot crunch.

Air-force commanders have previously said the current training system, which can only produce 115 new pilots each year, a fraction of whom are fighter pilots, is not fast enough to replace all those who move on to commercial opportunities.

The subtext to much of the auditor general’s report on Tuesday was the question of how Canada ended up in a position where the military will be flying fighter jets until they are 50 years old.

The Liberals were urged early in their tenure to launch an immediate competition to replace the CF-18s. Instead they spent two years working to buy those stopgap Super Hornets before a trade dispute with the company that makes them, Boeing, saw the government move on to the used Australian jets.

The Trudeau government insists that it was doing its due diligence, but critics — including numerous retired air force and defence officials — have accused it of trying to bend procurement rules to avoid buying the F-35.

Yet even before the Liberals took the reins, the Harper government was having a hard time making any progress on buying new fighter jets. The Tories championed the F-35 before resetting the entire process in 2012.

That move was prompted by Ferguson’s first report, which accused defence officials of misleading parliamentarians about the stealth fighter’s costs and various technical issues. National Defence later pegged the full lifetime cost of the fighters at $46 billion.

“Lot of people had a hand in this,” said defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, adding that the worst part is there is no easy or obvious solution to what has become a very troubling situation for Canada and its military.

“I think our fighter force is in trouble.”

Norway's Experience with F-35 Procurement is a Lesson for Canada

By: Levon Sevunts, Radio Canada International

s the federal government embarks on a much delayed and criticized quest to find a replacement for its ageing fleet of CF-18 Hornet fighter jets, Norway’s saga with the acquisition of F-35 stealth fighters offers Canada a valuable lesson.

The search for a replacement for CF-18 got a new urgency Tuesday after a blistering report by Canada’s auditor general, who lambasted the Liberal government’s handling of the file that could have serious implications for Ottawa’s ability to fulfill its NATO and NORAD obligations.

Just like Ottawa, Oslo was one of the first NATO countries to show interest in the new stealth multirole fighters developed by U.S. defence giant Lockheed Martin.

In June 2009, the Norwegian Parliament decided that the F-35A Lightning II would replace its current fleet of F-16 fighter jets. Unlike Ottawa, despite strong internal opposition, Oslo saw things through.

By 2025, Norway hopes to have a fleet of 52 F-35s. 

No-show at Trident Juncture demonstration

Norwegian F-16s escort a Jet Falcon DA-20 electronic warfare aircraft during an Air Power Capability Demonstration of the NATO exercise Trident Juncture 2018 in Byneset near Trondheim, Norway, October 30, 2018. (Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP/Getty Images)

Norwegian authorities were hoping to showcase their newest and most expensive defence acquisition in the country’s history at a massive display of NATO’s military might during the official launch of Trident Juncture 2018 exercise on Oct. 30.

But much to the chagrin of dozens of journalists, NATO officials and dignitaries that had assembled on the shores of the Trondheim Fjord in central Norway to watch the display of land, sea and air power, the Norwegian F-35s never showed up.

Lt.-Col. Stale Nymoen, commander of the 332 Squadron of the Royal Norwegian Air Force and one of the first Norwegian pilots to learn to fly the F-35s, said strong crosswinds at the Ørland Air Base forced officials to cancel the planned overflight.

The cancellation of the overflight on an otherwise perfect autumn day had nothing to do with the jet’s capabilities, Nymoen said.

“Seen from my perspective, it’s one of the best fighter aircraft out there,” Nymoen told a roomful of journalists during a briefing at the Ørland Air Base in central Norway earlier this month.

But it has taken even experienced pilots like him years to learn to fly the new fighter jets and, just as importantly, unlearn old habits, Nymoen said.

The first three F-35 fighter jets ordered by Norway’s Air Force arrive in Orland Air Base in central Norway Friday Nov. 3, 2017. (Ned Alley/NTB scanpix via AP)

Norway received its first four F-35s in January of 2017. But all of them were stationed at the Luke Air Force Base in Phoenix, Arizona, where Norwegian, U.S. and Italian pilots trained on the new aircraft.

It wasn’t until November of 2017 that the stealth fighter jets actually arrived for service in Norway, at the Ørland Air Base, which is going through a massive infrastructure upgrade to house the new planes.

Operating and flying them in Norway with its harsh North Atlantic and Arctic climate is a whole new experience, Nymoen said.

“What is different from Luke when we train to operate the aircraft here is temperatures, winter, icy and slippery runways, winds,” Nymoen said. “Those are conditions that we don’t necessarily get to train for when we’re training in the United States.”

And the Norwegian air force is taking a very cautious approach to avoid any accidents, he said.

“We have to learn to crawl before we can walk, and we have to learn to walk before we can run,” Nymoen said.

The first squadron of F-35s is expected to reach initial operational capability in 2019 and full operational capability only in 2025, eight years after the aircraft were delivered to Norway.

This timeline would also apply to Canada, if Lockheed Martin were to emerge as the winner of the competition to buy 98 advanced aircraft for the Royal Canadian Air Force announced by the Liberal government last December.

The list of eligible suppliers identified by the federal government also includes France’s Dassault Aviation, Sweden’s SAAB, the U.K.’s Airbus Defense and Space, and the U.S. defence and aerospace giant Boeing.

If the federal government manages to stick to its timetable, a contract award is anticipated in 2022 and the first replacement aircraft delivered in 2025.

This means that the current fleet of Canadian CF-18s and the 18 additional second-hand Australian F-18s the federal government is buying as a stopgap measure will have to operate until at least 2030, experts say.

Auditor General Slams Government Plan to Maintain CF-18 Fleet Until 2032

By: Murray Brewster, CBC News 

Canada's auditor general has shot down the Liberal government's handling of the air force's aging CF-18s in a blistering report that raises questions about national security, and even long-term safety, regarding the viability of the country's frontline fighter jets.

Auditor General Michael Ferguson's fall report, tabled Tuesday, methodically picks apart the recent policy change at the Department of National Defence, which requires the military to have enough warplanes to meet Canada's commitments to both NORAD and NATO at the same time.

Watch Power & Politics take a look at the ups and downs of Canada's fighter jet program

The RCAF is currently facing a shortage of both qualified pilots and technicians. Those pilots the RCAF does have on active roster are struggling to maintain the minimum 140 flight hours per year. 

From the get-go the policy was a non-starter, and the federal government knew it, said Ferguson.

"The fighter force could not meet the requirement because National Defence was already experiencing a shortage in personnel, and the CF-18 was old and increasingly hard to maintain," said the audit.

As of April 2018, the air force's CF-18 squadrons faced a 22 per cent shortage in technical positions — and a startling number of technicians were not fully qualified to do maintenance.

Fighter pilots are also in short supply. The air force is losing more of them than it is training each year; among those who do remain, almost one third do not get the required 140 hours of flying time per year.

At a news conference following the release of the report, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan conceded that personnel shortages were identified "early on" after the Liberals took over in 2015.

"This is a problem we knew we had," he said, pointing the finger at budget cuts made by the previous Conservative government. "This is what happens when you don't put enough resources into the military."

Watch Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan react to the AG report on fighter jets on Power & Politics


The extent of Liberals' own efforts to boost recruiting and retention of pilots and technicians in the three years since the election was the subject of some confusion Tuesday.

A written statement from Sajjan said the government "will launch new efforts to recruit and retain pilots and technicians."

During the news conference, the minister said the military's top commander had been directed to deal with the problem and that recruiting pilots is "a priority."

Pressed for specifics on recruitment, Sajjan said he's "going to leave it to the experts to figure out."

Proposed solution 'will not help solve' issues

The auditor's report took issue with the Liberal government's strategy to fill the so-called capability gap by buying additional interim aircraft.

The current proposal is to buy used Australian F-18s — of approximately the same vintage as Canada's CF-18s — and convert them for further use until the federal government completes the purchase of brand-new aircraft.

This plan, the auditor's report said, "will not help solve either the personnel shortage or the aging fleet."

Ferguson said an earlier, $6.3 billion plan to buy 18 brand new Super Hornet fighter jets on an interim basis would have been even worse — and the government was told so in no uncertain terms by the air force.

"National Defence's analysis showed that buying the Super Hornet alone would not allow the department to meet the new operational requirement," said the audit.

"The department stated that the Super Hornet would initially decrease, not increase, the daily number of aircraft available because technicians and pilots would have to be pulled away from the CF-18s to train on the new aircraft."

The proposal to buy Super Hornets was scrapped last spring after the manufacturer, Chicago-based Boeing, angered the Trudeau government in a separate trade dispute involving the sale of Bombardier passenger jets.

The Opposition Conservatives have long claimed the 'capability gap' was concocted by the Liberals as a way to push off a decision on a permanent replacement for the CF-18s. In the last election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau pledged not to buy the F-35 stealth fighter, the preferred option of the Harper government.
Sparring in the House

The report led to sparring in the House of Commons, with the Conservatives seeing the auditor general's assessment as vindication.

"Today's report confirms what we have been saying all along," said James Bezan, the defence critic.

"Justin Trudeau deliberately misled Canadians by manufacturing a 'capability gap' to fulfil a misguided campaign promise, and in the process has put the safety and security of Canadians at risk."

Sajjan, however, believed the report supported the government's position.

"The report confirms what we have always known: The Harper Conservatives mismanaged the fighter jet files and misled Canadians for over a decade," he said.

"The report confirms a capability gap exists, and started under the Conservatives."

In fact, what the report said was that "Canada's fighter force could not meet the government's new operational requirement." It contained objective analysis of how many aircraft would be required to meet various contingencies.
Fleet 'will become more vulnerable'

Meanwhile, the auditor is warning that the Liberal government has no plan to upgrade the combat capabilities of the CF-18s to keep them current over the next decade while the air force waits for replacements.

The last major refurbishment of the war-fighting equipment on the jets happened in 2008, and Department of National Defence planners have done little since because they had been expecting new planes by 2020.

"National Defence did not have a plan to upgrade the combat capability of the CF-18 even though it will now have to fly until 2032," said the audit.

"Without these upgrades, according to the department, the CF-18 will become more vulnerable as advanced combat aircraft and air defence systems continue to be developed and used by other nations."

The fact that the CF-18s are not up to date means they will not be able to operate in certain environments where the risk of surface-to-air missiles or advanced enemy planes is great.

That, in turn, "would limit Canada's contribution to NORAD and NATO operations," Ferguson said.

Sajjan said the department is looking at an upgrade to the combat systems.

"We would love to be able to solve this problem immediately," he said.

Dassault & Rafale Withdraw from CF-18 Replacement

By: Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press 

OTTAWA — The long effort to replace Canada’s ageing fighter jets took another surprise twist on Tuesday, as multiple sources revealed that French fighter-jet maker Dassault is pulling out of the multibillion-dollar competition.

Three newly delivered Rafale aircraft to the Egyptian Air Force (2017) 

The decision comes just over a week after the federal government published the military’s requirements for a replacement for Canada’s CF-18s as well as a draft process by which a winning supplier will be chosen.

Dassault had repeatedly pitched its Rafale aircraft to Canada over the years as successive governments in Ottawa have wrestled with selecting a new fighter jet. Dassault’s pitch included significant promises, including that it would assemble the planes in Canada.

But sources tell The Canadian Press that Dassault’s decision to withdraw was related to the fact France is not a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network, which counts the U.S., Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada as members. The five members have very specific requirements for how their equipment works together.

The French government, which had been closely working with Dassault as the most recent iteration of Canada’s fighter-replacement program has inched along over the past year, was preparing to notify Ottawa of the company’s withdrawal.

The move leaves four companies — U.S. aerospace giants Lockheed Martin and Boeing, European competitor Airbus and Swedish firm Saab — competing for the $19-billion contract to replace Canada’s 76 CF-18s with 88 new fighters.

A contract isn’t expected to be awarded until 2021 or 2022, with delivery of the first new aircraft slated for 2025. In the meantime, the government is planning to upgrade its CF-18s and buy 25 used fighters from Australia as a stopgap.

Dassault faced several significant challenges in meeting Canada’s requirements for a new fighter, said defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and while they weren’t insurmountable, they would have cost time and money.

Those challenges included meeting those Five-Eyes intelligence-sharing requirements, which Perry said put Dassault at a distinct disadvantage in the competition when compared to Lockheed Martin, Boeing and, to a certain degree, Airbus.

“For any of the non-American companies, solving the Five-Eyes interoperability issues is going to be challenging,” he said, noting that the U.S. in particular is very sensitive about data-sharing.

“And it costs companies a lot of money to mount and pursue bids. So if they think at this point in time that it’s not a realistic prospect, then pulling out is pretty understandable.”

That could explain why Dassault never established a strong presence in Canada during the many years when it was trying to sell the Rafale as a replacement for the CF-18, he added.

The CF-18s are about 35 years old. Canada’s attempts to buy a new fighter jet have dragged on for nearly a decade after the previous Conservative government announced in 2010 that Canada would buy 65 F-35s without a competition, with the first to be delivered in 2015.

But the Tories pushed the reset button in 2012 after the auditor general raised questions about the program and National Defence revealed the jets would cost $46 billion over their lifetimes.

After campaigning on a promise not to buy the F-35s, the Trudeau Liberals announced in November 2016 they would take their time with a competition to replace the CF-18s, and buy 18 “interim” Boeing Super Hornets without a competition because Canada needed more fighter jets badly.

But then Boeing’s trade dispute with Canadian rival Bombardier saw the Liberals scrap their plan to buy Super Hornets and instead begin talks to buy 18 used fighter jets from Australia. A contract for those used planes is expected in the coming weeks.

The formal competition to replace the CF-18s is scheduled to begin next spring.

RCAF - No Documented Fighter "Gap" Evidence

By: David Pugliese, The Ottawa Citizen 

Neither Canada’s top soldier nor the commander of the air force had or produced any records about a fighter jet “capability gap” in the year leading up to the Liberal government’s announcement that such a critical issue had to be dealt with by spending billions to buy aircraft.

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan used the capability gap argument in November 2016 to justify a $5-billion program to buy new Super Hornet jets, a deal since scuttled, and later a $500-million program to purchase used F-18 planes from Australia.

But in the year leading up to Sajjan’s announcement about the urgent need to acquire such planes, neither Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Jon Vance nor Lt.-Gen. Mike Hood, then head of the Royal Canadian Air Force, produced any documentation indicating there was ever a capability gap, according to Department of National Defence’s Access to Information branch. In addition, no such documents exist among the records of various members of Sajjan’s staff, according to the department.

A Royal Australian Air Force F-18 Hornet performs during the Australian International Airshow in 2015.PAUL CROCK/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

It would be normal practice to have hundreds, if not thousands of pages of records, discussing such a key defence issue or gap if it existed, military insiders tell Postmedia.

But records obtained by Postmedia through the Access law do show that just before Sajjan’s announcement that the 18 jets were needed in the “interim” to deal with the capability gap, the minister was told the existing fleet of CF-18s was in better shape than expected and could keep flying until 2032.


Conservative MPs allege the capability gap didn’t exist and was concocted by the government to delay a larger project to buy new jets, a competition that might end up selecting the F-35 stealth fighter the Liberals vowed never to purchase.

When asked about the lack of documentation about the capability gap, a DND official said the department could not comment.

Taxpayers may get more information Tuesday when the Auditor General’s office releases its examination of the fighter jet plan.

The deal to buy the 18 Super Hornets as “interim” jets eventually collapsed after the aircraft’s U.S. supplier, Boeing, angered the Liberals by complaining to the Trump administration that a Canadian firm was receiving unfair subsidies to build civilian aircraft. Because of that complaint, the government deemed Boeing an unreliable partner and instead struck a deal to buy used F-18 jets from Australia. That project is estimated to cost $500 million.

Those jets are needed on an interim basis not only to help fill the capability gap but because the current fleet of CF-18 fighters is too old, the government has stated.

But nine days before Sajjan held his November 2016 news conference to announce the original Super Hornet interim jet deal, the minister was told the CF-18 fleet was in better shape than expected.

“Analysis over the summer indicates that the structural damage is less than anticipated and that all aircraft can be flown and retired at a predicted rate beyond 2025 without additional investment in structural work,” Sajjan was told by deputy defence minister John Forster. “Doing so would require an investment to 2032 (when the last legacy aircraft would retire).”

Shortly after Sajjan’s news conference, Hood explained to a Senate committee it was the government that brought in a policy change that required the RCAF to meet both its NATO and North American air defence commitments at the same time. That, in turn, created the capability gap.

“That demands a certain number of aircraft that our present CF-18 fleet is unable to meet on its day-to-day serviceability rate,” said Hood, who has since retired. “They’ve (the Liberals) changed the policy of the number of aircraft I have to have.”

Hood said he didn’t know the reason for the change. “I’m not privy to the decisions behind the policy change,” added the general.

In addition, a 2014 report produced by Defence Research and Development Canada recommended against the purchase of such “bridging” aircraft to deal with gaps in capability. “The costs involved with bridging options make them unsuitable for filling capability gaps in the short term,” the report states. “Any short-term investment results in disproportionately high costs during the bridging period.”

That report, which had been in the public domain for years, was removed from the DND website. The DND claimed it was pulled down from its website because the report was found to contain classified information.

Auditor general takes aim at Liberals' fighter-jet plan with new probe

By: Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press - Published to BNN Bloomberg 

OTTAWA -- Six years after helping blow up the Harper government's plans to buy F-35 stealth fighters without a competition, auditor general Michael Ferguson is about to release a new report on Canada's tumultuous attempts to buy new fighter jets.

This time, the focus will be on the Trudeau government's handling of the file, which includes adopting several stopgaps while taking its time on a competition to buy new planes for the Canadian Forces.

Ferguson is expected to report specifically on the financial and technological costs of flying Canada's venerable CF-18s -- plus a handful of second-hand Australian jets -- into the early 2030s, when the aircraft will be nearly 50 years old.

The auditor general is also expected to train a spotlight on the air force's problems recruiting and retaining fighter pilots, the question of whether Canada has enough jets to defend itself -- and whether the Liberals followed procurement laws.

Ferguson's report follows several years of criticism over the Trudeau government's decision not to launch an immediate competition to replace the CF-18s, which started flying in the 1980s and were supposed to be retired by 2020.

It has been highly anticipated in political and defence circles given the damage that Ferguson's previous report on fighter jets dealt to the Conservatives and because of the shroud of secrecy that has surrounded the Liberals' decision-making on the file.

The Trudeau government has forced hundreds of federal civil servants and contractors working on the fighter-jet project to sign lifelong non-disclosure agreements, while many documents associated with the issue have been declared cabinet secrets.

Canada's attempts to buy fighter jets have dragged on for nearly a decade since the previous Conservative government announced in 2010 that Canada would buy 65 F-35s without a competition, with the first to be delivered in 2015.

The Tories pushed the reset button in 2012 after Ferguson released a scathing report that found defence officials twisted procurement rules and misled Parliament. National Defence later revealed the jets would cost $46 billion over their lifetimes, much more than the sticker price.

The Trudeau Liberals waded into the issue in the 2015 election when they campaigned on a promise to hold an open and fair competition while at the same time vowing not to buy the F-35s.

But rather than launch a competition right away, as many suggested, the Liberals said in November 2016 that they would wait until 2019. In the meantime, they planned to use a hole in the federal procurement laws to buy 18 "interim" Super Hornets without a competition.

The Liberals said at the time that the Super Hornets were urgently needed because Canada did not have enough CF-18s, but opposition parties and several retired military officers accused the government of bending the rules and wasting taxpayer dollars just to avoid buying the F-35.

They demanded the government launch an immediate competition to replace the CF-18s rather than wait; the government insisted more time was necessary to ensure due diligence and a successful procurement after years of trouble.

The government ultimately scrapped the plan to buy Super Hornets from Boeing for more than $6 billion due to a trade dispute between the U.S. aerospace giant and Montreal rival Bombardier.

But rather than launch a competition, it announced plans to buy 25 second-hand fighter jets from Australia for around $500 million.

The $19-billion competition to replace the CF-18s is slated to begin officially in the spring, though a winner won't be selected until 2021 or 2022. Delivery of the first of 88 planes is scheduled for 2025, with the last due in 2032.

The F-35 has been allowed to compete, despite the Liberals' election promise not to buy it. It is up against the Super Hornet as well as two European designs: the Eurofighter Typhoon and Saab Gripen. A French company with a fifth option dropped out last week.

In the meantime, the government is looking to spend upwards of $1.5 billion to keep the CF-18s and Australian fighters in the air long enough for the new planes to be delivered.

Defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute said they key question leading up to the report's release is what impact it will have on the Liberal government and Canada's attempts to buy a new fighter jet.

"I hope it doesn't set back our fighter program by another 10 years," he said. "Because what the auditor general found -- and the way it was interpreted last time -- set the fighter-jet program back by a decade."

CAF Ditches Plan for New Paint Scheme on SAR Aircraft

By: David Pugliese, The National Post 

Canada’s military has reversed its plan to abandon the familiar yellow paint scheme for the country’s new search-and-rescue planes after debate within the ranks over the aircraft’s need to be visible on such missions.

The new fleet of 16 Airbus C-295W planes will replace the main Royal Canadian Air Force search-and-rescue fleet of Buffalo aircraft as well as the Hercules transport planes which are also used at times in a search-and-rescue role. Postmedia reported last year that RCAF leadership had requested the new planes be painted tactical grey, asking for a change to the original contract which had stipulated the familiar yellow colour scheme, because they wanted the aircraft to be available for other missions, including combat.

But the move to the grey paint scheme has now been reversed. “While there was, last year, a stated interest in painting the C-295W grey, a decision was made following further consultation to maintain the iconic yellow colour scheme of the RCAF’s current SAR fleet, such as the Buffalo, Twin Otter, Cormorant and Griffon,” the Department of National Defence said in a statement Wednesday. “This colour, which provides a higher level of visibility and recognition in the ground and the air, is also widely known by Canadians — especially those who might find themselves in a situation requiring our aid.”

Asked last year about the plan to ditch the yellow paint scheme, the Forces said in a statement to Postmedia that “the RCAF has made the decision to use a grey colour scheme for the C-295W fleet to enable surging flexibility for the very wide range of missions the RCAF is required to conduct, from humanitarian and disaster relief missions, to security missions with partners, and all the way to full spectrum operations.”

Military sources said RCAF leadership wanted to redirect some of the planes for use on international missions instead of search-and-rescue. But that unilateral decision sparked heated debate inside the military and DND and, sources said, the air force was forced to abandon its plans.


When the federal government awarded the contract to Airbus in December 2016, cabinet ministers highlighted the importance of having the right aircraft for the search-and-rescue job. “With this technology, we are giving our women and men in uniform the tools they need to continue to deliver effective and essential search and rescue operations,” defence minister Harjit Sajjan said at the time.

Construction of the first aircraft began in 2017 and the first new planes are expected to be delivered in 2019. They are outfitted with sensors that allow RCAF personnel to share real-time information with searchers on the ground. Equipment also includes sensors for searching in low-light conditions. A centre, equipped with simulators, is being built at Comox, B.C. to support training for the air crews.

The RCAF’s Buffalo and Hercules aircraft assigned to search and rescue perform more than 350 missions annually, according to the Canadian Forces. The Canadian military is responsible for providing aeronautical search and rescue operations.

The RCAF’s search-and-rescue Buffalo aircraft, above, will be replaced, but the yellow colour scheme will remain with the new Airbus planes. DND

But the project to purchase the new planes has faced a rough road over the years. The competition was announced in 2004 by the then-Liberal government and re-announced by the Conservative government in 2006. But it took another decade before it could be completed and Airbus declared the winning company.

Even then, Leonardo, an Italian aerospace firm, launched a lawsuit against Canada over what it claimed was a rigged purchase that favoured Airbus.

That lawsuit was dropped earlier this year, shortly before the federal government awarded Leonardo a new sole-source deal potentially worth billions of dollars to upgrade Cormorant search-and-rescue helicopters.

Officials with the Canadian Forces and Leonardo say the ending of the legal action in May had nothing to do with the company being picked for the new project the same month.

Canada Quietly Pays $54 Million to remain in F-35 Consortium

The Canadian Press

Canada has quietly paid another $54 million toward the development of the F-35 stealth fighter jets, bringing its total investment in the controversial project to roughly half a billion dollars over the last 20 years.

The government is consulting with fighter-jet builders, including U.S. aerospace giant Boeing, before launching a formal competition early next year to decide on a replacement for the air force’s aging CF-18s.

Boeing remains on the fence about whether its Super Hornet will participate in the competition because of enduring questions about how the government will run it.

One concern is a new provision the government announced last year that aims to make it more difficult for companies that are deemed to be hurting the Canadian economy to win defence contracts.

The measure was announced at the height of Boeing’s bitter dispute with Canadian rival Bombardier, which has since been tossed out by a U.S. trade tribunal.

Boeing says it made its point with the challenge, and continues to work with the government with regards to other military contracts, but wants to see how the fighter-jet competition will be run before deciding whether to join.

RCAF Seeks to Manage Shortfall of Pilots

By Chris Thatcher, RCAF News 

Originally Published in Skies Magazine

The RCAF is addressing staffing shortages through targeted
and creative retention and recruitment strategies.

Royal Canadian Air Force CT-155 Hawk aircraft fly in close formation over the desert during Exercise Antler South at the Naval Air Facility El Centro in California, U.S., on November 30, 2017. PHOTO: Ordinary Seaman Erica Seymour, CK02-2017-1043-033

The pilotless cockpit may one day become the norm, but for the foreseeable future, pilots will remain in high demand.

Global forecasts by commercial aircraft manufacturers, airlines and industry associations anticipate a need for 500,000 new pilots over the next 20 years, as new routes open and existing markets expand. In Canada alone, more than 7,000 new pilots, flight engineers and flying instructors will be required between 2016 and 2025, according to the Canadian Council for Aviation and Aerospace.

Yet projections by organizations such as the International Air Transport Association suggest those targets will be difficult, if not impossible, to meet.

For military air forces already struggling to retain experienced pilots, aircrews and maintenance technicians, those forecasts are cause for concern. Few will have trouble attracting prospective pilots–applicants who since they were young boys and, increasingly, girls, are still drawn to the wonder and excitement of flying a fighter jet or maritime helicopter.

But the lure of commercial pay cheques, especially for maintainers, may challenge an air force’s ability to hold on to its best people while managing a normal rate of attrition.

The United States Air Force (USAF), for one, has felt the pressure of commercial hiring and a draining operational tempo in recent years. Lieutenant General Gina Grosso, the USAF’s personnel chief, told the House Armed Services subcommittee on military personnel in March 2017 that the entire air force was short 1,555 pilots, including 1,211 fighter pilots, as of the end of fiscal year 2016. The warning prompted Congress to authorize an increase in bonus pay to as much as $35,000 per year, up from the previous cap of $25,000, to retain talent.

The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) has traditionally been able to maintain an acceptable 10-year attrition rate of about 6.5 per cent, a turnover necessary to the overall health of the organization. But with the growing demand for aircrews and maintainers, “we are seeing an uptick and it has increased the pressure,” acknowledged Lieutenant-Colonel Rich Kohli, whose team within the directorate of air personnel strategy monitors occupation health and develops recruitment plans.

At first glance, the RCAF is in reasonably good shape. All aircrew officer occupations are above the 80 per cent range of desired strength: pilots are at about 84 per cent; air combat systems officers are at 80 per cent; and aerospace engineering officers are around 98 per cent.

Maintenance technicians are also well accounted for, averaging around 96 per cent of desired strength, though specific trades such as aircraft structures are about 87 per cent.

But the RCAF is working through a problem that originated in the 1990s, when the federal government cut spending and reduced the size of the military, prompting many to accept a golden handshake before retiring from service. That created a gap in the force that is now affecting training, maintenance, and operations. Those who left would today be among the most experienced instructors, technicians and squadron leaders, with 18 to 20 years of service under their belts.

“We have very few people with 18 years of experience right now,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli. “It would have given us a larger cadre to draw from to fill those critical positions. They would be our most experienced people involved in the line operations.

“It means we have a smaller population of people at that rate. So the attrition of a single senior pilot, for example, in Trenton right now would be felt quite dramatically when there isn’t a large group of people to draw from to replace that individual.”

Complicating matters further, the RCAF is also experiencing the gradual retirement of the baby boom generation, in many cases the very personnel who picked up the slack when the force was downsized.

“We are hitting that demographic bubble where a large number of individuals—about 20 per cent of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)—are in that retirement zone and eligible for annuity,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Elisa Cass, who oversees attraction, in-service selection, research and retention for the directorate of air personnel strategy. “That is still primarily the reason people are leaving.”

She noted, however, that many have opted to remain in the Reserve Force, allowing the Air Force to “keep their corporate skills.” Or, they have decided to return after a stint in the commercial sector, a move her team works to “expedite to the greatest extent possible.”

The RCAF has also welcomed a handful of allied pilots interested in joining the force to bridge that experience gap, but it’s a touchy area since allies have an informal agreement to not “poach” each other’s aircrews. Ultimately, the bubble will have to run its course, Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli said.

In response to a shortfall of roughly 4,000 maintainers at the end of fiscal year 2016 due to a variety of factors, including budget cuts over the past decade, the USAF took the dramatic step of upping the number of new maintainers it enrols in the training system each year from 6,000 to 8,000. That has reduced the deficit to just 400 technicians, but created challenges in providing sufficient training platforms.

Unfortunately, even if it were possible, significantly increasing the quantity of trainees will not solve the problem in Canada without affecting operations, Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli noted. For one, the RCAF lacks that large pool of experienced instructors and, as commander Lieutenant-General Mike Hood told the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in November 2016, “Our occupations are highly technical and require long periods of training.”

“It can take pilots three and a half years just to get their wings, and most technicians, from when they are enrolled, take about three years before they are on units fixing airplanes,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli. “If we are short 200 technicians somewhere, we can’t just have 200 basic qualified people show up tomorrow. We have to bring them up to ensure they develop expertise in their particular field.”

In the past two years, the RCAF has increased the number of pilots receiving their wings to about 110 from the five-year average of about 95, the number necessary to meet normal attrition rates. Not surprisingly, the RCAF has “no problems attracting pilots,” Lieutenant-Colonel Cass said, with the CAF receiving about 1,000 applicants each year. However, only one third–about 300–survives a rigorous aptitude test at the aircrew selection centre in Trenton, and just 150 to 200 are enrolled annually.

Technicians pose a more significant challenge. In total, the RCAF receives about 425 to 450 maintainers per year into the training system and graduates between 375 and 400, Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli said. But in fiscal year 2017/18, which ran until March 31, the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) had processed 503 applicants on behalf of the RCAF for aviation, avionics and air weapons technicians, and enrolled 204 as of late December 2017. That is about 100 fewer applicants and 50 fewer enrolled than in fiscal year 2016/17, though the RCAF expects to be just short of last year’s intake by the end of the fiscal year.

“We are seeing shortfalls in our annual recruiting targets,” he said, though he emphasized the RCAF remains “discerning” in who it selects for aircrew. “We want to make sure that people who are trained have a high probability of success.”
In search of retention keys

As part of a new defence policy, “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, released in June 2017, the Canadian government laid out several initiatives to “retain valuable military skills and accommodate changing career paths,” including more flexibility in career options and enticements to encourage more former Regular Force personnel to remain in service by transitioning to the Reserve Force.

It also proposed a comprehensive CAF-wide retention strategy. In conjunction, the RCAF is now developing an Air Force-specific plan, gathering evidence-based research from a variety of sources and directly from members to identify “key things we need to focus on,” explained Lieutenant-Colonel Cass. That will include a way for members “to anonymously make suggestions that would help retain them longer” through the RCAF website.

The reasons for leaving the military are as varied and personal as the reasons for why members originally joined, and what might entice them to remain in service is equally diverse. Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli noted the RCAF commander has “limited levers” and focuses on job satisfaction and ensuring people have the tools to do the job well within the RCAF, while working with the Military Personnel Command on things like retention bonuses or other benefits packages.

As RCAF commander, Lieutenant-General Hood has also launched a concerted effort to encourage the flow of innovative ideas. “While I uphold the chain of command for the controlled use of force and for military operations, I am flattening the organization when it comes to sharing and considering innovative ideas from all ranks and occupations,” he explained to the Senate defence committee in 2016. “In our online forums we have aviators commenting on complex ideas alongside generals and colonels. That is a cultural evolution that I want to see continue to grow.”

To date, that approach has included a Vector Check modelled on the popular TV show, “Dragon’s Den”, which provides any aviator with a chance to “sell” senior leadership on an idea or solution, and the launch of an innovation hub in the Waterloo, Ontario, technology triangle intended to expose Air Force personnel to the tech entrepreneur mindset. That cultural change in the RCAF alone may encourage airmen and airwomen to remain in service, but Lieutenant-Colonel Cass’s team will also be monitoring the “suggestion box” for any novel ideas around retention and recruitment.
Targeted recruitment a strategic game

The defence policy also committed to grow the CAF to 101,500 personnel, an increase of 3,500 for the Regular Force, to 71,500, and 1,500 for the Reserve Force, to 30,000. Much of the growth is aimed at filling needs in space-, cyber- and intelligence-related occupations, but could include additional aircrews and technicians as the RCAF introduces new maritime helicopter and fixed-wing search and rescue (SAR) fleets, considers expanding its SAR helicopter fleet, and moves forward with a plan to acquire new fighter jets and remotely piloted aerial systems.

A senior government official acknowledged during a briefing in December that even the interim fighter program, which will see delivery of 18 Australian F/A-18A/B Hornets to augment the current fleet, could mean a need for more pilots and technicians, and that “retention and recruitment efforts were underway.”

While flying or working on cutting-edge aircraft is admittedly “a huge hook” to attract talent, the RCAF nonetheless faces stiff competition for skilled trades and technology workers, said Kohli.

All sectors are chasing the same demographic, so the military has had to experiment and be “adaptive to the marketing strategies [of] our competition,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Dan Mainguy, the senior staff officer for marketing and attractions with the CFRG.

The CFRG applies benchmark enrollment criteria provided by the Army, Navy and Air Force to deliver increasingly creative and often very targeted recruitment campaigns, using online and various social media channels and face-to-face specialist recruiters to identify and interact with potential candidates. One program, called “Ask Me Anything”, gives prospective candidates direct online access for an hour to a serving member of similar age to answer any questions about their job.

“It is a very strategic game, played out tactically across the country,” Lieutenant-Colonel Mainguy said. “We really have to create a value proposition as part of our marketing strategy to be competitive alongside industry. We do very well as far as offering a salary that is relatively competitive with the rest of industry, but we have to sell all of the other intangibles [such as] professional development throughout a career, diversity of employment, diversity of location, bilingualism, pension benefits…to be more competitive.”

Aerospace-specific programs at trade schools and colleges have also become a prime target for RCAF and CFRG specialist recruiters. Members of Cass’s team have audited aircraft maintenance courses to understand the skills students acquire and are finding “between 70 to 90 per cent of our core military material is being covered,” she said. “Those programs are so well delivered that oftentimes the training that we have to provide is very minor once they come in.”

To encourage students to consider the RCAF before embarking on a commercial sector career, the Air Force is also marketing the fact that journeyman status for most trades can be acquired in much shorter time and at far less cost.

And it is providing credit for such programs by shortening the length of some courses once a trainee has completed basic training, and accelerating promotion. “Both pay and rank are biased to recognize what they are bringing to the table as semi-skilled entrants,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli.
Working smarter

Personnel shortages are often cyclical and carefully managed to minimize their impact on operations, but retention and recruiting issues will likely remain a constant challenge as Canadian demographics continue to change. So, the Air Force will have to work smarter, Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli acknowledged. That will mean greater use of simulation in the training system and to keep pilots current, reserving precious flying hours for operations.

In December, Lieutenant-General Hood directed staff to look at using other air operations officers to perform operations tasks, keeping qualified pilots focused on flying. And an air combat systems officer (ACSO), rather than a pilot instructor, may provide the initial cadre of unmanned aerial systems pilots. “It may require a dedicated operator or we may be able to continue on the ACSO route, or we may find that a pilot is actually required,” Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli explained. “It will depend on the hardware of the system that we put into place.”

New fleets with ever more complex sensor systems will also mean fundamental changes for technician training. More maintenance will be contracted, meaning “maintainers won’t need to know how every one and zero is working inside the box. They [will] need to be more focused on management of the systems, to be more aware of software versions,” Lieutenant-Colonel Kohli said.

The pilotless cockpit is estimated by some to be a decade away, though militaries, despite embracing unmanned drones, will take decades more to be totally comfortable with the idea of no pilots in their fighter, transport, maritime patrol and tactical aviation fleets.

In the meantime, they will have to continue applying innovative and focused personnel strategies to attract and retain the aircrews and technicians needed to keep those aircraft flying. And if some do seek opportunities in the commercial sector? Canadian aviation will be the beneficiary of well-trained, high-quality people.

Addressing the "Fighter Gap"

By: JAMES FRYER
© 2018 FrontLine Defence (Vol 15, No 2)

When asked if a second supply ship for the Royal Canadian Navy could be ordered from Davie Shipbuilding – a move that would restore re-fueling capability to both coasts and head off job losses at the Quebec shipyard – Transport Minister Marc Garneau declared: “We cannot artificially create a need for something that doesn’t exist.”

How ironic that a member of the federal cabinet should make this bold remark when there is a broad consensus that this is exactly what the Trudeau government is doing in the case of the alleged fighter capability gap. No fewer than 13 former chiefs of the air staff (with about 400 years’ worth of experience between them), as well as the Senate of Canada and most informed defence analysts, all agree that the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is not deficient in fighter capability (though they are certainly due to be replaced). 

F-35A

Insofar as the ‘gap’ is concerned, former fighter pilot Alan Stephenson has argued convincingly that it has been manufactured for political reasons – namely to impose unnecessary delays on the replacement of the CF-18 fleet, and put distance between a notional Trudeau government circa 2021 and its ill-considered 2015 election promise to buy anything but the much-maligned F-35.

Gap? What gap?
Certainly last year’s defence policy roll-out did nothing to add to the public’s understanding of why an interim buy of fighters is suddenly necessary to ensure Canada’s security. On page 38 of the policy – named Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) – the government did not specify how the security landscape had changed to such a degree that extra planes are required now. Nor has the government justified why an initial plan to fill the ‘gap’ with 18 modern F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets could be so easily aborted in favour of buying highly-used legacy Hornets from Australia. If national security is so well served by the latter, why wasn't it chosen as the first (and demonstrably cheaper) option.

Nor is there evidence that either NATO or NORAD have pressured Ottawa to up its game and put more fighters into service. Such a demand would likely have made it into the public domain, if for no other reason that NATO’s budgetary and force development targets are publicly known. Yet not a word from either about a fighter gap. The government continues to insist that such a thing exists, but is it pedalling ‘fake news’? Again, where is the evidence of a gap that would silence the legions of doubters?

And with the formal announcement (12 December 2017) of a process to replace Canada’s legacy fleet, many are left wondering why a seemingly straightforward competition to replace the full fleet should take until 2025 to deliver the first machine.

Boeing Super Hornet

It is instructive, if not a little ominous, that the government claims so much time is required to consult with industry on what it has to offer.

The RCAF requirements may have been tweaked for political reasons on 12 December (perhaps discounting low-observability as a key requirement), but can the requirements be so profoundly different from what they were toward the end of the last government’s tenure?

Indeed, with virtually every major country transitioning to low-observable fighters (Russia to the SU-57; China to the J-20 and J-31; much of NATO to the F-35; Israel, Japan, and South Korea announcing their intent to build stealthy designs) there seems to be little doubt as to where the future lies. Does the current government have some special insight into the future of air warfare that has eluded ally and non-ally alike?

Obfuscation, naïveté, or both?
What are we to make of the need for another round of industry consultations that will culminate in a list of suppliers? Consultations began with the previous government – the results of which were written up by the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS) and presented to the Harper government in June of 2014. Surely this information could be leveraged to reduce the duration of the recently-announced competition. Yet to listen to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan’s convoluted response to a question from the assembled media on 12 December, it is as if the NFPS and its peer-reviewed study never existed.

Not to be outdone, Public Services and Procurement Minister Carla Qualtrough stated in the same press conference that bidders should bear in mind that their current or prior dealings with Canada could be weighted against them during the bid evaluations. If a bidder was perceived to have inflicted harm on Canada’s economy, that would play against them in a competition – a none-too-subtle swipe at Boeing for launching a failed bid to impose punitive tariffs on Bombardier’s C-Series airliner. When asked if this would only add more time and complexity to the procurement (given that the definition of ‘harm’ could be quite subjective and therefore open to legal challenge), the Minister said she hoped it would not. As a novice cabinet minister, she might be forgiven for her naïveté.

Eurofighter Typhoon

Yet the broader government cannot be so easily excused. It should be obvious to anyone that when it comes to defence procurement in Canada, hope is not a method. One suspects that Minister Qualtrough will soon learn that painful lesson. For one thing, the government’s timetable for the fighter project puts delivery of the first jet in 2025 – precisely when the lead ship in the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project is supposed to be floated out. Superimposing the fighter and warship replacements upon each other is a sure-fire way to over-tax the insufficient project management capacity residing in the relevant federal departments. It has long been argued (and accepted) that a lack of trained and experienced civilian and military procurement staff are to blame for delays in delivering on core projects. Should not the two most complex and costly projects of our times be staggered so as not to interfere with each other? (There was a four-year gap between the acquisition of the final CF-18 in 1988 and the arrival of the first Halifax-class frigate). Herein lies the danger of not proceeding immediately to a competition.

Yet perhaps the grand prize for obfuscation should go to Liberal MP Steven MacKinnon, the parliamentary secretary to Minister Qualtrough. On a CTV News panel discussion in December he boldly proclaimed that it was an “exciting time” for the RCAF, lucky as it was to be acquiring used Australian Hornets as an interim measure. It may not have occurred to him that acquiring 30-year-old planes may actually be a disincentive to recruiting and retention. A would-be aviator is unlikely to be attracted by the prospect of climbing into obsolescent aircraft. And with the airlines trolling for experienced pilots and technical tradespeople, what message is sent to the current crop of air and ground crew by investing in the past rather than the future? Side-note: the latest batch of television recruiting ads no longer feature the fighter capability – perhaps a veiled admission that featuring obsolete kit does nothing to incentivize recruiting.

When asked about the fighter gap, MacKinnon claimed that the government’s defence policy had dealt “at length” with the issue. As noted above, no explanation – lengthy or otherwise – has been forthcoming in the policy about how the aerospace environment has changed to such as degree as to mandate a gap-filler. Either Mr. MacKinnon did not even read his own party’s policy document, or he banked that his co-panelists (not to mention the viewers) could be easily duped.

Timing is everything… isn’t it?
Aside from the danger of having to manage two mega-projects simultaneously, the timing of the fighter replacement raises another serious issue: technological obsolescence. Put simply, the longer Canada takes to decide, the narrower our options become.

Reviewing public statements by European governments, militaries, and aerospace officials regarding the future of their fighter aircraft fleets, it is clear that the Europeans are looking ahead to the next-generation of aircraft to replace Tornado and Typhoon (UK, Germany, Italy), as well as Rafale (France)and Gripen E (Sweden).

In the US, manufacturers such as Northrop are already musing about 6th-generation technologies. Worried by what it sees as Russian and Chinese advancements, the US Air Force is looking at advanced aircraft, weapons and sensors for introduction circa 2030.

The current leading-edge (4.5-/4.75-generation) aircraft in service in Europe are being upgraded, but officials from Airbus (Typhoon’s manufacturer) state that even with upgrades their design is not viable against capable adversaries beyond 2040 and that planning for their replacement should begin now if Europe is to retain the requisite design/manufacturing capability. The French and German governments have begun discussing collaboration on the next-generation fighter. The Rafale is likely in the same boat as Typhoon (obsolescent by 2040), since it and all the other canard-winged designs date back to the 1990s. Meanwhile, the US Navy has signalled that the penultimate version of the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet (Block 3) will go out of service in 2040.

The relevance of this for Canada is clear. If there is any inclination by the current or future government to buy an advanced 4th-generation aircraft – either from Europe or from Boeing – we will not be able to treat is as we have the CF-18. The new platform will not remain combat-viable for 35-40 years after its purchase because all ‘established’ candidates are fast reaching the end of their upgrade potential.

In effect, the RCAF’s ‘new’ 4.5/4.75-generation aircraft would function only as an interim, or inter-generational, aircraft for a period of about 15 years – or until new-generation machines emerge from European or American production lines in early 2040s.

Dassault Rafale

Even if European plans slip by 5 years (to the mid-2040s), the writing is clearly on the wall for fighter aircraft of the 4th generation. Pushing Canada’s fighter replacement into the mid-2020s puts Canada out of step with the pace of fighter replacement. Minister Sajjan was correct that we should have moved ahead on this file a decade ago, with a replacement in service today. Yet we now find ourselves in the position that if we choose one of the many ‘established’ candidates, we will likely have to go through the procurement process again after only 10 years to avoid the fleet obsolescence that our allies have now admitted to.

The promising but still-immature F-35 might be the only candidate with a technological growth path beyond 2040. But if it is not chosen, Canada should not delude itself that the other candidates will enjoy significant design longevity. Choosing one of them means lots of money for a very questionable return. As US Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson observed, “Buying a new version of something that was revolutionary 30 years ago doesn’t take us to a more competitive future.”

Creative thinking needed...
Clearly Canada cannot wait until late 2030s to replace the full fleet. Are there other options? One is to take a chance on the F-35, as many allied and partner nations have done.

All partner nations remain committed to it, and the aircraft has won orders in Israel and Japan and South Korea where these allies face capable rivals and would not think of entrusting their security to yesterday’s technology. A Canadian order would seem logical given that potential bidders were told during an ‘industry day’ on 28 January 2018 that Canada needs an aircraft that could last until 2060. By simple process of elimination, the F-35 is the only possible choice. Why then does the government fetishize competition when there are arguably no viable competitors?

A second option is to go with a mixed fleet of 4.75-generation aircraft available now, backed up by a mature 5th-generation candidate when available. Aside from the training and logistical challenges this will cause, there is the distinct possibility that once the former is acquired, this or a future government could balk at Phase 2, leaving Canada behind the technological curve after only a decade. It would also befuddle DND and the RCAF how to decide what portion of 88 planes – the numerical requirement articulated in SSE – can be drawn from each generation.

Another possible way forward is to make a choice between a European design or Super Hornet (Block 3), then re-scope the temporal dimension of the fighter project to last only 20 years (i.e., delivery of the first airframe until final disposal) rather than the 50 years currently envisioned for the CF-18. Again, such an aircraft will by design be an interim or ‘inter-generational’ aircraft.

Saab Gripen

There may be a political advantage in going this latter route. Since the government is required to specify the cost of acquisition and ownership over the lifespan of the airplane, the overall cost of a 20-year program should be considerably lower than a 40-year program since operations and maintenance costs will be halved. Sceptics will note (rightly) that DND will have to come back to Treasury at the 10-year point in order to buy a replacement aircraft. But 10 years is a long time in politics. Plenty of room to blame the situation on long-gone predecessors.

To be sure, a truncated fighter program may force the government to amortize the costs into a shorter timeframe. But if Canada is comfortable with an interim capability, choosing Saab’s Gripen E – undoubtedly the least expensive option – may have merit. Its single engine need not be a factor given the RCAF’s readiness to procure the F-35; and its advanced technology (electronically-scanned radar, internal infra-red sensor, advanced cockpit) represent an improvement over the CF-18.

…and less politicking
One more factor might need consideration: the new and somewhat bizarre requirement that a successful bidder demonstrate that its business dealings do not harm the Canadian economy.

If it is hard to see how Saab, Airbus, or Dassault could have done harm to the Canadian economy, it is equally hard to see how they could provide the lasting benefits that Boeing or Lockheed have bestowed on Canada over the decades. While some have argued that the so-called ‘Boeing clause’ is meant to put the screws to the US giant in its dispute with Bombardier, the corollary is that Boeing already has rendered significant industrial and technological benefits to Canada – something not lost on the 1,700 workers at the company’s Winnipeg facility. This cannot be overlooked by the government’s bid evaluators. Thus even after calculating the net ‘benefit-to-harm’ ratio, Boeing (or Lockheed) may still offer more politically-attractive partnerships than the three European firms. (Dassault or Saab could, however, attempt to court political favour by offering to assemble their jets in Canada.) Yet with the Super Hornet coming to the end of its development pathway with the Block 3 version, this again would seem to leave Lockheed Martin and the F-35 as the only viable choice – assuming that the government is indeed considering a long-term solution to the RCAF’s needs.

Conclusion
With the government stubbornly clinging to the false premise of a fighter gap, with the addition of highly subjective conditions for bidders, and with the apparent deletion of stealth capability as a requirement for the new aircraft, it is clear that the fighter replacement issue has become monstrously politicized. After promising sensible defence procurement reform during the last election, the Trudeau government seems to have acquired a distaste for simplicity and efficiency, not to mention evidence-based analysis. The politically-motivated cancellation of the EH-101 helicopter, followed by an 11-year ordeal to choose a (still non-operational) replacement, should have served as a cautionary tale against allowing what should be a straight-forward matter morph into a political football to be kicked around endlessly. Yet no such lesson seems to have been learned. What’s worse is that the government cannot deliver a cogent response to the question of why it’s doing what it’s doing. Perhaps it feels that it doesn’t need to?

Any fighter replacement program needs to be viewed through the lens of operational capability, logistical supportability, and cost. But timing must also play a part, and the government has set itself and DND up for a significant managerial, technical, and financial challenge by not exploiting the work done by the NFPS and de-conflicting the fighter purchase with other major procurements. Minister Sajjan seemed to at least partially recognize the former when he said on 6 December 2017: “These [air force] requirements are not only about having an aircraft for now, but we need to make sure this aircraft is there to serve us in the future.” The Americans and Europeans have given ample indication that their legacy fighter designs have a limited shelf-life. Canada should listen to them and act accordingly.

===
James Fryer is an independent defence analyst based in Toronto.

CP-140 Aurora Good To Fly Until 2030; Replacement Plan In The Works

By: David Pugliese, Defence Watch 

CP-140 Aurora escorted by CF-18 Fighter Jets. Vanguard Magazine. 

Pat Finn, the Department of National Defence’s assistant deputy minister for materiel, says the Aurora maritime surveillance aircraft will be around for a while. “We still have some years ahead as we add more capability to the aircraft,” he recently told parliamentarians. “We’re just finishing the life extension of the aircraft to 2030, which is a pretty significant capability investment.”

A short time later, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan signed a letter signaling Canada’s intent to join the Maritime Multi-Missions Aircraft forum, along with other nations, to share force development resources and knowledge. The end result could be a new maritime patrol aircraft. Poland and Canada were invited to join existing members of the forum which include France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey.

So what exactly comes next?

The Cooperation on Maritime Multi-Mission Aircraft (M3A) Capabilities is part of NATO’s Smart Defence Initiatives. It has a M3A Specialist Team, which is a multinational force development working group that is currently chaired by Canada. The team’s job is to examine technological advancements in the area of maritime patrol aircraft.

Department of National Defence spokeswoman Jessica Lamirande told Defence Watch the information gathered by the ST will be used to support the statement of requirement for Canada’s next generation multi-mission aircraft. That initiative is included in the Liberal’s defence policy but with the Aurora flying until 2030 the replacement is still a ways off.


In addition, the activities of the ST will also indirectly inform the advancement of other DND initiatives including those related to Arctic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Lamirande added.

Budget 2018 Shores up Cyber Defence but is Silent on New Jets and Warships

By: Murray Brewster, CBC News

The new federal budget focuses on ones and zeros over tanks and troops by pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into new and improved cyber and national security defences.

Several federal departments will not only see upfront cash but promises of long-term spending to counter both the threat of hackers — state-sponsored and otherwise — and cyber-criminals.

National Defence, by comparison, is seeing virtually nothing in terms of new spending on the nuts and bolts of the military, other than initiatives outlined in the recently tabled national defence policy.

The 2018 budget is, on the surface, a tacit acknowledgement that the nature of threats to national security — the nature of modern warfare itself — is changing.

The budget recycles the government's $3.6 billion pledge last December to provide veterans with the option of a pension for life and better services.

But cyber-security was, by far, the headline national security measure in the budget.

Finance Minister Bill Morneau's fiscal plan sets aside $750 million in different envelopes — much of it to be spent over five years — to improve cyber security and better prepare the federal government to fend off online attacks and track down cyber-criminals.
More for CSE

It also promises an additional $225 million, beginning in 2020-21, to improve the capacity of the country's lead electronic intelligence agency, the Communications Security Establishment, to gather foreign signals intelligence.

The Liberals will soon pass new national security legislation — C-59 — and CSE will receive important new powers and responsibilities to disrupt global cyber threats.

"These are brand new tools. They're going to need lots of resources — technological resources, personnel resources — to engage in those kinds of operations," said Wesley Wark, a University of Ottawa professor and one of the country's leading experts on cybersecurity and intelligence, in an interview prior to the budget.

The sense of urgency about getting the country's cyber-security house in order is being driven in part by the fallout from Russian hacking and meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, said a former assistant parliamentary budget officer.

"With what we've seen south of the border, I think cyber-security and cyber-threat has been elevated in this budget to a high-priority item," said Sahir Khan, now the executive vice president of the Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy.

The budget creates two new entities to deal with online threats.

The first, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, will assemble all of the federal government's cyber expertise under one roof — a plan that will require new legislation.

The second organization will be run by the RCMP and be known as the National Cybercrime Coordination Unit.

It will coordinate all cybercrime investigations and act as a central agency to which the public can report incidents.

The budget also includes cash for Public Safety's National Cyber Strategy, which not only aims to protect federal government networks but is meant to collaborate with the corporate financial and energy sectors to boost their defences.
Military procurement a work in progress

The budget's dearth of new spending on the real-world military — at a time of significant global insecurity — is due to reasons that are partly political and partly organizational, said Khan.

The former Conservative government's inability to deliver on promises of new equipment during its nine-year tenure was a political "albatross around its neck," he said.

The Liberals may have produced a clear defence policy but they have yet to straighten out the procurement system, he added.

The Trudeau government has promised a lot of military capital spending down the road. Khan said it seems determined to keep the issue out of the spotlight in the meantime.

What's missing from the new budget is a clear commitment that National Defence will get the cash it needs as those needs arise.

"I think there was a lot of clarity in the policy direction coming out of the government [defence] white paper," said Khan. "What a lot of us are trying to understand is whether the money … is accompanying that change in direction … so that DND has a stable footing to meet its needs."

He said he still has questions about whether promised future spending on fighter jets and warships has been baked into the federal government's long-term fiscal plans.

A senior federal official, speaking on background prior to the release of the budget, insisted that military capital spending is welded into fiscal plans going forward into the 2030s.

Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan has said repeatedly, since the strategy was released last June, that the defence plan was "fully costed" into the future.

Up until 2016, National Defence produced an annual list of planned defence purchases.

The Liberals promised to produce their own list of planned acquisitions and table it this year. Khan said it "needs to be presented to Parliament and the public."
Training and retaining?

The cyber initiatives in Monday's budget drew a mixed response from the high-tech sector.

On the one hand, the Council of Canadian Innovators praised budget signals that suggest the Liberals are open to dealing with home-grown companies rather than buying off-the-shelf from major U.S. firms.

"The imperative to build domestic cyber capacity is not just economic. It's existential," said Benjamin Bergen, the council's executive director.

"Without a domestic capacity in cyber we risk becoming a client state. Innovators welcome the announcement of a new Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, which will allow for information sharing between the public and private sector."

What the budget didn't offer was a clear commitment to training and retaining highly-skilled software engineers and IT professionals.

"We would have liked to have seen a retention strategy. There wasn't one," said Bergen. "We know Canada produces amazing graduates but we're struggling to keep that talent here."

The council estimates there will be up to 200,000 job openings in high-tech by 2020, which will put pressure on the industry and on the federal government as it bulks up its cyber capability.

Adam Froman, CEO of the Toronto-based data collection firm Delvinia, was blunt when asked if the federal government will be able to fill all of the cyber-security job openings created by this budget.

"They're not going to be able to. Plain and simple," he said. "Or they're going to have to outsource those jobs to foreign companies."

Deadline Looms for Boeing to Decide on CF-18 Replacement Bid

By: David Ljunggren & Leah Schnurr, Reuters News 

OTTAWA (Reuters) - Boeing Co must decide by the end of this week whether to take part in a multi-billion-dollar race to supply Canada with fighter jets, even as the U.S. company’s relationship with Ottawa has soured due to a trade dispute.

Although a U.S. trade commission on Jan. 26 dismissed Boeing’s complaint that Canadian plane maker Bombardier was dumping airliners on the American market, it is far from certain the ruling will be enough to placate Canada.

That could well influence the company’s decision on bidding on a contract for 88 jets worth between C$15 billion ($12.1 billion) and C$19 billion, people familiar with the matter said.

Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg said in a post earnings call last week the company will wait to see the commission’s reasoning, coming later this month, “to make decisions on our path forward.”

The company declined to comment further.

Boeing has until Feb. 9 to express an interest in taking part in the Canadian jet competition, failing which it will be excluded from the bidding process.

At stake could be billions of dollars of defense procurement orders at a time when Canada is ramping up military spending over the next decade. Boeing says it supports some 17,000 jobs in Canada.


The dispute also has weighed on the crucial NAFTA modernization talks, which have dragged on for months.

Although government officials say the competition will be open, they have privately made it clear that Boeing needs to drop the Bombardier challenge and talk of an appeal to stand a better chance of winning the jet contract, say sources familiar with the matter.

“A lot of things would be better if they did that,” said one source who declined to be identified given the sensitivity of the situation.
FROSTY RELATIONSHIP

There are signs the relationship between Boeing and Ottawa remain frosty. Boeing did not send its own staff to a meeting between the Canadian government and industry held in January to discuss the jets contract, the sources said.

Boeing said its F-18 Super Hornet was represented by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Pentagon unit that implements foreign arms sales. U.S. foreign military sales are often negotiated between the U.S. government and each customer nation.

Lockheed Martin Corp, Dassault Aviation SA and Airbus SE also are expected to compete.

Canada is part of the consortium that helped develop Lockheed’s F-35 stealth fighter, although Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said during his successful 2015 election campaign that he would not buy the plane because it was too expensive.

Canadian Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, who has said Boeing has not behaved like a trusted partner, did not answer directly last Tuesday when repeatedly pressed as to how the aerospace giant could get back into Ottawa’s good books.

Ottawa says the bids will be evaluated in part on the basis of “past and recent economic behavior of potential bidders leading up to the procurement.”


That test is months away from being finalised, meaning Boeing has no idea whether Ottawa would be satisfied if it did drop the challenge, sources said.

A company’s submission will be evaluated not just on the economic test but on a number of factors including, price and military capability, one of the sources said.

While Boeing has repeatedly said it will not take reprisals against its Canadian supply chain and workforce, the dispute between Boeing and Canada worries aerospace suppliers who fear they could lose future contracts, an industry source familiar with the matter said. Canada’s aerospace industry is a major employer in Quebec, a politically valuable province for Trudeau, who is facing elections in 2019.