What President Trump Might Mean for Canadian Defence Policy

By Vincent J. Curtis, Espris de Corps Magazine (Vol. 23, No. 11) 

With the election of Donald Trump as the next president of the United States, the world can expect a large recapitalization of the U.S. military over the next four to eight years. We can also expect the Trump administration to pressure NATO allies to increase their defence expenditures to two per cent of their GDP (gross domestic product).

Trump famously campaigned on the theme that the United States was not going to carry a heavier share of the defence burden of the western world than was justified by economics. If NATO allies expected the assistance of the United States, then they needed to do their part. Some of that pressure will undoubtedly be applied to Canada, for Canada is one of those not spending up to the agreed level of two per cent of our GDP.

What does this mean for Canadian defence?

In the first place, it would mean that the Canadian defence budget would have to increase to be in the range of CDN $48-billion. The budget track released by the Trudeau government in its maiden budget forecast revealed a decrease in defence expenditures — the amount projected for 2016 was $29.4-billion with a decrease to $14.4-billion by 2020–2021. In the eyes of Trump, we are moving in the wrong direction.

Yes, defence is one of many competing priorities for federal tax expenditures, but national defence and maintaining good relations with allies is among the most fundamental of priorities of any national government. Those priorities have a higher call for money than new spending to make life more comfortable for a minority of Canadians. The needs of all take priority over the needs of the few.

What use could be made of additional defence expenditures?

There is no question that the Canadian Armed Forces are in need of recapitalization. The Royal Canadian Navy needs to be completely rebuilt, and soon. The fighting capacity of the Royal Canadian Air Force is aging rapidly, and the replacement for the CF-18 fleet is late and nowhere in sight. The Canadian Army could also use a new store of capital equipment for general-purpose combat operations.

The government is dithering over whether it should acquire 10 or 12 frigates to refight the Battle of the Atlantic, should it ever come back. The naval brass is still in the grip of the old-school small ship navy mentality that has dominated Canadian naval thinking since the days of the Niobe and the Rainbow. The RCN brass need to have in their top drawer a plan for a real battle fleet — a fleet consisting not just of frigates but of one or more battlecruisers as well. And if battlecruisers seem to be too war-like for political tastes, then missile-cruisers in the 10,000-ton range can be had off-the-shelf from the United States at $2-billion apiece, less than the cost of a 5,000-ton custom-built frigate. Anyhow, a capitalization project for the Navy in the range of $40-billion should be ready to go.

The RCAF is caught between the failure of Lockheed Martin to deliver a viable F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in a timely and cost-efficient manner, and a new government that wants to start the bidding process for a CF-18 replacement aircraft from scratch. The solutions are easy: buy off-the-shelf F-16s, or the updated F/A-18E/F Super Hornet off the shelf, both of which are also still in production. These are Gen 4.5 fighters, not Gen 5 fighters, but they can be had soon; they are still current and viable for modern combat air operations, and should be seen as an interim purchase until the Gen 5 fighters are finally available.

The Army could also use a store of useful equipment, in particular modern artillery. The M-777 proved spectacular in Afghanistan, and no army has been able to succeed in modern combat operations in the absence of dominant artillery since the 17th century’s Thirty Years’ War.

The problem of joint operations between air and surface has and will continue to bedevil CAF combat operations. If it flies, it is said to belong to the RCAF. But what about rotary aviation? What about a naval aircraft carrier? The United Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal regions ranged from 77 to 92 per cent.

Although PRTs were once described as the militarization of aid, some of these areas are just too dangerous for aid workers. In South Sudan, peacekeepers ignored the rape and assault of aid workers in the country. The adoption of a UN PRT model would allow aid workers to operate more freely in the country. It would also allow more positive interaction between the indigenous population and UN peacekeepers. The interaction with aid organizations and the local population will foster trust and, in turn, hopefully, generate useful, operational intelligence.

PRTs involved a level of Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) and that level and overall approach can vary depending on the model. There are four generic PRT models: American, German, British(-Nordic) and Turkish. These four generic models can be then divided into many sub categories that vary depending on which nation implemented the model in Afghanistan. A PRT model can be adapted to suit the requirements of a UN peacekeeping mission. Moreover, a UN PRT model in Mali may not work for South Sudan or Somalia and therefore a PRT model will need to be drafted to meet the requirements of each individual theatre.

The Trudeau government is weighing its options and conducting fact-finding missions to pinpoint the one mission that has the least of political consequences. The last thing the Trudeau government and the Canadian Armed Forces need is another Somalia incident. Since our withdrawal, UN peacekeeping missions have been blighted with accusations of rape and the solicitation of sexual relations with prostitutes and even trading weapons for gold.

Canada’s re-engagement with peacekeeping will offer its own unique challenges. Peacekeepers are regularly fired upon and that alone will create a political fervor in Canada. Our re-engagement will take political fortitude, but if the Trudeau government really desires for Canada to take international leadership, we must drive the evolution of UN peacekeeping.

The Dismal State of Canada’s Navy

By: Claudia Nieroda, The NATO Association of Canada 

Canada’s navy is in deep, troubled waters. With the nation’s last destroyer retiring in 2017, we will be left without any large warships capable of defending and resupplying the remains of our naval fleet. The wear and tear, in addition to soaring replacement costs, has seen many ships decommissioned without timely replacements. The rusted decades-old ships that have persevered are prone to frequent mechanical breakdowns. Consequently, the Royal Canadian Navy today is ranked by Ken Hansen on the Canadian Naval Review as on the same level as Bangladesh’s maritime forces.

The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) was launched in June 2010 by the Harper Government in an attempt to restore the navy to its former glory. Following World War II, Canada had the fifth largest navy, but years of neglect left it in a disintegrated state. There remain a total of 29 warships, meaning vessels equipped with missiles and military weapons designed for combat and defense purposes. Canada’s last destroyer, the HMCS Athabaskan, is scheduled to retire in 2017, with no plans for another destroyer to replace it. With the largest coastline in the world and three oceans to patrol, the lack of naval armada is alarming.

The NSPS is meant to build, repair, and maintain the federal fleet. However, it does not appear that it is living up to its promise to bridge the significant gap that has been formed in Canada’s navy. Constant delays, budget cuts, and increasing production costs keep the NSPS from carrying out what it planned to do according to the original timeline.

Only six out of thirteen current icebreakers are capable of polar operations, but none are able to travel far in the Northern seas during the winter months. The NSPS commissioned the construction of a new icebreaker, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker, which was initially expected to be in service by 2017, but a series of delays will now have the ship joining the fleet in 2022. The government has issued an order for new Arctic/ Offshore Patrol Ships, such the HMCS Harry DeWolf, but the first of these will not be delivered until 2018. This means that the Arctic passages, such as the Northwestern Passage, will continue to be unsupervised and isolated during the winter season.

Budget cuts have led to what was supposed to be an Arctic deep-water port in Nanisivik, Nunavut, turned from a naval base into a refueling station. This refueling station will only be accessible during the few summer months and closed during the rest of the year. When the HMCS Harry DeWolf is ready to enter service, it will not have an Arctic base to operate from.

Currently, the navy is ill-equipped to meet the various treaty commitments with Canadian allies. It is unreasonable to assume foreign countries would be willing to protect Canada if it is common knowledge that the nation’s navy will be unable to come to their defense. This reputation may be detrimental to Canada’s security.

The importance of the navy is not just fundamental in the ability to defend freedom. While that is a crucial factor in today’s erratic global affairs, it is important that Canada’s navy be prepared to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises. For instance, if any civilian ship, such as the ferries that move passengers between Labrador and Newfoundland or Vancouver and Victoria, were to signal a distress call, the lack of naval units might lead Canada to depend on the U.S. Navy Coast Guard to back up the Canadian Coast Guard. If an earthquake struck one of the islands off of British Colombia, such as Haida Gwaii, similar problems might arise.

The navy is simply not equipped to respond to multiple crises at home, never mind additional crises abroad. The Canadian government would be hard pressed to fulfill the agreements with their treaty partners and allies in the defense capability, nor in humanitarian aid. It is crucial that Canadians do not take the reputation as a “peaceful” country for granted as geopolitical security can never be guaranteed. The NSPS needs to focus on the present state of the navy and how to expedite the planned improvements. We cannot simply wait 10 years for ships to be constructed; we need them now.

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 Nieroda Claudia Nieroda graduated from the University of Guelph with an Honours Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. Throughout her undergrad career, she participated in an exchange at the National University of Singapore, taking courses extensively in the field of International Relations. In her final year, she successfully wrote and defended a thesis paper exploring the advantages of soft-authoritarian regimes in South East Asia in terms of political and economic development. Claudia loves adventure and travel, visiting over 35 countries and 5 continents, and is currently pursuing a career in the field of international relations.