The Canadian North is the Least Defended Territory on Earth

By: Scott Gilmore, Macleans Magazine 

Never mind the Amazon, or even the Antarctic. Northern Canada is the global epitome of undefended territory.

There is no place on earth as poorly defended as the Canadian Arctic. But maybe that’s a good thing. We do enjoy pretending to be a nation of “peacekeepers” (in spite of the fact we currently do less peacekeeping than say, El Salvador or Gambia). Vimy Ridge, Juno Beach, Kapyong, Panjwaii: these are places typically not mentioned in polite company, and almost never spoken aloud by a Liberal government. When we talk about arming our military, we don’t even like to use the word “arm”—we say “procurement.”

So, perhaps it is fitting that the Canadian North is essentially the largest military-free zone in the world. To be fair, it is not utterly bereft of Canadian Forces. We have three very small bases. There are some radar installations (that use 1980s technology). There are the Rangers, of course, local volunteers who are given Second World War rifles, a hoodie, a ball cap and an annual photo op with whichever politician is shameless enough to fly north for 24 hours to emote about the Canadian North from the depths of his or her $1,200 Canada Goose parka. Our largest icebreaker— built in 1969—is currently undergoing it’s seventh refit. And, we have approximately 120 armed forces personnel, just enough to fill a Tim Hortons. All of this, of course, is spread over an area the size of Europe (except the icebreaker—it’s in Halifax).

The list of what we don’t have is considerably longer. There is no port, military or civilian. The closing of Churchill last year ended the fatuous notion that Canada has a third coast. No airbase. No search-and-rescue hub. No four-season ice-breakers. No ice-strengthened war-ships. In fact, our fleet is now so small and so rusted out it has lost the designation of being a “blue-water navy”, it is a coastal defence force—on calm days—if everything is working.

If you ask around Ottawa why this is, the answer is and always has been, “Because it’s hard.” Which is true. The Canadian North is remote, wild, undeveloped, like the Russian North for example. Facing a similar climate and geography, Moscow has only managed to build two infantry bases; nine naval ports; and seventeen airbases along its Arctic coast over the last 60 years.

RELATED: Putin, Trudeau and Canada’s Arctic problem

But the Canadian Arctic is more remote and difficult to access than Russia’s. It is more like the Amazonian rainforest—an expanse of jungle and swamp 25 per cent larger than the Canadian North. The Brazilians have almost nothing there, other than the Manaus Air Base, home to four air squadrons, and an airborne army battalion. And there are several naval facilities, including the Rio Negro naval base, 1,300km up the Amazonian river. That base has nine satellite facilities, as well as a helicopter squad and marines. The Brazilians also have a fleet of large riverine hospital ships that ply the remote backwoods of the jungle. But that’s it.

But the Brazilians spend 2.6 per cent of their GDP on the military. The economic choices of our political leaders have always been less guns and more butter (supply-managed, thank you). Regardless of our formal obligations to NATO that we spend two per cent on the Canadian Forces, our defence budget comes in at half that.

We have much more in common with Australia, a commonwealth democracy, managing a constant political struggle to maintain social services and infrastructure spending. It makes sense that we would be careful about our military deployments, frugal even. Consider how the Australian’s have chosen to defend the Outback. Other than a huge naval base in Darwin, and several air squadrons at the RAAF Tindal, another couple of air bases, a dozen training bases, an infantry battalion, and large radar installations at Alice Springs and elsewhere, the place is empty.

Even in Antarctica, at the bottom of the world, owned by no country, needing no defence, and subject to a treaty prohibiting military activity, there are dozens of research bases run by the armed forces of countries like Chile, Uruguay and even Pakistan. The search and rescue capabilities of McMurdo Station alone are greater than all of Canada’s north of the 60th parallel.

No, if you want to get away from it all, to go somewhere on the planet where no one will be able to rescue you—or stop you, or even know you’re there—you want Canada’s North.

But try to keep this quiet. We don’t want it overrun by adventure tourists. Or cruise ships like the Crystal Serenity, which went through last summer bringing its own rescue ship because Canada didn’t have one. Or resource companies, now free to roam over ice-free waters. Or the Chinese, who want to start sending cargo ships and oil tankers through on their way to Europe. Or the Russians, who are increasingly overflying NATO territory. Or our American allies, who announced in Congress this week they will not recognize Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.

No, let’s follow the leadership of Prime Minister Trudeau, who made sure the Arctic was only mentioned twice in the 360 priorities he gave his ministers, and who has bravely avoided drawing any attention to the North—visiting only once since taking office—and who has still not published an Arctic strategy. Let’s just not draw any attention to the fact we’ve utterly abandoned the Canadian North. What could possibly go wrong?

National Shipbuilding Behind Schedule

By: Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press

Reports reveal construction of supply ships, polar icebreaker is behind schedule.

OTTAWA—The federal shipbuilding program has hit another setback, as government documents show more delays in the construction of the navy’s new supply ships and the Canadian Coast Guard’s highly anticipated polar icebreaker.

The delays, revealed in departmental reports recently tabled in the House of Commons, are expected to cost taxpayers as the navy and coast guard are forced to rely even more heavily on stop-gap measures to address their needs.

The two supply ships, which together will cost $2.6 billion, and the $1.3-billion polar icebreaker, dubbed the John G. Diefenbaker, are to be constructed one after the other in Vancouver by shipbuilding company Seaspan.

A replacement for the 50-year-old icebreaker Louis S. St-Laurent will be delayed until at least 2022. (JONATHAN HAYWARD / THE CANADIAN PRESS)

All three vessels are desperately needed as technical problems recently forced the navy’s two existing supply ships into early retirement, while the coast guard’s 50-year-old Louis St-Laurent heavy icebreaker was supposed to retire next year.

National Defence and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans reported last year that the first new supply ship would enter the water in 2020, while the Diefenbaker would arrive in 2021 or 2022.

But the departments’ most recent timetable says construction of the first supply ship won’t be finished until at least 2021, with completion of the Diefenbaker similarly delayed until 2022 or 2023.

When the federal government’s $35-billion national shipbuilding plan, which includes construction of new Arctic patrol vessels and a fleet of warships in Halifax, was first announced in 2010, it was expected the supply ships and icebreaker would all be finished by 2018.

National Defence spokesman Evan Koronewski blamed “challenges associated with completing the detailed design and organizing the entire supply chain” for the delay in the supply ship schedule.

Those challenges were also responsible for pushing back construction of the Diefenbaker, as work on the icebreaker can’t start until the supply ships are finished.

The federal government has already committed millions of dollars in recent years to extend the lives of the current icebreaker fleet.

But the new delays help explain why the coast guard started looking last month at whether it can lease between one and five icebreakers from the private sector for the foreseeable future.

They also mean that the navy will be forced to rely more on allies as well as a converted civilian cargo ship to provide fuel, food and other supplies to Canadian naval ships at sea.

There have been questions over the years about Seaspan’s ability to construct complex military vessels, given that its previous shipbuilding experience has largely revolved around ferries and tugboats.

The company referred questions to the government.

But defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute suggested bad planning is to blame, as government officials were overly optimistic — or wholly unrealistic — about the shipbuilding plan’s various timelines.

“The whole enterprise is very behind schedule,” he said.

Re-Fresh Idea for the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy

By Mikaël Perron, CD
Defence Watch Guest Writer

As a three-ocean nation and a member of the G7, Canada shall be at the forefront of the world’s ocean safety. The flagships of a nation like ours should be using our own specific home design and should be of the highest standard.

So, the main classes of ships to be built under the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS aka NSS) should be of a Canadian design. Over the years, Canada achieved independence from mother England by designing ships like the Cadillac destroyers, the Louis St-Laurent and river class icebreakers, the Provider and Protecteur class AOR, the Tribal class destroyer and the Halifax class frigate.

In the process, we developed ground breaking technologies like the bear trap that allows for the usage of a heavy helicopter from a destroyer’s deck, the probe at sea refuelling system, the extensive use of gas turbines on combat ships, the integrated platform management system and many other innovations. I strongly believe that we should be keeping that attitude, especially in the case of the Canadian Surface Combatant program.

A MP once questioned why the Canadian Navy should get the best destroyers in the world since we are a middle power! Well, for starters, Canada is a member of the G7 and is looking for a seat at the UN Security Council. We do not possess aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships or nuclear attack submarines but we definitely are a destroyers/frigate Navy.

More than 80% of world trade goes through the seas and nations that maintain the security of the major sea lane of communication (SLOC) are getting noticed. The western world’s population lost sight of it but there is a major fleet building in Asia and a great submarine proliferation around the world; our new ship should be able to match threats from, and capabilities of, other nations so our sailors return safely home.

In many parts of the world, gun boat diplomacy is a very actual tactic that is well understood. At a time of financial constrain, ships are much less expensive to deploy and maintain for an sustained international presence than moving a ground force or a large air force deployment.

Ships can remain in international waters for long periods; a minimum footprint ashore is required. Warships can also rapidly shift from a humanitarian or diplomacy mission to full combat capability.

Only a few nations can keep ships deploy away from home for long periods of time or seamlessly integrate into an American battle group; we should not lose those abilities.

On the Arctic front, the race for northern resources has begun. Russia is building up to 14 new conventionally and nuclear propelled heavy Icebreakers on top of their large actual fleet. The USA are now accelerating the regeneration process of their icebreaker fleet while players like China are sending Icebreakers to test the resolve of Arctic nations. We should maintain an active and persistent presence that requires more than one heavy icebreaker, considering the vastness of our Arctic claim and the maintenance cycle of these ships.

The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy was a very well thought process that was done with the best information available at that time. I fully support it but it needs to evolve to include a higher level of flexibility. As the situation evolves, it should be able to get the most out of the passing opportunities. It must, at all time, take in consideration the interests of our military personnel, the strategic interests of the nation, the taxpayers and of course the industry.

For example, Davie shipyard was basically bankrupt at the selection moment and it made sense from an accountant’s point of view to discard them although they possess the highest capacity shipyard in Canada.

Since then, they’ve built the most advanced civilian ship in North America and we could take advantage of that. The government must seize the opportunity to improve the NSPS to ad flexibility to it that will better serve our sailors, national interest, our budget but also the industry.

The downturn in the oil industry offers us the possibility to negotiate the acquisition of ships that would be otherwise unaffordable and unavailable. There are now two VS4220 sitting at Davie shipyard; one 70% and the other one 40% complete. These ships possess extreme capabilities that are perfect for our ocean’s conditions.

I propose that Canada acquires them as true multi-task high endurance vessel that will also double as Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessels (OOSV). The science equipment that was to go on the OOSV to be built will be installed on one of them (we could easily buy extra gear to equip both the same way).

They will also possess helicopter support capability to carry up to a Cyclone size helicopter and to land up to Cormorant or even Chinook helicopters. Their large fuel carrying capacity would also allow them to support other government vessel such as the AOPS and other offshore vessel.

With a good negotiation process, the Canadian government could obtain these two ships at a low price. They would replace the OOSV and one of the Medium Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessel that were to be built.

That would speed up the delivery process of some much needed ships. In addition, the non-combatant winner of the NSPS – Seaspan – would not lose out in such a scenario. I can see three main scenarios that could deliver more to every stakeholder:

First scenario: 

Once the OOSV is cancelled, the building of the JSS can start ahead of time (Scientific gear that was to go on the OOSV will be installed on the VS4220). Seaspan will be given the construction of the more profitable third optional JSS instead of the OOSV. Because of reasons I will explain further, the Navy actually needs four supply ships — the three JSS and the interim AOR (iAOR) in this scenario.

Two Diefenbaker-class Icebreakers would be built. In order to have these two icebreakers in due time, the building of the Diefenbaker’s sister ship could be awarded to the Davie Shipyard. The performance of both Seaspan and Davie could be effectively measured and help to set a competitive bidding process in order to build three Canadian-designed River-class Icebreakers that would be optimal to the taxpayers later on.

Davie is also proposing the conversion of a three-year old PC3 Icebreaker sitting idle in Seattle. That has the potential to be a great bargain to the taxpayers as well as prevent a capability gap. The replacement of our icebreaker fleet would be achieved with much added capability while the NSPS process would keep the course with no losers.

Second scenario:

Once the OOSV is cancelled, the building of the JSS still can start ahead of time. Davie would be given the building of a second interim AOR so the building of the first Diefenbaker-class Icebreaker could also start ahead of time. In this case, Seaspan would be given the contract to build two Diefenbaker class Icebreakers. Davie would also do the conversion of the PC3 Icebreaker sitting idle in Seattle to prevent a capability gap and to strengthen our nation’s Icebreaking capability. A contract involving a competition would also be awarded later to replace the three remaining River-class Icebreakers. (The River-class Icebreakers were commissioned between 1979 and 1987).

Third scenario: 

Still having replaced the OOSV and the first Medium Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessel with two VS4220 vessels from Davie, Seaspan would be more than compensated with the building of three JSS and two Diefenbaker-class Icebreakers. The GoC would negotiate Davie’s offer for the PC3 Icebreaker conversion and also the three River-class conversions that they earlier proposed. That would offer a significant deal to the Canadian public and compensate for the delays caused by the building of additional JSS and heavy Icebreaker. Let’s remember that the CCGS Terry Fox was a commercial Icebreaker before joining the CCG fleet. The nation will then possess a strong shipbuilding industry ready to compete on the international market for specialized ship conversion.

The main point of this text is about the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) portion of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy. The program is to renew our surface combatant fleet with up to 15 vessels to replace the Iroquois class destroyers and the Halifax class frigates. It is understood that the program is more expensive than it was initially planned for and that the actual budget could only afford around eleven ships.

It is now under consideration to adopt a foreign design and to do a cost trade-off on the required capabilities.

I do believe that such a course of action is the wrong way to go. We are a major industrial nation with the largest coast line in the world. The CSC will be our flagship.

There is a solution that would allow us to reach a maximum effect with eleven ships with no or minimum compromise to the statement of requirement (SOR).

Last year, before I retired from the Canadian Armed Forces, I submitted a few initiatives under the defence renewal program. One of those was a fleet manning concept for the CSC.

The core idea of that solution is to separate the needs of the crew from the needs of the ships themselves. The end result looks like this: five Area Air Defence (CSC AAD) ships, five General Purpose (CSC GP) ships with all the necessary spares. One extra hull will allow for each ship to go on a two year extended maintenance period every ten years.

There will be twelve sea going crews and a shore maintenance team. It is organized so we can have four ships permanently deployed, four ships available for training, local exercises / patrol, short work periods and finally three ships on extended work period. This way of operating a class of ships will work with classes of ships of five or more ships. These ships also need to be designed so they could operate away from home port for a complete year.

That is also where the need for, at least, four JSS/iAOR comes from. Support ships multiply the effect of the surface fleet. We need to have at least one supply ship available on each coast at any given time. They will support the deployed CSC, do humanitarian relief mission, support the AOPS on northern patrol occasionally, etc.

To have fewer CSCs will free up the necessary personnel to man these two extra supply ships and also a class of around four corvette/light frigates, similar to the Dutch Holland class patrol ships with the addition of anti-submarine warfare capability. Those would be very affordable (around four of them for the price of a single CSC and would reposition gear from the Halifax class frigates such as the 57 mm gun, the close in weapon system (CIWS), the naval remote weapon system (NRWS) and other systems. These are excellent and up to date pieces of equipment; for example, the most advanced Dutch frigate are using the exact same guns that used to be installed on our Iroquois class destroyers in the 70s-80s after being refurbished. The proposed corvettes would also operate with a small crew. Such ship would patrol our coast, participate to Op Caribbe-type missions, conduct piracy patrols and support the CSC on some occasion.

As for the CSC, the use of AAD and CSC GP concepts would be ideal with the required number of hulls. I would see a ship of around 148-155 metres in length and around 20m breadth. Its displacement would probably be around 6000-7000 tons.

It would possess an integrated electric power plant consisting of two main diesel generators, a gas turbine generator and two small diesel generators for anchor or shore without power. That power plant allows for better fuel efficiency (only one generator supplying propulsion and hotel load at sea).

It allows for a great redundancy, for the disposal of the maintenance heavy controllable reversible pitch propeller (CRPP) and the disposal of the main gear box and gives extra power for eventual addition of energy-consuming technologies like a rail gun or laser CIWS. A possible option toward that power plant would be to use already designed parts of the QE class carrier an incorporate them to our hulls. I am thinking here of two of their 9MW diesel generators, one MT-30 gas turbine generator and two 20 MW electric motors.

For cruising, one diesel economically supplies hotel load and a speed above 15 kts along with a minimum range of 7000 nm. Two diesels will be used for fast cruising and close proximity maneuvering. The gas turbine will be used for sub hunting and fast man oeuvre while a diesel can be added to reach a maximum speed above 30 kts with a diesel to spare and the potential to later add some new energy consuming technologies. This would give a high level of redundancy.

They would carry a minimum of two multi-role boats (MRBs) and the flight deck will be able to land up to Chinook helicopter in order to support Special Forces operations.

We could afford the best weapons and sensors; 5 inch gun, two millennium guns, harpoon, evolved sea sparrow missile (ESSM), standard missile for the AAD and Tomahawk for GP version without forgetting torpedoes and the naval remote weapon system (NRWS).

I believe a 48 cell MK-41vls launcher could allow us to carry 32 ESSM and 40 SM missiles for the AAD version and 32 ESSM and a combination of Tomahawk and ASROC for the GP version. If savings are needed, the mix of weapon could be changed.

All CSC shall have full ASW capability with Cyclone helicopter, torpedo launchers, towed and hull sonars and possess the latest in torpedo counter-measures. I would suggest the I-mast 500 to be used on them ship since we participate in the development of the active phased array radar (APAR). The I-mast of the AAD version would be without the sea master 400 radar since it would utilize the SMART-L ER radar while the GP version would use the sea master 400 not using the SMART-L radar. The new upcoming SF500 radar could offer further possibilities.

The ships would possess an optimized crew around 200 strong.

OPV, Corvette or Light frigate

To balance the fleet and keep the NSPS going, a class of four smaller ships would be designed and built. They would be around 110m long 15m wide and displace about 3500 tons. They might share the same power plant as the AOPS or even a more economical plant aiming for a max speed between 21 and 24 kts. The use helicopter and two MRBs will compensate for the lower maximum speed. The I-mast 400 could be a good choice of sensors in this case. The crew would consist of a (65-75 strong) team with extra room for up to 20 and an extra 20 in austere conditions, in the same way as the CSC.

To conclude, the NSPS is essential in order to keep a modern government fleet at all time. It must enable us to replace every existing and to be built ships before it gets to its best before date. Every possibility to make it more affordable such as a new manning strategy for the CSC shall be taken. It must also quickly adapt to the changing economic situation and take advantage of passing occasions. A strong naval presence home and abroad is probably the best way for Canada to affirm itself on the world stage.

Liberals will spend $133 million in five years for Arctic Surveillance

By: David Pugliese, The National Post 

OTTAWA — The Canadian government will spend $133 million over the next five years for new technologies to improve surveillance of the Arctic.

Gascoyne Inlet Camp, Nunavut. 7 April 2014 – Twin Otter aircraft crew, Captain (Capt) Chuck Rockwell, Capt Andrew Oakes and Corporal Mike Nesbitt takes off from Gascoyne Inlet Camp, Nunavut after a personnel and equipment drop off on April 7, 2014 during Operation NUNALIVUT. (Photo: Master Seaman Peter Reed, CFB Shearwater, Nova Scotia)

The research project dovetails with the election promise of the Liberals who said they would increase surveillance in the Far North.

The work could also provide new technology for Canada as it enters into the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence Command agreement with the United States. Senior NORAD officers have suggested that to be relevant past 2025 the alliance should improve its surveillance capabilities in the north.

Defence Research and Development Canada, the military’s science organization, is co-ordinating the surveillance research. The project will “enhance all domain situational awareness” of the air, sea and underwater approaches to Canada, particularly in the Arctic, according to a DRDC notice recently issued to companies and universities.

“Right now we’re generating interest,” said DRDC spokeswoman Kathleen Guillot. “The call for proposals is anticipated in the fall.” The DRDC notice sent to industry noted that climate change is making the north more accessible, increasing economic activity and international interest in the Arctic.

“Such increased Arctic activity brings additional responsibilities for the Department of National Defence and other government departments in search and rescue, emergency response and environmental monitoring,” the notice noted. “A greater awareness of the potential challenges posed by foreign military and commercial activities in the Arctic region is also essential for Canada.”

It also stated that the current North Warning System radar technology, used for providing surveillance of northern air approaches to North America, will need to be replaced as early as 2025.

We view the Arctic as an emerging operating area with much yet to be defined.

“Starting work now to define cost effective solutions that would provide the situational awareness capabilities required into the future is critical for the defence of Canada, and the United States, against continuously evolving potential adversary systems and threats,” according to the DRDC notice.

Whatever technology to be considered for the Arctic must be suitable for a remote setting, where there is limited power, harsh weather and “vulnerability to capture,” it said.

U.S. officers are already viewing improvements in surveillance in the Arctic as an important part of protecting the continent. At a January 2015 news conference, Admiral William Gortney, head of NORAD and the U.S. Northern Command, said the Arctic remains “key terrain as the northern approach to North America.”

“We view the Arctic as an emerging operating area with much yet to be defined,” he said.

Canadian defence officials see the provision of a new radar system in the Arctic as potentially fulfilling part of its contribution to the future of NORAD, according to a September 2013 Department of National Defence briefing note. NORAD conducted a strategic review in 2014 noting the need for improved sensors, communications and infrastructure in the high North in order to remain effective into the future.

Canada’s Arctic coastline is 162,000 kilometers long and only one-tenth of its northern waters are charted.

© Copyright (c) National Post

Setting a New Course for the National Ship Strategy

BY MARK ROMANOW
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 13, No 2)

At the turn of the 21st century, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was well on its way to becoming a potent, well-balanced navy...

The combat fleet included 12 recently commissioned multipurpose Halifax-class patrol frigates with Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), and point Area Air Defence (AAD) capabilities, and carrying a Maritime Helicopter (MH). Also just commissioned were 12 moderately-capable Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) with limited Mine Counter-Measures capabilities. They joined the four recently (1987-94) modernized and upgraded Iroquois- or Tribal-class ASW destroyers, which now fielded Long-Range (LR)-AAD capability.

With the older Provider-class Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) ship having been paid off in 1998, the surface fleet was still ably supported by two ageing single-hulled Protecteur-class AORs that had been commissioned in 1969 and 1970.

And most promisingly, the RCN was set to be joined by four Victoria-class (ex-Royal Navy Upholder-class) diesel submarines (SSKs) considered to be the quietest in service anywhere, which just been acquired (after unexpectedly harsh defence cuts in Britain) from the UK Ministry of Defence in 1998 for a quarter of their build cost.

... and then the current changed.

Feb 2016 – HMCS Fredericton transits into Souda Bay, Greece for a fuel stop during Operation Reassurance. (DND Photo: Cpl Anthony Chand)

Overworked and Neglected

Throughout the 90s and the first decade of the new century, the RCN’s surface fleet was constantly over-tasked and in-demand, and the subject of many a Department of National Defence (DND) news release praising their ‘front line’ role in various conflicts or missions, from the 1991 Gulf War through to their ‘role’ fighting the Taliban (wait... they have a navy?). Unfortunately, while quick to praise their efforts and garner the political laurels, the various political parties forming the Government of Canada over the past 25 years basically let the RCN surface fleet rust out through lack of any timely replacements. Various programs to replace capability have suffered from both a lack of funding and a serious lack of procurement acumen.

Only too late, after many good shipyards that had previously built RCN ships closed through lack of orders, and the industrial knowledge base drifted away, has there been any political realization that the shipbuilding industry needs steady orders to produce navy vessels in a timely and affordable fashion. This has, belatedly, been slowly addressed through the tortuous National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, however, the NSPS (now apparently being shortened by PSPC to drop the “procurement” out of the shipbuilding strategy) seems more geared towards ‘built in Canada at an outdated fixed cost’, and ensuring various regional entities get their piece of the procurement pie – first Industrial Regional Benefits then Industrial and Technological Benefits – than in meeting RCN/national requirements for the right equipment to adequately protect our maritime sovereignty. Will this latest name contraction to the National Shipbuilding Strategy signal a shift from the “longer timeframe for less capability and more cost” scenario te NSPS was being criticized for?

Surface warships

The centrepiece of the RCN, HMCS Athabaskan is the lone surviving Iroquois-class destroyer (slated to be paid off in 2017 after 45 years of service) and was already experiencing engine and maintenance issues in 2015 from being pushed well-past the regular 35-year warship service life.HMCS Huron was paid off in 2005 due to personnel shortages, and sunk as a target in 2007 (just 13 years after the expensive upgrades). Both Iroquois and Algonquin were paid off in 2015 after experiencing age and non-economically repairable damage-related issues.

Even though RCN Commander Vice-Admiral Mark Norman noted to FrontLine (issue #1, 2015) that “Athabaskan has been kept in service, so we’ve kept that legacy [Long Range, Area Air Defence] capability alive”, from 2017 through to 2025-26 when the first LR-AAD configured Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) is hopefully commissioned, the RCN will face a ‘significant’ gap for nearly a decade – and additionally loose its current skill-set for intercept as point-AAD drills just can’t replicate LR-AAD challenges and live training exercises.

As for the Kingston-class vessels, their low speed (15kts max) suggests they may not be the most effective patrol vessels. Originally 100% reserve-crewed and -operated, they had not been fully utilized until, as cuts took their toll, these vessels began to receive extensive taskings.

The limited number of remotely operated modular payloads, which were always meant to be supplemented during the mid-life refit, have obviously limited their performance. A C$100 million mid-life refit of the nearly 20-year-old vessels was deemed unwarranted, and some or all will likely be retired once the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) start entering service.

Jan 2016 – Fredericton’s Naval Boarding Party participates in a boarding exercise during Op Reassurance. (DND Photo: Cpl Anthony Chand)

The premature retirement of HMCS Iroquois and Algonquin enabled a revised 60/40 regular/reserve force crewing model for the MCDVs to continue sea opportunities for the displaced crews, and the RCN Commander acknowledged “we are running them flat out now and that’s paying enormous dividends and really working well.” The MCDVs are also being tasked for limited Northern Arctic operations during the short ice-free summer . The max 17kt speed of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) will present many of the same limitations as the slow MCDV.

The core of the RCN surface fleet, the Halifax-class are currently in the middle of a C$4.3 billion modernization and Frigate Life Extension (HCM-FELEX) program that is designed to replace and upgrade systems by 2018 “to ensure the frigates remain effective throughout their service life” and reflect an increasing emphasis on combined littoral operations. Additionally, to ameliorate the lost flagship capabilities of divesting the Iroquois-class, the RCN Commander noted “we made a decision to enhance the first four of the modernized Halifax-class with some extra space [minor structural reconfiguration] and some monitors and extra accommodation space – so we could bridge the gap in the command and control function.”

As the upgrades are relatively on time and within approved budget, one would think that FELEX is a good RCN success story. But, one look at the Defence Acquisition Guide (DAG) 2015 raises serious questions over the possibility of additional C$410-890 million in post-FELEX Halifax-specific upgrades. In fact, the 2015 Guide lists nine Halifax-specific projects for implementation out to 2035, which is well past the expected 2027-2031 service life of the Halifax-class ships.

Two of these projects are scheduled for completion within a few years. The Multi Role Boat project is looking for new faster, larger Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) to provide multi-functional and improved systems. The Maritime Satellite Communications Upgrade will improve allied interoperability. The reasonable preliminary estimates of C$50-100 million each, plus the fact that such capabilities can be ported to the new CSC when the time comes, makes these projects easily justifiable.

The other seven Halifax-specific projects (StrongBow; Maritime Next Generation Communications Suite; Maritime Tactical Command and Control; Naval Electronic Attack Recapitalization; Naval Electronic Warfare System Surface; Virtual Integrated Shipboard Information Networks and Underwater Warfare (Sensor) Suite Upgrade), are a different story. Valued at an estimated C$310-690 million over the 2024 to 2035 time frame, they only make sense if the RCN and DND expect the NSS to fail and not deliver new CSC ships until 2035 onwards!

DAG 2015 seemingly indicates a lack of communication and understanding between the RCN, DND and the government when looking at the interrelationship between FELEX and the CSC project. Most Halifax-specific projects in DAG 2015 are not scheduled for completion until 2024/2025, and two not until 2035, which seems to indicate the RCN and DND are moving the CSC goal posts 10 years to the right. Or, in other words, the left hand is not talking to the right hand, and vice versa, and the centre just does not have a clue. As a CGAI report by Stewart Webb and Chris Murray (January 2016) notes, “Disturbingly, none of these preparations seem to address the elephant in the room, neglected hull maintenance to extend the frigates beyond” the 2027-2031 time frame. Does this portend a Halifax-class hull-driven retirement debacle (à la Iroquois-class and Protecteur-class) in the making?

March 2016 – HMCS Edmonton, an MCDV, approaches the harbour of Ensanada, Mexico, during ­Operation Caribbe. While on patrol in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean during March 2016 for Operation Caribbe, Canadian MCDVs Summerside and Saskatoon assisted the USCG in two interceptions that resulted in the seizure 26 bales of cocaine. (Photo: DND)

NSS Procurement Update

The much touted, agonizingly slow, NSPS was recently pegged at over C$42 billion. Noting his acquisition experience in the UK, the hiring of retired Rear-Admiral Steve Brunton of the Royal Navy as an expert shipbuilding advisor for the Surface Combatant project, may be a step in the right direction.

Clearly, the (new) NSS should not be artificially constrained by outdated budget figures, rather by the ‘best value’ solution best suited for the requirement. Let the competitive selection for an in-service or final development stage design that best meets each requirement be the cost driver, while keeping the penchant for innumerable Canadian-specific modifications to a minimum. If the budget needs a slight top-up to obtain the proper equipment – so be it!

As we put our RCN and Coast Guard personnel in harms way, surely it is incumbent on the GoC to provide them with the right tools for the task. The Auditor General of Canada confirmed this important point: “Cost/capability trade-offs need to be monitored and revisions made to project budgets, if necessary, to make sure that Canada gets the military ships it needs to protect Canadian interests and sovereignty.”

At the heart of the early NSPS delay was the state of Canada’s shipyards. Without a continuous source of contracts for sophisticated navy vessels, all three of Canada’s formerly impressive shipyards had lost most if not all of their navy-specific expertise and had been scrambling for small upgrade and repair contracts to keep at least a few people employed.

NSS Combatants

The first ‘combatants’ preceding the CSC build, the minimally-armed (short-range 25mm gun) constabulary AOPS are a politically-driven procurement foisted on the RCN by the previous government. There seems to be little drive to protect Canada’s vast and perennially neglected (except by every other country), Arctic Ocean maritime space, with its increasingly accessible natural resources. Even the UK is building a £200 million Polar Research Ship capable of 60-day operation in sea ice. Polling has indicated that Canadians want the government to assert our northern sovereignty.

The current AOPS is watered-down from the 2005 election promise of three armed naval icebreakers with full Polar-1 classification capable of year-round operation in all ice states.

Ideally, three armed Coast Guard (CG) Polar-1 rated icebreakers, instead of the currently planned six AOPS with barely adequate Polar-4/5 classification and one lone, unarmed, Polar-2 rated icebreaker, would have been more efficient for asserting sovereignty in our increasingly accessible Northwest passage shipping route through the Canadian Arctic. While the Americans have two heavy icebreakers to our lone remaining ship commissioned in 1969, the Russians have 12 heavy Polar-1 icebreakers (half of which are nuclear-powered for extended operation), plus dozens of smaller vessels whose operations have often extended into Canada’s Arctic region. If politicians seriously care about our Arctic, this Polar-1 icebreaker capability gap should be cause for serious concern.

Canadian Coast Guard medium icebreaker Henry Larsen participated in Operation Nanook, in 2010. At the time, ­Liberal Senator Colin Kenny said the Conservative’s Arctic ship plan should be sunk and replaced real icebreakers. (Photo: Sean Kilpatrick, THE CANADIAN PRESS)

As the Liberals review the old NSPS, there may still be time to increase CG funding and modify the icebreaker design, which is still in its initial design phase, and add a Polar-1 derivative. Better use of all three shipyards (Irving on the East coast; Davie in Quebec; and Seaspan on the West coast) could allow a speedier replacement of the ancient Louis S. St Laurent and the three 35-year old R-class icebreakers. Armed Polar-1 and Polar-2 rated Coast Guard icebreakers – utilizing RCN-crewed refurbished 76mm guns, fire control radar and basic Combat Management Systems from the paid off Iroquois-class or post-FELEX Halifax-class ships to keep costs to a minimum – would provide a very useful capability. These would allow a reduced number of constabulary reservist-crewed AOPS for asserting a northern Arctic sovereignty presence during the summer. The government would then have scalable options, available all seasons, to respond to the increasing likelihood of incursions of our Northern waters by unwanted commercial shipping or by cruise ships needing assistance.

CSC Update

The Canadian Surface Combatant project had become a weak link in the old NSPS, with many complaints. The early strategy of choosing between Most Capable Design (MCD) and Most Qualified Team (MQT) was quietly abandoned after MQT was identified by multiple press sources as clearly being written to favour only one team: Irving / Lockheed. A change to “Most Competitive Procurement Strategy” was announced in May 2015.

Another problem with the CSC procurement model was the separate Warship Designer (WD) and Combat Systems Integrator (CSI) streams, which greatly increased potential for unforeseen system integration issues while at the same time obscuring authority and therefore accountability. A recentFrontLine article and graphic by former ADM(Mat) Alan Williams illustrated the lack of transparency in that model. Two weeks after the article was published online, the current Liberal government announced it was combining WD/CSI streams. Assistant deputy minister at Public Services and Procurement Canada Lisa Campbell asserted this “was a big step for us [as it will help rein in costs, and] we’re not talking about a custom build anymore. We’re talking about existing designs [which were determined to meet Canadian needs] ... and in our view that is likely to have an impact on diminishing all sorts of risks,” and helps speed up the process. The change is still subject to industry feedback and final Cabinet approval and, of course, there will still be some modifications to suit Canadian requirements, as in every large so-called “off-the-shelf” procurement to date.

Based on the short-list of pre-qualified WD/CSI firms on the NSPS website, we can further narrow this down to companies with a Design Reference Point LR-AAD design that is robust enough to defeat both missile saturation attacks as well as simpler ASW requirements.

Defence Review Implications

With the ongoing Liberal review of military capabilities, its re-evaluation of major procurement projects, plus the recent budgetary shift of C$3.72 billion in capital procurement funds five years into the future, it would seem that sorely needed ship replacements are slipping further into the future. By better utilizing Canada’s third major shipyard (which admittedly had been facing financial hardship in previous years), some of the scheduling problems could be ameliorated.

With the new NSS, will the roadblocks be lifted to end further delay? It is hoped that the marine industry will not be abandoned by the Canadian defence procurement process once again, and that accountability will be restored to procurement processes.

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Mark Romanow is an independent defence analyst/writer based in Edmonton, Alberta.

Tories urge Liberals to reconsider unsolicited icebreaker bid

Written by Murray Brewster, CTV-News

OTTAWA -- Conservative MP and former cabinet minister Steven Blaney says the Trudeau government was too hasty in dismissing a pair of unsolicited bids from the Davie Shipyard, which offered to pad out existing plans to rebuild the coast guard's icebreaker fleet.

The company, in Levis, Que., is located in Blaney's riding.

"It is irresponsible not to consider a competitive offer that would provide additional, much needed ships," he said.

He said he supports the national shipbuilding program conceived under the Conservative government, but there is nothing stopping the federal Liberals from adding ships to the plan outside of the existing framework.

Blaney says the rapidly aging fleet of federal civilian ships, particularly the heavy icebreaker Louis St. Laurent, needs replacements right away -- or at least faster than the existing plan can produce them.

"Let's be clear. We are expecting the shipyards to deliver the ships awarded under (the national shipbuilding plan) on time and on cost," Blaney told The Canadian Press. "But what are the needs of the navy and the coast guard? They have huge needs and if there is room for additional ships, well, this should be seriously looked into."

The shipbuilding program, announced five years ago, has yet to see any vessels constructed because the winning yards -- in Halifax and Vancouver -- have gone through hundreds of millions of dollars in modernization and planning.

Davie offered to rebuild -- or construct from scratch -- seven icebreakers and support ships at a cost between $1.5 billion to $1.7 billion, in a bid that officials said would not be answered.

"(Procurement Canada) does not comment on or respond to unsolicited proposals," said department spokeswoman Michele LaRose.

The Canadian Press outlined details of the bids last week, but the department did not issue a firm denial until late Friday, a hesitation that stoked uncertainty in both Nova Scotia and B.C., which are heavily invested in the success of the existing program. Premiers Stephen McNeil and Christie Clark condemned the Davie offers.

The Davie proposals were seen as a deliberate attempt to undermine Seaspan shipyards in Vancouver, which is gearing up to build many of the vessels offered in the unsolicited bids. The shipbuilding program establishes both Seaspan and Irving Shipbuilding Inc., in Halifax, as the go-to yards for federal work.

Blaney says both of those facilities, which he has visited, are at capacity and still years away from producing the planned ships.

He noted that the civilian shipbuilding program -- depending on class and size -- has ordered fewer vessels than needed for replacements.

Asked why the Conservatives didn't order more ships up front -- or move the process along faster -- Blaney said that the government was working within a tight fiscal envelope and did what it thought best.

Davie shipyard submits unsolicited $1B bid on Liberals to build icebreakers

The battle over building Canada's future Navy, Coast Guard, and Icebreakers just got even uglier. Davie, who is currently converting the Asterix into a Resolve-Class AOR for the Navy, says it can do the same for the Coast Guard, and Icebreakers that Canada needs, for $1 billion - nearly $1 billion cheaper than currently awarded to Seaspan. 

Here is the rest of the article. 

By: Murray Brewster, The National Post

OTTAWA — An unsolicited bid — potentially worth up to $1 billion — to provide icebreakers and multi-purpose ships for the coast guard was submitted to the Trudeau government late last month, The Canadian Press has learned.

The proposal by Quebec-based Chantier Davie Canada Inc. has the potential to undercut one pillar of the national shipbuilding strategy, which delegates the construction of civilian ships to Vancouver’s Seaspan shipyard.

In a presentation to Public Services and Procurement Canada, Davie is partially reviving a pitch made to the former Conservative government in 2013, where it offered to a construct a Polar Class 3 icebreaker and deliver it in 18 months.

The latest bid offers not only that, but three smaller so-called River-class icebreakers and two multi-purpose ships, which could be used for scientific research, border patrol of search and rescue.


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The pitch involves converting three different types of vessels which Davie already has under construction — or can be obtained on the international market “at highly affordable prices.”

Some of the ships were being built for the offshore oil and gas sector, but the collapse in energy prices has led to their cancellation.

“This is a fast-track solution providing enhanced capabilities at a fraction of the newbuilding (sic) price,” said the proposal.

Davie says its ships can be delivered at 60 per cent of the cost of the current program with Seaspan and gives the federal government the option of either buying or leasing the vessels.

The prices are blacked out from a copy of the Feb. 24 cover letter to Public Services and Procurement Minister Judy Foote, which was obtained by The Canadian Press. But officials, speaking on background because they’re not authorized to talk to the media, say the pitch adds up to at least $1 billion, depending on the options chosen.

Alex Vicefield, CEO of Davie’s parent company, said the pitch “has been very well received,” but would not go into detail.

Public services and procurement spokesman Pierre-Alain Bujold would not confirm receipt of the proposal but did say the government has not issued a request for proposals for icebreakers and reaffirmed the department’s commitment to the overall shipbuilding program.

Vicefield said there is a business opportunity but also an important public policy issue at stake.

“We come from the international marine industry where we have to be innovative and lean to compete,” he said Wednesday.

“When we see a situation which is clearly facing all kinds of problems and we have solutions which can save our client many hundreds of millions of dollars and receive an even better product faster, it would not be in anyone’s interest to hold back.”

Davie used a similar approach to the federal government when it pitched — and won — a multimillion-dollar contract to provide the navy with a temporary supply ship. The former Harper government had to amend cabinet rules in order to allow the sole-sourced contract to go through.

Both Seaspan and Halifax-based Irving Shipyards, the other company in the national shipbuilding program, protested and the Liberals, shortly after being elected last fall, temporarily put the plan on hold. They relented and Davie has already begun the modifications for the leased ship.


The worst thing we could do is to stop, alter or otherwise change the (National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy) before it’s actually really gotten underway

Jonathan Whitworth, the CEO of Seaspan, said the new bid is an attempt to undermine the shipbuilding program, where the fundamental premise was to establish only two go-to shipyards in the country — one for combat, the other for civilian vessels.

“The worst thing we could do is to stop, alter or otherwise change the (National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy) before it’s actually really gotten underway,” he said in an interview Wednesday.

One of the biggest criticisms of the program, which was launched in 2011, is that it has yet to produce a single ship, something the Davie proposal plays on in its presentation by referencing the age of the current decades-old fleet.

“What has become increasingly evident is that it would be considerably more cost-effective and considerably better for the men and women of the Canadian Coast Guard to fully replace these over-aged vessels,” said the presentation.

Whitworth would not discuss the potential legal ramifications of the Liberals running with the Davie proposal. But he said if the federal government was looking for stop-gap ships until Seaspan delivered, then it should allow an open competition among all the shipyards in Canada rather than a “sole-source gift” as the previous government did with the navy supply ship.