Frigate replacement program kicks off with design competition

By: Murray Brewster, CBC News

The Trudeau government is now ready to solicit bids from defence contractors interested in designing and equipping Canada's next generation of combat ships.

And it is demanding an extraordinary amount of detail and data from those companies, some of which have waited years for the program to get underway.

Even before the ink is dry on the proposal request, there are concerns among some bidders about how much Canadian content will end up in the new surface combat ships.

Related
Warship design requests delayed for national shipbuilding program
Liberals give shipbuilding contractors a peek at future frigate plans

The federal cabinet has given the green light to release a long-anticipated request for proposals for an off-the-shelf warship design and combat systems.

Pre-qualified defence companies are expected to receive their packages on Thursday and the government is anticipated to follow up with a technical briefing to explain the details to the public.

The bidders have until April 27 to submit their plans to Irving Shipbuilding Inc., which was selected in 2015 as the prime contractor.

The Halifax-based company is the federal government's go-to yard for combat ships under the National Shipbuilding Strategy.

CBC News has obtained partial extracts of the draft request for proposal, which has been the subject of intense backroom debate among potential bidders.

The document — dated Oct. 9, 2016 — asks for an exceptional amount of detail and clearly displays the amount of control Irving is exercising over the bidders and potential subcontractors.
High stakes for taxpayers

The stakes for Canadian taxpayers are enormous and the Liberal government has wrestled, since coming to power a year ago, to get a handle on the project, expected to be the most expensive under the umbrella of the National Shipbuilding Strategy.

Internal estimates produced last year in the transition between the Conservative and Liberal governments suggest the construction cost for 15 warships could exceed $40 billion. In addition, another $60 billion — or more — could be added to the price tag when lifetime maintenance and staffing requirements going decades into the future are considered, as the auditor general has insisted.

Judy Foote, minister of public works and procurement, addresses members of the defence and security industries at the CANSEC 2016 expo in Ottawa last May. (Fred Chartrand/Canadian Press)

Public Works Minister Judy Foote said last May the government won't release a cost estimate until there is a signed contract in the program, which is expected to be the largest procurement in Canadian history.

The cone of silence also extends to the draft request for proposals, which prohibits bidders and their subcontractors from talking to the media about the project, unless they receive written approval from Irving.

There's also an attempt to keep a lid on the cutthroat competition.

"Neither the bidders, nor any of their respective subcontractors, employees or representatives shall make any public comment, respond to questions in a public forum or carry out any activities to either criticize another bidder or any bid — or publicly advertise their qualifications," said the proposal, obtained by CBC News.

The navy is looking for a warship with the capability of hunting submarines, but also defending against enemy aircraft and missiles. It is expected to be swift enough to keep up with U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups and be armed with both a single 127-millimetre gun and surface-to-surface missiles of its own.

The new surface combatants will also carry up to 200 sailors and have the deck space available to allow for the conduct of humanitarian missions, such as the at-sea rescue of migrants.

The Liberals, like the Conservatives before them, have also not committed to building a specific number of warships, which are not expected to enter service until the mid-2020s.

Rather than designing a replacement for the navy's patrol frigates from scratch, the government chose last spring to go with a proven warship design from another country.

Expected bidders include:

• Alion-JJMA Corp. (U.S.).
• Lockheed Martin (U.S.). 
• BAE Systems Surface Ships Ltd. (Britain). 
• DCNS (France). 
• Fincantieri (Italy). 
• Navantia (Spain). 
• Odense Maritime Technology (Denmark). 
• ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (Germany).

Some are ship designers, while other build electronics.

Backroom battles

There have been numerous backroom brawls leading up to the release of the request for proposals, including concerns about how much high-end Canadian-made electronics — known as systems integration — will go into the new warships.

HMCS St. John's, a Halifax-class frigate, heads from berth in Halifax in April 2008. The federal government has issued a tender call to companies interested in designing replacements for the frigates. (Andrew Vaughn/Canadian Press)

Sources, who are close to the file but only able to speak on background, tell CBC News that L-3 Communications Canada has written a letter, supported by some of the other bidders, warning the government no significant Canadian content — radar, sonar and communications — will end up in the surface combatants unless the foreign designers are forced to work with a company from this country.

The evaluation process, however, gives points to companies with higher Canadian content.

The request for proposals demands that each bidder supply an eye-watering amount of detail, including the number of "fasteners" that would be used to build each ship, including all anchors, bolts, nails, nuts, rivets and rods. The government also wants part numbers and descriptions about what tools will be used.

Some contractors see it as "an utterly incredible request," according to sources, who say "a lot of trees will die" in order to supply paper for the presentation. Some of the companies that bid on the air force's fixed-wing search and rescue plane program last January faced similar demands for detail, to the point where two bidders hired moving vans just to deliver their presentations to Public Works.

But officials working on the warship program insist — since it is an off-the-shelf design — each bidder should have all of that detailed information at their fingertips and it helps refine cost projections.

There has been a bruising fight over the federal government's demand that each contractor hand over intellectual property rights or all of the foreground and background data that goes into each design. An earlier draft of the plan said bidders would be disqualified if they failed to do so, but federal officials have agreed to a compromise.

The issue is of enormous importance because of the lucrative long-term maintenance contracts that will follow the construction.

If the government doesn't get the right deal, it could cost taxpayers untold hundreds of millions of dollars down the road in licensing fees, and might even restrict the military's ability to update and use its own equipment.

New Remote Weapon stations to be installed on RCN Ships

By: Nestor Arellano Apr 13 2016

Vanguard Defense

A fleet of Canadian navy ships will be equipped with new remote weapon stations as part of a $36 million contract signed by the government with Raytheon Canada Ltd.

Under the terms of the deal, Raytheon will provide up to 58 naval remote weapon stations for the Royal Canadian Navy.

The stations will be installed on Canada’s existing fleet of Halifax-class modernized frigates, as well as on the future Queenston-class Join Support Ships. The contract also ensures ongoing overhaul and maintenance of the equipment for an initial five years, as well as two additional weapon stations to be used for training in both the east and west coast fleet schools.

“Canada needs a fleet that is both capable and flexible, one that will enable us to defend the country’s maritime interests here at home and around the world,” Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, commander of the RCN, said. “Part of that force capability includes the inherent need to protect our ships and sailors from the threats they may encounter in any operational setting. The acquisition of this remotely operated weapon system will enhance the Navy’s close-in force protection capability while also providing enhanced personal protection to the crew operating these systems.

The weapon stations currently on board the fleet of Halifax-class modernized frigates are not remotely operated and require gun operators to be outside on the ship deck operating the guns.With these new Naval Remote Weapon Stations, operators will now be able to remotely observe and locate targets under various environmental conditions (day or night, rain, snow, smoke, dust/sand, haze, fog and various sea/air temperature, as well as other conditions affecting visibility) from a separate compartment on board the ship, which will increase the safety and protection of the ship’s crew.

With these new Naval Remote Weapon Stations, operators will now be able to remotely observe and locate targets under various environmental conditions (day or night, rain, snow, smoke, dust/sand, haze, fog and various sea/air temperature, as well as other conditions affecting visibility) from a separate compartment on board the ship, which will increase the safety and protection of the ship’s crew.

The Naval Remote Weapon Stations contracts are aligned with the Defence Procurement Strategy, which aims to leverage military spending to create highly skilled jobs and drive economic growth across the Canadian economy.

The delivery of the Naval Remote Weapon Stations is expected to begin in August 2017. These contracts will help create and maintain up to 23 jobs in Canada.

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Nestor Arellano is editor of Vanguard Magazine. Nestor is a seasoned journalist who has written extensively on defence and military industry issues as well as technology and business developments. He is also associate editor of Vanguard's sister publication, IT in Canada.

Setting a New Course for the National Ship Strategy

BY MARK ROMANOW
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 13, No 2)

At the turn of the 21st century, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was well on its way to becoming a potent, well-balanced navy...

The combat fleet included 12 recently commissioned multipurpose Halifax-class patrol frigates with Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), and point Area Air Defence (AAD) capabilities, and carrying a Maritime Helicopter (MH). Also just commissioned were 12 moderately-capable Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) with limited Mine Counter-Measures capabilities. They joined the four recently (1987-94) modernized and upgraded Iroquois- or Tribal-class ASW destroyers, which now fielded Long-Range (LR)-AAD capability.

With the older Provider-class Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) ship having been paid off in 1998, the surface fleet was still ably supported by two ageing single-hulled Protecteur-class AORs that had been commissioned in 1969 and 1970.

And most promisingly, the RCN was set to be joined by four Victoria-class (ex-Royal Navy Upholder-class) diesel submarines (SSKs) considered to be the quietest in service anywhere, which just been acquired (after unexpectedly harsh defence cuts in Britain) from the UK Ministry of Defence in 1998 for a quarter of their build cost.

... and then the current changed.

Feb 2016 – HMCS Fredericton transits into Souda Bay, Greece for a fuel stop during Operation Reassurance. (DND Photo: Cpl Anthony Chand)

Overworked and Neglected

Throughout the 90s and the first decade of the new century, the RCN’s surface fleet was constantly over-tasked and in-demand, and the subject of many a Department of National Defence (DND) news release praising their ‘front line’ role in various conflicts or missions, from the 1991 Gulf War through to their ‘role’ fighting the Taliban (wait... they have a navy?). Unfortunately, while quick to praise their efforts and garner the political laurels, the various political parties forming the Government of Canada over the past 25 years basically let the RCN surface fleet rust out through lack of any timely replacements. Various programs to replace capability have suffered from both a lack of funding and a serious lack of procurement acumen.

Only too late, after many good shipyards that had previously built RCN ships closed through lack of orders, and the industrial knowledge base drifted away, has there been any political realization that the shipbuilding industry needs steady orders to produce navy vessels in a timely and affordable fashion. This has, belatedly, been slowly addressed through the tortuous National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, however, the NSPS (now apparently being shortened by PSPC to drop the “procurement” out of the shipbuilding strategy) seems more geared towards ‘built in Canada at an outdated fixed cost’, and ensuring various regional entities get their piece of the procurement pie – first Industrial Regional Benefits then Industrial and Technological Benefits – than in meeting RCN/national requirements for the right equipment to adequately protect our maritime sovereignty. Will this latest name contraction to the National Shipbuilding Strategy signal a shift from the “longer timeframe for less capability and more cost” scenario te NSPS was being criticized for?

Surface warships

The centrepiece of the RCN, HMCS Athabaskan is the lone surviving Iroquois-class destroyer (slated to be paid off in 2017 after 45 years of service) and was already experiencing engine and maintenance issues in 2015 from being pushed well-past the regular 35-year warship service life.HMCS Huron was paid off in 2005 due to personnel shortages, and sunk as a target in 2007 (just 13 years after the expensive upgrades). Both Iroquois and Algonquin were paid off in 2015 after experiencing age and non-economically repairable damage-related issues.

Even though RCN Commander Vice-Admiral Mark Norman noted to FrontLine (issue #1, 2015) that “Athabaskan has been kept in service, so we’ve kept that legacy [Long Range, Area Air Defence] capability alive”, from 2017 through to 2025-26 when the first LR-AAD configured Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) is hopefully commissioned, the RCN will face a ‘significant’ gap for nearly a decade – and additionally loose its current skill-set for intercept as point-AAD drills just can’t replicate LR-AAD challenges and live training exercises.

As for the Kingston-class vessels, their low speed (15kts max) suggests they may not be the most effective patrol vessels. Originally 100% reserve-crewed and -operated, they had not been fully utilized until, as cuts took their toll, these vessels began to receive extensive taskings.

The limited number of remotely operated modular payloads, which were always meant to be supplemented during the mid-life refit, have obviously limited their performance. A C$100 million mid-life refit of the nearly 20-year-old vessels was deemed unwarranted, and some or all will likely be retired once the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) start entering service.

Jan 2016 – Fredericton’s Naval Boarding Party participates in a boarding exercise during Op Reassurance. (DND Photo: Cpl Anthony Chand)

The premature retirement of HMCS Iroquois and Algonquin enabled a revised 60/40 regular/reserve force crewing model for the MCDVs to continue sea opportunities for the displaced crews, and the RCN Commander acknowledged “we are running them flat out now and that’s paying enormous dividends and really working well.” The MCDVs are also being tasked for limited Northern Arctic operations during the short ice-free summer . The max 17kt speed of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) will present many of the same limitations as the slow MCDV.

The core of the RCN surface fleet, the Halifax-class are currently in the middle of a C$4.3 billion modernization and Frigate Life Extension (HCM-FELEX) program that is designed to replace and upgrade systems by 2018 “to ensure the frigates remain effective throughout their service life” and reflect an increasing emphasis on combined littoral operations. Additionally, to ameliorate the lost flagship capabilities of divesting the Iroquois-class, the RCN Commander noted “we made a decision to enhance the first four of the modernized Halifax-class with some extra space [minor structural reconfiguration] and some monitors and extra accommodation space – so we could bridge the gap in the command and control function.”

As the upgrades are relatively on time and within approved budget, one would think that FELEX is a good RCN success story. But, one look at the Defence Acquisition Guide (DAG) 2015 raises serious questions over the possibility of additional C$410-890 million in post-FELEX Halifax-specific upgrades. In fact, the 2015 Guide lists nine Halifax-specific projects for implementation out to 2035, which is well past the expected 2027-2031 service life of the Halifax-class ships.

Two of these projects are scheduled for completion within a few years. The Multi Role Boat project is looking for new faster, larger Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) to provide multi-functional and improved systems. The Maritime Satellite Communications Upgrade will improve allied interoperability. The reasonable preliminary estimates of C$50-100 million each, plus the fact that such capabilities can be ported to the new CSC when the time comes, makes these projects easily justifiable.

The other seven Halifax-specific projects (StrongBow; Maritime Next Generation Communications Suite; Maritime Tactical Command and Control; Naval Electronic Attack Recapitalization; Naval Electronic Warfare System Surface; Virtual Integrated Shipboard Information Networks and Underwater Warfare (Sensor) Suite Upgrade), are a different story. Valued at an estimated C$310-690 million over the 2024 to 2035 time frame, they only make sense if the RCN and DND expect the NSS to fail and not deliver new CSC ships until 2035 onwards!

DAG 2015 seemingly indicates a lack of communication and understanding between the RCN, DND and the government when looking at the interrelationship between FELEX and the CSC project. Most Halifax-specific projects in DAG 2015 are not scheduled for completion until 2024/2025, and two not until 2035, which seems to indicate the RCN and DND are moving the CSC goal posts 10 years to the right. Or, in other words, the left hand is not talking to the right hand, and vice versa, and the centre just does not have a clue. As a CGAI report by Stewart Webb and Chris Murray (January 2016) notes, “Disturbingly, none of these preparations seem to address the elephant in the room, neglected hull maintenance to extend the frigates beyond” the 2027-2031 time frame. Does this portend a Halifax-class hull-driven retirement debacle (à la Iroquois-class and Protecteur-class) in the making?

March 2016 – HMCS Edmonton, an MCDV, approaches the harbour of Ensanada, Mexico, during ­Operation Caribbe. While on patrol in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean during March 2016 for Operation Caribbe, Canadian MCDVs Summerside and Saskatoon assisted the USCG in two interceptions that resulted in the seizure 26 bales of cocaine. (Photo: DND)

NSS Procurement Update

The much touted, agonizingly slow, NSPS was recently pegged at over C$42 billion. Noting his acquisition experience in the UK, the hiring of retired Rear-Admiral Steve Brunton of the Royal Navy as an expert shipbuilding advisor for the Surface Combatant project, may be a step in the right direction.

Clearly, the (new) NSS should not be artificially constrained by outdated budget figures, rather by the ‘best value’ solution best suited for the requirement. Let the competitive selection for an in-service or final development stage design that best meets each requirement be the cost driver, while keeping the penchant for innumerable Canadian-specific modifications to a minimum. If the budget needs a slight top-up to obtain the proper equipment – so be it!

As we put our RCN and Coast Guard personnel in harms way, surely it is incumbent on the GoC to provide them with the right tools for the task. The Auditor General of Canada confirmed this important point: “Cost/capability trade-offs need to be monitored and revisions made to project budgets, if necessary, to make sure that Canada gets the military ships it needs to protect Canadian interests and sovereignty.”

At the heart of the early NSPS delay was the state of Canada’s shipyards. Without a continuous source of contracts for sophisticated navy vessels, all three of Canada’s formerly impressive shipyards had lost most if not all of their navy-specific expertise and had been scrambling for small upgrade and repair contracts to keep at least a few people employed.

NSS Combatants

The first ‘combatants’ preceding the CSC build, the minimally-armed (short-range 25mm gun) constabulary AOPS are a politically-driven procurement foisted on the RCN by the previous government. There seems to be little drive to protect Canada’s vast and perennially neglected (except by every other country), Arctic Ocean maritime space, with its increasingly accessible natural resources. Even the UK is building a £200 million Polar Research Ship capable of 60-day operation in sea ice. Polling has indicated that Canadians want the government to assert our northern sovereignty.

The current AOPS is watered-down from the 2005 election promise of three armed naval icebreakers with full Polar-1 classification capable of year-round operation in all ice states.

Ideally, three armed Coast Guard (CG) Polar-1 rated icebreakers, instead of the currently planned six AOPS with barely adequate Polar-4/5 classification and one lone, unarmed, Polar-2 rated icebreaker, would have been more efficient for asserting sovereignty in our increasingly accessible Northwest passage shipping route through the Canadian Arctic. While the Americans have two heavy icebreakers to our lone remaining ship commissioned in 1969, the Russians have 12 heavy Polar-1 icebreakers (half of which are nuclear-powered for extended operation), plus dozens of smaller vessels whose operations have often extended into Canada’s Arctic region. If politicians seriously care about our Arctic, this Polar-1 icebreaker capability gap should be cause for serious concern.

Canadian Coast Guard medium icebreaker Henry Larsen participated in Operation Nanook, in 2010. At the time, ­Liberal Senator Colin Kenny said the Conservative’s Arctic ship plan should be sunk and replaced real icebreakers. (Photo: Sean Kilpatrick, THE CANADIAN PRESS)

As the Liberals review the old NSPS, there may still be time to increase CG funding and modify the icebreaker design, which is still in its initial design phase, and add a Polar-1 derivative. Better use of all three shipyards (Irving on the East coast; Davie in Quebec; and Seaspan on the West coast) could allow a speedier replacement of the ancient Louis S. St Laurent and the three 35-year old R-class icebreakers. Armed Polar-1 and Polar-2 rated Coast Guard icebreakers – utilizing RCN-crewed refurbished 76mm guns, fire control radar and basic Combat Management Systems from the paid off Iroquois-class or post-FELEX Halifax-class ships to keep costs to a minimum – would provide a very useful capability. These would allow a reduced number of constabulary reservist-crewed AOPS for asserting a northern Arctic sovereignty presence during the summer. The government would then have scalable options, available all seasons, to respond to the increasing likelihood of incursions of our Northern waters by unwanted commercial shipping or by cruise ships needing assistance.

CSC Update

The Canadian Surface Combatant project had become a weak link in the old NSPS, with many complaints. The early strategy of choosing between Most Capable Design (MCD) and Most Qualified Team (MQT) was quietly abandoned after MQT was identified by multiple press sources as clearly being written to favour only one team: Irving / Lockheed. A change to “Most Competitive Procurement Strategy” was announced in May 2015.

Another problem with the CSC procurement model was the separate Warship Designer (WD) and Combat Systems Integrator (CSI) streams, which greatly increased potential for unforeseen system integration issues while at the same time obscuring authority and therefore accountability. A recentFrontLine article and graphic by former ADM(Mat) Alan Williams illustrated the lack of transparency in that model. Two weeks after the article was published online, the current Liberal government announced it was combining WD/CSI streams. Assistant deputy minister at Public Services and Procurement Canada Lisa Campbell asserted this “was a big step for us [as it will help rein in costs, and] we’re not talking about a custom build anymore. We’re talking about existing designs [which were determined to meet Canadian needs] ... and in our view that is likely to have an impact on diminishing all sorts of risks,” and helps speed up the process. The change is still subject to industry feedback and final Cabinet approval and, of course, there will still be some modifications to suit Canadian requirements, as in every large so-called “off-the-shelf” procurement to date.

Based on the short-list of pre-qualified WD/CSI firms on the NSPS website, we can further narrow this down to companies with a Design Reference Point LR-AAD design that is robust enough to defeat both missile saturation attacks as well as simpler ASW requirements.

Defence Review Implications

With the ongoing Liberal review of military capabilities, its re-evaluation of major procurement projects, plus the recent budgetary shift of C$3.72 billion in capital procurement funds five years into the future, it would seem that sorely needed ship replacements are slipping further into the future. By better utilizing Canada’s third major shipyard (which admittedly had been facing financial hardship in previous years), some of the scheduling problems could be ameliorated.

With the new NSS, will the roadblocks be lifted to end further delay? It is hoped that the marine industry will not be abandoned by the Canadian defence procurement process once again, and that accountability will be restored to procurement processes.

===
Mark Romanow is an independent defence analyst/writer based in Edmonton, Alberta.

Canadian Surface Combatant Fleet - Is the Program Salvageable?

New questions are being asked about the Canadian National Shipbuilding Program that was instituted by the previous Conservative government.

For years public servants, outside contractors, auditors (including the Auditor General Michael Ferguson) have said that the $26 Billion earmarked for the program would not be enough. Ferguson called the funding, "insufficient" in a 2013 report.

Yesterday, Vice Admiral Mark Norman, head of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) told CBC that the warnings from industries about the lack of funding were accurate.

To put it simply - the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC)  Fleet will cost well above the $26 Billion budget.



The CSC fleet is supposed to be the back bone of the RCN from 2025 to 2035; replacing the Halifax-Class frigates and the Iroquois-class destroyers. The $26 Billion was to build "up to 15" new warships according to the former Harper Government.

During the 2015 election campaign, Stephen Harper continued to dismiss claims that the CSC Fleet could not be built with the $26 Billion. He said the Navy would adjust. A few insiders claimed that as few as 8 or 10 CSC vessels could be built with the $26 billion.

The question now is, under a new government can the CSC Fleet be salvaged?

During the election, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said that any savings from withdrawing from the F-35 program would be directed to the RCN to ensure it gets the ships it needs.

According to the RCN - it NEEDS at least 15 ships - so if the total number of CSC gets cut, it would dramatically harm its operational capabilities. Although some independent analysts say the RCN will either have to accept fewer ships or the government will need to pony up more money.

Some are saying the RCN should do without an area air defence variant CSC, and settle on a more basic design. Both are a possibility. But, so is asking for more money from the new Liberal government for the CSC is another. It will be a test for the Liberals who promised during the election campaign to ensure that the RCN gets the ships it needs.

According to CBC, to build the proposed 15 ships - it will cost upwards of $42 Billion. 

HMCS Winnipeg showcases Halifax Class Modernization at DSEi in London

Published by The Canadian Armed Forces
Navy News / October 29, 2015

By Sub-Lieutenant Jamie Tobin

After almost three months of operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Winnipeg took a break to sail up the River Thames and sit centre stage at the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) exhibition, from September 15 to 18, 2015.

DSEi is the largest defence industry trade show in the world; it is held every second year in London, United Kingdom.

HMCS Winnipeg was in attendance at this year’s event to support the Canadian Armed Forces’ defence industry partners by showcasing one of the final products of the Halifax Class Modernization project.

HMCS Winnipeg in October 2015. Photo: RCN

“It was an honour to support the Canadian defence industry at DSEi. Operations would not be possible without the steadfast support we receive from the Canadian defence industry,” says Commander Pascal Belhumeur, Commanding Officer of HMCS Winnipeg. “We are proud to represent the Royal Canadian Navy at the show. Winnipeg celebrated its 20th birthday on June 23 and it has never looked better.”

The ship’s company provided tours of HMCS Winnipeg to event guests, defence industry representatives, to foreign military and government officials, to trade representatives as well as to friends and family.

The command team co-hosted two industry luncheons, and the ship served as the venue for the Canadian defence industry networking reception attended by more than 250 guests.

“Our Canadian defence industry participants, Government of Canada partners and DSEi event staff were extremely impressed by the hospitality and professionalism of the team on board Winnipeg,” said Daniel Salisbury, International Program Officer for the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel).

Upon completion of the event, HMCS Winnipeg sailed back out the River Thames to rejoin Standing NATO Maritime Group One and to put its enhanced capabilities to work in support of Operation REASSURANCE, Canada’s contribution to NATO assurance measures in Europe.

Kenney: RCN could receive as few as 11 CSC's

Last week a report came out regarding the $26 billion dollar budget for the Royal Canadian Navy's Canadian Surface Combatant Fleet which is supposed to replace and modernize the 4 HMCS Iroquois destroyers and the 12 HMCS Halifax-Class Frigates.

The initial CSC order called for 16 vessels to be built under the program. That number was later reduced to 15 due to budgetary constraints.

On Friday, October 2, 2015 Defence Minister Jason Kenney confirmed the bottom number possible. Kenney indicated that the government will not just write a blank check to the CSC program to ensure that 15 vessels are built - inflation and planning are taking their toll on the $26 Billion fixed budget, that is loosing close to $1 million per day in delays.

Kenney confirmed Friday that the $26 billion will purchase between 11 - 15 CSC Vessels. So 11 is now the bottom number. Now the Navy is concerned it will not get enough vessels to maintain its current level of operations; both domestically or internationally.

The lowered number does not come as a surprise to many Navy insiders; who have hinted that the fixed budget could produce as few as 8 CSC vessels.

With 8 to 11 CSC the Navy might have to look elsewhere to find more vessels to increase the size of its fleet. It is the only Navy in the world belonging to a country that borders 3 Oceans - and it might be down to 8 major vessels. That is pretty sad for a Navy that was once the third largest in the world (Post World War Two).