Smol: Canada is Weak in the Arctic

By: Robert Smol, CBC Opinions 

Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent boast of possessing an arsenal of undetectable nuclear weapons has not really had material effect on geo-political relations — yet. North American and European preoccupation of late has been less on Russia's military procurement than on the acute issue of the nerve agent attack on an ex-spy in the U.K.

On Monday, Canada and the U.S. both announced it would be expelling diplomats from its borders in response to the attack.

But despite this recent action, this country continues to bask in that ever-so-Canadian sense of delusion when it comes to understanding our place in a potential future Russian-American standoff. And while I do not want to sound like those old-fashioned "Russians are Coming" harbingers of hype, it is important that we take careful stock of our strategic military options in the case of a superpower spat — or worse.

For starters, the notion of a neutral, peaceful demilitarized Canada is a delusion. Whether we like it or not, Canada is perfectly placed to be the battleground of choice in a future conflict: we share a long and long-disputed Arctic border with an increasingly militaristic and hostile superpower.

Largely unpopulated, open and scantily defended, Canada's Arctic is the safest and shortest line of attack and counterattack in a potential conflict. To think that Russians, North Koreans or Americans will decide, out of courtesy, to hang a detour around the second-largest country in the world is dangerously naïve and irresponsible. And the United States will not necessarily protect Canada in the case of a ballistic missile attack, as Canada's senior officer in Norad reminded us last year.

We know that Russia is rather unabashedly building up its military presence in the Arctic. There are at least 18 recently constructed or upgraded Russian military bases along the Russian-Canadian Arctic border, along with its sizeable air force, nuclear submarines and 40 operational icebreakers with more under construction.

In terms of Canadian military assets in the region, we maintain a small signals intelligence facility on Ellesmere Island (CFS Alert), which is manned by approximately 60 personnel — not all of whom are serving military. In Yellowknife, Joint Task Force North maintains a small headquarters staff of approximately 70 personnel, with an area support unit of 50.
Boots in the snow

The Royal Canadian Air Force is represented in the region by a non-combat utility transport squadron flying four small CC-138 Twin Otter aircraft that came into operation around the time our prime minister was born. And apart from the southern Canada-based soldiers who occasionally stick their heads into the Arctic for short exercises, there is no permanent "boots in the snow" combat establishment ready to deal with a violation of our territory.

Meanwhile, the closest thing to a ground force on the Canadian side consists of a series of patrols of minimally trained reserve auxiliaries, The Canadian Rangers, who each receive all of 10 days training and are still carrying vintage World War II rifles.

Our government might try to assure us that the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship project, which is currently under construction, will provide a deterrent to possible Russian aggression. But the minimal armament for these boats will place these ships in a "constabulary role," according to the Royal Canadian Navy. Translation: they are not going into battle.

The hull assembly of Canada's first AOPS. This ship is not going into battle, writes Robert Smol. (Andrew Vaughan/Canadian Press)

We might tell ourselves that the specially trained Russian soldiers, warships and fighter bomber aircraft that are now rigorously training on bases such as Sredny Ostrov, Alexandra Land and Nagurskoye near ourdisputed northern border have no nefarious intentions, at least when it comes to Canada. But they are there, armed and ready, on our disputed border. So the question is: what are their intentions?

Just how much longer can we pretend that our strategically important and resource-rich Arctic will remain secure? Can we really afford to delude ourselves into thinking that our projection of ourselves as a "peacekeeping nation" will be enough for the superpowers to both respect Canada's claims to the Arctic and sidestep our territory in the event of war?

As time goes on, and other nations continue to stake their claim on the Arctic, the answer may soon not be ours to make.

Robert Smol served over 20 years in the Canadian Armed Forces. He is currently a teacher and freelance writer in Toronto.

This column is part of CBC's Opinion section. For more information about this section, please read this editor's blog and our FAQ.

The Canadian North is the Least Defended Territory on Earth

By: Scott Gilmore, Macleans Magazine 

Never mind the Amazon, or even the Antarctic. Northern Canada is the global epitome of undefended territory.

There is no place on earth as poorly defended as the Canadian Arctic. But maybe that’s a good thing. We do enjoy pretending to be a nation of “peacekeepers” (in spite of the fact we currently do less peacekeeping than say, El Salvador or Gambia). Vimy Ridge, Juno Beach, Kapyong, Panjwaii: these are places typically not mentioned in polite company, and almost never spoken aloud by a Liberal government. When we talk about arming our military, we don’t even like to use the word “arm”—we say “procurement.”

So, perhaps it is fitting that the Canadian North is essentially the largest military-free zone in the world. To be fair, it is not utterly bereft of Canadian Forces. We have three very small bases. There are some radar installations (that use 1980s technology). There are the Rangers, of course, local volunteers who are given Second World War rifles, a hoodie, a ball cap and an annual photo op with whichever politician is shameless enough to fly north for 24 hours to emote about the Canadian North from the depths of his or her $1,200 Canada Goose parka. Our largest icebreaker— built in 1969—is currently undergoing it’s seventh refit. And, we have approximately 120 armed forces personnel, just enough to fill a Tim Hortons. All of this, of course, is spread over an area the size of Europe (except the icebreaker—it’s in Halifax).

The list of what we don’t have is considerably longer. There is no port, military or civilian. The closing of Churchill last year ended the fatuous notion that Canada has a third coast. No airbase. No search-and-rescue hub. No four-season ice-breakers. No ice-strengthened war-ships. In fact, our fleet is now so small and so rusted out it has lost the designation of being a “blue-water navy”, it is a coastal defence force—on calm days—if everything is working.

If you ask around Ottawa why this is, the answer is and always has been, “Because it’s hard.” Which is true. The Canadian North is remote, wild, undeveloped, like the Russian North for example. Facing a similar climate and geography, Moscow has only managed to build two infantry bases; nine naval ports; and seventeen airbases along its Arctic coast over the last 60 years.

RELATED: Putin, Trudeau and Canada’s Arctic problem

But the Canadian Arctic is more remote and difficult to access than Russia’s. It is more like the Amazonian rainforest—an expanse of jungle and swamp 25 per cent larger than the Canadian North. The Brazilians have almost nothing there, other than the Manaus Air Base, home to four air squadrons, and an airborne army battalion. And there are several naval facilities, including the Rio Negro naval base, 1,300km up the Amazonian river. That base has nine satellite facilities, as well as a helicopter squad and marines. The Brazilians also have a fleet of large riverine hospital ships that ply the remote backwoods of the jungle. But that’s it.

But the Brazilians spend 2.6 per cent of their GDP on the military. The economic choices of our political leaders have always been less guns and more butter (supply-managed, thank you). Regardless of our formal obligations to NATO that we spend two per cent on the Canadian Forces, our defence budget comes in at half that.

We have much more in common with Australia, a commonwealth democracy, managing a constant political struggle to maintain social services and infrastructure spending. It makes sense that we would be careful about our military deployments, frugal even. Consider how the Australian’s have chosen to defend the Outback. Other than a huge naval base in Darwin, and several air squadrons at the RAAF Tindal, another couple of air bases, a dozen training bases, an infantry battalion, and large radar installations at Alice Springs and elsewhere, the place is empty.

Even in Antarctica, at the bottom of the world, owned by no country, needing no defence, and subject to a treaty prohibiting military activity, there are dozens of research bases run by the armed forces of countries like Chile, Uruguay and even Pakistan. The search and rescue capabilities of McMurdo Station alone are greater than all of Canada’s north of the 60th parallel.

No, if you want to get away from it all, to go somewhere on the planet where no one will be able to rescue you—or stop you, or even know you’re there—you want Canada’s North.

But try to keep this quiet. We don’t want it overrun by adventure tourists. Or cruise ships like the Crystal Serenity, which went through last summer bringing its own rescue ship because Canada didn’t have one. Or resource companies, now free to roam over ice-free waters. Or the Chinese, who want to start sending cargo ships and oil tankers through on their way to Europe. Or the Russians, who are increasingly overflying NATO territory. Or our American allies, who announced in Congress this week they will not recognize Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.

No, let’s follow the leadership of Prime Minister Trudeau, who made sure the Arctic was only mentioned twice in the 360 priorities he gave his ministers, and who has bravely avoided drawing any attention to the North—visiting only once since taking office—and who has still not published an Arctic strategy. Let’s just not draw any attention to the fact we’ve utterly abandoned the Canadian North. What could possibly go wrong?

Canadian firm wants to buy used Norwegian CC-130Hs for RCAF for use in Arctic

By: David Pugliese, The National Post 

A Canadian firm wants Ottawa to buy older transport aircraft from Norway, saying this could significantly boost the military’s capabilities in the Arctic relatively cheaply.

The five C-130H aircraft, modernized before they were put in storage in the U.S. and with about 50 per cent of their flying time remaining, could be acquired for about $60 million, says Tom Edmison, president of Total Corporate Aviation Services.

The deal would include tens of thousands of parts for the aircraft, which could also be used for the Royal Canadian Air Force’s existing C-130H transport planes.

“These aircraft have everything you need to operate in the Arctic,” said Edmison, a veteran pilot whose firm has offices in Calgary and Sidney, B.C.

“They’re fine airplanes. And the original replacement value for those parts is probably worth more than the airplanes.”

The proposal comes as the Liberal government, in the midst of its defence review, is seeking input on how to improve Canada’s military capabilities, including providing more of a presence in the Far North.

The original replacement value for those parts is probably worth more than the airplanes.

Edmison said the aircraft could be bought outright or acquired by Total Corporate Aviation Services, then leased to the government for Arctic operations, but flown by RCAF crews.

Some Canadian military leaders have complained about tight budgets, prompting industry to suggest innovative solutions.

Irving Shipbuilding of Halifax has proposed leasing a commercial vessel that would be converted to a multi-mission support ship for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The vessel would be offered on a five-year lease and have a 30-member civilian crew.

Ottawa has also entered into a lease arrangement with a sister firm to Davie Shipyards for a commercial vessel that is being converted into a refuelling and supply ship for the navy. The ship will be operated by a civilian crew, plus a few navy personnel to handle military-related duties.

Norway stored the C-130s after it bought newer J models of the same aircraft. It paid about $600-million for the four C-130J planes, plus associated equipment

The planes are being stored at a U.S. government facility in Tucson, Ariz., at a cost of $750,000 a year, so there is an economic reason to sell the planes, Edmison said.

The aircraft were originally maintained for Norway at a facility in Canada.

Edmison says his proposal offers a low-cost way of boosting Canada’s presence in the Far North over the shorter term until the military can decide how it can meet the government’s desire to establish more of a presence in the region.

“They’re low-time airplanes and they would fit perfectly to augment the Canadian military as a bridge to the future,” he added.

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The RCAF currently has 12 C-130H planes, said spokesman Maj. Alexandre Cadieux.

Renee Filiatrault, a spokeswoman for Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said she had not heard about the C-130H pitch, but would not be able to comment anyway on a specific proposal.

“We’re currently undergoing a defence policy review, which will help the government determine future direction and priorities so our military is well equipped and prepared in the years to come, including as it relates to the Arctic,” she said.

Any proposal to acquire used equipment is bound to face an uphill battle from Department of National Defence bureaucrats and air force officers, Edmison said.

“Of course they want to buy brand new planes but if they don’t have the money or if it is going to take years, then why not go this route?” he asked.

“For a relatively low cost, the air force gets a capability it needs.”

Reviewing Canada’s Arctic Capability: Suggestions for the Defence Policy Review

By: Adam Lajeuness, CDA Institute. 

CDA Institute guest contributor Adam Lajeunesse, a post-​doctoral fellow at St. Jerome University, offers suggestions on how the government can approach the Arctic in the context of the Defence Policy Review.

As the Liberal government undertakes its comprehensive defence review, eyes are inevitably turning to the Arctic, a region that held such a personal interest for former Prime Minister Stephen Harper and one which he so often used to burnish his nationalistic credentials. At first glance, Arctic defence policy would seem ripe for radical revision. The ‘use it or lose it’ mentality that Harper introduced early in his term often manifested in grandiose (by Canadian standards) displays of military power and rhetoric, sometimes presupposing foreign threats to Canadian sovereignty and Russian military threats to its security. For a Liberal government seeking a new détente with Russia as part of a broader push towards cooperation and dialogue over confrontation, there would seem to be room to swing away from the old Conservative defence philosophy that has defined the past ten years of Arctic military operations.

The reality of Canada’s Arctic security philosophy is, however, far more complicated than the broad brush depictions often used in the media. Despite the sometimes hawkish feelings generated by Harper’s statements on the North, and the frequent photoshoots of the prime minister and other VIPs in the Northwest Passage surrounded by warships, Canada’s Arctic security policy has been level-​headed, thoughtful, and restrained. Behind the headlines, CAF strategy and doctrine has repeatedly emphasised the absence of any military threat to the region, preparing instead for a wide range of unconventional scenarios – such as pollution prevention and support to civilian departments and agencies. What the Liberals will likely discover as they move forward is that they have little choice but to continue the Conservative approach to Arctic defence.

That assessment is based on the assumption that the geopolitical situation in the region will not deteriorate over the next decade. Such predictions are impossible to make with absolute confidence but the evidence suggests that it’s a safe bet. Russia, so often held up as a potential aggressor, has certainly been building its Arctic military capability, however that build-​up has mostly taken the form of ground force expansion, SAR, and local area defence – not power projection. Moscow is also the principal beneficiary of circumpolar stability as it seeks to attract hundreds of billions of dollars in Chinese and Indian (and perhaps if sanctions are lifted, Western) investment to the region. Russian military posturing is necessary for domestic consumption and for maintaining the siege mentality that keeps Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings high, but there is little that Russia can achieve through aggressive expansion into the Arctic Basin or anywhere beyond its own Arctic territory.

China is likewise unlikely to present any real military threat to the region. It has long sought a cooperative relationship with Arctic powers and, only recently, released a shipping guide instructing its vessel operators to respect Canadian law and regulation when in Canadian waters. China also lacks the technology and military platforms to operate safely in ice-​covered waters and appears to be in no hurry to spend the small fortune required to achieve that inessential capability.

Regardless of Russian or Chinese intentions or capabilities, conventional security is well in hand. NORAD provides adequate monitoring and fighter coverage of the North American Arctic and the US Navy maintains a subsurface capability and presence which began neatly sixty years ago. If Arctic defence policy is productively changed, it must be at the operational and tactical level, and here there is much that still needs to be adjusted. The Harper government’s great success was in defining the Forces’ direction and requirements – moving it away from its traditional warfighting role and into a support position. Implementation has, however, been slow, painful, and incomplete.

To begin with, the CAF’s Arctic forces require a more coherent training program, better communication, faster procurement, and a clearer sense of mission. The Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG) were stood up in 2007 to provide the Army with a force that it could confidently deploy in response to a variety of Arctic scenarios. In the years since, the ARCG have suffered from inconsistent training standards, poor harmonization of operating requirements, and a lack of higher-​level direction – with training and equipping having been delegated to the ARCG host divisions.

Equipping these forces has proven more challenging than should have been the case. Certain Arctic clothing and basic equipment still needs to be developed or purchased, while the Forces’ lack of light and heavy over-​snow vehicles (and its inability to maintain what it currently owns) can be attributed to bureaucratic inertia and a poor understanding within the Army of what its Arctic purpose and requirements really are. The distribution of the Army snowmobiles provide a perfect case in point. Rather than being concentrated in the hands of the ARCGs, the machines were parcelled out to the divisions in small groups, making large scale training impossible.

The Army has also shown an inability to learn many of the lessons observed during its annual Arctic exercises, something that can in part be chalked up to a lack of communication. Arctic deployed forces rarely communicate after the fact and there has been a general failure to compare notes between these units on what has worked and what has not. Siloed within different divisions, ARCG training is often undertaken in isolation where lessons are learned and relearned repeatedly.

The operational role of the Army’s Arctic forces , likewise, needs to be clarified. The ARCG, for instance, were described in their Master Implementation Directive as a rapid response force that could be assembled and deployed in the event of an emergency. The reality is that these reserve units could never be deployed quickly enough or sustained as a formed unit without extensive planning. Rather, these groups represent a reserve of basic Arctic capability that can be tapped when needed to provide perhaps half a dozen soldiers with the skills needed to provide mass to an Immediate Reaction Unit or another government agency. Their call out procedure should be refined and false planning assumptions purged from expectations of how the Army might use its forces outside of a planned exercise.

These are only a few examples of the CAF’s Arctic growing pains – indeed, there are many more issues of supply, training, and operational doctrine that still need to be addressed. None of these problems are really surprising however. Similar problems became apparent in the 1950s and again in the 1970s-​80s when the CAF undertook a similar expansion of its Arctic presence. It is understandable how an organization as large and complex as the Canadian military might move slowly to embrace a new and unfamiliar set of responsibilities.

Yet, in spite of these shortfalls, the government should recognize that the CAF’s overarching concept for Arctic operations is good and should be maintained. What is required is not a fundamental rethink but a renewed focus on turning the Forces’ existing high-​level strategic direction into something that is achievable, practical, and exercised on a regular basis.
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Dr. Adam Lajeunesse is a SSHRC postdoctoral fellow at St. Jerome’s University. He is currently working on a research program examining the history of Canadian military operations in the Arctic and the history of northern development, with a focus on hydrocarbon exploration from the 1960s to the mid-​1980s. (Image courtesy of the Canadian Army.)

Fisher: Super Hornets will force Canada out of its own Arctic

Critics of the F-35 will laugh and say this is hyperbole and melodrama. It is not. Keeping the U.S. safe is the top priority of every U.S. president. If Canada cannot or will not protect its Atlantic, Pacific and northern approaches, its NORAD treaty with the U.S. permits Washington to do so.

Russia announced last week that its air force will begin deploying its first stealthy T-50 fifth-generation jet fighters next year. Such a timeline is highly doubtful. But Vladimir Putin has no higher priority than acquiring stealth technologies and, within a decade, T-50s will be deployed at air bases across the top of Russia.

Once this happens, and with threats from T-50-launched cruise missiles and Russian and North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-35 will be far more able to shoot down than Super Hornets, the reality is that the U.S. will do whatever it has to to defend itself.

That will mean patrolling Canada’s margins with USAF F-35s, which will use fighter jet-capable airfields in Iqaluit, Rankin Inlet, Inuvik and Yellowknife built mostly with U.S. money in the 1980s.

Worse than that, Washington will insist that Canada’s Super Hornets stay in the rear.

The reason is clear. Four allied air forces operate in the Arctic. The U.S., Norway and Denmark, which defends Greenland and sometimes deploys fighter jets to a base they jointly operate with the USAF at Thule, will soon only be flying state-of-the art F-35s in the Far North. The other country, Canada, will not.

The F-35 is revolutionary in that it will basically be a flying computer with sensor fusion. F-35s flying hundreds of kilometres apart will be able to create a common battle picture. Being stealthy, they will secretly patrol far more safely while collectively surveying vast amounts of territory for information that they can instantly share with each other, spy and command aircraft and ground stations.

Once the Super Hornet is found, as it will be by a stealthy enemy, F-35s in the vicinity will become targets, too. That is why the U.S. will not want Canadian fighters operating anywhere near its warplanes in the north.

A new argument advanced by the government last week is that there is a “credibility gap” for NATO and Norad with the existing F-18 Hornets that must be immediately filled by an interim purchase of Super Hornets. NATO and Norad people have privately but emphatically insisted that no such crisis exists and will not exist for about a decade, so there is no reason for Canada to rush to make a decision.

As for this being sold as an interim buy, with a decision on the F-35 later, this is a red herring. Canada has neither the money nor the military infrastructure to support two fleets of fighter aircraft.

An older but still persistent argument to support the Super Hornets is that it will be safer to operate in the Far North than the one engine F-35s. Advances in civilian and military jet engine technology long ago made such thinking obsolete. Otherwise, the Pentagon would not have decided that only F-35s will fly from its most northern air base near Fairbanks, Alaska.

The Super Hornets’ advantages in range, payload and an extra engine are irrelevant if the aircraft is not survivable. The Super Hornet will not be invisible to radar so, at a certain point in the not too distant future, it will be shot down long before it can engage the enemy.

With the U.S. defending Canadian air space because of Ottawa’s refusal to buy F-35s, what the RCAF will eventually end up with in the north is a niche capability in air/sea rescue.

That Canada is prepared to cede its defence and sovereignty over all three maritime approaches to the USAF is one of the many reasons that there is extreme disappointment and disbelief across the upper reaches of Canada’s military community about what has been decided. What makes them furious is the government’s refusal to discuss the matter.

Finland has looked at the numbers that Denmark came up with after a competition in which it chose the F-35 over the Super Hornet. As a result, the Finns are believed to be close to deciding that they, too, will reject the Super Hornet in favour of the F-35. If Finland follows Denmark’s lead, it will become the 12th western-oriented air force in a row to choose the F-35 over the Super Hornet, with Canada the only exception.

Canadians should ask themselves: Is everyone who made those decisions — including those confronting similar security challenges in the Arctic — stupid? What is it that makes Canada so unique that it feels it can ignore the collective wisdom of all its allies and friends?

There are no two more important issues for a government than national defence and sovereignty. Such matters must be settled fairly and as transparently as possible. Have the promised open competition to decide what aircraft is best to defend Canada for the next half-century

By: Matthew Fisher, The Ottawa Citizen 

LONDON — The most questionable aspect of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s quixotic decision to renege on the promise of an open competition for Canada’s next fighter jet and suddenly ram through the sole-source purchase of Super Hornets — a decision Postmedia News has revealed it is close to making — is that, by doing so, Canada will end up surrendering sovereignty of its Arctic air space to the United States Air Force in about 10 years.

Liberals will spend $133 million in five years for Arctic Surveillance

By: David Pugliese, The National Post 

OTTAWA — The Canadian government will spend $133 million over the next five years for new technologies to improve surveillance of the Arctic.

Gascoyne Inlet Camp, Nunavut. 7 April 2014 – Twin Otter aircraft crew, Captain (Capt) Chuck Rockwell, Capt Andrew Oakes and Corporal Mike Nesbitt takes off from Gascoyne Inlet Camp, Nunavut after a personnel and equipment drop off on April 7, 2014 during Operation NUNALIVUT. (Photo: Master Seaman Peter Reed, CFB Shearwater, Nova Scotia)

The research project dovetails with the election promise of the Liberals who said they would increase surveillance in the Far North.

The work could also provide new technology for Canada as it enters into the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence Command agreement with the United States. Senior NORAD officers have suggested that to be relevant past 2025 the alliance should improve its surveillance capabilities in the north.

Defence Research and Development Canada, the military’s science organization, is co-ordinating the surveillance research. The project will “enhance all domain situational awareness” of the air, sea and underwater approaches to Canada, particularly in the Arctic, according to a DRDC notice recently issued to companies and universities.

“Right now we’re generating interest,” said DRDC spokeswoman Kathleen Guillot. “The call for proposals is anticipated in the fall.” The DRDC notice sent to industry noted that climate change is making the north more accessible, increasing economic activity and international interest in the Arctic.

“Such increased Arctic activity brings additional responsibilities for the Department of National Defence and other government departments in search and rescue, emergency response and environmental monitoring,” the notice noted. “A greater awareness of the potential challenges posed by foreign military and commercial activities in the Arctic region is also essential for Canada.”

It also stated that the current North Warning System radar technology, used for providing surveillance of northern air approaches to North America, will need to be replaced as early as 2025.

We view the Arctic as an emerging operating area with much yet to be defined.

“Starting work now to define cost effective solutions that would provide the situational awareness capabilities required into the future is critical for the defence of Canada, and the United States, against continuously evolving potential adversary systems and threats,” according to the DRDC notice.

Whatever technology to be considered for the Arctic must be suitable for a remote setting, where there is limited power, harsh weather and “vulnerability to capture,” it said.

U.S. officers are already viewing improvements in surveillance in the Arctic as an important part of protecting the continent. At a January 2015 news conference, Admiral William Gortney, head of NORAD and the U.S. Northern Command, said the Arctic remains “key terrain as the northern approach to North America.”

“We view the Arctic as an emerging operating area with much yet to be defined,” he said.

Canadian defence officials see the provision of a new radar system in the Arctic as potentially fulfilling part of its contribution to the future of NORAD, according to a September 2013 Department of National Defence briefing note. NORAD conducted a strategic review in 2014 noting the need for improved sensors, communications and infrastructure in the high North in order to remain effective into the future.

Canada’s Arctic coastline is 162,000 kilometers long and only one-tenth of its northern waters are charted.

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