Time for Canadian NATO Secretary General?

Originally published on FrontlineDefence Blog -Up For Debate 

Arguing the affirmative is Tim Dunne

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is about to appoint its 14th secretary general and it appears that Canada, a founding member of NATO and one of the principal architects of the alliance, is not even being considered for the job. Read Tim's submission on this topic here:http://defence.frontline.online/article/2018/3/9691-Is-it-Time-for-a-Canadian-as-NATO-SecGen%3F

Arguing against is Brett Boudreau

The ‘decade of disdain’ for NATO, under the Harper / MacKay / Hillier period, marked a nadir for Canada-Alliance relations. Recently, there have been earnest efforts to repair the bond, but Canada remains far from any serious consideration as the prospective source of a future NATO Secretary-General. Read Brett's submission on this topic here:
http://defence.frontline.online/article/2018/3/9690-Is-it-Time-for-a-Canadian-as-NATO-SecGen%3F

Does Visibility Matter? SAR Fleet New Paint Scheme Questioned

CHRIS MACLEAN
© 2017 FrontLine Defence (Vol 14, No 5)

It probably seemed minor by some standards, but a recent RCAF announcement may impact the credibility of the fledgling Defence Policy, damage what little integrity there is in the system of defence procurement, and jeopardize SAR mission effectiveness. The SAR community is asking questions, who will answer?

Canada’s new Defence Policy, entitled “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, was released with great fanfare in June 2017. This, of course, was of great consequence since the Canadian Armed Forces had not received an updated defence policy since the Canada First Defence Strategy was unveiled by the Harper government in 2008.

The new policy describes itself as a “rigorous, evidence-based analysis of Canada’s defence needs and the resources required to effectively deliver upon them over a 20-year horizon.”

That 20-year timeframe is backed up by numerous references in the document. And so, it was surprising when, less than five months after its release, the RCAF selectively announced (to a few media sources) additional roles or the new Fixed Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) aircraft.

12 Feb – Members from 103 Squadron Gander, NL prepare to perform a hoisting sequence from inside the CH-149 Cormorant helicopter during a joint search and rescue exercise held in Iceland. (Photo: Master Corporal Johanie Maheu)

According to an RCAF email to FrontLine on 9 Nov 2017, the new FWSAR planes will be painted grey and readied for added duties, including combat missions.

“The RCAF has made the decision to use a grey color scheme for the C-295W fleet to enable surging flexibility for the very wide range of missions the RCAF is required to conduct, from humanitarian and disaster relief missions, to security missions with partners, and all the way to full spectrum operations,” confirmed Capt Trevor Reid, Air Force Public Affairs.

This announcement heralds a significant change in the mission and role of the new Fixed Wing Search and Rescue aircraft.

Despite the traditional employment of the SAR aircraft in Canada, the RCAF has suddenly added security missions and “full spectrum” operations to the role of a SAR asset. It remains to be seen what “surging flexibility” means, but “security missions with partners” and “full spectrum operations” are clearly defined in military doctrine manuals as combat-related.

Those are not SAR missions, and that last item in particular deserves to be dissected. “Full Spectrum Operations” means the aircraft and crew must be able to operate effectively in a full combat environment.

This is a startling change for an aircraft that was procured to be manned and operated in a domestic SAR role. Beyond the reduction of SAR service to Canadians, this change will require significantly different capabilities if the new aircraft is to be capable, and survivable, for these new types of missions.

According to sources, SAR aircraft have never been tasked with “security missions with partners” before. This speaks to an expeditionary role where the aircraft will be pulled from their domestic SAR role to contribute to a military mission, possibly in Peace enforcement (the new evolution of peacekeeping).

Does this announcement mean that SAR missions may take a back seat to military missions? Is the Air Force also short on military ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) aircraft? If so, why not add more to the contract and paint them grey instead of diverting SAR-specific aircraft. After all, the Defence Policy does highlight the strategic importance of a robust and “critical” ISR capability – and clearly states its commitment to funding the necessary requirements.

However, the Policy also states that: “The Government has no higher obligation than the safety and security of the Canadian people,” which should mean that SAR platforms cannot be plundered to provide the assets needed for the also-important ISR role.

Canada’s SAR Mission
On the sidelines, after patiently waiting for the FWSAR aircraft replacement to be awarded, the SAR community now fears that those highly capable new planes will be quietly retasked for military purposes.

To recap the background, the FWSAR project, which had pinballed around the procurement system for well over a decade, was finally awarded last year, and 16 aircraft are set to begin deliveries in 2019. The aircraft selected by the Government of Canada for the FWSAR role is the Airbus C-295W (it has been redesignated as the CC295 for Canada). Its flexibility as a platform has led to it being acquired by different nations for various roles, including Search and Rescue, Tactical Transport, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Gunship, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Electronic Warfare.

All of the roles listed above require very specific equipment and skill sets if the crews are to be safe and effective in the tasked mission – in some cases, the equipment required for each is mutually exclusive.

According to Air Force Public Affairs, these new C-295s will be “even more reliable and available more often than our current fleet” of 6 Buffalo and 12 legacy CC130 Hercules aircraft.

SAR Tech MCpl Matt Zukowski pushes a pump case off the ramp of a CC130 Hercules aircraft from 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova Scotia. (Photo: Private Melissa Spence AMSO)

So what is at issue with grey paint, and why is it important?

Just as the SAR aircraft must be visible to be effective, the Tactical aircraft must be difficult to see – survival depends on it (however, it needs a lot more than grey paint). Tactical aircraft require defensive suites including warning systems, chaff and flares, and ceramic armament to protect crew and vital aircraft components. These expensive items can have a long lead time depending on the complexity of the system and the aircraft that is to use them. They can also add significant weight to the aircraft, limiting range and endurance, both of which are important to a SAR aircraft. As well, electronic systems can cause interference on critical sensors and other equipment that impacts mission success.

Based on the information shared to date, the C295 is conceivably going to be modified to do a secondary combat role, and put its ability to do its primary role – Search and Rescue for Canadians – at risk.

The concept of combining these roles was not mentioned in the Defence Policy. The first hint that anything was different from the last 14-or-so years of FWSAR replacement discussions, was the decision to forgo the very visible SAR colouring. This colour scheme has very solid reasoning behind it, and the SAR community is convinced it is an operational advantage for SAR mission success.

So why change? A number of questions are raised by this dramatic policy shift. Is there an increased threat level for Canada that would justify preparing for full scale conflict on the North American continent, or to justify cutting SAR service to support “security missions”? Does it mean that the Cormorant and Griffon helicopters in SAR and the Jet Ranger training helicopters are also going to be painted grey, to allow “surging flexibility” for those fleets? If not, then what is the real rationale behind this significant change for FWSAR aircraft – and has the government sanctioned it?

Of the list of new missions, as provided by the Air Force, only security missions and full spectrum operations justify a low-visibility paint job. However, in response to a FrontLine follow-up request to clarify those specific mission types, Capt Reid stated the RCAF “will not speculate on future missions.” So the question remains, who’s behind the paint-police?

Have we ordered too many SAR aircraft to fulfill Canadian rescue needs? Is the rugged and varied terrain across our 10 provinces and 3 territories not vast enough or varied enough to require 16 planes to cover the SAR requirements, as originally established? Or is the RCAF attempting to shift other mission needs onto the FWSAR contract? This is where defence procurement takes another hit in terms of transparency.

Will this new mission statement impact the SAR contract award? As one source commented, “other companies would have pitched a very different product if they had known that DND was looking for a multirole platform for ISR and combat missions.”

The Statement of Operating Intent for the Fixed Wing SAR Aircraft project specified how the Canadian Armed Forces intended to use its new FWSAR replacement aircraft. It outlined who will operate the aircraft, where and in what environment the aircraft will be flown. It also specified the intended flying rate and provided the bidders with generic flight profiles for representative missions.

The roles envisioned for the new FWSAR Aircraft included: SAR in Canada; Disaster Relief in Canada; Surveillance and Control of Canadian Territory and Approaches; Aid to Civil Power; National Sovereignty Interests / Enforcement; and Defence of North America.

Visibility is a Big Deal
While the announcement of the change in aircraft livery to grey paint has raised considerable discussion in the RCAF, and specifically in the SAR community, it has been largely ignored elsewhere.

One insider is convinced “the Air Force did not talk to anyone noteworthy in SAR” before making the decision to paint the new planes grey. “Our SAR crews fly throughout Canada’s diverse terrains and climatic conditions, they almost always fly in dangerous regimes of flight.” These crews put themselves at great risk, and if a rescue plane does go down, they want it to be highly visible.

He also points out that “high vis colours lets those on the ground know someone is looking for them.” Describing the concept as “SAR 101”, he says it “gives survivors hope and psychological survival advantage.”

I spoke to a former SAR Commander on November 6th – he couldn’t believe that a change to grey paint would be in the works. “SAR aircraft should have the best visibility,” he stated emphatically.

27 Feb – SAR Techs from 442 Transport and Rescue Squadron discuss their plan of action on the ground as a Cormorant helicopter comes in to land on top of a mountain near Hope, British Columbia during an annual SAR Exercise. (Photo: Bdr Albert Law, 39 Canadian Brigade Group)

The Current SAR Fleet

How has the RCAF been handling its Fixed Wing SAR requirements while waiting for the replacement aircraft? The RCAF uses Buffalos and Hercules for Primary SAR, but they also use all domestic fleets for Secondary SAR. Of these aircraft, any that are not deployed from Canada in a tactical or combat role are painted in high visibility paint. The reason is that within Canada, there are benefits to having an aircraft with high visibility. The first is safety – it is easier for other aircraft to see and avoid an aircraft that has high visibility paint. For that reason, the Twin Otter aircraft in Northern operations, the training aircraft at Portage and Moose Jaw, and the Combat Support Griffon helicopters are painted in high visibility colors. The second reason is survival – if an aircraft has an incident and makes a forced landing, it is much easier to find if it has bright colors. The Combat Support Griffons were painted yellow after an extended search for a missing Griffon in Labrador, where the aircraft was very hard to find as its camouflage paint blended into the terrain.

The third and most important reason is mission effectiveness in SAR. It does not appear to be well understood that SAR aircraft are painted yellow and red for operational reasons, and that high visibility is an integral part of the primary role.

SAR aircraft often operate in marginal weather while searching for survivors of air, marine, and ground emergencies. The aircraft operate low-level, at a relatively low airspeed, searching visually as well as electronically for those in peril. Twin engine aircraft like the Buffalo and CC295 are fairly quiet by nature, especially in the low power settings required for visual search and, in the past, survivors have stated that due to high winds and environmental conditions, they were unable to hear the search aircraft until it was too late to start a signal fire or launch a flare. A grey plane can visually fade into swirling snows and driving rain.

SAR aircraft are painted in high visibility colors to allow them to be seen by survivors and other aircraft and, as a survival aid, to be found themselves if they have a mishap.

A review of historical SAR aircraft such as the Canso, Albatross, Twin Otter, and Caribou, as well as Labrador and Piasecki helicopters, show that all were painted in bright colors. Back in the day, red, white and blue were considered optimum, but with experience and increased technology, it was determined that yellow and red were more visible colours – and so the helicopters, Twin Otters, and Buffalos later adopted that color scheme.

At first, the Buffalo fleet (originally bought by the Canadian Army) was painted in camouflage colors, but when they became a SAR asset in 1970, were painted white and red (patterned after their predecessor, the Albatross) and some were painted in UN white paint for the Sinai mission. However, after a number of observations were raised by Canadian survivors about the low contrast of white aircraft in winter, the decision was made to paint the aircraft in the same highly observable yellow and red colors as the SAR helicopters.

The Hercules, by contrast, is very noisy, so the high vis-paint was deemed less important. For those who would scoff at the notion of a yellow Herc, it is important to note that the fleet of Griffon helicopters also has two paint schemes – camouflage for the Tactical Helicopter Squadrons and yellow and red for the Combat Support and SAR Squadrons.

The current fleet of SAR Buffalo aircraft (painted yellow and red) are limited to the roles of SAR, Humanitarian, and Domestic operations.

On the other hand, the fleet of legacy Hercules (painted grey) are multi-role aircraft that have different squadrons performing different roles – including SAR, tactical transport, and air-to-air refuelling.

10 Feb – SAR Tech, Sgt Kevin O'Donnell from 103 Squadron Gander, NL is hoisted down from a CH-149 Cormorant helicopter for a mountain rescue scenario during a joint search and rescue exercise held in Iceland. (Photo: Master Corporal Johanie Maheu, 14 Wing Imaging Greenwood)

A key point here, is that the RCAF does not allow Hercules aircrew in any of those three roles to maintain a concurrent capability in the other roles – as it was found that the demands of maintaining multiple currencies were contributing factors to accidents that resulted in the loss of aircraft and the lives of crews.

Translating the Hercules experience to the new CC295, would logically suggest that this added combat mission would also require additional, dedicated crews. Considering that the number of CC295 aircraft acquired by the RCAF was specifically tailored to the SAR requirements, it follows that greater numbers would be required to take on these additional missions.

Historically, Canadian SAR aircraft have responded to international humanitarian events, such as the 2010 Haitian earthquake. For that mission, the RCAF deployed the yellow and red Griffon helicopters, despite the fact that camouflage Griffons were available.

The only “expeditionary” deployments of Buffalo aircraft have been in traditional UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and the Sinai, but those operations were Peace Support, not Security Operations. Even so, the loss of Buffalo 461 on 9 August 1974, to three Syrian Surface to Air Missiles ended the practice of sending aircraft only protected with a special paint job into combat zones – at least until today.

The simplistic statement that the aircraft will be painted grey instead of yellow and red disregards the reality that any such increased role would require, at minimum, more aircraft, more crews, and upgrades to make them survivable in a combat role.

Without clarification or detail on the additional equipment to be procured, it leaves tremendous room for speculation.

Referring back to the statement in the Strong, Secure, Engaged Defence Policy, it was made clear that all costs for capability had been mapped out for the next 20 years, but there is no mention of costly modifications for survivability in combat operations, additional aircraft, or additional personnel. The contradiction is obvious.

Learning from History?
History provides another context under which to examine the paint question. Let’s look back to the turn of the century, when a previous Liberal government was acquiring the Cormorant helicopter for Rotary Wing SAR.

At that time, like today, the Air Force announced that the new SAR aircraft would be grey in colour. The explanation back then was more direct (and probably more to the point than today’s convoluted reasoning of a “surging flexibility” of grey paint.

9 May – A CH-146 Griffon helicopter from 417 Search and Rescue Squadron based in Cold Lake, Alberta conducts operations over northern Alberta while providing assistance to the province during wildfires near Fort McMurray. (Photo: MCpl Brandon O'Connell)

The military had just gone through a decade of low funding and low morale, brought on in part by the Somalia affair and its aftermath. The only bright spot in the late 1990s was the military response to a number of national disasters, including the Saguenay flood, the Winnipeg flood, and the Quebec ice storm. In each case, the media shone the spotlight on the yellow and red SAR aircraft (at times referring to them incorrectly as Coast Guard). Based on a perception that they were not getting “their share” of good press, the Air Force insisted that the new SAR helicopter had to “look military” (hence the grey).

However, the government eventually decided that, rather than pander to a misguided desire for glory, it was more important to consider the situations of Canadians in distress – desperate for rescue in bad weather – and make sure there was an aircraft they could see and signal to. Will the current government follow their lead? Stay tuned.

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Chris MacLean is the Editor-in-Chief at FrontLine magazines.

Canada’s defence in crisis? Who cares?

BY CHRIS MACLEAN
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 11, No 3)

These questions, particularly the last one, keep surfacing lately, especially within the groups who are tasked with our safety; those who have chosen to serve and protect. In the last edition of FrontLine,Don Macnamara was reminding politicians that safeguarding Canadian citizens and protecting their way of life is the prime directive of government. This great responsibility stands firm, no matter what the polls suggest or how the social winds blow. This is one requirement for which Government must act without necessarily asking for approval of the masses. Some things are just expected of a leader.

Do Canadians know about the huge number of international issues that can affect our future security? Maybe a few. Do they ask if we are really prepared to deal with them? Why would they, when they assume the authorities have prepared?

Do they know (or care) that our national interests – security, sovereignty, prosperity, and a stable world order – are pre-requisites to the enviable standard of living enjoyed by the average Canadian? Of course they do. Do they take it for granted? Of course they do, after all, this is Canada – one of the great nations of the world, right?

How many of your neighbours really understand the implications of living in the second-largest country on Earth, with the world’s longest coastline on three oceans? How aware are Canadians that 40% of our national territory is that “True North” that we sing about – and that we really cannot defend it?

As for the defence of our country and the pursuit of a stable world order, do average Canadians have any idea of the major equipment crises facing its military? Sure, the military has taken the brunt of many cartoons depicting the sad state of equipping the Canadian Armed Forces, but the real target of those jokes should be the government that wields the decision-making authority.

One might assume that every federal politician would understand the importance of being properly versed and advised on matters related to the military, and that it would be incumbent on them to learn as much as they could so they can make informed decisions in Parliament. You would be wrong. Last month, two Liberal MPs cancelled delivery of their free copy of FrontLine Defence. They feel no more responsibility in this matter than my nephews do. Another two people at PCO also cancelled. How can we expect the general public to care about defence, when our very MPs and Privy Council office avoid anything about defence other than, possibly, what they are being spoon-fed?

MPs should not only be learning as much as they can about national defence, they should take great pains to explain it to their constituents.

How many politicians have any idea that the real crisis facing their Navy, in terms of available warships or the impact and limitations on multi-ship operations, is a result of the loss of its two support ships? Beyond that, having only xx warships for a maritime nation our size, and no real plan to replace them in a timely manner, nor any real idea how many we can afford (yes, those x’s were intentional), should be the stuff of a national scandal. Few know, but how many would care even if they knew?

Similar questions can be asked about the vehicles and modern weaponry needed by the Canadian Army. The fighter replacement of the RCAF is better known, but only due to controversy. Are Canadians aware that, in the not too distant future, replacement of air-to-air refuelling capabilities, as well as maritime patrol aircraft, are going to be required?

Major equipment should never be political issues; defence procurement should be done in the national interest. This is an essential question as the Government launches into its public consultations for a Defence Policy Review.

It is important that we avoid cynicism about the possible outcomes of the defence review by assuming it will be “same old thing”. For generations, Canadians and their dedicated servicemen and women have suffered from financial starvation combined with irrational procurement processes.

How can real military defence needs be met when governments continue, essentially, to set a budget and then figure out what it can buy without first determining what its national interests are so it knows if these purchases are necessary or not?

Does Canada have to wait for a huge domestic terrorism event before the public wakes up to the risks this country faces with an impoverished military? Our allies admire the performance of the CAF – but wonder why they are so few from such a large and wealthy country of such strategic relevance. It should not be necessary to frighten the population to create demand for a larger and better-equipped military. The government should recognize this without the need for a public outcry, because that won’t come until it is too late.

Is DND – with the largest ‘discretionary’ budget in government – viewed simply as a money tree that can be cherry picked for surpluses to be transferred to other departments? Do senior bureaucrats consider themselves part of the national security nexus? If not, why not, if the first responsibility of government is the security of Canada.

Is the nature of our globalized world recognized and understood by ALL government departments? If not, how can we ever achieve a ‘whole of government’ response to threats to Canada’s world order, prosperity and security and sovereignty issues and threats. Why is there not a Government document that assesses the international security environment and provides ‘policy guidance’ for all departments? Is it because our Government lacks interest, capability or competence to achieve what most other nations have?

Politicians are not elected because they understand the intricacies of international security affairs. Yes, some former military members have served in Parliament – very few until the current Parliament that has at least a half-dozen veterans. But defence policy has been a partisan activity, leading to budget and procurement changes with every new Government. Is there any good reason why a national security assessment and strategy cannot be produced on a non-partisan basis?

How do Canadians learn anything about defence? Media coverage by military specialists is slim – but there are others who, with limited knowledge and understanding, write with assumed authority, often misrepresenting situations and creating political issues that are subsequently addressed by politicians who do not understand the issues either.

So, will our MPs communicate with Canadians to inform them not only of the rationale for the number of soldiers, sailors and aviators we need to defend Canada, but also the implications of failing to do so?

It has been said that the most important social service a government can provide is the means to keep its citizens alive and free.

If Canadians do not know or do not care about the nation’s defence, clearly the first problems are national ignorance and national apathy. Those problems are unacceptable for a Canada that must survive and prosper in a dangerous world.

Dunne: Why RCN Should Consider Nuclear Submarines

BY TIM DUNNE
 2015 FrontLine Defence © (Vol 12, No 6)

It’s no secret that Canada has problems with military acquisition. While DND and its partner departments arguably do a good job selecting the right major equipment purchases for a bona fide requirement that has been vetted through the policy deliberation process, the Westminster parliamentary system effectively shut all opportunities for senior public servants and military officers to engage in meaningful dialogue with the public about these issues. The inevitable consequence is a misinformed and unsupportive Canadian public. Some of the more high profile examples that come to mind include the proposal to purchase nuclear submarines, the botched maritime patrol helicopter project; and most recently, the F-18 Fighter Replacement program.

Feb 2015 – HMCS Victoria returns home through the Straits of Juan De Fuca, after operations with the United States Navy. (Photo: LS Zachariah Stopa, MARPAC Imaging Services)

Canada’s top four defence priorities, enumerated in the Defence White Paper, Defence in the Seventies, and articulated by then Defence Minister Donald S. McDonald in his address to the Empire Club on 7 October 1971, are: first, the defence of Canada, including the surveillance of our own territory and coastlines, and the protection of our governmental institutions; second, the defence of North America in cooperation with the United States; third, collective defence under NATO; and,fourth, such international peacekeeping roles as we may undertake. While the fourth appears to have become a victim of transformative, worldwide geopolitical changes, the first three are still relevant, particularly #1 – the defence of Canada.

With her Navy convinced of the need for submarine capability for surveillance and defence, why does this discussion keep being swept aside?

A compelling case study of a lack of clear communication leads us back to the 1987 proposal to purchase 10 to 12 nuclear-propelled submarines, which is a starkly naked example of the perennial Canadian approach to defence: always a day late and a dollar short.

Newest Nuclear-powered Submarines

• Astute Class (BAE Systems), the latest in service with the British Navy, first launched in 2007.
• Virginia Class (General Dynamics Electric Boat), the latest SSN in service with the United States Navy, first launched in 2003.
• Yasen Class (Malakhit Central Design Bureau), the latest SSN in service with the Russian Navy, first launched in 2010.
• Barracuda Class (DCNS), the latest SSN for the French Navy, the first will be commissioned in 2017.
• Kalvari Class (Mazagon Dock Limited), the latest SSN for India, the first of six is expected to be commissioned in 2017.
• Type 095 (Chinese designation: 09-V) is a proposed class of third generation nuclear-powered attack submarines for China’s navy.
• The Brazilian Navy signed detailed contracts in late 2009 with the French naval manufacturer DCNS. These contracts included technology transfers and construction assistance for four Scorpene-class diesel-electric attack submarines, as well as one nuclear powered vessel. Construction of the first SSN is planned to end in 2023 with entry into service slated for 2025.

The Submarine Story

Germany’s wartime efforts constituted a guerre de course, or commerce warfare. Her strategic efforts to stop the flow of military equipment and supplies across the Atlantic by torpedoing merchant ships at night during the Battle of the Atlantic (1939 to 1945) should have been a significant learning experience for Canada about the essential value of submarines.

Canada played a critical role in reducing the submarine threat and forcing the German navy back from the Atlantic shipping lanes, however, fighting the U-boat threat came at a huge cost. Despite the best efforts of the Allies, the Merchant Navy lost more than 30,000 men, and around 3,000 ships in more than 100 convoy battles. The cost for the Germans was equally tragic, losing 783 U-boats, and 28,000 sailors. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) sank, or assisted in the sinking, of 31 enemy submarines at a cost of 14 warships to U-boat torpedoes and 8 ships to accidents in the North Atlantic. A majority of the 2,000 Canadian sailors who perished in maritime combat died at sea at the hands of their adversary. Canadian merchant seamen suffered much heavier losses. One in ten of the 12,000 who served in Canadian and Allied merchant vessels perished.

In his history of the Canadian Navy, The Sea is at Our Gates, Retired Commander Tony German describes the difficult birth of the post-war Canadian submarine service. “Post-war training needs had been inadequately met by borrowing from the RN [Royal Navy] and USN [United States Navy].” The RN permanently stationed three boats of the 6th Submarine Squadron in Halifax under Canadian operational command, and anti-submarine warfare training was contingent on USN generosity.

Canada’s early submariners served in British submarines to learn the vital skills necessary to operate these vessels safely and effectively. According to retired Navy Captain Norman Jolin, an RCN officer with experience in submarine operations, Canada paid for the services of British submarines (Sixth Submarine Squadron) operating from Halifax, Nova Scotia in the 1950s and 1960s.

It wasn’t until 1960 that a Canadian submarine service was approved and Canada began to search for a suitable boat for the fledgling service. Initial exploration looked at the possibility of acquiring American conventional Barbel Class submarines and six American-designed Thresher Class nuclear boats that could be built in Canada, but the price tag was too high. Instead, USS Burrfish, aBalao Class submarine, was loaned to the RCN in May 1961 after being decommissioned and laid up in 1956. Commissioned in Canada and renamed HMCS Grilse, she was operated by the RCN until 1969. USS Argonaut, a Tench Class boat had operated in the Mediterranean as late as 1968 before joining the RCN and renamed HMCS Rainbow in 1968. She was returned to the US in 1977 and later scrapped. With extensive British training under their belt by the time Canada procured her own submarines, the boats were crewed entirely by Canadians.

In the meantime, in 1963 the Canadian government approved the purchase of British-built Oberon Class submarines that were quiet, effective and cheaper. HMCS Ojibwa, Okanagan, and Onondagawere operational from the late 1960s to the late 1990s. Two others, Olympus and Osiris, were procured much later for use in harbour training and spare parts respectively.

Challenge & Commitment

As the Oberons aged, discussions for their replacement began. The Defence Minister at the time was longtime MP "Yukon Erik" Nielsen. Recognizing the importance of protecting ice-covered waters in Canada's North, Nielsen asked the ADM(Materiel) group, who were briefing him on conventional submarines, whether such subs could stay under ice. After being informed that only nuclear boats could perform such missions, he then asked why they they weren't being considered. According to sources, the response was that the Canadian public "probably wouldn't be supportive" and that they would be expensive. Nevertheless, Nielsen asked the Materiel group to look at nuclear submarine options and determine whether there were any that could be more affordable.

When Perrin Beatty took over the portfolio in 1986, the project was important enough to be included in the June 1987 defence white paper, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada. “A program of 10 to 12 [nuclear submarines] will permit submarines to be on station on a continuing basis in the Canadian areas of responsibility in the northeast Pacific, the North Atlantic and the Canadian Arctic,” the report suggested.

Los Angeles Class nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Memphis (SSN_691) heads out to sea following a brief port visit at Souda Bay, Crete, Greece.

Even today, almost 30 years later, the result of that initiative is memorable. Much of the promise of the White Paper went unfulfilled, and the submarine program was still-born after an abortive competition between the British and French competitors to sell their submarine technology to Canada. With Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, and the long-awaited collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the purchase was repeatedly seen as unnecessary.

Canada’s three Oberon class submarines, already 20 years old when Challenge and Commitment was released, were extended a further 10 to 12 years and retired between 1998 and 2000, with no immediate replacement.

The 1994 Defence White Paper indicated an interest in Britain’s four Upholder Class boats built byVickers Shipbuilding and Engineering between 1983 and 1993. They were put on the auction block in 1994 when finances forced the Royal Navy to convert to a nuclear-powered submarine force. The UK could not afford to operate both a conventional and a nuclear submarine program, Jolin underscored. And with the procrastination that typifies major military acquisition programs in Canada, the government announced the Submarine Capability Life Extension Project on 6 April 1998, in which the four Upholders would replace the three Oberons.

The submarines underwent a reactivation refit before they were passed to the RCN and renamed the Victoria Class. A tragic fire on the voyage back to Canada was the first of many setbacks, however, they were put through a rigorous Canadian refit, notably to replace the British fire control systemswith Canadian fire control systems designed to fire the MK 48 torpedo previously used in the Oberons, and install Canadian communications equipment, and were eventually integrated into the RCN fleet, seeing service in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and as far away as the Caribbean and the coast of Africa.

Now a quarter of a century old, they need to be replaced in the coming years. But the question is, with what?

The Future Canadian Submarine

Today’s submarines are designed to be principally anti-submarine vessels with integrated covert intelligence gathering resources. The submarine that replaces the Victoria Class boats “must be able to operate in Canada’s area of responsibility,” notes retired Capt(N) Jolin. “This means there is a need for an open ocean capability for the Atlantic and the Pacific, as well as near the ice edge, to deny access to the Arctic archipelago to a potential adversary.”

This requires a blunt discussion about propulsion systems for a class of submarine that must operate in the world’s most hostile and unforgiving maritime environments. It includes, not merely near the Arctic ice edge, but also beneath it, because it is a foregone conclusion that there are submarines beneath Canada’s polar ice cap, and they are not ours.

There must be a realization that Canada shares Arctic borders with three other nations, the United States, Denmark (at Greenland), and Russia, and the latter has proven to be an avaricious and pugnacious neighbour. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin declared that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century. He is intent on returning Russia to its former position of global power.

Putin carved out Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, and invaded Georgia in 2008 over control of the two territories. Russia is seen as the source of a 2014 breakaway movement in Crimea and eastern Ukraine that gave Russia the pretext to annex the region. Although now collaborating to fight ISIS, it is doubtful that any such partnerships are anything more than strategic necessities, and will not change Putin’s end game in any way.

Canadians should use these events to form a new prism through which to watch the Kremlin, and to interpret several significant events in the Arctic. In the 17 January 2014 edition of the Globe and Mail,columnist Mark MacKinnon notes that the Kremlin has identified the Arctic as a priority. MacKinnon identified two noteworthy events:

Russian explorer Artur Chilingarov planted a Russian flag on the sea floor at the North Pole on 1 August 2007;

In October 2013, Captain Valentin Davydyants, captain of the 25,000-tonne nuclear[-powered] icebreaker Fifty Years of Victory, established a speed record carrying the flame for the Sochi Olympics to the North Pole.

In 2010, the Norwegian Barents Observer’s Arctic watcher, Atle Staalesen, asked Russian President Dmitry Medvedev about a NATO presence in the Arctic. “[T]he Arctic can manage fine without NATO.” He went on to say that the Arctic is part of the Russian common wealth, which does not have any relation to military objectives. However, former veteran CBC political correspondent Brian Stewart warned, in a 2 November 2015 report, that “Russia is not Canada’s only concern, but Russia is special.” Stewart writes that President Putin “has made a priority of the Arctic, where huge amounts of untapped oil and gas reserves are expected to become extractable as ice caps melt, and where strategically advantageous shipping lanes could yet open to fleets of Russian and Chinese icebreakers.”

Saying it has plans to deploy 80,000 troops to the far north in a crisis, Russia recently set up “Arctic Joint Strategic Command North,” consisting of two motorized brigades and Pantsir-S1 anti-air missiles, and held the largest Arctic military exercise with more than 35,000 Russian troops, 50 ships and submarines, and 110 aircraft.

In the face of Putin’s apparent aspirations regarding the Arctic, it is time for Canada to get serious about military security, particularly maritime security, and about Arctic security even more so.

SSN – Ship Submersible Nuclear-powered

If there are submarines under Canada’s polar icecap, as retired Capt(N) Jolin asserts, the only vehicle that can respond to that incursion is a nuclear-powered boat, which is the only proven power source that is capable of prolonged operations under the Arctic ice. Anti-nuclear advocates encourage Canada to look at air independent propulsion (AIP) systems that do not require access to the surface atmosphere to generate power. However, these systems are simply not yet at the level of maturity or effective operation to offer the capability of prolonged under-ice operations. All AIP systems need to carry liquid oxygen in heavy, bulky tanks, which limit the boat’s ability to operate as well as its habitability.

A submerged conventional-powered submarine must recharge its batteries and clean its atmosphere by running its diesel generators at periscope depth with a snorkel (or snort) mast raised. Not only does it have to slow down for this, it increases the possibility of detection as radar can detect a snorkel, and diesel exhaust can be seen for miles, depending on the weather. And so, the need to snort compromises its most important attributes, stealth and speed. It also completely rules out sustained under-ice operations, as the boat must have the ability to come up to periscope depth in ice-free waters to snort.

AIP systems permit a submarine to generate power without having to snort for limited periods of time, but these systems do not have the endurance to permit under- ice operations for prolonged use. Submariners would still be confined to the ice edge and could operate at 20 knots and higher, but only very short bursts, often only for minutes at a time.

Present-day AIP systems have been developed for navies with different operational and tactical circumstances than Canada. A non-nuclear AIP system that can provide power comparable to a nuclear power plant simply does not exist.

The reactors of nuclear powered vessels are fuelled once and can then operate between 25 to 33 years, depending on the reactor. According to National Defence’s Cost Factors Manual (2015 edition), the budgeted annual cost of fuel for a single Victoria Class submarine is just under $1 million. Critics suggest that SSNs are out of financial reach – are they considering the $20-$35 million plus in fuel and operational savings over its lifespan?

The greatest advantage of a nuclear powered boat over its diesel-electric cousin is its endurance, able to remain submerged for an unlimited time within the life span of its nuclear core. Its reactor can manufacture the air for vessel operation and life support. The only limitations would be imposed by the habitability requirements of the crew. A nuclear boat is virtually invisible to its adversaries and friends alike. They can become an essential component of Canada’s naval fleet mix.

May 2015 – A dolphin jumps in front of Virginia Class attack submarine Pre-Commissioning Unit John Warner (SSN 785) as the boat conducts sea trials in the Atlantic Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Huntington Ingalls Industries, by Chris Oxley)

What Submarines Do

Nuclear-powered vessels are strategic resources that, when submerged, anti-submarine warfare crews have to be either extremely lucky or have intelligence on the approximate search location, or face a very long, expensive and exhausting search. So, what do submarines provide to its navy and to its nation?

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR): An SSN can remain on station for unlimited periods and covertly trail other submarines and surface ships. As a “force multiplier,” its multiple sensors allow monitoring of surface and sub-surface military, fisheries, commercial and criminal activity, providing early and covert detection of suspicious or threatening activities. As a “force enabler,” it gives pinpoint directions for over-the-horizon friendly forces. And, as an intelligence vehicle, it positions prior to a conflict to conduct ISR activities, map the geospatial features of an operational area, observe the patterns, doctrine, tactics and capabilities of an enemy, and remain until hostilities have ceased.

Power projection: It can use maritime force within and outside its own waters to meet a threat, or to influence activities or events within its purview. Its weapons can include torpedoes and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) through vertical launch silos or their torpedo tubes.

Sea control: A single submarine can deny area access to an adversary, both surface and undersea to the seabed below. This allows a navy to protect sea lanes; deny access to aggressor ships, submarines and aircraft; and deliver land forces ashore.

Sea Denial is a critical component of sea control. Deploying a submarine into an operational environment dramatically changes how opposing naval forces conduct their operations. Locating a submerged boat diverts ships, aircraft and other submarines from other missions, and consumes incredible quantities of resources, making its search and pursuit a strategic decision.

During the 1982 Falklands War, Britain deployed 2 aircraft carriers, 11 destroyers, five nuclear submarines, one diesel-electric submarine and 25 helicopters to anti-submarine warfare. They depleted much of their sonobuoys and anti-submarine weapons, and asked the United States to replenish the British inventory, all against one small Argentinean diesel-electric boat, the ARA San Luis.

In 2004, the two-day search for an old and noisy Chinese Han Class nuclear submarine in Japanese waters required an entire U.S. Navy P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft squadron, Japanese Defence Force P-3s, a number of nuclear submarines, and surface ships and a T-AGO surveillance ship with towed sonar.

In response to the 5 April 1986 fatal bombing of Berlin’s popular “La Belle” nightclub, the U.S. launched Operation El Dorado Canyon, and U.S. air strikes against Libya began 10 days later. US Navy submarines deployed into the area during the pre-strike and post-strike positioning of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, confined Libya’s fleet of six Soviet-built diesel submarines to port.

Operational stealth: Submarines conduct non-conventional military operations such as mining, clandestine mine reconnaissance, placement of maritime mines, and stealthy insertion and extraction of special forces. It remains virtually invisible to all but the best (and luckiest) anti-submarine forces.

In 1977, the Argentinean government was pressing the British government to pass over control of the Falkland Islands. Britain deployed two frigates and a submarine, but only the submarine was able to get near the islands while the frigates remained more than 1,600 km away. The British submarine used its full range of ISR, giving the British government the options of employing the boat’s combat capabilities or recall it as circumstances dictated.

Operational endurance: One of the nuclear-powered submarine’s most strategic attributes is its ability to remain on station, submerged, silent and invisible, for long periods to observe and develop options to respond to tactical and operational situations and unforeseen opportunities.

Freedom of movement: The ability to covertly move with relative impunity into and within the area of operations, including where surface vessels and aircraft cannot go.

Yasen Class submarine, the latest SSN in service with the Russian Navy, first launched in 2010.

Flexibility: The submarine has a wide range of sensor and communications equipment, a potential wide array of weapons, and an ability to operate in stealth, secrecy and silence across the spectrum of maritime operations.

New Technologies

Submarines have always carried torpedoes, but they can now carry and launch cruise missiles against land targets up to 2,500 km away. There are many new and enhanced technologies being integrated and retrofitted into submarines that give submarines a variety of futuristic characteristics and capabilities. For instance, the Royal Navy’s new Astute Class nuclear submarine, and the USNVirginia Class submarines, are designed for the full spectrum of blue-water and littoral missions, each equipped with telescoping masts that do not penetrate the pressure hull.

The Virginia Class twin AN/BVS-1 telescoping photonics masts replaces the traditional periscope. Eliminating the periscope tube that protrudes from the steel pressure hull, increases watertight integrity and limits the risk of water leakage in the event of damage. The photonics mast exchanges the mechanical, line-of-sight periscope with high-resolution cameras, light-intensification and infrared sensors, an infrared laser rangefinder, and integrated electronic support measures. Information from these sensors is carried through fibre optic data lines to the control center with visual data displayed wirelessly on LCD monitors. The Virginia boats use pump-jet BAE Systems propulsors that reduce cavitation and are quieter than traditional bladed propellers; a fibre optic fly by wire vessel control system; and an updated AN/BSY-1 integrated combat system by General Dynamics AIS (previously Raytheon).

Globally, some 40 nations employ more than 400 submarines of all types. A resurgent Russia has its eye on the resource-rich Arctic, and with China’s growing interest in the area, it is time that Canada recognize the need for these specialized vessels with their suites of technologically sophisticated weapons, information and detection systems.

Capt(N) Jolin, whose experience included Oberon Class submarine operation on Canada's East Coast and the UK, did warn that while a nuclear-powered submarine is cost effective to operate, the shore-based facilities, training and supply chain to service and support these vessels “can be eye-wateringly expensive.” Perhaps frank and serious discussions with our American allies could induce them to allow Canada to piggy-back on existing USN infrastructure.

Another, albeit unlikely, way of addressing maintenance and repair facilities would be to negotiate with allied nations who wish to operate SSNs, and agree to jointly fund these services on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as common-use facilities. All participating nations would pay their share and the bills for their own use.

Convincing our U.S. cousins to admit us to the naval nuclear club may not be easy as the U.S. would then have to allow Canada access to some of their most closely-guarded technologies, capabilities and strategies. It will require long, hard and difficult negotiation and debate about common interest, mutual defence, and acknowledgement that we would be the junior partner in the arrangement – and that we would have to play by rules already established by the U.S. Navy.

NATO calls on its members to devote two percent of its GDP to defence. It’s been a long time since Canada has met that objective, but perhaps it’s time that we re-evaluate our defence spending in view of our neighbour, where the Canadian North meets the Russian North.

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Tim Dunne is based in Dartmouth.