Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press
OTTAWA -- A retired admiral is telling the Trudeau government's defence review that National Defence is often paralyzed by timid bureaucrats and politicians who pass the buck on decisions.
Retired vice-admiral Bruce Donaldson, who until a few years ago was second-in-command of the military, says in a written brief that the system is set up to avoid risk and accountability.
"I suggest that there is a culture of risk intolerance that has infected the federal level -- financial in the case of public servants, and political in the case of ministers -- that has led government to prefer additional process, "third-party validation" of responsible officials' work, and serial delay to achieving results," Donaldson wrote.
He is referring to a trend that has developed since the political fiasco surrounding the F-35 stealth fighter purchase, which has seen government increasingly turn to outside experts and panels to assess and rubber-stamp its plans.
"Indeed, it appears that there is now a view that avoiding spending on intended outcomes is somehow a desirable 'result' for Canadians."
Instead, Donaldson says the net result is costly delays and failure to deliver necessary equipment and support.
Donaldson, who retired in 2013, also says the public has little understanding of federal finances, and doesn't realize that less money is spent on defence than in servicing the country's debt.
"Canadians lack any context for understanding the management of public funds at the federal level, and have been encouraged to view the expenditure of hundreds of millions -- or billions -- of dollars on military capability as inherently wasteful and unreasonable and has been encouraged to see spending on the military as wasteful."
He suggests government has done a poor job of educating citizens on the necessary cost of doing business as a country.
The Liberals held the first in a series of six public consultations this week in Vancouver as Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan attempts to craft an updated vision for the military.
It is the first time in over 20 years that citizens have been asked what role they believe the Canadian Armed Forces should be playing in the world and with what equipment.
The panel also heard from the country's leading organization representing defence industry contractors, which encouraged the Liberals to talk about more than just capabilities and hardware lists.
Christyn Cianfarani, head of the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries, says the defence review should commit the federal government to crafting a vision of how the defence industry can address the country's unique security and economic challenges.
Canada, unlike other countries, has not sat down and determined which industries are key national security assets. The notable exception is the shipbuilding industry, where the Harper government made a conscious decision to build both warships and coast guard vessels in the country, rather than off-shore.
Other nations, such as Britain, France, Japan and even Australia, have a more sophisticated relationship with their industries and weapons-makers and have decided to nurture and support key industrial sectors.
Cianfarani says she is not advocating anything as radical or expansive as the national shipbuilding strategy, which was also intended to stave off the collapse of the sector.
In an interview with The Canadian Press, she said more focus and organization could be put towards encouraging development in cyber-technology, Arctic mapping and communication, even unmanned aerial vehicles.
That could open up the Liberals to charges of picking winners and losers in the corporate world.
"I would rather have you pick a winner, than pick nothing and end up with losers," she said.
"In the absence of making a decision, inevitably the decision will be made for you. If we do not signal to foreign nations and foreign suppliers that there are things in Canada -- things we are willing to invest in -- then inevitably business will decide for you. Other nations will decide for you what you are left with."
Friday, April 29, 2016
Canadian Forces ill-prepared to put the blue helmets back on: report
Murray Brewster — Canadian PressThe Trudeau government has promised to get Canada back into the peacekeeping business, but a new report from two independent think tanks says the military is ill-prepared for the task.
The study by the Rideau Institute and the Centre for Policy Alternatives was penned by Walter Dorn, a professor at the Canadian Forces Staff College and one of Canada’s leading experts in peacekeeping.
For the last decade, he says, the army has specialized in counter-insurgency warfare because of the combat mission in Kandahar and other skill sets — once second nature to Canadian training — were relegated to the back burner.
Dorn says the complexities of modern peace operations require in-depth training and education, on subjects including the procedures, capabilities and limitations of the United Nations.
He says Canada is currently far behind other nations in its readiness to support the United Nations and train for modern peacekeeping.
“Special skills, separate from those learned in Afghanistan and warfare training, would need to be (re)learned, including skills in negotiation, conflict management and resolution, as well as an understanding of UN procedures and past peacekeeping missions,” said the report.
“Particularly important is learning effective co-operation with the non-military components of modern peacekeeping operations, including police, civil affairs personnel and humanitarians, as well as UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the local actors engaged in building a viable peace.”
The focus of training at both the Canadian Forces Command College in Toronto and the army staff college in Kingston, Ont., is on “taking part in ‘alliance’ or NATO-style operations,” Dorn concluded.
“At the higher (national security) level, the case studies and exercises on peacekeeping were dropped.”
Both Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan have said rather than sending a lot of soldiers, Canada can contribute equipment and expertise, such as commanders and headquarters contingents. But Dorn says the military regime provides less than a quarter of the peacekeeping instruction it did a decade ago.
The report recommends the reinstatement and updating of the many training programs and exercises that have been cut, and introducing new instruction that reflects the increasing complexity of modern peace operations.
“Canadian soldiers have served as superb peacekeepers in the past and can do so again, with some preparation,” the report says.
Following the Somalia scandal of the mid-1990s in which a teenager was tortured and killed at the hands of Canadian soldiers, National Defence recognized the need for specialized training. It was implemented with success between 1995 and 2005, when the army went into Kandahar.
Dorn says while the number of personnel deployed in the field by the United Nations is now at an all-time high of more than 125,000, the number of Canadian soldiers involved in those operations has dwindled to an all-time low of 29 as of Dec. 31, 2015.
The study by the Rideau Institute and the Centre for Policy Alternatives was penned by Walter Dorn, a professor at the Canadian Forces Staff College and one of Canada’s leading experts in peacekeeping.
For the last decade, he says, the army has specialized in counter-insurgency warfare because of the combat mission in Kandahar and other skill sets — once second nature to Canadian training — were relegated to the back burner.
 |
| Number of CAF Members and Police Officers deployed on UN Missions (1991-2011) |
He says Canada is currently far behind other nations in its readiness to support the United Nations and train for modern peacekeeping.
“Special skills, separate from those learned in Afghanistan and warfare training, would need to be (re)learned, including skills in negotiation, conflict management and resolution, as well as an understanding of UN procedures and past peacekeeping missions,” said the report.
“Particularly important is learning effective co-operation with the non-military components of modern peacekeeping operations, including police, civil affairs personnel and humanitarians, as well as UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the local actors engaged in building a viable peace.”
The focus of training at both the Canadian Forces Command College in Toronto and the army staff college in Kingston, Ont., is on “taking part in ‘alliance’ or NATO-style operations,” Dorn concluded.
“At the higher (national security) level, the case studies and exercises on peacekeeping were dropped.”
Both Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan have said rather than sending a lot of soldiers, Canada can contribute equipment and expertise, such as commanders and headquarters contingents. But Dorn says the military regime provides less than a quarter of the peacekeeping instruction it did a decade ago.
The report recommends the reinstatement and updating of the many training programs and exercises that have been cut, and introducing new instruction that reflects the increasing complexity of modern peace operations.
“Canadian soldiers have served as superb peacekeepers in the past and can do so again, with some preparation,” the report says.
 |
| Cyprus 1965: A Canadian observation post along the "Green Line" separating Greek and Turkish forces. Some 25,000 Canadian soldiers served with UNFICYP |
Dorn says while the number of personnel deployed in the field by the United Nations is now at an all-time high of more than 125,000, the number of Canadian soldiers involved in those operations has dwindled to an all-time low of 29 as of Dec. 31, 2015.
Canada's Military mission in Iraq: A close-up look at the fight against ISIS
Bruce Campion-Smith, Ottawa Bureau Chief for The Toronto Star
Originally Published to CTV News Online
ERBIL, Iraq -- Abandoned villages, a shattered bridge, hidden bombs and a steady stream of fighters headed to the frontline.
That’s the scene that greeted Canada’s top general as he paid a dramatic visit to northern Iraq Thursday to the area where Canadian special operations forces soldiers are aiding Peshmerga fighters.
Gen. Jonathan Vance, chief of defence staff, said the Islamic State is doomed to defeat and predicted that Canadian forces and their Peshmerga allies will play a key role in the coming battle for Mosul, the Iraqi city that remains a key extremist stronghold.
RELATED STORIES
ISIS a dangerous but 'defeatable' enemy: Canada's top soldier
Lisa LaFlamme in northern Iraq: The Survivor's Camp
“We are on key terrain with a key partner as what is being billed as the final coup de grace of ISIL in Iraq occurs on Mosul,” Vance said.
CTV News and The Toronto Star were on hand as Vance came to take stock of Canada’s military mission, to “get eyes on as we contemplate next steps in the campaign.”
For more than a year, a small group of Canadian special operations forces soldiers have been working here, teaching Peshmerga troops skills that range from the basics -- map reading and shooting -- to calling in airstrikes.
That mission will get bigger in the coming months with the Liberal decision to end airstrikes and instead triple the number of troops on the ground to act as advisors.
The United States has also committed Apache attack helicopters, more cash and more troops as Western nations lay the groundwork for a final push to defeat ISIS, which has wreaked havoc across Iraq and Syria since 2014.
With the extra personnel, Canada will stretch its reach in this area west of Erbil, assisting Peshmerga along a line more than 100 kilometres long.
All of it is key terrain, some within sight of Mosul.
Vance predicts the battle for the city will unfold over the coming year, a battle delayed as Iraqi forces first seek to oust Islamic extremists from other sites across the country.
“There’s no question that Iraq and the coalition, they all want to get on with it but there’s other things that have to get done,” said Vance, who was making his first visit to Iraq since taking over as chief of defence staff in 2015.
“For a battle that must be started correctly and finished correctly, you don’t want to necessarily rush it,” Vance said.
But when that battle comes, Iraqi forces will squeeze Mosul from the south and it will be up to the Peshmerga soldiers, mentored by Canadian special operations forces troops, to protect the northern flank -- and block the ISIS’s path of escape.
“At some point, the coalition and Iraqi security forces will deal with Mosul and our forces will be on vital ground, key to the containment of ISIL,” Vance said.
Vance stressed that the Peshmerga -- not Canadians -- will be on the frontline to hold Islamic State fighters in place. “We are responsible to train and support them. They’re responsible to hold,” Vance said.
Canadian forces and their Peshmerga allies are already eroding the Islamic State’s capabilities in Mosul, thanks to their proximity to the city which enables intelligence collection and targeting, said Col. Andrew Milburn of the U.S. Marines, who commands coalition special operations forces.
“It’s very careful targeting. Your guys are not causing civilian casualties here. I can affirm that,” Milburn told the Star in an interview earlier this week.
“That’s a hard claim to make but these guys are doing this very well. They’re deliberately going after what we call key nodes in ISIS infrastructure, leadership, (command and control) nodes,” he said.
It was Vance’s first visit to Iraq since taking over as top general last summer and he saw firsthand the devastation caused by Daesh and the ongoing disruption caused by the conflict.
Vance visited a key stretch of the highway linking Erbil and Mosul where it crosses the Khazir River.
In 2014, this territory was all held by ISIS. With Erbil at risk, Peshmerga forces counterattacked, pushing ISIS fighters back. In their retreat, the militants blew up the bridge to stall the Peshmerga counterattack.
Today, two spans of the bridge are nothing more than smashed concrete and twisted metal, resting in the river.
An improvised single-lane, steel girder bridge has been erected in its place. On Thursday afternoon, a steady of cars passed by carrying Peshmerga fighters headed to and from the front, just a short distance to the west. Lacking military transport, they are forced to rely on their personal vehicles to move about.
Three villages, all within eyesight, have been largely abandoned and the buildings and terrain remain littered with explosive devices.
“Anything in the bushes, avoid it. The last thing I want is for you guys is to step on something that goes boom,” a Canadian special operations sergeant cautioned journalists as they awaited Vance’s arrival.
Indeed, the general’s visit -- done under a tight cordon of security provided by Canadian special operations forces troops -- was not without risk. ISIS militants are just a few kilometres away and their rockets and mortars land on the riverside villages every day, the sergeant said.
Vance cast an expert eye on the demolished bridge and said it highlights the capabilities of ISIS. “That’s a professional military act to drop that bridge,” he said.
But while still dangerous, Vance painted a picture of ISIS as a faltering force, starved of financing, losing terrain and forced to put inexperienced personnel into battle as “cannon fodder.”
“There’s no doubt in my mind -- and I don’t want to overplay this -- they will lose militarily in Iraq. It’s inevitable,” Vance said.
“But between now and the time they lose militarily they still have the power to generate big events that can cause a lot of problems,” he said.
That’s why local commanders like Maj.-Gen. Aziz Waisi, commander of the Zeravini forces, express gratitude for the work of Canadian soldiers -- and appeal for more.
“The Canadian people should be proud of their forces on the ground. They’re doing excellent work with us,” said Waisi, who accompanied Vance.
But like others here, he pressed home their need for better weapons to replace decades-old military gear, equipment like vehicles, anti-tank weapons, night-vision goggles, robots to help defuse improvised explosive devices and drones.
“We are hoping that Canada can assist us more,” Waisi said.
As part of its retooled mission, Canada has committed to providing arms for a new Zeravini commando force. “As we form it and train it, they’ll have the weapons necessary to do the job,” Vance said.
But he quickly adds, “we are not doing a wholesale re-equipping of the Peshmerga.”
Canadian commanders have conceded that more troops on the ground means more risk.
But Vance is hoping Canadians get behind the expanded mission.
“Just because it’s hard and dangerous doesn’t mean it’s bad,” Vance said.
“We do danger. That’s what a military force is for. Canada’s military goes to dangerous places all the time. It’s always for a good cause. I’d like very much for Canadians to put their shoulder behind what we’re doing here,” Vance said.
“Despite the dangers, it is for a good cause,” he said.
ERBIL, Iraq -- Abandoned villages, a shattered bridge, hidden bombs and a steady stream of fighters headed to the frontline.
That’s the scene that greeted Canada’s top general as he paid a dramatic visit to northern Iraq Thursday to the area where Canadian special operations forces soldiers are aiding Peshmerga fighters.
Gen. Jonathan Vance, chief of defence staff, said the Islamic State is doomed to defeat and predicted that Canadian forces and their Peshmerga allies will play a key role in the coming battle for Mosul, the Iraqi city that remains a key extremist stronghold.
RELATED STORIES
ISIS a dangerous but 'defeatable' enemy: Canada's top soldier
Lisa LaFlamme in northern Iraq: The Survivor's Camp
“We are on key terrain with a key partner as what is being billed as the final coup de grace of ISIL in Iraq occurs on Mosul,” Vance said.
 |
| CDS General Vance in Erbil, Iraq April 2016. |
CTV News and The Toronto Star were on hand as Vance came to take stock of Canada’s military mission, to “get eyes on as we contemplate next steps in the campaign.”
For more than a year, a small group of Canadian special operations forces soldiers have been working here, teaching Peshmerga troops skills that range from the basics -- map reading and shooting -- to calling in airstrikes.
That mission will get bigger in the coming months with the Liberal decision to end airstrikes and instead triple the number of troops on the ground to act as advisors.
The United States has also committed Apache attack helicopters, more cash and more troops as Western nations lay the groundwork for a final push to defeat ISIS, which has wreaked havoc across Iraq and Syria since 2014.
With the extra personnel, Canada will stretch its reach in this area west of Erbil, assisting Peshmerga along a line more than 100 kilometres long.
All of it is key terrain, some within sight of Mosul.
Vance predicts the battle for the city will unfold over the coming year, a battle delayed as Iraqi forces first seek to oust Islamic extremists from other sites across the country.
“There’s no question that Iraq and the coalition, they all want to get on with it but there’s other things that have to get done,” said Vance, who was making his first visit to Iraq since taking over as chief of defence staff in 2015.
“For a battle that must be started correctly and finished correctly, you don’t want to necessarily rush it,” Vance said.
But when that battle comes, Iraqi forces will squeeze Mosul from the south and it will be up to the Peshmerga soldiers, mentored by Canadian special operations forces troops, to protect the northern flank -- and block the ISIS’s path of escape.
“At some point, the coalition and Iraqi security forces will deal with Mosul and our forces will be on vital ground, key to the containment of ISIL,” Vance said.
Vance stressed that the Peshmerga -- not Canadians -- will be on the frontline to hold Islamic State fighters in place. “We are responsible to train and support them. They’re responsible to hold,” Vance said.
Canadian forces and their Peshmerga allies are already eroding the Islamic State’s capabilities in Mosul, thanks to their proximity to the city which enables intelligence collection and targeting, said Col. Andrew Milburn of the U.S. Marines, who commands coalition special operations forces.
“It’s very careful targeting. Your guys are not causing civilian casualties here. I can affirm that,” Milburn told the Star in an interview earlier this week.
“That’s a hard claim to make but these guys are doing this very well. They’re deliberately going after what we call key nodes in ISIS infrastructure, leadership, (command and control) nodes,” he said.
It was Vance’s first visit to Iraq since taking over as top general last summer and he saw firsthand the devastation caused by Daesh and the ongoing disruption caused by the conflict.
Vance visited a key stretch of the highway linking Erbil and Mosul where it crosses the Khazir River.
In 2014, this territory was all held by ISIS. With Erbil at risk, Peshmerga forces counterattacked, pushing ISIS fighters back. In their retreat, the militants blew up the bridge to stall the Peshmerga counterattack.
Today, two spans of the bridge are nothing more than smashed concrete and twisted metal, resting in the river.
An improvised single-lane, steel girder bridge has been erected in its place. On Thursday afternoon, a steady of cars passed by carrying Peshmerga fighters headed to and from the front, just a short distance to the west. Lacking military transport, they are forced to rely on their personal vehicles to move about.
Three villages, all within eyesight, have been largely abandoned and the buildings and terrain remain littered with explosive devices.
“Anything in the bushes, avoid it. The last thing I want is for you guys is to step on something that goes boom,” a Canadian special operations sergeant cautioned journalists as they awaited Vance’s arrival.
Indeed, the general’s visit -- done under a tight cordon of security provided by Canadian special operations forces troops -- was not without risk. ISIS militants are just a few kilometres away and their rockets and mortars land on the riverside villages every day, the sergeant said.
Vance cast an expert eye on the demolished bridge and said it highlights the capabilities of ISIS. “That’s a professional military act to drop that bridge,” he said.
But while still dangerous, Vance painted a picture of ISIS as a faltering force, starved of financing, losing terrain and forced to put inexperienced personnel into battle as “cannon fodder.”
“There’s no doubt in my mind -- and I don’t want to overplay this -- they will lose militarily in Iraq. It’s inevitable,” Vance said.
“But between now and the time they lose militarily they still have the power to generate big events that can cause a lot of problems,” he said.
That’s why local commanders like Maj.-Gen. Aziz Waisi, commander of the Zeravini forces, express gratitude for the work of Canadian soldiers -- and appeal for more.
“The Canadian people should be proud of their forces on the ground. They’re doing excellent work with us,” said Waisi, who accompanied Vance.
But like others here, he pressed home their need for better weapons to replace decades-old military gear, equipment like vehicles, anti-tank weapons, night-vision goggles, robots to help defuse improvised explosive devices and drones.
“We are hoping that Canada can assist us more,” Waisi said.
As part of its retooled mission, Canada has committed to providing arms for a new Zeravini commando force. “As we form it and train it, they’ll have the weapons necessary to do the job,” Vance said.
But he quickly adds, “we are not doing a wholesale re-equipping of the Peshmerga.”
Canadian commanders have conceded that more troops on the ground means more risk.
But Vance is hoping Canadians get behind the expanded mission.
“Just because it’s hard and dangerous doesn’t mean it’s bad,” Vance said.
“We do danger. That’s what a military force is for. Canada’s military goes to dangerous places all the time. It’s always for a good cause. I’d like very much for Canadians to put their shoulder behind what we’re doing here,” Vance said.
“Despite the dangers, it is for a good cause,” he said.
Fortress Canada: How much of a military do we really need?
Written by: David McDonough and Tony Battista, CDA Institute
As the Trudeau government pursues its review of Canada’s defence policy, an interesting debate is emerging in defence policy circles — between those who want to pull back from the world and those who think that would be a big mistake.
As the Trudeau government pursues its review of Canada’s defence policy, an interesting debate is emerging in defence policy circles — between those who want to pull back from the world and those who think that would be a big mistake.
 |
| Sapper Mathieu Riva Maille (front) and Sapper Tommy Cabana (rear) fire a round from an 84mm Carl Gustaf anti-tank recoilless rifle during Exercise RAFALE BLANCHE in Valcartier, Quebec February 4, 2016. |
Some have pointed to the safety and security offered by Canada’s geo-strategic location in North America as arguing for a homeland-focused defence policy. Thomas Juneau took up that thread last week, suggesting that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) should learn to “do less with less.”
Others have warned against using Canada’s relative security to justify a more modest military. By accepting such a “twisted logic,” as George Petrolekas calls it, we’d ignore not only the military requirements of non-discretionary missions at home and in North America, but also the hard power assets needed to pursue international peace and security.
Both sides make valid points. They also tend to overstate their positions.
It’s true that Canadians enjoy an island of safety in today’s global security environment, insulated from what’s happening in Ukraine, Syria and the South China Sea. This is partly a function of our geographically isolated position in North America; it’s also because we enjoy such a friendly relationship with our only close neighbour, the United States.
Indeed, observers have long been aware of Canada’s “involuntary security guarantee” from the superpower to the south. This guarantee may not be quite so ironclad today as it once was; ballistic missile defence is a good example of a gap in it. But in broad terms, America’s commitment to our defence does represent an important feature of the continental relationship.
Even during the darkest days of the Cold War, the only direct Soviet threat Canada faced was from strategic nuclear bomber and ballistic missile forces. And aside from some early continental efforts to establish a perimeter air defence network, we largely accepted that point of vulnerability — so long as America’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities remained intact.
Yet few would argue today that Canada should have used its relative security in the Cold War to justify either a reduction in its military capabilities or a sole focus on air defence. Instead, Canada found itself supporting the NATO “shield” with air and ground force deployments. We had two good reasons for doing that.
First, Canada’s approach to defence is often determined by our national interests abroad — from continental relations with the United States to trans-Atlantic ties with Europe. The fact that Canada enjoys safety from threats abroad could provide a foundation for Canadian defence policy, maybe even one that ultimately constrains its available strategic options. But it doesn’t have to.
Second, Canada recognizes that certain security developments abroad — while not having an immediate impact on Canadian and North American defence — might pose a more direct threat in the future. Which is why we’ve long preferred a “forward defence” approach in the pursuit of international peace and security.
Rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have.
These are the considerations that have shaped Canada’s defence policy since the Cold War, preventing a return to the isolationist impulses of the interwar period. Without them, it would have been all too easy for us to settle for a constabulary-type force backed by some air defence specialization.
So simply pointing to the conditions of Canada’s geo-strategic position — an observation that dates back at least to Raoul Dandurand’s 1924 claim that “we live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable material” — doesn’t really explain past Canadian defence policy. And using our isolation to chart our future security course would be strategically short-sighted; defence policy is as much about shaping military capabilities decades into the future as it is about deploying the resources we have now.
But it’s also a bad idea to stretch this argument too far. Basic conditions need to be met in the defence of Canada — and it would be difficult to accept “doing less with less” in such non-discretionary missions.
But no one is really arguing that Canada should settle for a reduced CAF unable to fulfil its domestic defence role. The real question is whether such domestic missions may have different — and less demanding — capability requirements than expeditionary operations. Naval ships that patrol coastal and Arctic waters, or aircraft that intercept foreign intruders, may not require the expensive higher-end capabilities needed for international missions.
And it’s not so easy to determine clearly where the needs of North American defence begin and end. There may be significant consequences to policy issues in which Canada has a serious interest — such as trade — if we’re seen by the Americans as a “freeloader”.
Our problem is that the perception is out there already: Canada has long taken advantage of the United States’ “involuntary security guarantees” to take a free ride on defence spending. We tended to allow the United States to absorb most of the cost of our air defence during the Cold War, we were initially reluctant to deploy forces to Europe (and sought to reduce that commitment in a hurry), and we were quick to embrace the so-called “peace dividend” of the post-Cold War period; in fact, it can be argued we sought that dividend in the early 1970s before partly reversing course.
As scholars like Joel Sokolsky have noted, Canada’s first question in military matters tends to be, “How much is just enough?” And we’ve never really faced serious consequences for our free-riding, making it a very hard habit to break.
So rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have. One area that should be explored is the size of our armed forces, and how much we spend on personnel compared to capital.
In a time of fiscal restraint, a fixation on military size can come at the expense of recapitalization requirements and fleet-replacement plans, to the detriment of the CAF. One need only look at regular force size versus spending levels between our key allies: Canada, with its relatively large force size and small defence budget, is an outlier.
One possible solution, of course, is to increase our defence spending. Given our relatively safe location, however, any arguments for a budget boost are likely to fall on deaf ears. The alternative is to right-size our forces to better ensure that the CAF remain multi-purpose and combat-capable — even if certain elements of the CAF (navy, air force, special forces) might benefit disproportionately from such a recalibration.
In that sense, having a smaller military doesn’t automatically mean global irrelevance. Instead, it could actually help safeguard Canada’s ability to continue taking both discretionary and non-discretionary military missions, at home and abroad. And making our military more efficient by recalibrating the force structure — even if that means a smaller regular force — would make the CAF more sustainable.
If Canada is really “back”, it has to be back with substance — and that includes our ability to meet our security and defence commitments in a credible way.
Author: David McDonough and Tony Battista
Dr. David McDonough is research manager and senior editor at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. Tony Battista is the chief executive officer of the CDA and CDA Institute. Views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the CDA Institute. View all posts by David McDonough and Tony Battista
Others have warned against using Canada’s relative security to justify a more modest military. By accepting such a “twisted logic,” as George Petrolekas calls it, we’d ignore not only the military requirements of non-discretionary missions at home and in North America, but also the hard power assets needed to pursue international peace and security.
Both sides make valid points. They also tend to overstate their positions.
It’s true that Canadians enjoy an island of safety in today’s global security environment, insulated from what’s happening in Ukraine, Syria and the South China Sea. This is partly a function of our geographically isolated position in North America; it’s also because we enjoy such a friendly relationship with our only close neighbour, the United States.
Indeed, observers have long been aware of Canada’s “involuntary security guarantee” from the superpower to the south. This guarantee may not be quite so ironclad today as it once was; ballistic missile defence is a good example of a gap in it. But in broad terms, America’s commitment to our defence does represent an important feature of the continental relationship.
Even during the darkest days of the Cold War, the only direct Soviet threat Canada faced was from strategic nuclear bomber and ballistic missile forces. And aside from some early continental efforts to establish a perimeter air defence network, we largely accepted that point of vulnerability — so long as America’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities remained intact.
Yet few would argue today that Canada should have used its relative security in the Cold War to justify either a reduction in its military capabilities or a sole focus on air defence. Instead, Canada found itself supporting the NATO “shield” with air and ground force deployments. We had two good reasons for doing that.
First, Canada’s approach to defence is often determined by our national interests abroad — from continental relations with the United States to trans-Atlantic ties with Europe. The fact that Canada enjoys safety from threats abroad could provide a foundation for Canadian defence policy, maybe even one that ultimately constrains its available strategic options. But it doesn’t have to.
Second, Canada recognizes that certain security developments abroad — while not having an immediate impact on Canadian and North American defence — might pose a more direct threat in the future. Which is why we’ve long preferred a “forward defence” approach in the pursuit of international peace and security.
Rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have.
These are the considerations that have shaped Canada’s defence policy since the Cold War, preventing a return to the isolationist impulses of the interwar period. Without them, it would have been all too easy for us to settle for a constabulary-type force backed by some air defence specialization.
So simply pointing to the conditions of Canada’s geo-strategic position — an observation that dates back at least to Raoul Dandurand’s 1924 claim that “we live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable material” — doesn’t really explain past Canadian defence policy. And using our isolation to chart our future security course would be strategically short-sighted; defence policy is as much about shaping military capabilities decades into the future as it is about deploying the resources we have now.
But it’s also a bad idea to stretch this argument too far. Basic conditions need to be met in the defence of Canada — and it would be difficult to accept “doing less with less” in such non-discretionary missions.
But no one is really arguing that Canada should settle for a reduced CAF unable to fulfil its domestic defence role. The real question is whether such domestic missions may have different — and less demanding — capability requirements than expeditionary operations. Naval ships that patrol coastal and Arctic waters, or aircraft that intercept foreign intruders, may not require the expensive higher-end capabilities needed for international missions.
And it’s not so easy to determine clearly where the needs of North American defence begin and end. There may be significant consequences to policy issues in which Canada has a serious interest — such as trade — if we’re seen by the Americans as a “freeloader”.
Our problem is that the perception is out there already: Canada has long taken advantage of the United States’ “involuntary security guarantees” to take a free ride on defence spending. We tended to allow the United States to absorb most of the cost of our air defence during the Cold War, we were initially reluctant to deploy forces to Europe (and sought to reduce that commitment in a hurry), and we were quick to embrace the so-called “peace dividend” of the post-Cold War period; in fact, it can be argued we sought that dividend in the early 1970s before partly reversing course.
As scholars like Joel Sokolsky have noted, Canada’s first question in military matters tends to be, “How much is just enough?” And we’ve never really faced serious consequences for our free-riding, making it a very hard habit to break.
So rather than resigning ourselves to doing less with less — or having unrealistic expectations about doing more with more — it would be prudent to instead ask if we might be more efficient with what we have. One area that should be explored is the size of our armed forces, and how much we spend on personnel compared to capital.
In a time of fiscal restraint, a fixation on military size can come at the expense of recapitalization requirements and fleet-replacement plans, to the detriment of the CAF. One need only look at regular force size versus spending levels between our key allies: Canada, with its relatively large force size and small defence budget, is an outlier.
One possible solution, of course, is to increase our defence spending. Given our relatively safe location, however, any arguments for a budget boost are likely to fall on deaf ears. The alternative is to right-size our forces to better ensure that the CAF remain multi-purpose and combat-capable — even if certain elements of the CAF (navy, air force, special forces) might benefit disproportionately from such a recalibration.
In that sense, having a smaller military doesn’t automatically mean global irrelevance. Instead, it could actually help safeguard Canada’s ability to continue taking both discretionary and non-discretionary military missions, at home and abroad. And making our military more efficient by recalibrating the force structure — even if that means a smaller regular force — would make the CAF more sustainable.
If Canada is really “back”, it has to be back with substance — and that includes our ability to meet our security and defence commitments in a credible way.
Author: David McDonough and Tony Battista
Dr. David McDonough is research manager and senior editor at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDA Institute), and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. Tony Battista is the chief executive officer of the CDA and CDA Institute. Views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the CDA Institute. View all posts by David McDonough and Tony Battista
CFB Borden to host mass casualty exercise
FRONTLINE IN THE NEWS
Civilian and military first responders from Simcoe County will converge on Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Borden on Sunday, May 1, 2016, to participate in a joint mass casualty exercise as part of Exercise STOP, DROP AND ROLL, a simulated response to an air show accident.
Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel from various CFB Borden units will join over 30 volunteer medical first responders from St. John Ambulance Barrie Simcoe Muskoka, County of Simcoe Paramedic Services, and Emergency Management Ontario staff to work through a simulated mass casualty scenario.
“CFB Borden personnel are thankful to have the opportunity to work alongside key emergency services stakeholders in such a critical exercise," said Brigadier-General Carl Doyon, Commander CFB Borden/Military Personnel Generation Training Group. "This is a perfect opportunity to share common practices and to ‘train as we fight’ through the rehearsal of our emergency practices and procedures, in advance of this year’s Canadian Armed Forces Day and Air Show.”
Elements of the exercise include triage (determining the severity of injuries and required treatment), extraction (removing casualties from unsafe areas), treatment (providing basic and advanced first aid to save a life, prevent further injury, and provide comfort until emergency services arrive), and transportation (preparing a patient to be transported by emergency services).
The goal of the exercise is for local emergency services personnel and the CAF to practice working in partnership to provide basic and advanced first aid in the aftermath of a large-scale natural disaster or accident.
“St. John Ambulance is grateful to CFB Borden and its first responders for this fantastic opportunity to practice our medical skills in a mock disaster scenario," said Bill Sergeant, Chairman of the Board, St. John Ambulance Barrie Simcoe Muskoka Branch.
"An exercise of this magnitude allows everyone participating to hone skills that will benefit the greater Simcoe County, now and in the future.”
This year, CFB Borden is celebrating its centennial. As part of the celebrations, the base will hold the Canadian Armed Forces Day and Air Show on June 11 and 12, 2016. This exercise will be conducted to enhance partnerships and further the skills of the first responder agencies that will be working during the air show.
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