A Deeper look at the necessity of a mixed RCAF Fighter Fleet

By: Alexis Amini, NATO Association 

Despite the military and economic benefits of having a mixed fighter fleet composed of the 5th generation stealthy F-35 and the 4th generation non-stealthy Super Hornet, some critics argue that Canada cannot afford such an aerial force structure. Therefore, some experts suggest that the RCAF should opt for a sole purchase of either the Super Hornet or the F-35. Nonetheless, with the return of great power competition, by having a single fighter fleet, Canada will have difficulties in upholding its two mandates defined in its current defense policy: the defense of North America in cooperation with the US and contributing to international security through expeditionary operations within coalitions like NATO.

Regarding expeditionary operations, peer and near-peer competitors are looking to counter Western air forces’ supremacy by developing land and air-based weapon systems that can be used in an Anti Access/Area denial (A2/AD) fashion aimed at making an airspace off-limits to an enemy air force including stealth fighters. Indeed, it is necessary to bear in mind that stealth has been developed to avoid detection from high frequency radars optimized for targeting, against which non-stealthy aircrafts are vulnerable. However, stealth planes with tail fins like the F-35 are visible to low-frequency radars used for early warning and surveillance. Being aware of this F-35 vulnerability, revisionist countries like Russia and China are developing low frequency surveillance radars able to cue high frequency targeting radar toward the F-35’s location in the sky. Such a radar system can detect and target both non-stealth and stealth aircrafts at greater distances. It is being integrated into ground A2/AD weapons like surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) batteries as well as aerial A2/AD assets like fighters such as the Russian non-stealthy Flanker and the stealthy T-50 PAK-FA. Such a development is quite revolutionary since low frequency radars are voluminous compared to their high frequency counterparts. Usually, airborne low frequency radars are installed as radar dishes on top of large airframes acting as Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platforms such as the E-3 Sentry or the E-2 Hawkeye. That said, the Russian aerospace industry managed to miniaturize these low frequency radars and fit them on fighters in addition to their onboard high frequency targeting radar. Current Western fighters like the 4thgeneration Super Hornet and the 5th generation F-35s are only equipped with high frequency targeting radars which only permits them to detect and engage non-stealthy platforms while enemy stealth jets may operate unopposed.

To counter this rising A2/AD threat in the context of expeditionary operations, a mixed fighter fleet composed of a single type of stealth jet and a series of non-stealth aircrafts is essential. The non-stealth component would include Electronic Warfare (EW) aircrafts, airborne missile platforms (or arsenal planes) and dedicated AEW planes equipped with low frequency radars capable of detecting both stealthy and non-stealthy enemy jets. The stealth component would be composed of the F-35 that will mainly act as a survivable Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) platform as well as an airborne Command and Control (C2) node. Indeed, since near peer and peer competitors will possess a vast amount of military capabilities employed in an A2/AD fashion, stealth fighters cannot destroy those in a swift manner given their limited payload due to their stealth design. The F-35 would be armed with missiles for mostly self-defense. Therefore, to degrade these A2/AD military capabilities in the swiftest way possible, a non-stealthy platform that can act as an arsenal plane is required. As a first step to degrade the air defenses, an EW aircraft operating at a safe distance from the A2/AD envelope will jam low-frequency surveillance radars equipping SAM batteries and airborne enemy fighters. Once the low frequency radars are jammed thus preventing the cueing of high frequency targeting radars designed to guide missiles launched from opposing SAMs or jets, the F-35 can safely enter the A2/AD envelope and identify land and airborne non-stealthy targets (ISTAR role) whose coordinates will be transmitted to far-flying arsenal planes armed with long-range missiles (C2 role). Parallel to that, an AEW platform equipped with a low-frequency radar would be operating at a safe distance from the A2/AD envelope and would be tasked with searching and detecting airborne stealth fighters and then cue in F-35s and non-stealthy arsenal planes’ high frequency targeting radar toward the enemy stealth jet’s location so that they may eliminate them.

Despite the advantages of such a mixed fighter fleet in facing the A2/AD threat posed by revisionist powers, critics argue that Canada cannot afford such a force structure. Indeed, a mixed fighter fleet entails high costs given the need for distinct supply chains and training regimens, something Ottawa can ill afford with a limited defense budget. Therefore, the case is being made for a RCAF exclusively composed of either the 4thgeneration non-stealthy Super Hornets or the 5th generation F-35. However, in developing a single type force structure, Canada will not have the full spectrum of capabilities mentioned above that are necessary to degrade an A2/AD envelope. The RCAF would have to rely on other partners for certain capabilities it will not have in its arsenal. Thus, Canada will only be a second-tier partner in any future coalition in the context of expeditionary operations. Such an outcome would dash Canada’s aspiration to be an invaluable coalition partner by having military capabilities in high demand.

In addition, a single type fighter fleet would complicate Canada’s task in defending North American airspace in the context of NORAD. Since Russian aerospace forces possess 4th generation Flankers and 5th generation T-50s are equipped with a low and high frequency radar able to detect and engage both non-stealthy and stealthy jets at great distances, a single type RCAF fighter fleet composed exclusively of either the F-35 or a Super Hornet will be unable to effectively counter Russian incursions thus warranting American intervention as per the NORAD treaty.

Nonetheless, Canada can afford a mixed fighter fleet composed of a single type of stealth jets and a series of non-stealth planes if it’s a combination of one manned platform and several types of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) given the relative low cost of drones compared to their manned counterparts.

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Alexis Amini – editor for the Canadian Armed Forces program – is a graduate student in public and international affairs at Université de Montréal (UdeM), Québec. He has a BSc in political science from the same university. Having lived in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates where he witnessed major geopolitical events, Alexis developed a passion for international security. His research focus revolves around geopolitics, defense policies and political risk analysis. Upon completion of his master’s program, Alexis intends to join the strategic intelligence industry.

Canadian Army Buying UAVs from US Navy

The Government of Canada has announced that it is buying an existing unmanned aerial surveillance system, through a government-to-government contractual arrangement (U.S. Foreign Military Sales program) with the U.S. Government. The contract, which is valued at US$14.2 million, includes initial training.

“The Blackjack aerial surveillance system will provide the Canadian Armed Forces with modern, sophisticated technology that will give commanders the situational awareness they need to conduct missions effectively," said Dedfence Minister Sajjan. "We are pleased to work cooperatively with the U.S. government and the U.S. Navy to bring this leading-edge technology to Canada.”

The RQ-21A Blackjack is a small unmanned aircraft that will provide the Canadian Army with persistent, real-time intelligence through aerial surveillance and reconnaissance. It is a critical component of the Land Force Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance program. The system will be used for surveillance purposes only and will offer imagery and communication capabilities to help give soldiers an operational advantage in all environments. It will allow Army commanders to immediately identify threats, to take time sensitive decisions, and to respond quickly.

Canada is the first foreign military to acquire the system from the U.S. Navy. The system includes five unmanned aircraft, two ground control stations and one launch and recovery system. Each aircraft is capable of providing surveillance coverage of over 100 km for over 12 hours.

The Blackjack is produced by Boeing Insitu, based in Bingen, Washington. Once delivered to the Canadian Army in 2017, the system will be based out of Canadian Forces Base Gagetown and operated by the 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support).

•The Canadian Armed Forces requires rapid access to relevant information about the environment in civil or military situations, and only a family of unmanned aircraft vehicles can meet the diverse intelligence demands of a modern battlefield.
•The RQ-21A Blackjack is a runway independent system that can carry multiple payloads, which makes it a flexible, multi-mission platform that could be used on foreign operations, and that could be called upon by the government to support domestic operations such as a G8 Summit or even a natural disaster.
•The system was procured through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program with the U.S. Government.

Cayouette: Statement of Requirements for CF-18 Replacement

Fighter Replacement
The Need for a Statement of Requirements
BY RICHARD CAYOUETTE
© 2016 FrontLine Defence (Vol 13, No 1)

There is no doubt that Canada needs a replacement for its ageing CF-18 fleet – the airframe, avionics and weapon systems are getting old and obsolete. What are our future needs? Have new technologies and threats been considered? Can we make the replacement program a success story for Canada’s economy?

The RCAF CF-18 has been life-extended twice - now until at least 2025; and there is no definitive replacement plan yet.
Photo: RCAF 

The CF-18 was a ground-breaking (should say air-breaking) feat of technology when it was selected. A force multiplier, its multi-role capability is still impressive by today’s standards. The same order of magnitude of technological leap that was achieved in the early 80s is non-existent in 2016.

When we hear about manœuverability, agility and ease to fly, our military pilots express their “want’’ for a single seat aerial sports car, not a military system. Nowadays the pilot is the limiting factor in air-to-air combat as he/she is limited to pulling an 8g turn; a few will admit it. Think of all the hardware and systems needed to interface with and keep a pilot alive: cockpit, stick, throttle, pedals, visual instruments, ejection seat, liquid oxygen, redundant systems... A pilot on board means much more weight and drag for a given design; it makes the fighter jet inefficient and very expensive. Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) do not have these restrictions, they can be built at a much lower cost and can easily outturn and defeat any manned aircraft.

Highly skilled pilots are needed to command the platforms but not necessarily to be inside the platforms. Consider this scenario: Upon detection of an air threat in the Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ), C-130s, C-17s or other aircraft take off from various Canadian air bases. Each aircraft carries multiple UCAVs which they launch as they approach the interception point (in a best case scenario, the UCAVs takeoff on their own from small airports near the CADIZ, thereby cutting response time). Airborne intruders will see UCAVs coming at them from all azimuths, each pinging with their radars, each having multiple “all aspect’’ missiles on board locked-in for the intercept. That is a deterrent that would be fatal to ignore.

This is akin to the Bomarc tactics but the nukes are replaced with a swarming and cooperative engagement artificial intelligence capability, sophisticated communication systems, long-range detection and identification sensors and very smart and precise guidance software.

Would that scenario fulfill the NORAD air defence role? Definitely, yes.

The required technology and expertise already exists in Canada for design and construction of such a solution. Maybe a non-stealth, remotely-piloted F-35 variant with no cockpit and vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability is the answer.

The element of surprise can be advantageous. The F-35 does not have long range capability in the Canadian context but we could deploy many of them near our border in very isolated, very camouflaged shelters from which they would take off vertically; the “shell game” tactic would be very hard to counter as no conspicuous runway is needed. VTOL fighters could be a real tactical advantage. We are about to buy F-35s without that capability. Why?

That brings me to the question of stealth. Stealth aircraft are needed for invasion, for deep penetration strikes where destruction of enemy air defence and ground assets is the primary goal. That is why the B-2 and the F-117 were developed. Does Canada need a stealth aircraft? Not unless our defence strategy includes invading foreign nations.

The primary operational role for Canada’s F-18s is NORAD air defence: the sovereignty of our airspace and borders. The enemy should see many of us coming at them fast and from far away outside the CADIZ, with the right weapon: that is the deterrent. There are many excellent options in operation around the globe. Let the discussion be about the sensors, speed and range and other capabilities of the platform, and about the weapon’s performance and quantity, not about showmanship.

Why is there a machine gun on the F-35? It does not fit the air defence scenario. The “sport’’ connotation springs again. All that is needed is a long range missile for intercept and, for self-defence, an all-aspect missile that can engage an enemy on its tail.

Ok, we have NATO and coalition requirements for ground support where only a pilot in the cockpit can make the fast decisions required by its counterpart on the ground, the Forward Observer Officer. In this mission scenario, having a big machine gun, a large number of bombs and some agility and survivability are a big plus. So why not get the drawings and build, in Canada, a bunch of A-10s with modern avionics? That would be formidable! Such designs do not require export-forbidden and foreign-owned technology like stealth and “smart skin’’, which means there is no reason we cannot build 100% of it here.

In my opinion, the F-22 Raptor is the best air-to-air combat aircraft. If we still need a manned air-to-air superiority fighter for visually identifying a commercial aircraft in distress or an unknown intruder, let’s buy a few Raptors to do that mission.

Aircraft, and all its components: engines, airframe, software, avionics, can be designed and built – right here in Montreal. Companies here produce the best military simulation and training systems in the world. All the required competencies are in our own country. We must design and build it here in Canada to own the capability and cost-effectively support platforms throughout their long life cycle. Not just in Montreal, but everywhere in Canada where the skilled labour is available.

In summary, the operational requirements for replacing the F-18 fighter jets have to be reviewed with future missions in mind. I am convinced that once completed, the Statement of Operational Requirements (SOR) will have effectively torn down the barriers preventing design and production of the platforms and weapon systems here in Canada.

Canada needs an effective air-to-air defence platform and some manned ground support fighter jets, like a modernized A-10 and a very few Raptors for exception handling (a mixed fleet mostly designed and built in Canada but only the best in class for each tactical scenario).

The focus of replacing the CF-18s should be about our safety, the health of our economy and, correspondingly, about Canadian pride.

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Richard Cayouette is the President of Martello Defence Security Consultants Inc., based in Bromont, Quebec.

RCAF Tries to Persue JUSTAS (Drone) Program...Again

Public Services and Procurement Canada has released another “request for information” to the defence industry for the Joint Unmanned Surveillance Targeting and Acquisition System (JUSTAS) project.

Industry has been down this route before, with various Canadian Forces attempts at JUSTAS going on for a decade or so now.

An earlier version of JUSTAS was supposed to have the unmanned aerial vehicles (aka drones, UAVs, UAS, etc) operating as early as 2010. That was pushed back to early 2012. In 2012 a letter of interest on JUSTAS was released to industry but that went no where.

Over the years the Canadian Forces tried other means to buy a fleet of longer-range UAVs. In 2007 the CF tried to push a sole source purchase of Predators but the Conservative government decided against that proposal.

During the Libyan war in 2011, senior Canadian defence leaders pitched to the government the idea of spending up to $600 million for armed drones to take part in that conflict. That proposal was also declined.

For the Afghan war, the CF had purchased the Sperwer, which had its issues, and later leased the Heron UAV fleet from MDA for missions in Kandahar.

This latest request for information to industry talks about options for the acquisition of an interim JUSTAS capability as well as a full JUSTAS capability. But it also emphasizes this is just a request for information and there is no guarantee of a contract.

A contract would be awarded – if the government decided to proceed on this course – in the 2018/2019 timeframe.

If that comes about – a big if – then that latest schedule is a little bit ahead of past milestones. According to an RCAF spokesman; long range RCAF plans envisioned a JUSTAS contract awarded between 2019 and 2020.

RCAF Drone's To Be Purchased or Further Delay?

The RCAF has been looking to purchase Drones (UAVs) since it outlined its various options to Air Force Staff in 2005.

The issue is, the following year in 2006, Canada's operations in Afghanistan picked up, and Canada opted to lease UAVs for immediate use from numerous aerospace industries, with the option to purchase them at a later date. The full financials were not provided to the RCAF for these options according to an internal audit.

The RCAFs Joint Unmanned Surveillance Targeting and Acquisition System (JUSTAS) was supposed to be operational in 2010. That date was later pushed back to 2012, and just recently been pushed to 2017.

However, recent reports from the RCAF to industry experts, the Air Force does not expect UAV operational systems in place until 2023.

The latest outline shows a contract awarded for the drones possible between 2019 and 2020, with delivery taking place between 2021 and 2025. That is if the RCAF procurement stays with its plan this time, it will only be a decade and a half behind schedule. Who knows what operations we will be involved in in 2025, and what capability we will require.